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# TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

No. 450.

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THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COM-  
PANY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON.

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IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA.

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FILED FEBRUARY 6, 1913.

(23,539)

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a

*Return to Writ.*

In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

In obedience to the commands of the within Writ, I herewith transmit to the Supreme Court of the United States, a duly certified transcript of the complete record and proceedings in the within entitled case, with all things concerning the same.

In Witness Whereof, I hereunto subscribe my name, and affix the seal of said Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in the City of Oklahoma, this 25<sup>th</sup> day of January, 1913.

[Seal Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma.]

W. H. L. CAMPBELL,  
*Clerk of the Supreme Court  
of the State of Oklahoma,*  
By JESSIE PARDOE, *Deputy.*

1 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ss:

The President of the United States to C. E. Robinson, Greeting:

You are hereby cited and admonished to be and appear at and before the Supreme Court of the United States at Washington, District of Columbia, within thirty days from the date hereof, pursuant to a writ of error filed in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, wherein The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company is plaintiff in error, and you, C. E. Robinson are defendant in error, to show cause, if any there be, why the judgment rendered against said plaintiff in error as in said writ of error mentioned should not be corrected, and why speedy justice should not be done the parties in this behalf.

Witness the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma this 31st day of December, A. D. 1912.

JOHN B. TURNER,  
*Chief Justice of the Supreme Court  
of the State of Oklahoma.*

Attest:

[Seal Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma.]

W. H. L. CAMPBELL,  
*Clerk of the Supreme Court  
of the State of Oklahoma,*  
By JESSIE PARDOE, *Deputy.*

OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLA., Jan. 9, 1913.

I, the undersigned, attorney- of record for defendant in error in the above entitled cause, hereby acknowledge the service of the above

citation, and enter an appearance in the Supreme Court of the United States.

H. H. SMITH,  
RITTENHOUSE & RITTENHOUSE,  
*Attorneys for Defendant in Error.*

2 [Endorsed:] No. 2015. In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, Plaintiff in Error, vs. C. E. Robinson, Defendant in Error. Citation. Filed Jan. 9, 1913. W. H. L. Campbell, Clerk.

3 In the Supreme Court of the United States and in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

No. 2015.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

*Petition for Writ of Error.*

To the Honorable the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma:

The petitioner, The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company respectfully shows that on the 22nd, day of October A. D. 1912 the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma entered a judgment herein in favor of the defendant in error and against the plaintiff in error in which said judgment and proceedings had prior thereto in this cause certain errors were committed to the prejudice of this petitioner, all of which more in detail appear in the assignment of errors filed with this petition.

That after the rendition of said judgment and on the 5th, day of November A. D. 1912 your petitioner filed a petition for rehearing, a copy of which said petition is hereto attached, marked Exhibit "A", and made a part hereof; that thereafter and on the 24th, day of December A. D. 1912 an order was made by this court denying said petition, and thereupon an opinion was filed in this cause by this court affirming the judgment of the District court of

4 Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma, a copy of which opinion is hereto attached, marked Exhibit "B" and made a part hereof, and the defendant below, your petitioner, respectfully shows that there was a judgment in said cause in the District Court of Lincoln County State of Oklahoma in favor of the defendant in error and against your petitioner for the sum of Fifteen Hundred Dollars and costs of suit, which said judgment upon appeal to the

Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma was affirmed by said court.

And your petitioner further respectfully shows that the said Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma is the highest court of the State of Oklahoma in which a decision in said cause could be had, and your petitioner claims the right to remove said cause to the United States Supreme Court by writ of error under the statutes of the United States authorizing writs of error to State Courts, inasmuch as in said judgment of said Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma and the proceedings in said cause certain errors were committed to the prejudice of petitioner, The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, all of which will more in detail appear from the assignments of error which is filed with this petition.

And because by said judgment the said Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma there was denied to your petitioner a title, right, privilege or immunity claimed by your petitioner in the proceedings in said case under the constitution of the United States and under a statute of the United States, and an authority exercised under the United States.

And because your petitioner claimed in said cause that the alleged contract set forth in the petition and amendments thereto in said contract was void as being in violation of the Statutes of the United States, that is to say in violation of the Act of Congress approved February 4, 1887 and in effect April 5, 1887 (24 Statutes at Large

379) as amended by an Act approved March 2, 1889 (25  
5 Statutes at Large 885) and by an Act approved February 10th., 1891 (26 Statutes at Large 743) and by an Act approved February 8, 1895 (a8 Statutes at Large 643) and by an Act approved June 29, 1906 (34 Statutes at Large 584) known as the Interstate Commerce Act or an Act to regulate commerce, which said claim of a right, title or immunity under said Act of Congress and the amendments thereto was denied your petitioner by said judgment of said Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

Because your petitioner claimed in said cause that the alleged contract in the petition and the amendments thereto in said case was in direct conflict with the Act to regulate commerce and the amendments thereto, and that the judgment of the District Court of Lincoln County, which said judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma could not be affirmed without giving validity to an alleged contract made in direct violation of the terms of said Act to Regulate Commerce; that the conclusion of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma that it could legally dispose of the issues in said case without passing upon and deciding as to whether or not said alleged contract of shipment was in violation of the Act to Regulate Commerce is erroneous and of no legal effect, and, as a matter of fact, is a denial of the contention of this petitioner that said pretended contract was in violation of the Act to Regulate Commerce, which said claim of a right, title or immunity under said Act of Congress and the amendments thereto was denied to your petitioner by said judgment of said Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

Wherefore, your petitioner claims and says that by a final judgment in a suit in the highest court of the State of Oklahoma in which — in said cause could be had there was a right, title, privilege or immunity which was specially set up or claimed under the constitution of and under the statutes of the United States by your petitioner, and the decisions of said court was against such right, title privilege or immunity which was so specially set up and claimed by your petitioner under such constitution and such statute and wherefore and in accordance with the statute in such case made and provided therefor your petitioner prays that a writ of error may issue in this behalf out of the Supreme Court of the United States for the correction of the errors, and assignment whereof is filed with this petition, and that a transcript of the record, proceedings and files and papers in this cause duly authenticated may be sent to the Supreme Court of the United States.

And your petitioner prays for the allowance of a citation and supersedeas in due form of law, and your petitioner will ever pray.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE  
RAILWAY COMPANY, *Petitioner,*  
*Plaintiff in Error,*

By COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,  
CHARLES H. WOODS,  
GEORGE M. GREEN,  
*Its Attorneys.*

7

EXHIBIT "A."

In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

No. 2015.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

No. 2016.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

H. F. MOORE et al., Defendants in Error.

*Petition for Rehearing.*

The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, plaintiff in error in the above entitled causes, respectfully moves this court to grant it a rehearing upon the opinion and judgment of this Court rendered herein on the 22nd. day of October A. D. 1912, by which the judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

In support of the motion the plaintiff in error respectfully submits:

### I.

That the opinion and judgment of this court is in direct conflict with the Act to Regulate Commerce (35 U. S. 3591) and the amendments thereto; that said judgment could not be affirmed without giving validity to an alleged contract made in direct violation of the terms of said Act to Regulate Commerce; that the conclusion of this Court that it could legally dispose of the issues in this cause without passing upon and deciding as to whether or not said alleged contract of shipment was in violation of the Act to Regulate Commerce is erroneous and of no legal effect and, as a matter of fact, is a denial of the contention of this plaintiff in error that said pretended contract was in violation of the Act to Regulate Commerce.

### II.

That the decision of this Court is in direct conflict with the Act to Regulate Commerce as construed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Chicago & Alton R. Co., vs. Kirby, decided May 27th, 1912, and reported in Advance Sheets to Lawyers' Co-operative Edition Vol. 32, page 618; that the effect of the opinion and judgment of this Court is to give validity to a contract similar to that held void by the Supreme Court of the United States, and to impose a greater burden because of said pretended oral contract upon the plaintiff in error than could be lawfully imposed under the terms of said Act to Regulate Commerce and under the published tariffs of the plaintiff in error.

### III.

That the Court either overlooked or disregarded the fact that notwithstanding the defendant in error, the plaintiff below, sued upon an alleged oral contract, that he admitted *the* prior to the movement of the live stock involved he voluntarily went to the office of the railway company and executed a written contract, and further that he went there for the express purpose of obtaining such contract and did obtain and execute the same and secured the benefit of the rate applicable thereto. The Court in ignoring or disregarding said facts either overruled or disregarded the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State in St. L. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Ladd, 124 Pacific 461. This plaintiff in error respectfully insists that a decision of said cause made in disregard of the fact that the plaintiff sought and obtained the written contract set out in defendant's answer and offered and admitted as a part of his evidence on cross-examination is of necessity erroneous and prejudicial to it; that it denies any legal effect of the written contract freely entered into by the parties, under which the horses moved, under which the rate was fixed, and under which the charges were paid; and that the disregarding or ignoring of said contract resulted in the doing of a gross injustice to the plaintiff in error.



## IV.

The decision of this court overlooks and does not decide or pass upon important propositions urged in the brief of plaintiff in error, which establish the incorrectness of the judgment of the lower court: that the court inadvertently misconstrued the facts, and does not correctly state the facts, as shown by the record.

## V.

That the opinion of the court is not only opposed to the weight of authority, but is not supported either by precedent or authority, is violative of the law as declared by the Supreme Court of this State and of the Supreme Court of the United States, and prejudicial to the plaintiff in error, and a rehearing should be granted and the cause reversed and ordered dismissed.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,  
CHARLES H. WOODS,  
GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error.*

## 9

## EXHIBIT "B."

In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, Supreme Court  
Commission, Division Number Two,

No. 2015.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff  
in Error,

v.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

*Syllabus.*

1. Plaintiff sues for damages done to a shipment of race horses, alleging shipment to have been made under a definite verbal contract, charging gross negligence and praying for full amount of damages. Defendant answered by general denial and by pleading a written contract which limited its liability to the value therein named, and by the further allegation that the written contract was the only one made between the parties. Plaintiff's reply was in effect an unverified general denial of new matter. Held: The overruling of defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings because of the unverified reply was not error.

The issues whether the shipment was made under a verbal agreement and whether defendant was guilty of gross negligence were joined by the defendant's general denial, and plaintiff had the right to have such issues determined and was entitled to any evidence relevant, competent and material to a determination of the same, regardless of the written contract, and regardless of the fact that a

determination of such issues had the effect of rendering the provisions of the written contract not binding.

2. Where a shipment of live stock consists of race horses shipped for the purpose of being entered in certain races and the carrier has notice of the class to which the stock belongs and the purpose for which it is shipped and the agent of the carrier at the destination of the shipment is notified that some of the stock has been injured and such agent goes to the stables where such injured stock is kept and sees same and has ample opportunities to ascertain the extent of the injuries: Held: This is a substantial compliance with the provisions of the shipping contract requiring notice of injury to be given before the stock is removed or slaughtered or mingled with other stock.

3. Where a shipment of live stock is made under a verbal contract and where every move made, every step taken toward a shipment up to and including a complete consignment and surrender of control by the shipper, the starting in transit of the shipment and the assumption of liability for negligence by the carrier, is all under and pursuant to such parole agreement, and after this a printed shipping contract is presented to the shipper to sign, he has a right to assume that it embodies the terms of the verbal agreement, and the carrier will not be permitted to escape liabilities accruing to the shipper under the verbal agreement by reason of certain provisions in the written contract at variance with the parole contract, unless the shipper's attention has been called to such provisions and  
10 fair opportunity given him to assent to same.

Error from the District Court of Lincoln County—Hon. J. J. Carney, Judge.

Action by C. E. Robinson against the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company for damages.

Judgment for plaintiff and defendant brings error.  
Affirmed.

Cottingham & Bledsoe, Charles H. Woods and George M. Green for plaintiff in error.

H. H. Smith, Rittenhouse & Rittenhouse, for defendant in error.

This action was begun June 29th, 1908 in the District Court of Lincoln County, by C. E. Robinson against The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company for damages done to a certain race mare, Nancy Allen, shipped with some other race horses from Kansas City, Missouri, to Lawrence, Kansas, in September, 1907. The substance of plaintiff's petition is: That in September, 1907, plaintiff had the horses in question in Kansas City, and on said day called upon the agent of the railway company at Kansas City and by phone informed him that he, Robinson, had some race horses he desired to ship to Lawrence, Kansas, in time for the races next

day. The Agent informed him that such shipment could be made and that if the horses could be loaded between 4 and 6 o'clock of that afternoon, they would be taken by a fast freight, the "Red Ball," which made no stops for local freight on the way and would reach Lawrence about 12 o'clock that night. This being satisfactory to Robinson, it was agreed between him and the agent that the shipment should be made by that train. Whereupon, the agent instructed him where to bring the horses, and informed him that a car would be placed there to receive them. Pursuant to this agreement the horses were taken to the place designated by the agent and loaded into the car between 5 and 6 o'clock of that afternoon. After being loaded the car was closed and tagged "Red Ball," to designate to the crew that it should go with the Red Ball train on that evening. Sometime thereafter it was pulled into the company's yards but was overlooked or neglected by the Red Ball crew and left in the yards for the night. The excuse given by the crew—that they had forgotten it. During the night it was carelessly switched and bumped around in the yards by the local freight in making up its trains and sometime on the following morning, was started with the local freight to Lawrence, Kansas, arriving there about 2 P. M., of the next day, too late for the races on that day and with the mare, Nancy Alden, badly damaged and permanently injured from the careless and grossly negligent manner in which the car had been handled.

The railway company answered by general denial and by pleading a written contract alleged to have been fairly and for a valid consideration entered into, and to have been the only contract made between the shipper and the carrier. Defendant replied, denying the allegations of new matter in the answer; denying that the written contract was entered into in good faith, and that it was the only contract made between the parties, and in effect, reaffirming that the verbal contract made between the parties was the one under which the shipment was made. The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of Robinson for \$1,500.00, upon which judgment was rendered, and from which judgment the railway company appeals.

#### HARRISON, C.

Numerous errors are assigned by appellant but all are disposed of under two general propositions, viz: First, whether the Railway Company was entitled to judgment on the pleadings, having set up a written contract, the execution of which was not denied under oath; Second, were the provisions in the written contract valid, and were they binding on the shipper? As to the first proposition the plaintiff did not rely on a written contract of any character, nor did he sue for violation of the terms of a written contract, but alleged the shipment to have been made under a definite verbal contract and sought recovery on the grounds of gross negligence of the company in the manner of handling the shipment. This presented the material issues to be tried, a determination of which in favor of the plaintiff would entitle him to recover and which were joined by

defendant in its general denial of the allegations in the petition. The plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to have these issues tried and determined, and in the trial of the same was entitled to all the competent, material evidence at his command in support of his view of such issues. Therefore, the setting up of a written contract by defendant did not preclude the plaintiff from his right to have such issues determined nor entitle defendant to judgment on the pleadings, notwithstanding plaintiff had failed to deny the execution of the contract under oath. If plaintiff had stated a cause of action, which in our opinion was done, he had a right to have the same determined upon the theory he had chosen, upon the grounds of his own choice. And, not relying on a written contract, not suing on a written contract, but claiming the shipment to have been made under a verbal agreement, and relying for recovery on the carrier's common law liability for negligence, he should not be required to abandon his chosen grounds and to try his case upon a different theory by the setting up of a written contract, unless such contract constituted a *prima facie* defense to his action. Whether it did or not depended upon the question that it was the only contract, which question was one of fact and was completely answered by a determination of the issues tendered in the petition "that the shipment was made under a verbal contract." Hence, the decisive issues tendered by both the petition and the written contract being disposed of by a determination of the issues presented by the petition, it is immaterial whether the execution of the written contract be denied under oath or not, or whether or not plaintiff's reply was verified. It was held by this Court in *Flescher v. Callahan*, 122 Pac. 489, that section 5643 Comp. Laws 1909, "providing that all allegations of the execution of written instruments and endorsements thereon shall be taken as true, unless the denial thereof be verified by affidavit, requires the verification of the denial of the execution only." The execution of the instrument in question here was not in issue. Therefore, it was not in error to overrule defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

12 This case is clearly distinguishable from *St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Cake*, 25 Okla. 227, 105 Pac. 322, and *St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Phillips*, 17 Okla. 264, — Pac. —. In those cases a wholly different fundamental principle of pleading was involved. In each of these cases the plaintiff sued for violation of a written contract and relied on the contract for recovery. And in each case, the contract relied upon showed that the plaintiff had not complied with the conditions precedent to recovery, and that in the absence of a verified denial or plea of waiver of such conditions, plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The case at bar rests on a different principle of pleading for the reasons herein stated.

The same question of pleading was decided in the case of *C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Speers*, 31 Okla. 469, wherein the court, speaking through Justice Williams, says:

"The defendants having pleaded the contracts and the same being admitted because no reply was filed, still were not entitled to have judgment rendered in their favor upon the pleadings, because of the

issue joined by the general issue as to the death of four head of cattle and the value thereof."

In the second proposition two material provisions of the written contract are involved, viz: the provision that notice of the damage be given by the shipper to the carrier within a prescribed time after the damage is discovered, and the provision which limits the carrier's liability to the valuation placed on the stock in the contract. The contract provided that written notice of and "damage sustained by the stock should be given to the company before the stock should be slaughtered or intermingled with other stock, and the further provision that the company should not be liable in any amount in excess of the values printed in the contract which are as follows: "Each horse or pony (gelding, mare or stallion), mule or jack, \$100.00. Each ox, bull or steer, \$50.00. Each cow \$30.00. Each calf \$10.00. Each hog \$10.00. Each sheep or goat \$3.00." The record shows that the provisions for notice were substantially complied with. The injured animal was not intended for slaughter nor to be intermingled with and put on the market in bulk with other stock. She was a racing animal, shipped for that specific purpose, and the railroad had notice of the class to which she belonged and the purpose for which she was shipped. And when the shipment reached its destination and it was discovered that the animal, Nancy Alden, was injured, the company was notified of same and the agent of the company went to the stable where she was kept and saw her and had ample opportunity to examine her. The evidence, however, showed that it was impossible at the time to ascertain the extent of her injuries. Later, it was ascertained that she was rendered useless for racing purposes. The company having actual notice of the injury, had ample opportunity to examine the extent thereof, and, under the circumstances of this case, we think the notice which the company had was a substantial compliance with the provisions of the contract.

The question here is not a question of law as to whether the carrier had authority to limit its common law liability to a value fixed by the shipper and fairly agreed upon between the shipper and carrier, but is a question of fact whether such value was fixed by the shipper and whether it was fairly agreed upon between the parties. If, as a matter of fact, such value was not fixed by the shipper and was not fairly agreed upon by the parties, but was arbitrarily printed in

the contract by the carrier without the knowledge or even the implied assent of the shipper, then the carrier's liability is not limited to such value and there is no necessity for a construction of the federal act. Therefore, the issue being one of fact, was properly determinable by the jury, from the evidence, and we think the verdict was fairly and reasonably supported by the testimony submitted. But it is contended by the company that the court erred in admitting testimony which tended to vary the terms of the written contract. If there had been no other issue to be tried except the validity of the written contract, the contention might be well taken. But there were other issues dependent of the written contract and decisive of plaintiff's right of recovery, on which plaintiff relied and had a right to have determined and a right to intro-

duce any testimony relevant, competent and material to a correct determination of such issues. And if the evidence offered was competent and material to a determination of such issues, and was offered for such purpose, it was not error to admit same, although it may have had the consequent effect of varying the terms of the written contract. For, as, stated in the discussion of the first proposition, plaintiff had tendered the issue, "That the shipment was made under a verbal agreement, and that the company was guilty of gross negligence" and relied on these grounds for recovery. The defendant, by general denial, joined these issues, thereby giving plaintiff the right to have them determined, although the conclusion may have followed, as a logical sequence, that the terms of the written contract were not fairly entered into. *C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Spears*, supra, is in point on the question of admission of evidence.

As to whether the printed contract superseded all other—of whether the verbal agreement was merged in the printed contract, the evidence was conclusive that a definite and complete agreement in reference—the shipment was made over the 'phone by the shipper and the agent of the carrier without any mention or reference to the rate, the value of the stock, further than that it was racing stock, or to any limitation or liability or any mention of the fact that a written or printed contract would be required. The testimony offered by defendant substantiates this view and corroborates the testimony of plaintiff on those points. It also shows clearly that the stock was loaded, the car closed and tagged "Red Ball", the shipment fully delivered to the carrier and control of same completely surrendered by the shipper and that after the car had been moved from place of loading and started in transit, all pursuant to the verbal agreement, some two hours thereafter the agent of the company presented to the shipper the printed contract, without calling his attention to the special provisions directly at variance with the terms of the verbal agreement, and without giving him an opportunity to examine its contents and exercise his right of choice.

Under these circumstances, having made a definite and complete agreement as to the shipment, having surrendered certain of his rights and certain rights having accrued to him under such agreement, it was reasonable for him to presume that the printed contract presented to him under such circumstances, contained no provisions which would take away the rights already accrued. *A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Dill*, 48 Kan. 210; *K. P. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds*, 17 Kan. 251; *Ry. Co. v. Lockwood* 17 Wall 367; *Hart v. Ry. Co.* 112 U. S. 331; *Bostick v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co.* 45 N. Y. 712; *Swift v. Pacific Mail and Steamship Co.*, 106 N. Y. 206; *M. K. & T. Ry. Co., v. Withers*, 40 S. W. (Tex.) 1073; *St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gorman*, 79 Kan. 643; *Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Craycroft* 12 Ind. App. 14 203; *Guly Ry. Co. v. Wood* 30 S. W. (Tex.) 715; *Louisville & C. Ry. Co. vs. Meyer* 78 Ala. 577; *Strohm v. Detroit etc. Ry. Co.* (Wis.) 94 Am. Dec. 546.

In *Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Craycroft*, supra, it was held:

"Where the shipper loads his goods under a parole contract, it

will govern, and his right of recovery will not be limited by a written contract handed to him as they are being carried away."

In *Sirohm v. Detroit Ry. Co.*, supra, it is said:

"Having previously entered into a special agreement he may rightfully assume, in the absence of notice to that effect, that it is embodied in the paper or receipt, or at least, that the receipt contains nothing contrary to it. It is in the nature of a direct fraud or cheat for the company or its agents, after having entered into a verbal agreement, thus wrongfully to insert a contract of an entirely different character, and present it to the party, without directing his attention expressly to it and procuring his assent. It is no answer for the Company in such a case, to say that the other party should have been more diligent and watchful, and should have detected the fraud. So long as he is ignorant of the new conditions, and does not assent to them, the contract in writing is not consummated, and parole evidence may be received."

"In *Bostick v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co.*, the court held:

"The verbal agreement had been acted upon, and under it the plaintiff had parted with all control over his goods.

"The rule that prior negotiations are merged in a subsequent written contract does not apply to such a case as this. If the plaintiff had expressly assented to the terms of the bill of lading subsequently delivered to him, such assent would operate as a change of the terms of the contract originally made, and under which he had parted with his property. But after the verbal agreement had been consummated and rights had accrued under it, the mere receipt of the bill of lading, inadvertently omitting to examine the printed conditions, was not sufficient to conclude the plaintiff from showing what the actual agreement was under which the goods had been shipped."

In *M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Withers*, supra, in the syllabus the court said:

"After plaintiff's cattle had been loaded on defendant's cars for shipment under a verbal contract, and the cars closed and sealed, defendant's agent presented a written contract, binding plaintiff to do certain acts, not required by the oral agreement, as a condition precedent for recovery in case of damage. Plaintiff had not time to read the contract before the train started, but, supposing it was a pass for a man to go with the cattle, signed it. Held: That the verbal contract controlled the shipment."

Now, in the case at bar, up to and including a complete consignment and surrender of control of stock by the shipper, the starting of the shipment in transit and the assumption of liability for negligence by the carrier, every move made, every step taken toward the shipment was under and pursuant to a parole contract. Under these circumstances, the shipper had the right to act on the faith thus inspired and rely on the rights thereby accrued to him, and the carrier will not be permitted to take away those rights, and relieve itself of the liability thus incurred, without even having given him a fair opportunity to assent thereto.

The record discloses that such opportunity was not given. There-

fore, the verbal contract must control. There being no agreement in the verbal contract as to the extent or limitation of liability, the carrier is held to its common law liability for negligence. There is no controversy as to the value of the animal, the extent of the injuries, nor the damages thereby sustained. The allegations of negligence being fairly sustained by the evidence, we see no reason why the verdict should be set aside.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.

16 [Endorsed:] No. 2015. In the Supreme Court of the United States and in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. The A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., Plaintiff in Error, vs. C. E. Robinson, Defendant in Error. Petition for Writ of Error. Filed Dec. 31, 1912. W. H. L. Campbell, Clerk.

17 In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

No. 2015.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

*Assignment of Errors.*

The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, plaintiff in error in the above entitled cause, respectfully shows that on the trial of said cause and in the rendition of the judgment of the trial court, and in the opinion and judgment of the Supreme Court of the State in said cause manifest errors were committed to its prejudice, which are apparent from the record therein: That the errors committed by the trial court and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State and committed by the Supreme Court of the State in its opinion and judgment in said cause are more particularly set forth as follows:

First. That the Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in affirming the judgment of the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

Second. That the Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in not reversing said judgment of the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

Third. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the contract set forth in the petition and amendment thereto of the defendant in error, plaintiff below, was a valid contract.

18 Fourth. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in refusing to hold said contract void as being a contract in violation of the Act of Congress of February 4, 1887 and the amendments thereto, commonly called the Interstate Commerce Act or the Act to Regulate Commerce.



Fifth. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in affirming said judgment enforcing a contract which was void as being in contravention of and a violation of the Act of Congress of February 4th, 1887, and the amendments thereto, entitled an Act of Congress of February 4, 1887 approved February 4, 1887, and in effect April 5, 1887 (24 Statutes at Large 379) as amended by an Act approved March 2, 1889 (25 Statutes at Large 885) and by an Act approved February 10th, 1891 (26 Statutes at Large 743) and by an Act approved February 8, 1895 (28 Statutes at Large 643) and by an Act approved June 29, 1906 (34 Statutes at Large 584) known as the Interstate Commerce Act or an Act to Regulate Commerce.

Sixth. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in its failure to consider the federal question presented in said cause and in concluding that said Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma could legally dispose of the issue in said cause without passing upon and deciding as to whether or not said alleged contract of shipment was in violation of the Act to Regulate Commerce, and such action was a denial to the plaintiff in error of a right, title, privilege and immunity specially set up and claimed under such clause and section of the said Interstate Commerce Act, to the great damage of the plaintiff in error.

Seventh. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the alleged contract was not invalid and that it was, if made, in violation of the Act of Congress and amendments and particularly in violation of Sections 2, 3, 6, and 10 of said Act of Congress as amended June 29th, 1906.

19 Eighth. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in refusing to hold that contract was invalid as being in violation of said Act and sections thereof.

Ninth. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in refusing to hold that said contract was discriminatory and unlawful under said Act and sections thereof.

Tenth. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the defendant in error was not bound by the terms and provisions of the tariffs and classifications on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission and with its Agent at Kansas City, Missouri, the point of origin of said shipment.

Eleventh. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the plaintiff in error had a right under the evidence in the case to agree to carry the horses in said shipment upon its Red Ball freight train.

Twelve. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the alleged agreement to carry the horses upon the Red Ball freight train, a particular train, was not an agreement to perform a special service not provided for by the published tariff and classification.

Thirteenth. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the contract of shipment was the oral negotiations had over the telephone with the shipper and someone representing himself to be the agent of the railway company, which said contract was in direct violation of and not one provided for by the tariffs and classifications which were on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission and

with petitioner's agent at point of origin, and in holding that said verbal negotiations were the contract of shipment, and were not superseded by the written contract of shipment entered into by the parties subsequent to said alleged oral contract.

Fourteenth. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the defendant in error was not presumed to have knowledge of the provisions of said Act and sections thereof, and the provisions of the tariffs and classifications on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission and with the Agent at Kansas City, Missouri, the point of origin of said shipment.

Fifteenth. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the defendant in error was not presumed to know that he contracted for a lower rate than that to which he was lawfully entitled and that he contracted for special privilege in shipment by designated train to which he was not lawfully entitled, and for which the plaintiff in error and defendant in error could not contract without violating said Acts of Congress and sections thereof.

Sixteenth. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in its construction and application of the law with reference to said Act and Sections thereof as hitherto declared and announced by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Seventeenth. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in that the judgment aforesaid given was given for said defendant in error and against The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, whereas by the law of the land, the said judgment ought to have been given for the said The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company.

For which errors The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company prays that the said judgment of the Supreme Court of State of Oklahoma and of the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma be reversed, and a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff in error and for its costs.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,

CHARLES H. WOODS,

GEORGE M. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error.*

21 [Endorsed:] No. 2015. In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. The A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., Plaintiff in Error, vs. C. E. Robinson, Defendant in Error. Assignment of Errors. Filed Dec. 31, 1912. W. H. L. Campbell, Clerk.

22 In the Supreme Court of the United States and in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

No. 2015.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

*Order Allowing Writ of Error.*

Let the writ of error issue upon the execution of a bond by The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company to C. E. Robinson, in the sum of Four Thousand (4000) Dollars, such bond when approved to act as a supersedeas.

Dated at Oklahoma City in the State of Oklahoma this 31st day of December A. D. 1912.

JOHN B. TURNER,

*Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of  
the State of Oklahoma.*

Attest:

[SEAL.] W. H. L. CAMPBELL, Clerk.

By JESSIE PARDOE, Deputy.

Endorsed: No. 2015. In the Supreme Court of the United States and in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. The A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. Plaintiff in Error, vs. C. E. Robinson, Defendant in Error. Order allowing writ of error. Filed Dec. 31 1912. W. H. L. Campbell, Clerk.

23 In the Supreme Court of the United States and in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

No. 2015.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

*Writ of Error.*

24 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ss:

The President of the United States of America to the Honorable the Judges of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, Greeting:

Because in the record and proceedings, as also in the rendition of the judgment of a plea which is in said court before you, or some

of you, the highest court of law or equity in said State in which a decision could be had in said suit between The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, plaintiff in error, and C. E. Robinson, defendant in error, wherein was drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision was against their validity; or wherein was drawn in question the validity of a statute or of an authority exercised under said State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision was in favor of such their validity; or wherein was drawn in question the construction of a clause of the Constitution or of a treaty or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision was against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute or commission; a manifest error hath happened to the great damage of said plaintiff in error, as by its complaint appears.

We, being willing that error, if any hath been, should be duly corrected, and full and speedy justice done to the parties aforesaid in this behalf, do command you, if judgment be therein given, that

25 then under your seal distinctly and openly, you send the record and proceedings aforesaid, with all things concerning the same, to the Supreme Court of the United States, together with this writ, so that you have the same in said Supreme Court at Washington, within thirty days from the date hereof, that the record and proceedings aforesaid being inspected, the said Supreme Court may cause further to be done therein to correct that error, what of right, and according to the laws and customs of the United States should be done.

Witness the Honorable Edward Douglass White, Chief Justice of the United States, the 31 day of December A. D. 1912.

ARNOLD C. DOLDE,  
*Clerk of the United States District Court for  
the Western District of the State of Oklahoma.*

Approved and allowed by the Honorable John B. Turner, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

[Seal of the United States District Court, Western District  
of Oklahoma.]

JOHN B. TURNER,  
*Chief Justice of the Supreme Court  
of the State of Oklahoma.*

26-29 [Endorsed:] No. 2015. In the Supreme Court of the United States and in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. The A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., Plaintiff in Error, vs. C. E. Robinson, Defendant in Error. Writ of Error. Filed Jan. 3 1913. W. H. L. Campbell, Clerk.

30 In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

No. 2015.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

*Petition in Error.*

Comes now the plaintiff in error and for its cause of action in error alleges and says:

I. That heretofore, to-wit, on the 30th day of April, 1910, judgment was rendered against The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, plaintiff in error, in the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma, in the sum of \$1,500.00 and costs of said action;

II. That the pleadings in said cause with all the orders and judgment of the court, together with all evidence introduced on the trial, the rulings of the court thereon, and all proceedings had in said cause are embodied in a case made by the plaintiff in error, duly made and served, and by the Honorable J. J. Carnery, the Presiding Judge at the trial of said cause, duly settled and signed and attested by the Clerk of the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma, which said original case-made is hereto attached, marked Exhibit "A", and here referred to and made a part of this petition in error, which said case-made contains all the rulings of the court  
31 below, the proceedings on which said rulings were based, and all matters in connection therewith, to enable this Court to review said judgment and proceedings on which same was  
- based, and to treat the assignments of error herein made by reference to said case-made.

III. The plaintiff in error alleges that the Court below erred to the substantial prejudice of the plaintiff in error in numerous, divers and sundry rulings in said proceedings, all of which more fully appear in said case-made hereto attached, marked Exhibit "A", that is to say:

First. That the Court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial filed by the plaintiff in error.

Second. That the Court erred in rendering judgment upon the verdict of the jury in favor of the defendant in error and against the plaintiff in error, said verdict appearing to have been rendered under the influence of passion or prejudice and being too large.

Third. That the Court erred in rendering judgment against the plaintiff in error.

Fourth. The Court erred in rendering judgment upon the verdict of the jury in favor of the defendant in error and against the plaintiff in error, said verdict not being supported or sustained by sufficient evidence and for the reason that the same is contrary to law.

Fifth. Because the Court erred to the substantial prejudice of the

plaintiff in error in misdirecting the jury as to matters of law, to which instructions of the court, the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Sixth. That the Court erred to the substantial prejudice of the plaintiff in error in errors of law occurring at the trial of said cause and excepted to by the plaintiff in error, at the time.

Seventh. That the Court erred in admitting certain irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial testimony over the objection of the plaintiff in error at the trial of said cause, to which ruling of the court, the plaintiff in error duly excepted at the time and still excepts.

Eighth. That the Court erred to the substantial prejudice of the plaintiff in error in refusing to admit certain competent, relevant and material testimony offered by the plaintiff in error at the trial of said cause, to which ruling of the court, the plaintiff in error duly excepted at the time and still excepts.

Ninth. That the Court erred in its instructions to the jury, to the giving of which instructions, the plaintiff in error duly excepted at the time and still excepts.

Tenth. That the Court erred to the substantial prejudice of the plaintiff in error in refusing to give to the jury certain pertinent, relevant and material instructions requested by the plaintiff in error, being instructions numbered from one to seven, inclusive, to which refusal of the Court, the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Eleventh. That the Court erred in approving the verdict of the jury and in rendering judgment against the plaintiff in error and in favor of defendant in error, to which action of the Court, the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Twelfth. That the Court erred in overruling the objection of the plaintiff in error to the introduction of any evidence by the defendant in error at the beginning of the trial of said cause, to which action of the court, the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Thirteenth. That the Court erred in overruling the motion of the plaintiff in error for judgment upon the pleadings in this cause, to which ruling of the court, the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Fourteenth. That the Court erred in overruling the demurrer of the plaintiff in error at the conclusion of the evidence of the defendant in error, to which action of the court the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Fifteenth. That the Court erred in overruling the motion of the plaintiff in error at the conclusion of all the evidence for the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in error, to which action of the court, the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Sixteenth. That the Court erred to the prejudice of the plaintiff in error in construing the interstate commerce act as not only destroying the terms of a contract made for the transportation of freight at published rates, but in holding that the same destroyed all rights of compensation and that said tariff so filed in accordance

with the interstate commerce act was not binding upon the defendant as to the contract of shipment entered into between the plaintiff in error and the defendant in error, to which ruling of the court, the plaintiff in error duly excepted at the time and still excepts.

Seventeenth. That the Court erred in its construction of said interstate commerce act in holding that a reduced rate of freight in consideration of the shipment being valued at a specific amount discharged the shipper from liability to said specific amount and in holding that the shipper was not bound by the terms and conditions of said tariff so filed with the interstate commerce commission and on file at the depot of the plaintiff in error at Kansas City, Missouri, to which ruling of the court the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

34 Eighteenth. That the Court erred in overruling the motion for new trial filed by the plaintiff in error, to which ruling of the court the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Wherefore, the plaintiff in error prays that this Court may review said judgment and examine the errors contained in said case-made, and that upon hearing said judgment of the Court below may be reversed and this cause may be remanded to the Court below with instructions to enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in error and for such other and further relief as may be proper, just and consistent with equity and good conscience and that the plaintiff in error may have its costs herein expended.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,  
CHAS. H. WOODS,  
GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error.*

35 Filed Sep. 15, 1910. D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court,  
Lincoln County, Okla.

36-68

*Case Made.*

C. R. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

Be it remembered that heretofore to-wit the 29th day of June 1908, the plaintiff, C. E. Robinson, commenced his action against the defendant, Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, by filing in the District Court of Lincoln County Oklahoma, his petition, which is in words and figures following, to-wit:

\* \* \* \* \*

69 In the District Court in and for Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

STATE OF OKLAHOMA,

*Tenth Judicial District, ss:*

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Amended Petition.*

Now comes the plaintiff and for his cause of action herein complains and alleges:—

1.

That he is and was a resident of the City of Winfield in the State of Kansas, and at the times hereinafter alleged was the owner of the bay pacing mare, Nancy Alden, and at the times hereinafter alleged was engaged in the business of racing and training horses belonging to and owned by himself and other persons, and at the times hereinafter mentioned, the defendant, the Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, was a corporation existing under the laws of the State of Kansas, and was the owners of and operated a railroad as such corporation, from and through the City of Kansas in the County of Jackson, and state of Missouri, to and through the City of Lawrence in the County of Douglas, and State of Kansas, together with the tracks, cars, locomotives and other appurtenances thereto belonging; and at the times hereinafter alleged, was a common carrier of freight and passengers for hire between the City of Kansas City in the State and County aforesaid, and the City of Lawrence in state and county aforesaid.

2.

That on or about the 17th day of September, 1907, the plaintiff delivered to the defendant the said pacing mare, Nancy Alden, together with three other head of trotting and pacing race  
70 horses, at the City of Kansas City, County and State aforesaid, about four o'clock p. m. for the purpose of transporting or conveying the said Nancy Alden to the City of Lawrence in the County and State aforesaid, for the purpose of racing her there in races, and the defendant, its agents and servants and employees, whose names are and were unknown to this plaintiff, and as this plaintiff is informed, were the clerks in the freight department of the defendant at their general freight office in the City of Kansas City and State of Missouri; that said clerk or clerks stated that they would deliver said mare out of the City of Kansas City within the County and State aforesaid, on a freight train at or about 10:00 o'clock of the same evening; and that said freight train was a fast freight and did not gather local freight; and the said clerk directed



this plaintiff, C. E. Robinson, to load the said horse between the hours of 5:00 o'clock and 6:00 o'clock at the platform of their yards at the receiving freight office in said City County and State, in the evening previous to the night following the day when said injuries occurred, but the defendant its agents and servants failed to convey said mare according to said promise and conversation, and left her with the remaining three horses, which were loaded and shipped with her, in a box car on the tracks of the defendant for a number of hours in said car as this plaintiff believes, on said defendant's track in said City of Kansas City, where said car was violently moved and knocked around and handled carelessly and with gross negligence on the part of the defendant, its agents and servants in making up a local train of cars in which train was the car in which this mare was loaded; and in moving around the said car over the tracks of the said defendant, during the night, the said mare was knocked down several times and bruised and injured as herein alleged. And as he believes, and is informed, the said mare was

71 left out of the fast freight train and finally shipped in a local freight train and deposited about day-light, or during the latter part of the night, in what is known as the Argentine yards, as he is informed, said Argentine yards being a switching track where freight was made up and collected for transportation. That said mare was hauled and transported from the said City of Kansas City, County of Jackson and State aforesaid, on a way freight train, which collected local freight, and contrary to the promise and conversation made by the defendant and its said employees, with this plaintiff; that the plaintiff is not informed and was not at that time, of the names of the stations or the points where and when said mare was injured, nor is he informed of the names of any station agents or employees with whom he persisted during the night for handling the car roughly as alleged hereinbefore; and he alleged that said mare was injured somewhere between the time she was loaded in the yards about 6:00 o'clock of said evening and the morning she was delivered to the said City of Lawrence, and he believes she was injured in the yards at Kansas City, or in the yards of the defendant known as the Argentine yards.

That the conversation had with and promise made between defendant, its said employees and this plaintiff, was made in what this plaintiff was informed to be the freight office of the defendant in the City of Kansas City, County of Jackson and State of Missouri; and that said servant and employees is unknown to this plaintiff, but that said clerk directed them to load said mare at or about 6:00 o'clock and that she would be conveyed in a train known as the Red Ball Freight, which freight the defendant and its employees informed this plaintiff, was a fast train; and that said freight collected and hauled no local freight; and that said mare would be deposited in the city of Lawrence about 12 o'clock of the night after the evening she was loaded; and that said defendant negligently and

72 carelessly left said mare at said freight train, and that the delay incurred thereby, and the rough handling by defendant, as alleged hereinbefore, was the proximate cause of her injuries.

## 3.

That on or about the 17th day of September, 1907, the plaintiff delivered to the defendant the said pacing mare, Nancy Alden, together with three other head of trotting and racing houses, at their yards in the city of Kansas City, County of Jackson, and State of Missouri about four o'clock p. m. of said day, for the purpose of transporting or conveying the said Nancy Alden to the City of Lawrence in the state of Kansas, for the purpose of racing her there in races, and the defendant, its agents and servants in charge of the freight or shipping office in said yards, the names of which are unknown to this plaintiff, undertook and agreed to deliver said mare out of the City of Kansas City, Missouri, into the City of Lawrence and State of Kansas, and said defendant and its employee informed this plaintiff and H. F. Moore, that their regular fast freight train which they called the Red Ball Freight, left their yards in Kansas City enroute to and through the City of Lawrence in the State of Kansas, on or about 10 o'clock of the same evening, and that if said mare was loaded between four and six o'clock of said evening, she would be conveyed on said freight to the City of Lawrence in the State of Kansas, and there and then said defendant and its employee instructed the said H. F. Moore and C. E. Robinson to load said mare with the other three horses in a box car on the tracks of said defendant at the time herein specified, and the said plaintiff did so load said mare and the other three head of horses and said defendant and its employees agreed that the defendant would convey and deliver said mare to her said destination and informed this plaintiff after they were loaded that said fast freight designated as the Red

Ball freight, would take this car of horses out of the City of  
73 Kansas City, Missouri, to the City of Lawrence in the State of Kansas about 10 o'clock of the same evening. The plaintiff alleges and complains that the defendant, its agents and servants failed to convey said mare according to said promise but instead thereof left her with the remaining three horses in a box car on the tracks of said defendant in or about Kansas City and while the said mare was in the said box car on the tracks in the yards of said defendant in Kansas City, and between the City of Kansas City, Missouri, and the City of Lawrence in the State of Kansas the defendant carelessly and with gross negligence in switching and moving said car, and in making up its train of cars, and in moving this car around and about over the tracks of said defendant, did finally attach said car containing said mare to and on a local freight train, and deliver said mare with the other three of said horses, to the City of Lawrence in said County and State, a distance of fifty miles or thereabouts, at or about 12 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day, while said mare was hauled and transported from the City of Kansas City Missouri, to the City of Lawrence in the State of Kansas, on a carrying freight, and contrary to the promise made to this plaintiff when the said mare with the other said horses, were loaded according to the directions of the defendant and its employees, but on the contrary, defendant, its agents and servants conducted and managed

said train so carelessly and negligently in conveying and transporting the said mare that she was severely bruised, injured and damaged in the following manner, to-wit:—That the defendant, its agents and servants in charge of said train of cars and locomotive, on defendant's line, between the points aforesaid, and at the times before alleged, did by their gross negligence and carelessness run this train of cars and locomotive to which was attached the car conveying the said mare, into other cars or train of cars while shifting

cars in and out of this train of cars, and at other times in moving the car in which was the said mare and on the tracks of the said defendant, and did generally roughly handle said car so that the said mare was thereby and therefrom, with great violence knocked down and injured in her left front leg and ankle, being bruised and wrenched and the ligaments and tendons thereof bruised and wrenched and she become therefrom lame in said leg, and was thereby permanently injured and damaged in it; and did cut, bruise and strain the suspensory ligaments and cords attached to the hock joint of her right hind leg to such an extent and in such manner as to cause violent swelling and lameness and permanent injury to her right hind leg. All of which injuries rendered said mare unfit for racing purposes and rendered her unable to earn and win money as a race horse for the balance of the racing season of the year 1907, and did thereby so permanently injure her that she is now unfit for and is disqualified for racing purposes as a race horse, and thereby and therefrom this plaintiff was damaged as hereinafter alleged.

4.

He says at the time of the injuries alleged hereinbefore, said injuries were due to and on account of the gross negligence and carelessness of the defendant, its agents and servants in charge of said locomotive and train of cars; and that this plaintiff exercised ordinary care in protecting and attempting to restrain the defendant its agents and servants from inflicting on the said mare the injuries aforesaid.

5.

He says that he expended the sum of Three Hundred Dollars (\$300.00) in preparing and conditioning the said mare, Nancy Alden, for racing and that at the time of her injury she was in good racing condition, and could pace four racing heats in a race for a mile on an ordinary half mile course in two minutes and fifteen seconds per mile, and could pace four racing heats in a race over a mile course in two minutes and ten seconds per mile.

75

6.

He says that he purchased the said mare on or about June first of the year 1907, from the First National Bank of the City of Armour, County of Douglas and State of South Dakota, and paid therefor the sum of Seventeen Hundred Dollars (\$1,700.00), and

that she had improved under and by his training, and was at the time of the injuries hereinbefore complained of, worth, and here reasonable market value was Two Thousand Dollars (\$2,000.00).

## 7.

He says that the principal value of said mare consisted in her ability to win money as a race mare and that by reason of and due to the injuries hereinbefore complained of and on account of the gross negligence and carelessness of the defendant, its agents and servants as aforesaid, the racing value of the said mare was and is entirely destroyed and that she was thereby and therefrom permanently injured and rendered valueless for racing purposes, and that on account of her value as a racing mare and due to her capacity to win money in races she was reasonably worth and her market value was the sum of Two Thousand Dollars (\$2,000.00) and that at this time by reason of the injuries complained of, she is only worth, and her reasonable market value is Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars (\$250.00).

## 8.

He further says that he has paid out the sum of Seventy five Dollars (\$75.00) entrance money to secretaries of three race meetings for races in which said mare was entered in the months of September and October, and by reason of said injuries, he was deprived as he believes, of earning said entrance fee and other prize money; and he incurred in expenses in caring for said mare on account of the injuries complained of, the further sum of Fifty Dollars (\$50.00) and that thereby and therefrom he was  
76 damaged in the sum of One Hundred and Twenty five Dollars (\$125.00).

## 9.

He says that by reason of the injuries hereinbefore complained of, he has been damaged in the sum of One Hundred and Twenty-five Dollars (\$125.00) for money expended, as aforesaid, and by reason of the injuries to the said mare which rendered her unfit for racing purposes as complained of herein, that he is further damaged in the sum of Seventeen Hundred and Fifty Dollars (\$1,750.00); and that he is damaged in all by reason of and on account of the gross negligence of the defendant, its agents and servants as herein complained of, in the sum of Eighteen Hundred and Seventy-five Dollars (\$1,875.00).

Wherefore he prays judgment against the defendant for the sum of Eighteen Hundred and Seventy-five dollars (\$1,875.00) the costs of this action and for other proper and necessary relief.

H. H. SMITH,  
RITTENHOUSE & RITTENHOUSE,  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

Endorsements on back of Amended Petition: No. 2808. Ent. C. E. Robinson Plaintiff vs. A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co. Defendant. Amended Petition. Original. Filed Nov. 25, 1908. D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County Oklahoma.

77 Whereupon the 2nd day of December 1908, leave is given said defendant to plead to plaintiff's amended petition, which order of the court is in words and figures as following, to-wit:

78 Court convened Dec. 2, 1908, at 9 o'clock A. M. pursuant to adjournment.

Officers present, W. N. Mahen, Presiding Judge; D. J. Norton, Clerk; John J. Davis, County Attorney; Chas. B. Wilson, Jr., Deputy County Attorney; L. E. Martin, Sheriff; W. L. Ducker, Court Reporter; W. Lee Waldrup, Court Crier.

Public proclamation being ordered by the court and announced by the crier for the opening of court, the following proceedings were had and business done, to-wit:

No. 2808.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co., Defendant.

On application leave is granted said defendant five days in which to plead to plaintiff's amended petition.

79 Whereupon the 7th day of December 1908, the defendant files its Demurrer to Plaintiff's Amended Petition, which Demurrer is in words and figures as following, to-wit.

80 In the District Court of Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant.

*Demurrer.*

Comes now the defendant, The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company, a corporation and demurs to the amended petition of the plaintiff filed herein and for grounds for demurrer states that said petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the said plaintiff and against this defendant.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,  
HOFFMAN & ROBERTSON,

*Attorneys for Defendant.*

Endorsements on back of Demurrer. No. 2808. Ent. C. E. Robinson, Plaintiff vs. A. T. & S. F. R. R. Co. Defendant. Demurrer. Cottingham & Bledsoe and Hoffman and Robertson, Att'ys, Filed Dec. 7, 1908. D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

81 Whereupon the 12th day of December 1908 said cause comes on for hearing on the defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's second amended petition, which ruling of the court in words and figures as following to-wit:

82 Court convened Dec. 12, 1908, at 9 o'clock A. M. pursuant to adjournment. Officers present, W. N. Maben, Presiding Judge; D. J. Norton, Clerk; John J. Davis, County Attorney; Chas. B. Wilson, Deputy County Attorney; L. E. Martin, Sheriff; W. L. Duckert, Court Reporter; R. Lee Waldrup, Court Crier;

Public Proclamation being ordered by the court and announced by the Crier for opening of court, the following proceedings were had and business done, to-wit:

No. 2808.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co., Defendant.

*Demurrer to Second Amended Petition.*

Comes now the plaintiff and defendant by their respective counsel, whereupon counsel for the defendant submits a general demurrer to the petition of said plaintiffs, and the court after hearing the argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, overrules said demurrer, — which ruling of the court counsel for the defense duly excepts. Thereupon said cause comes on for hearing on the special demurrer of defendant to plaintiff's petition and the court after hearing the argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises sustains the special demurrer to which ruling of the court counsel for plaintiffs duly excepts. On application, plaintiffs are given leave to amend *their* petition by an interlineation and the defendant is given ten days in which to file its answer to said amended petition.

83 Whereupon the 12th day of December 1908, the plaintiff files his amendment to his second amended petition, which amendment is in words and figures as following to-wit.

84     STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
              *Tenth Judicial District, ss:*

In the District Court of Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY CO., Defendant.

*Amended Petition.*

Now comes the plaintiff and for his cause of action herein further, complains and alleges:

1.

Amending by adding to his amended petition already filed herein *by adding* after the word "races" in the last line of paragraph Two on Page 1 of said petition, the following words; "and the said defendant, its agents and servants were informed by this plaintiff that the said mare, Nancy Alden, was a race mare, and she was being shipped there for said purpose."

C. E. ROBINSON,

By H. H. SMITH.

RITTENHOUSE & RITTENHOUSE,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

Endorsements on back of Amended Petition: No. 2808. Ent. District Court County of Lincoln. C. E. Robinson, Plaintiff vs. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., Defendant. Amended Petition, Rittenhouse & Rittenhouse, Attorneys for Plaintiff. Filed Dec. 12, 1908, D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

85     Whereupon the 29th day of December 1908 the defendant filed its answer to plaintiff's second amended petition and amendment thereto which answer is in words and figures as following to-wit:

86     In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Answer.*

Comes now the defendant above named and for its answer to the petition and amended petition of the plaintiff on file herein says:

First. That it admits its incorporation as alleged in said petition and denies each, all and every of the other allegations therein contained, except such as hereinafter specifically admitted.

Second. For a second and further defense to said petition and amended petition, this defendant alleges and avers the facts to be that on or about the 16th day of September, 1907, there was delivered to it at Kansas City, Missouri, four head of horses to be shipped to Lawrence, Kansas, and at said time the defendant and plaintiff herein, entered into a written contract governing the transportation of said horses, a true and correct copy of which said contract is hereto attached, marked "Exhibit A" and made a part of this answer.

That by the terms of said contract it was provided "First, That live stock covered by this contract is not to be transported within any specific time nor delivered at destination at any particular hour, nor in season for any particular market."

That said contract further provided:

Third. The shipper hereby represents and agrees that his live stock does not exceed in value the prices below named, it being understood that the rate given is based upon such limit of valuation, which is the highest value accepted for the lower rate (animals of a higher value being charged a higher rate); and in case of loss or damage from any cause for which the Company may be liable,

87 payment shall be made therefor only on the basis of the actual cash value at the time and place of shipment, but in no case to exceed the following, which is understood not to exceed the value as held by the shipper, to-wit:

Each horse or pony, gelding, mare or stallion, mule or jack per head, \$100."

Defendant alleges that said contract was entered into and executed by the parties hereto, the plaintiff and defendant herein, voluntarily and for a valid consideration and that said contract is the only contract entered into and executed by said parties governing the shipment of said cattle.—Defendant avers that is said injury happened as alleged in said petition, that this defendant's liability cannot exceed the sum of \$100.00 for said injuries so sustained, as alleged in said petition.

That said contract further provided:

"Seventh. The shipper further agrees, that at the end of every division or wherever the train conductor shall be changed, on request of the conductor, the party in charge of the stock (and if there be more than one, all of them) shall make out and sign a statement, (causing the signature or signatures to be witnessed by some third party) showing fully the condition of the stock, the damage, if any, thereto, and the time and place and cause thereof, and the delay if any, on such division, and the time and cause, thereof, and everything unusual or exceptional that may have occurred to the stock, specifying all of his complaints as to the manner in which the train and stock were handled on such division, and to deliver the same to the conductor on that division; and whenever the same shall be unloaded at any station before they leave such station, the party in charge (and if more than one, all of them) shall make, sign and deliver to the station master a statement of the



88 condition of said stock and of any thing unusual or exceptional that may have occurred at said station, specifying all complaints as to the manner in which the stock have been handled or treated at such station and the shipper shall be conclusively stopped from denying the truth of such statements or any or every of them, and the failure to deliver any and every of such statements herein provided shall conclusively bar and discharge any right of action of the shipper for loss or damage to said stock from whatever cause."

Defendant alleges that said contract was entered into and executed by the parties hereto, the plaintiff and defendant herein, voluntarily and for valid consideration and that said contract is the only contract entered into and executed by said parties governing the shipment of said horses. That the plaintiff or anyone acting for him, who was in charge of said stock, made out and signed statements showing the condition of said stock, the damage thereto, if any, or the time and place and cause thereof, nor did the plaintiff or anyone for him serve such notice on the conductor in charge of said train or agent in charge of the station at Lawrence, Kansas, where this defendant has such agent, or gave to said agent any notice by the provisions of said contract, nor gave to its station master or any one in charge of said station authorized to receive any such notice and the defendant alleges and avers the fact to be that no such notice was served upon its conductor in charge of the train upon which said stock were transported, or upon, its station master or agent at the city of Lawrence.

That said contract further provided:

Eighth. In order that any loss or damage to be claimed by the shipper may be fully and fairly investigated and the fact and nature of such claim or loss preserved beyond dispute and by the best evidence, it is agreed that as a condition precedent to his right to recover any damages for any loss or injury to his said stock during the transportation thereof, or at any place or places where *where*

89 the same may be loaded or unloaded for any purposes on the Company's road, or previous to loading thereof for shipment, the shipper or his agent in charge of the stock will give notice in writing of his claim thereof to some officer of said company, or to the nearest station agent, or if delivered to the consignee at a point beyond the Company's road to the nearest station agent of the last carrier making such delivery, before such stock shall have been removed from the place of destination above mentioned, or from the place of delivery of the same to the consignee, and before such stock shall have been slaughtered or intermingled with other stock, and will not move such stock from said station or stock yard until the expiration of three hours after the giving of such notice; and a failure to comply in every respect with the terms of this clause shall be a complete bar to any recovery to any and all such damages. The written notice herein provided for cannot and shall not be waived by any person except the general officer of the company, and he only in writing. Nor shall any such damage be recoverable unless writ-

ten claim therefor be presented to the company within ninety-one days after the same may have occurred."

Defendant alleges that said contract was entered into and executed by the parties hereto, the plaintiff and defendant herein voluntarily and for valid consideration; that said contract is the only contract entered into and executed by the parties hereto governing the shipment of said horses. Defendant avers that the horse- were unloaded and taken from the cars at Lawrence, Kansas, at which place this defendant had a station agent, that when plaintiff unloaded said horses he was well aware of their condition and knew whether they

had sustained any injury or damage, and that the plaintiff  
90 nor any one acting for him, prior to the commencement of this action or before the removal of said horses from the car, made any demand in writing for any damages sustained and never at any time gave notice in writing of the plaintiff's claim for damages, loss or injury to such stock, to the defendant or any of its officers or agents, before such stock was removed from the place of destination and before such stock was intermingled with other stock. Defendant further alleges that plaintiff or any one acting for him, made any written claim or presented the same to this Company within ninety-one days after said damages were alleged to have occurred.

Said contract further provided:

"Twelfth, it is distinctly agreed that all prior understanding concerning the furnishing of cars or facilities for said shipment or concerning the transportation of said stock for said shipment, are hereby merged and contained in this written agreement, and this written agreement contains all the terms, conditions and provisions relating in any manner to the shipment or transportation of said stock; and said shipper hereby expressly waives all claims for damage arising from breach of any prior agreement with respect to the transportation of said stock or the furnishing of cars therefor, and hereby released the company from any and all liability therefor."

Defendant alleges that said contract was entered into and executed by said parties hereto, the plaintiff and defendant herein, voluntarily and for valid consideration and that said contract is the only contract entered into and executed by the parties governing the shipment of said horses; that if the plaintiff had any understanding with the agent of this defendant, at Kansas City at the time said stock were delivered to this defendant, that all prior negotiations in relation to the transportation of said stock are merged in this contract of shipment.

91 That said contract heretofore referred to and hereto attached marked "Exhibit A" and made a part of this answer, was entered into and executed in the State of Missouri and that said contract is a Missouri contract and under the terms and conditions of said contract, its performance was to be and was in the State of Kansas that there is no specific statute in force in the State of Missouri governing said contract of shipment, but the law as interpreted by the Appellate and Supreme Courts of the said State of Missouri, has upheld the said contract and the terms and conditions thereof

have been held to be valid and binding between parties entering into the same; that under the laws of the State of Kansas, in which said contract was to be performed, the First, Third, Eighth and Twelfth provisions and the other provisions of said contract, except as are hereinafter specifically alleged, have been upheld by the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, as valid and binding between the parties entering into said contract; that under the statute of the State of Kansas, Section 13, Chp. 124, Laws of 1883, (Sec. 17, Chp. 69, Gen. St. 1897) provides: "No railroad company shall be permitted, except as otherwise provided by regulation or order of the Board of Railroad Commissioners, to change or limit its common law liability as a common carrier."

That the Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of Kansas have by an order and rule permitted the common carriers in the State of Kansas to limit their common law liability by a stipulation in the contract for shipment, live stock, limiting the amount for which the railroad company shall be liable in case of loss or injury, and the said Board has by its permission and order made said provision of said contract valid and binding between the parties thereto.

That there is no special statute in force in the State of Kansas affecting the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Twelfth provisions of said contract, but said provisions and by the laws of the state of Kansas as determined by the judicial proceedings of the said State of Kansas, are in full force and effect and are valid and binding provisions.

Wherefore, defendant having fully answered prays that it may go hence and recover its costs herein expended without delay.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,  
GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Defendant.*

*Affidavit.*

STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
*County of Logan:*

Geo. M. Green, of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon his oath, says that he is one of the attorneys of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company in the State of Oklahoma, and one of the attorneys in the above case. That he has read the above and foregoing answer to said plaintiff's petition and amended petition herein and knows the contents hereof and that each and all and every of the allegations contained and set forth in said answer are true in substance and in fact, as he is informed and verily believes; that he makes this verification, because the general officers of said defendant, which is a corporation organized and doing business under the State of Kansas, are absent from the State of Oklahoma.

GEO. M. GREEN.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of November A. D. 1908.

[SEAL.]

BERTHA SCHUPP,  
*Notary Public.*

My Commission expires July 2, 1910.

93      Endorsements on back of Answer: No. 2808 Ent. In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma, C. E. Robinson, Plaintiff, vs. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, Defendant. Answer. Filed Dec. 29, 1908. D. J. Morton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

94                      Form 67-A. Regular.

Read this Contract carefully as numerous changes have been made.

*Live Stock Contract (Limited Liability).*

The Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company.

Rules and Regulations for the Transportation of Live Stock.

NOTICE—This Railway has two rates on Live Stock.

The rate given under this contract is lower than the rate made by the Railway Company and connections for the transportation of stock at carriers' risk, and without limitation of liability, and is based upon the conditions and agreements found in this contract and upon the valuation therein fixed. The shipper by accepting this contract is deemed to accept the lower rate upon the terms and conditions specified as part of this contract:

No station agent or station master of this Company has any authority to agree for the Company that cars shall be furnished at his or any other station for shipment of Live Stock at any special rate, or that any particular kind or class of car will be furnished for such purpose, or that Live Stock will be forwarded on any particular train, or be delivered at destination at any special time or for any particular market, or to transport stock beyond the line of this Company's road. No one but a general officer of the Company has power to make such contract.

No. of cars,      Initials,  
                     ——— A. T. 29297.

This agreement made at Kansas City, Mo., Station, 916, 1907, between and on behalf of the above named Railway Company, hereinafter called the Company and the connecting carriers severally, of the first part, and H. F. Moore of K. C., hereinafter called

95      the shipper, of the second part.

Whereas the Company transports live stock as per rules and regulations, all of which are made a part of this contract.

Now, therefore, in consideration of the foregoing and of the mutual covenants and conditions hereinafter contained, the Company agrees to transport for the shipper, upon its own road only, but at the lower rate applicable to this form of live stock described below, as herein provided, viz:

One car, said to contain four head of horses, consigned to H. F. Moore, at Lawrence, Kansas, to be carried by said Company to said place of destination, if the same be upon the road of said Company, but if such destination be beyond the road of said company, then to deliver or tender such shipment at the connecting point on the lines of its road to any convenient connecting carrier, selected by it, to be forwarded to the place of destination, and on so delivering or tendering to such connecting carrier all liability whatever of the Company for carriage of said stock shall be thereby ended, it be understood that the Company assumes no liability whatever on account of the carriage of said stock beyond its road, and that the Company shall not be liable for any damage to, injury or delay of said stock, or for anything whatever that may happen to the same after such delivery or tender of delivery in case such connecting carrier shall refuse to receive the same. Each carrier in the route shall receive such stock when delivered to it and transport the same over its road to a succeeding carrier, and the responsibility of each carrier shall not begin until it receives said stock from the consignor or from the connecting carrier.

It is also agreed that the Company shall not be held liable for any damages whatever that may accrue to the shipper or to the stock (in case the other carrier or carriers shall refuse to receive, carry or deliver the stock on payment or tender of said rates) beyond the difference between the amount the shipper may have been compelled to pay and the rate given, but in no event in excess of the lower joint through tariff rate in force and applicable to shipments under this form of contract; thirty days' notice in writing shall be first *begin* by the shipper before such refund shall be made. The guaranty of any through rate shall not in any wise be construed to extend the liability of the Company beyond its road or for delivery or tender thereof, except as hereinbefore stated.

Where the live stock is delivered at the Union Stock Yards, Chicago, Illinois, the lower rate applicable to this contract shall include also the terminal charge of \$2.00 per car as provided in the Tariffs in addition to the rate in Chicago, for transfer from Corwith station of the A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. in Chicago to and delivery at said Union Stock Yards, the rate to Chicago covering only transportation to and Corwith station; which terminal charge and rate the shipper agrees to pay.

In consideration of the foregoing, it is further mutually agreed *agreed* between the parties hereto as follows:

First. That the live stock covered by this contract is not to be transported within any specific time nor delivered at destination at any particular hour, nor in season for any particular *hour, nor in season for any particular marked.*

Second. The Company will stop cars for watering or feeding only at such of its stations as it has at the time adequate facilities for such purposes, and only when requested to do so in writing by the shipper or attendant in charge; and the second party shall not confine his stock in the cars for a longer period than 28 consecutive hours, with-

out unloading same for rest, feeding and watering for a period of at least 5 consecutive hours unless prevented from so doing by storms or other accidental causes.

97 Third. The shipper hereby represents and agrees that his live stock does not exceed in value the prices below named, it being understood that the rate given is based upon such limit of valuation, which is the highest value accepted for the lower rate (animals of higher value being charged a higher rate); and in case of loss or damage from any cause for which the company may be liable, payment shall be made therefor only on the basis of the actual cash value at the time and place of shipment, but in no case to exceed the following, which is understood not to exceed the value as held by the shipper, to-wit:

For each horse or pony, gelding, mare or stallion, mule or jack, per head.....	\$100.
Each ox, bull or steer, per head.....	50.
Each cow, " " .....	30.00
Each calf, " " .....	10.
Each hog, " " .....	10.
Each sheep or goat, " " .....	3.

Fourth. The shipper agrees at his own cost and expense to properly bed the cars in which the stock are to be transported, and in all respects to put them in proper condition for shipment of said stock, and also agrees before the cars in which said stock is to be transported leave said first named station, that he will carefully examine the same, and that if any defect or deficiency whatever be found in any of said cars, that he will at once report the fact to the station agent of the Company and demand in writing another car or cars in lieu thereof; and if the shipper shall fail to make such demand, it shall then be conclusively presumed that said cars and each of them are in all respects suitable for transportation of said stock and the shipper agrees to assume and hold the Company not liable for any damage that may occur to the stock on account of any defect in the cars, or any of them, which were not so reported to the Company's said agent in writing.

98 The shipper further agrees to see that the cars are securely fastened, so as to prevent the escape of stock therefrom, and that he will not hold the Company responsible for any loss or damage that may result from failure or neglect on his part or of his agents or employes, to do so and also agrees to assume all risk of injury or loss of or to said stock because of any defect in said cars or because of the stock being wild, unruly, weak, or maiming each other or themselves, or because of heat, suffocation or other results of being crowded in the cars, or of being injured or destroyed by fire on any account whatever and especially because of the burning of hay, straw or other material used in bedding or feeding the stock, or for any other purpose; and for injury or damage to said stock while in transit, it shall be presumed that the same resulted from overloading

by the shipper or from the neglect or inattention of the shipper or his employes, for which the Company shall in no respect be liable.

Fifth. That at his or their own risk and expense, the shipper will load the stock at the first named station, take cars of, feed and water and attend to some while they may be in the stock yards of the company or lots awaiting shipment, and while the same is being loaded, transported, unloaded and reloaded, and to load, unload and reload the same at feeding and transfer or other points wherever the same may be unloaded for any purpose whatever, and will properly attend to and care for the stock while in the cars in transit or otherwise, and hereby agrees that the Company shall not be liable for any loss or damages to said stock while being so in the shipper's charge, and so cared for and attended to by the shipper or his or their employes as aforesaid; and in cases where the Company shall furnish laborers to assist in the loading, unloading or reloading of said stock, it is understood they are furnished for the accommodation of the shipper, and they shall be entirely subject to the shipper's orders, and shall be deemed the shipper's employes while so engaged.

99 and the Company shall in no wise be liable for their acts or negligence.

Sixth. The shipper hereby assumes and releases the Company from risk of injury or loss which may be sustained by reason of any delay in such transportation of said stock, or injury thereto, caused by any mob, strike, threatened or actual violence to real or personal property or by the refusal of the Company's employes to work or otherwise, or by failure of machinery, engines or cars, or in to tracks or yards, storms, washouts, escape or robbery of any of said stock, overloading cars, fright to animals, in crowding one upon another, or from any and all other causes whatever; the liability of the carrier or any fact essential thereto in any instance or case shall not be presumed, but the burden of establishing such liability is assumed by the shipper in the event of a suit.

Seventh. The shipper further agrees, that at *this* end of every division or wherever the train conductor shall be changed, on request of the conductor, the party in charge of the stock (and if there be more than one, all of them) shall make out and sign a statement (causing the signature or signatures to be witnessed by some third party) showing fully the condition of the stock, the damage, if any, thereto, and the time and place and cause thereof and the delays, if any, on such division, and the time and cause thereof, and everything unusual or exceptional that may have occurred to the stock, specifying all his complaints as to the manner in which the train and stock were handled on such division, and to deliver the same to the conductor on that division; and whenever the same shall be unloaded at any station, before they leave such station, the party in charge (and if more than one, all of them) shall make, sign and deliver to the station master a statement of the condition of said stock

100 and of anything unusual or exceptional that may have occurred at such station, specifying all complaints as to the manner in which the stock have been handled or treated at such station, and the shipper shall be conclusively estopped from denying the truth of such statements or any or every of them and



the failure to deliver any and every of such statements herein provided shall conclusively bar and discharge any right of action of the shipper for loss or damage to said stock from whatever cause.

Eight. In order that any loss or damage to be claimed by the shipper may be fully and fairly investigated and the fact and nature of such claim or loss preserved beyond dispute and by the best evidence, it is agreed that as a condition precedent to his right to recover any damages for any loss or injury to his said stock during the transportation thereof, or at any place or places where the same may be loaded or unloaded for any purpose on the Company's road, or previous to loading thereof for shipment, the shipper or his agent in charge of the stock will give notice in writing of his claim therefor to some officer of said company, or to the nearest station agent, or if delivered to consignee at a point beyond the Company's road, to the nearest station agent of the last carrier making such delivery, before such stock shall have been removed from the place of destination above mentioned, or from the place of delivery of the same to the consignee, and before such stock shall have been slaughtered or intermingled with other stock, and will not move such stock from said station or stock yards until the expiration of three hours after the giving of such notice and a failure to comply in every respect with the terms of this clause shall be a complete bar to any recovery of any and all such damages. The written notice herein provided for cannot and shall not be waived by any person except a general officer of the Company, and he only in writing. Nor shall any such damage be recoverable unless written claim therefor shall be presented to the Company within ninety-one days after the same may have occurred.

101 Ninth. It is further agreed that no suit or action against the Company for any damages accruing or arising out of said shipment or of any contract pertaining to the same, or the furnishing of facilities for such shipment, shall be sustained in any court of law or equity unless such suit or action shall be commenced within six months next after the loss or damage shall have occurred: The failure to institute suit within said time shall be deemed conclusive evidence against the validity of such *of* cause of action, and shall be a complete bar to such suit.

In the event this agreement for institution of suit within six months should be held invalid, then no such suit or action shall be maintainable unless instituted within two years next after the occurrence of the loss or damage, and the expiration of such two years shall be a complete bar to any recovery of damages.

Tenth. And whereas the through rate made for the said transportation to destination, and guaranteed by the above named company, is the rate fixed by said Company and the companies or carriers operating the connecting lines of railroad to the point of destination in their tariffs or schedules for similar shipments at owner's risk, in view of the limitations and exemptions contained in the agreement, and is less than the rate fixed where such shipments are made without limitation of liability, or at carrier's risk.

It is further understood and agreed that each and all of the provisions, limitations and exemption- in this contract applicable to or



in favor of the Company, shall also apply to and inure separately in favor of each of the several connecting carriers to the point of destination, and that each of such carriers shall only be obligated to transport said stock over its own road and deliver to a connecting carrier, and the last carrier to the place of destination under the provisions of this agreement, and no carrier or carriers shall be liable to any event, for any loss or damage which may occur upon the road or roads, connecting or otherwise, of any other carrier or carriers;

102      that each of the connecting carriers shall transport said stock over its own road under said through rate, in accordance with the provisions of this agreement and that this agreement is entered into by the above named Company in its own behalf and as agent for, and, severally and not jointly, on behalf of each of the connecting carriers operating roads forming part of the route over which said stock may be shipped to the point of destination above mentioned; that no other contract need be executed to cover the movement of the shipment over the line of any carrier in the route, it being understood that this contract is hereby adopted by the shipper and each of such carriers accepting the shipment as the several contracts between said shipper and each of such carriers respectively, providing for their mutual rights and obligations.

Where any succeeding or connecting carrier, in case the live stock are to be forwarded beyond any road, shall decline to accept and carry at the through rate except under its own regular form of live stock contract (limited liability) then (if the shipper or some agent for him shall not accompany the shipment) any agent of the carrier tendering or forwarding the shipment is hereby authorized by the shipper to execute on his behalf any such live stock contract for transportation over such connecting line, so that the shipper may receive the benefit of any through or lower rate applicable under such contract.

Eleventh. The shipper shall hold the carrier harmless from any and all claims for injuries to persons accompanying said cattle for said shipper, resulting from the carrier's or employee's negligence or otherwise, and will indemnify it for any damages it may be required to pay by reason thereof, or any expense it may be put to or damages it may be required to pay by reason of the introduction of said cattle into a county, territory or state against the quarantine or other laws of the United States or of any state, territory, people or community. In case the carrier shall be obliged to pay damages

103      on account of the loss or injury to said cattle, it shall be subrogated to the shipper's right to pay any insurance thereon.

It is also expressly agreed that the Company shall not be liable for any mistake or inaccuracy in any information furnished by the Company or any of its agents or officers as to quarantine regulations, state or federal, it being expressly understood that if any such information is furnished by the Company, is furnished as pure gratuity, and without any warrant or guarantee of its accuracy.

Twelfth. It is distinctly agreed that all prior undertakings, concerning the furnishing of cars or facilities for said shipment or concerning the transportation of said stock or said shipment, are hereby

merged and contained in this written agreement, and this written agreement contains all the terms, conditions and provisions relating in any manner to the shipment or transportation of said stock; and said shipper hereby expressly waives all claim for damage arising from breach of any prior agreement with respect to the transportation of said stock or the furnishing of cars therefor, and hereby release the Company from any and all liability therefor.

Thirteenth. In making this contract the shipper expressly acknowledges that he has had the option of making this shipment under the tariff rates either at carrier's risk or at a limited liability, and that he has selected the rate and liability named herein, and expressly accepts and agrees to all the stipulations herein named.

Fourteenth. If the whole or any part of any provision of this instrument shall be adjudged void by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction, the remaining provisions of parts of provisions, in themselves valid, shall not be affected thereby, but shall be as valid and enforceable as if the invalid provision or part of provision had not been inserted herein.

104 The signature of the shipper or his agent hereto is and shall be a conclusive evidence that said second party fully understands and assents to all the provisions and conditions of the foregoing contract.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE  
RAILWAY COMPANY AND CONNECT-  
ING CARRIERS (SEVERALLY),

By D. S. FARLEY,  
D., *Its Agent*.

H. F. MOORE, *Shipper*,  
By S. E. DU BOIS, *Agent*.

NOTE.—Agents must see that this contract is signed *the* the shipper, or in his name by his authorized agent before commencing to load any of said stock, and that all *tanks* are filled *ina* and point of destination inserted must not be beyond a line road in the Santa Fe Route, unless special instructions otherwise provide.

Not negotiable.

"Exhibit A."

On Back of Live Stock Contract.

We the undersigned owners of the live

We the undersigned owners of the live stock mentioned in the within contract, in consideration of the free the within contract, in consideration of the free pass granted, issued by the within named Company, over its and issued by the within named Company, over its and connecting lines, hereby agree that the within named Company, and hereby agree that the within named Company, and each and every connecting carrier which may honor said pass,

connecting carrier which may honor said pass, shall not be liable to any of us for any injury or damages of any to any of us for any injury or damages of any kind suffered by us or any of us while in charge of said live stock us or any of us while in charge of said live stock or while in course of transportation — on our return course of transportation or on our return passage.

And whereas travel by freight trains is necessarily more dangerous than upon passenger trains, *we* hereby assume all risks incident thereto and of the manner in which such trains are operated, and we agree to identify ourselves and each of us whenever required to do so by any conductor and we hereby release  
 105 said Company, and each and every connecting carrier which may honor said pass, from all liability for any injury or damage suffered by any of us, if injured while violating any regulations of said Company, and we further agree to specially observe the following regulations:

First. Remain in a safe place in the caboose attached to the car while the train is in motion.

Second. Get on and off said caboose only while the same is still or stationary.

Third. Will not get on or be on any freight car while switching is being or is to be done at stations or other places or at any other time.

Fourth. Will not walk or stand on any track or station or other places at night without a lantern, and will not be upon or attempt to cross any track while switching is being or is about to be done thereon, but will first use every effort to ascertain whether it is — usually made safe to alight from trains, but are advised of the fact that freight trains frequently stop upon bridges and at places along the line of the road where it is not safe to alight from the caboose without first ascertaining by examining the surrounding ground that it is safe to alight thereat, and will therefore not attempt to alight from the caboose or car whenever the car may stop for any purpose without first making careful examination from the steps of the caboose (with a lighted lantern if at night time) and ascertain the condition of the ground, and first determine by every available means that it is safe to step down from the caboose or car at such place or places, and in this respect will not rely — except at our own risk, on any assurance or statement of the conductor or other railway employé.

In consideration of the foregoing and of the free transportation, we and each of us hereby agree to assume all the risk of injury from alight-, from the caboose or car on account of the condition of  
 106 the ground or on any account, and agree that in case of an accident, wreck, mishap or other casualty, however caused, in which we or either of us may or shall receive any personal injury, the one so injured shall notify in writing the Company or carrier upon whose road the accident or casualty may have happened through his home agent or through the nearest and most convenient local agent of such Company or carrier, of such injury, and of the

time, place and all the circumstances and extent thereof, and of the names and addresses of witnesses, within thirty days after the happening of such injury, and as a condition precedent to the right to maintain any suit or action or recovery on account of such alleged injury; and it is understood that such notice in writing cannot be waived by such home or local agent of the Company or carrier; and we and each of us further agree that we or any of us shall not have any cause or right of action to maintain any action for any injury except that of which notice as aforesaid shall be given to said Company or carrier, as aforesaid, and that no Company or carrier shall be liable for or on account of any injury or damage occurring on the road of any other Company or carrier.

H. F. MOORE,

*Parties in Charge of and Accompanying Live Stock.*

L. E. DU BOIS, Witness.

Endorsements on back of answer: No. 2807. Ent. In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma. H. E. Moore, C. E. Robinson, S. H. Smith, Plaintiffs vs. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, Defendant. Answer. Filed Dec. 29, 1908. D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Okla.

107 Whereupon the 26th day of March 1909, the plaintiff filed his motion to strike the defendant's answer to plaintiff's second amended petition which motion is in words and figures the following to-wit:

108 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Motion.*

Comes now the plaintiff in the above entitled action and moves the Court to strike all of the answer of the defendant filed herein to the petition and amended petition of the plaintiff, of the second paragraph on page five (5) beginning with the words "that the Contract" etc., inclusive of the balance of page five (5) and all of said paragraph to the word "wherefore" on page six (6) for the reason that the same is redundant and irrelevant and for the further reason that the said answer shows that the contract therein plead in said answer was executed on or about the 16th day of September, 1907, at Kansas City, Missouri, and that thereafter the horses which were subject matter of said contract, were shipped from Kansas City in the State of Missouri to Lawrence in the state of Kansas, and from said allegations in said answer and the subject matter of said contract this court herein takes judicial knowledge of the fact that this was a contract for the shipment of said horses

over said defendant's railway and was such a contract which was to be performed partly in the state of Missouri and partly in the State of Kansas. And that that portion of the answer herein which refers to the laws of Kansas control-ing said contract can form no part of the issues in this cause of action.

H. H. SMITH,

RITTENHOUSE & RITTENHOUSE,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

Endorsements on back of Motion: No. 2808. Ent. District Court, County of Lincoln, C. E. Robinson, Plaintiff vs. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. Defendant Motion Rittenhouse & Rittenhouse, Attorneys for Plaintiff. Filed March 26, 1909, D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

109 Whereupon the 13th day of April 1909, the plaintiff filed his demurrer to the defendant's answer which demurrer is in words and figures as following to-wit:

110 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Demurrer.*

Now comes the plaintiff and demurs to the second paragraph of the answer of the defendant filed herein to the plaintiff's petition and amended petition, on the ground that it appears upon the face of said answer that the same does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense in law.

H. H. SMITH,

RITTENHOUSE & RITTENHOUSE,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

Endorsements on back of Demurrer: No. 2808 Ent. District Court, County of Lincoln C. E. Robinson, Plaintiff, vs. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. Defendant. Demurrer. Rittenhouse & Rittenhouse, H. H. Smith, Attorneys for plaintiff. Filed Mar. 13 1909 D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

111 Whereupon the 13th day of April 1909, the defendant was given to April 19 1909 to investigate its authorities, which order of the court is in words and figures as follows to-wit:

112 Court convened April 13 1909, pursuant to adjournment officers present, W. N. Maben, Presiding Judge; D. J. Morton, Clerk; by W. L. Johnson, Deputy; John J. Davis, County At-

torney; L. E. Martin, Sheriff; W. L. Ducker, Court Reporter; and R. Lee Waldrip Court Crier.

Public proclamation ordered by the court and announced by the Crier for the opening of court, the following proceedings were had and business done, to-wit:

No. 2808.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE A., T. & S. F. RY. Co., Defendant.

Comes now the plaintiffs and defendant by their respective counsel, whereupon counsel for the plaintiff submits a motion to strike certain portion- of the defendant's answer, and on application defendants are given until April 19, 1909 to investigate authorities.

113 Whereupon the 19th day of April 1909, leave is granted the defendant to file its Amendment to their answer which order of the court is in words and figures, as follows, to-wit:

114 Court convened April 19 1909 at 9 o'clock A. M. pursuant to adjournment. Officers present W. N. Mahen, Presiding Judge; D. J. Norton, Clerk of the District Court; John J. Davis, County Attorney; L. E. Martin, Sheriff, W. L. Ducker, Court Reporter; R. Lee Waldrip, County Crier.

Public proclamation ordered by the court and announced by the crier for the opening of court, the following proceedings were had and business done to-wit:

No. 2808.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co., Defendant.

On application leave is given defendant to file amendment to its answer, and it is further ordered by the court that said cause be set for trial May 3, 1909.

115 Whereupon the 19th day of April, the defendant filed its amendment to *their* answer, which amendment is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:

116 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma,

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Defendant.

*Amended Answer.*

Comes now the defendant and by leave of court as had and obtained, filed the following amendment to its answer, not waiving any matter pleaded in the said answer, and filing the following amendment as supplemental thereto and as an amendment thereto.

The defendant alleges and avers the fact to be that said shipment was from the State of Missouri into the State of Kansas, and was, therefore, an Interstate shipment, and said shipment was made upon a tariff of rates, which was duly filed and approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and which said tariff had been posted in this defendant's depots, both at Kansas City, Missouri, and at Lawrence, Kansas, and which was in full force and effect at the time said shipment moved; that said tariff was promulgated, filed and published in accordance with an Act of Congress, commonly known as the Interstate Commerce Act, which was approved June 29th, 1906; that by said tariff which was filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and posted as provided by law, as above set out, and which was approved by the said Interstate Commerce Commission, and which was the legal tariff governing Interstate shipments of freight and live stock, it was provided as follows:

"(A) Rates named in section two apply on shipments of ordinary live stock, where contracts are executed by shippers on blanks furnished by these companies, and are bases on the declared valuation by the shipper at time contract is signed, not to exceed the following:

117 Each horse or pony (gelding, mare, stallion), mule or jack \$100.00. Each ox, bull or steer \$50.00. Each cow, \$30.00<sup>14</sup>. Each calf, \$10.00. Each hog, \$10.00. Each sheep or goat, \$3.00.

(B) Where the declared value exceeds the above an addition of twenty-five per cent will be added to the rate for each one hundred per cent or fractional part thereof of additional declared valuation per head. Animals exceeding in value \$800.00 per head will be taken only by special arrangement.

(C) Table of rates named will be charged on shipments of live stock made with limitation of company's liability at common law, and under this status shippers will have the choice of executing or accepting contracts for shipments of live stock with or without limitation of liability and rates accordingly."

That said shippers obtained the benefit of such reduced rate applicable to the value fixed in the written contract governing said shipment of horses; that said shipment set out in the petition was

made in all respects, under the said tariff so filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the same is in all respects governed by the Act of Congress of the United States, above set out, commonly known as the Interstate Commerce Act, and that the Rights and liabilities of the defendant to this action are determined and fixed by said Act of Congress, and in deciding the rights of the parties hereunder a consideration of said Act of Congress is necessary and that the rights and liabilities of the parties to this action cannot be fixed or determined except by a construction of said Act of Congress.

That the liability of the defendant under this Bill of Lading and the construction of the said Act of Congress has never been clearly and unequivocally adjudicated and settled by the Supreme Court of the United States and that the construction of said statute in  
118 respect to the questions presented herein under said Bill of Lading are still unsettled by said Supreme Court.

And defendant further alleges that there is a controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant and in this action, above set out, and that the decision of this case and of the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto requires an adjudication as to proper construction of said Act of Congress and a settlement of the controversy between the parties as to the meaning and effect thereof;

Wherefore defendant prays judgment as in the answer, to which this is an amendment, prayed.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,  
HOFFMAN & ROBERTSON,  
GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Defendant.*

Endorsements on back of Amendment: No. 2808. Ent. District Court, Lincoln County. C. E. Robinson vs. A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co. Amendment to Answer. Filed April 19, 1909. D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

119 Whereupon the 28th day of June, 1909, the plaintiff filed his motion to strike defendant's amended answer to plaintiff's amended petition which motion is in words and figures as following, to-wit:

120 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,  
vs.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Motion.*

Comes now the plaintiff in the above entitled action and moves the court to strike all of the answer of the defendant filed herein to the petition and amended petition of the plaintiff, of the second paragraph on page five (5), beginning with the words "that said



contract," etc., inclusive of the balance of page five (5), and all of said paragraph to the word "wherefore" on page six (6), for the reason that the same is redundant and irrelevant, and for the further reason that the said answer shows that the contract therein plead in said answer was executed on or about the 16th day of September, 1907, at Kansas City, Missouri, and that thereafter the horses which were the subject matter of said contract, were shipped from Kansas City in the state of Missouri to Lawrence in the State of Kansas, and from said allegation in said answer and the subject matter of said contract this Court herein takes judicial knowledge of the fact that this was a contract for the shipment of said horses over said defendant's railway and was such a contract which was to be performed partly in the state of Missouri and partly in the state of Kansas. And that that portion of the answer herein which refers to the laws of Kansas as controlling said contract can form no part of the issues in this cause of action.

H. H. SMITH,  
RITTENHOUSE & RITTENHOUSE,  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

121      Endorsements on back of Motion: No. 2808 Ent. District Court of Lincoln County. C. E. Robinson, Plaintiff, vs. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, Defendant. Motion. Filed March 26, 1909, D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

122      Whereupon the 9th day of July 1909, the plaintiff filed *their* supplemental motion to strike defendant's answer to the plaintiff's amended petition which motion is in words and figures the following to-wit:

123      STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
*Tenth Judicial District, ss:*

In the District Court of Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY CO., Defendant.

*Motion to Strike.*

Comes now the above named plaintiff and after obtaining leave of the Court herein moved to strike from the answer of the defendant all of said answer, beginning with the word "second" on page one in line eight down to the word "wherefore" on page six, line fifteen of said answer on the following grounds to-wit: First. That said second paragraph of said answer is irrelevant, redundant and frivolous.

Second. That said answer contains no allegations which constitute a legal defense to plaintiffs cause of action.

Third. That the allegations in said answer and alleged contract therein set out constitute no legal defense to plaintiff's cause of action under the laws of Missouri where said contract was executed. Fourth. And all of said amended answer because same is no defense in law.

H. F. MOORE,  
By H. H. SMITH,  
RITTENHOUSE & RITTENHOUSE,  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

Endorsements on back of Motion to Strike: No. 2808 Ent. Motion. Original. Filed July 9, 1909, D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

124 Whereupon the 12th day of July 1909, said cause comes on for hearing upon the plaintiff's motion and supplemental motion to strike the defendant's answer and amendment thereto to plaintiff's amended petition, which motion is by the court overruled and is in words and figures the following to-wit:

125 No. 2808.  
C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,  
vs.  
THE A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co., Defendant.

Comes now the plaintiffs and the defendant by their respective counsel whereupon counsel for the plaintiff submits a motion to strike defendant's answer and the amendment thereto from the files. And the court being fully advised in the premises overrules said motion, to which ruling of the court counsel for the plaintiff duly excepts.

On application plaintiff is given ten days to file reply. .

126 Whereupon the 12th day of July 1909, the plaintiff filed his reply to the defendant's amended answer which reply is in words and figures the following to-wit:

127 STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
*Tenth Judicial District, ss:*

In the District Court of Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,  
vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY Co., Defendant.

*Reply.*

Comes now the above entitled plaintiffs in this action herein and after obtaining due leave of court to file their reply to defendant's

answer and amended answer deny each and every allegation therein contained, and affirmatively allege, that if a binding contract was entered into at the time of the shipment herein with these plaintiffs or their agent, which is denied, limiting recovery for each horse and the said mare to one hundred dollars, that said value was arbitrarily printed in said contract of shipment as evidenced by said answer and no value was fixed by the shipper, and no representation made to the defendant company or its agent that said mare was worth not exceeding one hundred dollars, and no such value was relied on by the defendant in fixing a lower rate of shipment, which plaintiffs allege was the regular and not a lower rate, and that said contract if as alleged in the original and amended answer was made in and *and* was a Missouri Contract, which plaintiffs admit, it was not a contract of limitation, and that portion of said contract is inapplicable and void under the laws of said state and for the further reason defendant and its agent and servant knew, or in the exercise of caution and ordinary care should have known that the value of said mare was greatly disproportionate to the alleged fixed value in said contract of shipment.

H. H. SMITH,

RITTENHOUSE AND RITTENHOUSE,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

128      Endorsement on back of reply: No. 2808 Ent. Reply.  
Filed July 12 1909, D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court,  
Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

129      Whereupon the 20th day of August 1909, the defendant  
files its Demurrer to the plaintiff's reply to the defendant's  
Amended Answer, and Amended Thereto, which demurrer is in  
words and figures as follows, to-wit:

130      In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Defendant.

Comes now the above named defendant and demurs to the reply of the plaintiff in the above entitled action and for grounds of said demurrer alleges that said reply does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the answer and amended answer of the defendant on file herein.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,

CHAS. B. WILSON, JR.,

*Attorneys for Defendant.*

Endorsements on back of Demurrer: No. 2808 Ent. In the District Court of Lincoln County, Oklahoma. C. E. Robinson, Plain-

tiff, vs. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, Defendant, Demurrer. Filed Aug. 20 1909. D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

131 Whereupon the 6th day of December 1909, the plaintiffs — their exceptions to the depositions of W. R. Smith and James T. Gilmore, which exceptions *is* in words and figures as following to-wit:

132 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

A., T. & S. F. RY. Co., Defendant.

*General Exceptions to Depositions of Judge W. R. Smith.*

Now comes the plaintiff in the above entitled action and excepts to and moves the court to suppress so much of the deposition of Judge W. R. Smith, taken at Topeka, Kansas, in this case to be read on behalf of the defendant as to the law of Kansas in relation to notice of claim for damages and the limitation of the liability of the defendant to \$100 and to the 8th clause of said contract plead in defendant's answer and to the 3rd clause plead in said answer as to the degree of negligence for the reasons: 1. That said contract of shipment alleged in defendant's answer was made, if at all, as therein alleged, under the laws of the United States, Governing Interstate shipments and the deposition of said Smith has no application to the issues in this case, and is incomplete irrelevant and immaterial. The said deposition to state purporting the law of Kansas, and the law of Kansas having no application to the issue in this case except, if at all, on the construction of the law, as a question of law to the Court, and not a question of fact to the jury. 2. For a further reason that the purported contract alleged in defendant's answer in support of which the deposition is offered, is and would be void under the laws governing Interstate shipment, the same being incomplete, irrelevant and immaterial, and tending to prove none of the issues involved in this case as questions of fact.

C. E. ROBINSON, *Plaintiff.*

H. H. SMITH,  
RITTENHOUSE & RITTENHOUSE,

*His Attorneys.*

Endorsements on back of General Exceptions to depositions of Judge W. H. Smith, No. 2808 Ent. C. E. Robinson vs. A. T. S. F. Exceptions. Filed Dec. 6, 1909. D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

133 Whereupon the 17th day of December 1909, the defendant filed its objection to the depositions of H. F. Moore, which exception to depositions is in words and figures, as follows, to-wit:

134 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Defendant.

*Objections to Depositions.*

Comes now the above named defendant in the above entitled action and makes the following exceptions to depositions on file in the above entitled case, as follows, to-wit:

*Deposition of H. F. Moore.*

Defendant objects to question 6 and the answer thereto:

Q. How fast did you ever see her pace and what is the fastest time you ever saw her pace?

A. I saw her pace a mile in 2.16½ and a good many miles in better than 2:20. She was never cut loose to go at the top of her speed in any of these races.

Defendant objects to the question for the reason that the same is not a proper measure of damages and for the reason that the answer of the witness is not responsive and is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

Defendant objects to question 12 and the answer thereto:

Q. State what in your opinion was her market value on or about September 20, 1907, previous to her alleged injury.

A. She was worth and would have brought anywhere from fifteen hundred to two thousand dollars.

Defendant objects to the question for the reason that it tends to vary the terms of a written contract of shipment and to the answer thereto for the reason that the same is incompetent irrelevant and immaterial.

Defendant objects to question 13 and to the answer thereto:

135 Q. How much could she earn or was her earning capacity before her alleged injury by the defendant?

A. She was winning every time she started. The week before she was injured she earned \$250.00. I think she could have earned every week that amount of money.

Defendant objects to the question for the reason that it tends to vary the terms of a written contract and to the answer of the witness for the reason that the same is based upon supposition and what the witness thinks and is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

Defendant objects to question 14 and to that portion of the answer as follows:

Q. Do you know how she was injured, if so, state how it occurred.

A. \* \* \* Mr. Robinson and I protested a number of times to switchmen, brakemen and other employees and they paid no attention to us.

Defendant objects to the same for the reason that it is not shown that the switchmen, brakemen and other employees were employees of this Company, and for the further reason that it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

Defendant objects to question 19 and to the answer thereto;

Q. If this mare became injured so that she could not become sound again and able to race, what would in your opinion be her reasonable market value?

A. About three hundred dollars.

Defendant objects to the question and answer for the reason that the same tend to vary the terms of a written contract and are incompetent irrelevant and immaterial.

Defendant objects to question twenty and to the answer thereto;

136 Q. You say she was a fast mare. Do you know how long she was trained?

A. I was working on Running Mead Stock Farm when she was brought there from Kentucky and a mile in 2:35 was as fast as she could pace. She then learned very rapidly and if no accident happened her I think she would pace in 2:05 in 1908.

Defendant objects to the answer for the reason that it is not responsive to the question, is based upon supposition, is an opinion of the witness, incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

Defendant objects to question 23 and to the answer thereto;

Q. What would be the market value of this mare if she could pace three heats in 2:05?

A. About ten thousand dollars.

Defendant objects to the question and answer for the reason that same is too remote, speculative, tends to vary the terms of a written contract, incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

Defendant objects to question 27 and to the answer thereto;

Q. State what the conversation was.

A. I asked him what the freight was on the horses from Kansas City to Lawrence and he said about \$20.00, but he did not have the bill as the conductor had told him on the Red Ball freight the night before he had it and had left the horses in the yards, or rather in making up the train then had overlooked them in the yards. The conductor took the bill along with him so he did not know.

Defendant objects to the witness as same is not responsive is hearsay, incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

Wherefore, defendant prays that the questions and answers be excluded from the jury for the reasons above given.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,  
CHAS. B. WILSON, JR.,  
GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Defendant.*

137 Endorsements on back of objections to Depositions; No. 2808 Ent. In the District Court of Lincoln County, Oklahoma. C. E. Robinson Plaintiff, vs. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, Defendant. Objections to Depositions, Filed Dec. 17 1909, D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

138 Whereupon the 4th day of April 1910, said cause was set for trial April 18 1910, which order of the court is in words and figures as following, to-wit:

139 Be it remembered that on this 4th day of April, 1910, the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma, convened in regular session in the District Court Room at Chandler in said County and State, pursuant to law. Present and presiding, the Honorable Roy Hoffman, District Judge; also present, D. J. Norton, Clerk; John J. Davis, County Attorney; L. E. Mattin, Sheriff; and W. L. Ducker, Court reporter; and public proclamation of the convening of said court having been made, and said court having been opened in due form of law, the following proceedings were had, to-wit:

No. 2808.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Defendant.

Ordered by the court that said cause be set for trial April 18, 1910.

140 Whereupon the 18th day of April 1910, the defendant filed its motion for a Judgment on the pleadings, which motion is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:

141 In the District Court of Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, De-  
fendant.

*Motion for Judgment on Pleadings.*

Comes now the defendant and moves the court for judgment on the pleadings in the above cause, for the reason that said pleadings show on their face that the defendant is entitled to judgment.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorney for Defendant.*

Endorsements on back of Motion for Judgment on Pleadings: No. 2808 Ent. Lincoln County, District Court. C. E. Robinson, Plaintiff, vs. A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co. Motion for Judgment on Pleadings. Filed Apr. 20, 1910. D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

142 Whereupon the 18th day of April 1910, said cause comes on for hearing upon the demurrer of the defendant to plaintiff's reply to the defendant's answer and amendment thereto, and upon the defendant's motion for judgment on pleadings, which ruling of the court is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:

143 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

2808.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Journal Entry.*

Now, to-wit, on this 20th day of April, A. D. 1910, same being one of the regular judicial days of the regular term of this court, this cause came on for hearing upon the demurrer of the defendant to the reply of the plaintiff, the plaintiff appearing by H. H. Smith and Rittenhouse & Rittenhouse, his attorneys, and the defendant appearing by Cottingham & Bledsoe Geo. M. Green and Emery Foster, its attorneys, and

Thereupon said demurrer was presented to the court and the court being fully advised in the premises overruled said demurrer as to the general denial contained in said reply and sustains said demurrer as to the new matters set forth in said reply to the sustaining of said demurrer the plaintiff at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Thereupon, and on the 20th day of April A. D. 1910, said cause came on for hearing upon the motion of the defendant for judgment upon the pleadings, the parties appearing as heretofore, and the court being fully advised in the premises overruled said motion, and to the overruling of which said motion the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts; and

Thereupon and on the 20th day of April A. D. 1910, said cause having been duly and regularly assigned for trial and duly and regularly reached for trial, the parties appearing as heretofore; and

144 Thereupon comes a jury of twelve good and lawful men, to-wit: S. E. Earlbough, C. P. Childers, S. J. Rowley, A. E. Mascho, T. N. West, Oscar Hoyt, H. Gibson, Weltter Phelps, J. E. Young, M. A. Rackley, F. N. West, A. K. Bradley who are duly empaneled and sworn to try said cause; and

Thereupon the plaintiff states his case to the jury and defendant states his case to the jury.

Thereupon the defendant objects to the introduction of any evidence in behalf of plaintiff for the reason that the plaintiff's petition, amended petition and reply do not state facts sufficient to con-



stitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant; which objection is duly considered by the court and overruled, to which ruling of the court, the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts; and,

Thereupon the plaintiff proceeds with the introduction of his testimony and concludes the same and rests his case; and

Thereupon the defendant files its demurrer to the evidence of the plaintiff upon the grounds and for the reasons that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff herein is not sufficient and does not prove or tend to prove a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant and for the further reason that there is a variance between the pleading and proof, which demurrer is by the court considered and overruled to which ruling of the court, the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts; and

Thereupon the defendant proceeds with the introduction of its evidence and concludes the same and rests its case; and the plaintiff introduces evidence rests his case; and

Thereupon the defendant moves the court for peremptory instructions to find for the defendant and the court being fully  
145 advised in the premises overrules said motion to which ruling of the court, the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts, and

Thereupon the court instructs the jury in writing as to the law of the case and the case is argued to the jury by counsel for plaintiff and defendant; and

Thereupon the jury retire in charge of a sworn officer of the court to deliberate on their verdict; and

Thereupon and thereafter the jury return into open court with their verdict, which is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:

"We, the jury empaneled and sworn to try the above cause do upon our oaths find for the plaintiff and assess the amount of his recovery at Fifteen Hundred (\$1,500.00) Dollars," which said verdict is received and filed.

Thereupon the jury are discharged from further consideration of this case. Thereafter and on the — day of —, A. D. 1910, said cause came on for hearing upon the motion of the defendant for a new trial herein, the parties appearing as heretofore and the court after argument of counsel for plaintiff and defendant, and being fully advised in the premises, overrules said motion for new trial, to which ruling of the court, the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts; and

It is therefore considered, ordered and adjudged by the court that the plaintiff, C. E. Robinson, do have and recover of and from the defendant, The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, the sum of Fifteen Hundred and no/100 (\$1,500.00) Dollars with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the 20th day of April A. D., 1910, and costs of this suit.

Thereupon said defendant makes application to the court for extension of time within which to make and serve a case-made in  
146 said cause for review by the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, and the court upon due consideration of said application and for good cause shown grants said applica-

tion, the said defendant being granted sixty days within which to make and serve a case-made for review by the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, the plaintiff being granted ten days in which to suggest amendments thereto; said case-made to be signed and settled on five days' notice by either to the other.

It is further ordered by the court that execution herein be stayed upon the giving of a good and sufficient bond by defendant in the sum of Twenty-six Hundred (\$2,600.00) Dollars, to be approved by the clerk of this court, which bond is to be given within thirty days, execution to be stayed pending appeal of this cause to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma:

It is further ordered that said appeal be filed in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, within one hundred twenty days from this date.

JOHN J. CARNEY, *Judge.*

O. K.

H. H. SMITH,

R. & R.,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Defendant.*

Dated this — day of April, A. D., 1910.

147 STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
*Lincoln County, ss:*

In the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, Sitting within  
and for Said County and State.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Transcript of Testimony.*

CHANDLER, OKLAHOMA, April 20, 1910.

Before Hon. J. J. Carney, Judge.

The Plaintiff appearing in person, and by his attorney, H. H. Smith of Shawnee, Oklahoma, and the defendant company appearing by its attorney, George M. Green of Guthrie, Oklahoma, and a jury being duly called, sworn and examined, and sworn to try the case, the following proceedings were had.

148 (Mr. Smith states plaintiff's case to the jury.)

Mr. GREEN: We waive statement.

Mr. GREEN: Comes now the defendant and objects to the introduction of any testimony upon the ground and for the reason that the pleadings in the case do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,

and for the further reason that the said pleadings show upon their face that the defendant is entitled to a judgment upon the pleadings.

Motion is overruled.

Mr. GREEN: Save us an exception.

Mr. SMITH: The plaintiff now offers in evidence the deposition of S. H. Smith, a witness taken at Washington City in the office of the Interstate Commerce Commission, by John H. Marble, the attorney for the plaintiff in this action, on the 6th day of November, 1908, to be read as evidence in behalf of the plaintiff in this action. Plaintiff now offers the deposition without reading the caption.

(Mr. Smith reads deposition which is in words and figures as follows):

149 CITY OF WASHINGTON,

*District of Columbia, ss:*

Deposition of S. H. Smith, a witness, taken to be used in the action pending in the District Court within and for the County of Lincoln, in the state of Oklahoma, wherein C. E. Robinson is plaintiff and Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, a corporation, is defendant.

In pursuance of the motion hereto attached and at the time and place therein stated, the said C. E. Robinson, Plaintiff, appeared by John H. Marble, his attorney, and the said Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, Defendant, appeared by Britton & Gray, its attorneys; and thereupon the said plaintiff produced the following witness, to-wit:

S. H. SMITH, of lawful age, who, being first duly sworn deposeth and sayeth as follows:

C. E. ROBINSON

vs.

A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co.

*Deposition.*

Q. State your residence and occupation.

A. I live at Washington, D. C. and I am Chief Special Agent for the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Q. Are you acquainted with the mare, Nancy Alden?

A. Yes sir. I owned her previous to 1907.

Q. What has been your experience in racing, breeding, buying and selling trotting horses?

150 A. As a boy I was familiar with the operations of my father's business as a breeder of trotting horses at Running Mead Stock farm at Vine Grove, Kentucky; I grew up in the work of breeding and training trotting horses and cannot remember the

time when I was not in touch with the work. I have continued my interest in the business as owner and breeder to the present time. My experience, as above described, covers a period of not less than 25 years of actual dealings in the business.

Q. Do you know the breeding of the mare, Nancy Alden?

A. I do; she was a trotting bred mare but was a pacer.

Q. You say you owned her. How fast could she pace at the time you sold her.

A. I bought her in Kentucky and I sent her to Running Mead Stock Farm in the winter of 1906. She had never been trained much; could pace in about 2:20, or at that rate for half a mile.

Q. To whom did you sell her?

A. I sold her to my brother, H. H. Smith.

Q. Was she sound at the time you sold her to him?

A. Yes sir, she was absolutely sound.

Q. State what became of her after that, if you know.

A. He sold her to C. E. Robinson.

Q. Did you see her at any time after that?

A. I saw her in the summer of 1907, I do not recall the month; I think it was in September.

Q. Do you know what her reasonable market value was at that time?

A. Yes sir.

Q. What was it?

Mr. GREEN: To which the defendant objects for the reason it tends to vary the terms of a written contract.

Overruled. Exception.

151 A. I would say \$1,800.00.

Q. Has she or not improved in speed since the time you owned her?

A. Yes sir, she had improved a great deal.

Q. Was she sound at this time; the time you saw her in September, 1907?

A. At that time I saw her in Armour, South Dakota, during the summer or early fall. She was then absolutely sound.

Q. Did you see her at any time after that?

A. Yes sir, I saw her in Shawnee, Oklahoma, in May, 1908.

Q. What was her condition at that time as to soundness?

Mr. GREEN: To which the defendant objects as—because the time is too remote.

Objection is overruled. Exception.

A. She was slightly lame in her left front leg, and had a bunch on the outside about her pastern joint and her right hind leg, I think it was; at any rate one of her hind legs was enlarged on the outside up near the hock joint.

Q. State the character of each injury and describe it?

A. Well, the ankle joint and the ligaments that we call the suspensory ligaments on the left side between the back tendon and the

bone, were enlarged and strained, and the ankle, as I said, was apparently involved. The suspensory ligaments which run to the hock joint and attach to it seemed to be also involved. Otherwise, she was as sound as when I sold her.

Q. What kind of a racing mare was Nancy Alden, if you know?

A. I never raced her.

152 Q. What kind of a mare was she around the streets of the city, if you know?

A. She was good headed, generally tractable mare.

Q. Was she a level headed mare or not?

A. Yes sir, she was level headed and very sensible.

Q. Was she a large or small mare?

A. She was a large mare, and had a great deal of style.

Q. At the time you say her in Shawnee in May, 1908, can you say you know what her market value was as compared to her market value during the previous year that you saw her in Armour?

A. I say that she would not bring one half what she would bring when I saw her at Armour. Not knowing the extent of her lameness, and whether or not it was permanent, I would be unable to say exactly, although I would say that the bunches and appearance, unless removed, would greatly impair her market value, as a buyer would assume that she was broken down from the appearances, and this would destroy her racing value, which would be the largest part of her market value.

Q. Have you any interest in the mare, Nancy Alden?

A. I have not.

Q. You may state, if you know, what would Nancy Alden be worth, that is, her reasonable market value if she was sound and could pace three heats in 2:08—for a mare eligible to pace in the 2:24 class?

Mr. GREEN: To which the defendant objects as incompetent irrelevant, and immaterial and tends to vary the terms of a written contract.

Overruled. Exception.

153 A. She would be worth thirty-five hundred dollars.

Q. What would she be worth if she could pace that fast in the condition you saw her in at Shawnee.

A. About One Thousand Dollars, provided she could go a race occasionally.

Q. Do you think she could go a race in that condition.

A. Yes, she might be patched up or doctored and gotten up to a race occasionally.

S. H. SMITH.

I, H. S. Milstead, a Notary Public, within and for the District of Columbia, do hereby certify that the above named S. H. Smith, the witness whose name is subscribed to each of the three (3) pages of the foregoing deposition, was by me first duly sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in the case afore-

said, and that the deposition by him so as aforesaid subscribed, was reduced to writing by A. V. Swanberg, a disinterested person and subscribed by said S. H. Smith in my presence, and the same was taken before me on the 10th day of November, A. D., 1908, between the hours of eight o'clock A. M. and 6 o'clock P. M. of said date, and at my office, 1317 F. Street N. W., City of Washington, District of Columbia, as specified in the notice hereto attached. I further certify that I am not related or an attorney for either of said parties or otherwise interested in the event of said action. I further certify that said deposition was taken on the said 10th day of November, A. D., 1908, in pursuance of a postponement from the 6th day of November to this day, agreed upon before me on said 6th day of November, A. D., 1908, by said S. H. Smith and said Britton and Gray.

[SEAL.]

S. H. MILSTEAD,  
*Notary Public.*

My commission expires Feb'y 8, 1912.

154 STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
*Pottawatomie County, ss:*

In the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, of the State of Oklahoma, Sitting Within and for the County of Lincoln.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE R. R. Co., Defendant.

The said above named defendant, and Cottingham and Bledsoe, attorney- of record, you will take notice that on Friday, the 6th day of November, A. D., 1908, the plaintiff above named will take the depositions of sundry witnesses to be used as evidence in the above cause, said deposition will be taken before H. S. Milstead, a notary public in and for the District of Columbia, U. S. A. at the office of the Interstate Commerce Commission, at the city of Washington, said District of Columbia, between the hours of eight o'clock A. M. and 6 o'clock P. M. of said day and that the taking of the same will be adjourned and continue from day to day at the same place and between the same hours until they are completed.

H. H. SMITH,  
*Attorney for Plaintiff.*

Service of the above notice is hereby acknowledged to have been made on us this 30th day of October, 1908.

COTTINGHAM AND BLEDSOE,  
GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorney- for Defendant.*

155 Mr. SMITH: The deposition of H. F. Moore, taken at the office of J. T. Hand, a Notary Public, at Armour, Douglas County, South Dakota.

*Notice to Take Deposition.*

STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
*Lincoln County, ss:*

In the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, Sitting in and  
for the County of Lincoln.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY Co., Defendant.

The said defendant, the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. and J. R. Cottingham, Attorney of record, will take notice that on Monday, (August) the 24th day of August, A. D., 1908, the plaintiff above named will take the depositions of H. F. Moore and sundry witnesses to be used as evidence in the above cause in which C. E. Robinson is plaintiff and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. are defendants to be read in evidence in the above entitled action in behalf of the plaintiff, now pending in the District Court of Lincoln County and State of Oklahoma, at the office of Jno. P. Hand a Notary Public of Douglas, town of Armour, in the State of Oklahoma, between the hours of nine o'clock A. M. and six o'clock P. M. of said day, and the taking of the same will be adjourned from day to day at the same place and between the same hours until they are completed.

H. H. SMITH AND PRETEE AND  
RITTENHOUSE AND RITTENHOUSE.

*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

156      Service of the above notice is hereby acknowledged to have  
been made on me this 5th day of August, 1908.

COTTINGHAM AND BLEDSOE.

*Attorneys for the Defendant.*

Deposition of witness taken to be used in an action pending in the District Court within and for the County of Lincoln, in the State of Oklahoma, wherein C. E. Robinson is plaintiff, and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. is defendant in pursuance of the notice hereto attached and at the time and place therein stated.

The said C. E. Robinson, plaintiff, appears by his att'y and thereupon the said plaintiff produced the following witness, to-wit:

H. F. MOORE, of lawful age, being first duly sworn, deposeth and saith:

Q. State your age, occupation, and residence and name.

A. Age 21 yrs. Armour, S. D. Trainer of horses, H. F. Moore.

Q. Have you had any experience in training, buying and selling trotting horses.

A. I have had general experience with horses, buying, selling and training horses, most of the time I have been with the Running Mead Stock Farm, Armour, S. D.

Q. What position, if any, did you have with them.

A. I was trainer most of the time. I shipped the horses to market and prepared them for sales and sometimes assisted in buying horses in other places.

Q. Are you acquainted with the market value of horses when you know their speed and breeding, and make an examination of them?

A. Yes sir, I am.

Q. Are you acquainted with the pacing mare, Nancy Alden, alleged to have been injured at Kansas City on or about September 20, 1907, if so state all you know about her and how fast she could pace.

157 Mr. GREEN: To which the defendant objects as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Objection overruled.

Mr. GREEN: Save us an exception.

A. She was a sound bay mare, about eight years. I say her race 9 or 10 times before her alleged injury. She generally won 2nd or 3rd money and could have won 1st money most of the time, except the last three races I saw her in before her alleged injury in those three races she won very easily.

Mr. GREEN: Defendant now moves to strike out all that part of the answer as follows: "I saw her race nine or ten times before her alleged injury. She generally won second or third money and 1st money most of the time—except the last three races I saw her in before her alleged injury; in those three races she won very easily." for the reason it is not responsive, incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Motion is overruled.

Mr. GREEN: Save us an exception.

Q. How fast did you ever see her pace and what is the fastest time you ever saw her pace?

Mr. GREEN: Same objection.

Objection is overruled. Exception.

A. I saw her pace a mile in 2:16½ and a good many miles in better than 2:20. She was never cut loose to go at the top of her speed in any of these races.

Mr. GREEN: We move to strike out "She was never cut loose to go at the top of her speed in any of these races" as not responsive, incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, calls for a conclusion.

158

Overruled. Exception.



Q. How fast in your opinion could she pace, and show much faster could she pace than 2:16½?

A. She could pace three or four mile heats over a half mile track in better than 2:15 and as many heats around 2:10 over a mile course.

Q. Do you know if she was game or good looking?

Mr. GREEN: Objected to as leading and suggestive.

The COURT: I don't understand the word, "Game"?

Mr. SMITH: Yes, whether she was a game horse, had game and stamina.

Mr. GREEN: The question is whether she was game or good looking.

Mr. SMITH: Yes whether she was game or good looking. It goes to her value.

The COURT: What is the objection.

Mr. GREEN: It is leading and suggestive.

Mr. SMITH: If she was game or good looking?

The COURT: With one?

Mr. SMITH: Yes.

Overruled. Exception.

159 A. She was very handsome and the gamiest I ever saw.

Q. What do you mean by the gamiest you ever saw?

A. I mean that she would fight out a race better than any mare I ever saw.

Q. Does this add to the value of a race horse?

Mr. GREEN: To which the defendant objects as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Objection is overruled.

Mr. GREEN: Save us an exception.

A. Yes, a great deal.

Q. Were you acquainted with the market value of this mare about September 20, 1907?

A. Yes sir, I was acquainted with her value.

Q. State what in your opinion was her market value on or about September 20, 1907, previous to her alleged injury.

Mr. GREEN: To which the defendant objects for the reason it tends to vary the terms of a written contract, incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

Objection is overruled.

Mr. GREEN: Save us an exception.

A. She was worth, and would have brought anywhere from \$1,500.00 to \$2,000.00.

Q. How much could she earn or was she earning before her alleged injury by the defendant?

Mr. GREEN: To which the defendant objects for the reason that the question goes on the assumption that she was injured by the de-

defendant, calls for a conclusion, and incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

160 The COURT: "Alleged injury?"

Mr. SMITH: Yes sir.

Mr. GREEN: Tends to vary the terms of a written contract.

Overruled.

Mr. GREEN: Save us an exception.

A. She was winning every race she was started in. The week before she was injured she earned \$250. I think she could have earned every week that amount of money.

Mr. GREEN: Move to strike out that part of the answer, "I think she could have earned that amount of money every week" as an opinion of the witness; it is a question of fact for the jury.

Motion is overruled.

Mr. GREEN: Save us an exception.

Q. Do you know how she was injured. If so, state how it occurred.

A. C. E. Robinson and myself loaded her and three other horses in a car at about six o'clock on or about September 20, 1907 to ship to the races at Lawrence, Kansas. We were informed by the clerk in the office of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. R. at Kansas City that we would get out of Kansas City into the City of Lawrence, Kansas that night on a fast freight called the Red Ball. Instead of getting out at 10 o'clock that night we never got out until about six o'clock the next morning, and we were switched and pounded around over the tracks of the Santa Fe most all night, and 161 this mare was knocked down several times. Mr. Robinson and I protested a number of times to switchmen, brakemen, and other employes, but they paid no attention to us." The mare continually braced herself against the jarring and either in bracing or falling down strained her tendons and one of her front legs in the pastern joint. Don't remember which one. One of her hind legs was also considerably swollen. When we got to Lawrence she was so lame and sore—too lame and sore to start there and Robinson did not start her.

Mr. GREEN: Defendant moves to strike out the portion of the answer for the reason it is not responsive, as follows:

"We were informed by the clerk in the office of the Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe R. R. at Kansas City that we would get out of Kansas City into the city of Lawrence, Kansas, that night on a fast freight, called the Red Ball. Instead of getting out at 10 o'clock that night we never got out until about six o'clock the next morning."—That part of it, and then that part of it: "Mr. Robinson and I protested a number of times to switchmen, brakemen and other employes, but they paid no attention to us," for the reason that the said portions are not responsive to the question, and that part of the answer in relation to the protest for the reason it is not shown that the switchmen or brakemen were the employes of the defendant.

The COURT: That part of the answer which states that protests were made to the brakemen and switchmen is stricken out.

Mr. GREEN: Defendant excepts to the part not stricken.

Q. Who was in charge of her, and who had been most of the year, if you know?

A. C. E. Robinson.

162 Q. Did you see her after she was shipped away from Lawrence, Kansas.

A. I did not, I went back to Dakota.

Q. In your opinion were her injuries temporary or permanent?

Mr. GREEN: That is a question of fact for the jury.

Mr. SMITH: He is testifying according to his experience as a race horse man.

Objection is overruled.

Mr. GREEN: Save us an exception.

A. I could not say with any degree of certainty. Her suspensory ligaments in her front legs and in one of her hind legs seemed seriously involved and my experience and observation is that it is very difficult to keep a horse racing after those ligaments have been strained or seriously injured, although one may work on them continuously and get a good race out of them occasionally on a soft track. Sometimes they become sound again, but as a rule they are lame after.

Q. If this mare was injured so she would not become sound again and able to race, what, in your opinion would be her reasonable market value?

Mr. GREEN: Defendant objects for the reason it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, and tends to vary the terms of a written contract.

Objection is overruled. Exception.

163 A. About \$300.00.

Q. If she were partially injured, and would race now and then, what would be a reasonable value for her, in your opinion?

Mr. GREEN: Same objection.

Overruled. Exception.

A. The fact that a horse that is lame at all and liable to go down at any time, seriously injures their value because one never knows when they are liable to quit, also it requires a great deal of labor and expense to keep them up when they are injured, the way she was. I could not say—she was a very fast mare and would be worth under those circumstances about \$600.00.

Q. You say she was a fast mare. Do you know how long she was trained?

A. I was working on the Running Mead Stock Farm when she was brought there from Kentucky, and a mile in 2:35 was as fast as she could pace. She learned very rapidly and if no accident had happened her I think she would pace in 2:05 in 1908.

Mr. GREEN: Now we move to strike out that part of the answer: "I think she would pace in 2:05 in 1908" for the reason it is not re-

sponsive and calls for a conclusion of the witness, and incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

The COURT: It is not responsive and will be stricken out.

Mr. GREEN: I think the whole answer ought to be stricken out on that ground too.

Motion is sustained. Exception.

Q. On what do you base this opinion.

164 Mr. SMITH: That is a mile in 2:05.

Mr. GREEN: Same objection.

Overruled. Exception.

Q. What would be the market value of this mare if she could pace three heats in 2:05?

Mr. GREEN: Defendant objects for the reason that it is speculative incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. It is not shown she could pace in 2:05.

Objection is sustained.

(A. About \$10,000.00.)

Q. Have you seen the mare since her injury?

A. I have not.

Q. Had you any interest in this mare at this time or before her injuries.

A. I never had at any time.

Q. Did you have any conversation with the agent at the Santa Fe Office at Lawrence, Kansas, or the chief clerk in the office of the agent on or about Sept. 21, 1908.

A. I did.

Q. State what the conversation was.

A. I asked him what the freight was on the horses from Kansas City to Lawrence. He said, About \$20.00 but he did not have the bill as the conductor had told him on the Red Ball, the night before, he had it and had left the horses in the yards, or rather, in making up the train they overlooked them in the yards, so the conductor took the bill along with him so he did not know.

Mr. GREEN: Move to strike that out. I think what the agent told him what somebody else—

165 Mr. SMITH: It is shown to be an employee of the Santa Fe?

Objection is overruled. Exception.

A. What did you do?

Q. I paid him, I think \$20.00 and H. H. Smith paid him out at the track \$2.50, the balance of the freight.

Mr. GREEN: Move to strike out, "I paid him I think, \$20. Defendant moves to strike out what he thinks and what H. H. Smith did.

Mr. SMITH: We have no objection.

The COURT: Motion is sustained.

Q. Who was H. H. Smith?

A. He came up to see the horse races, he was vice president of the bank to which I understand money was owing for the horses. He took charge of them there or turned all the horses to C. E. Robinson, and I came back to S. Dakota.

H. F. MOORE.

I, John P. Hand, a notary public, in and for the county of Douglas, State of South Dakota, do hereby certify that the above named witness whose name is subscribed to the foregoing deposition, was by me first duly sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, in the case aforesaid, and that the deposition by him subscribed *were* reduced to writing by N. E. Goheen, a disinterested person, and subscribed by the witness in my presence, and the same *were* taken on the 24th day of August, 1908, between the hours of 8 o'clock A. M. and six o'clock P. M. of said day, and at the  
 166 office of John P. Hand, in the town of Armour in the County of Douglas and State of South Dakota, as specified in the notice hereto attached, and that I am not related to not an attorney for either of said parties, or otherwise interested in the event of said action.

[SEAL.]

JOHN P. HAND,  
*Notary Public.*

Commission expires Meh. 11, 1911.

167 (Mr. Green reads cross examination which is in words and figures as follows:

In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

H. F. MOORE, C. E. ROBINSON, and S. H. SMITH, Plaintiffs,  
 vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
 Defendants.

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto that the Cross examination and redirect examination of the witness, H. F. Moore, taken on this, the 8th day of December, 1908, before John P. Hand, a Notary Public, in and for the County of Douglas, and State of South Dakota, at Armour, South Dakota, may be used in evidence in the case of C. E. Robinson, Plaintiff, vs. The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, pending in the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

It is the intention of the parties hereto that the deposition of the above named witness is to be used in both of said causes.

THOMAS H. GOHEEN,  
*Attorney for Plaintiff.*  
 GEO. M. GREEN,  
*Attorney for Defendant.*

168 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma,

H. F. MOORE, C. E. ROBINSON, and S. H. SMITH, Plaintiffs,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Defendant.

*Stipulation.*

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between H. H. Smith, attorney for the plaintiffs in the above entitled action, and George M. Green, one of the attorneys for the defendant, that the taking of the cross examination of witnesses who gave their depositions on the 17th day of August, 1908, before J. P. Hand, a notary public in and for the county of Douglas, in the state of South Dakota, at the town of Armour, may be taken at any time, and that said depositions be transmitted to the clerk of the District Court with a copy of this agreement attached, and we hereby waive any further notice of the taking of said depositions.

Witness our hands this — day of September, 1908.

H. H. SMITH,

*Attorney for Plaintiff.*

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorney for Defendant.*

169 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma,

H. F. MOORE, C. E. ROBINSON, and S. H. SMITH, Plaintiffs,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Defendant.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Defendant.

Cross examination of witness Mr. H. F. Moore, and deposition given on the 17th day of August, 1908, before Mr. J. P. Hand, notary public in and for the county of Douglas in the State of South Dakota, at the town of Armour, which said cross examination is taken pursuant to the stipulation hereto attached.

The plaintiff appeared by Mr. Thomas Goheen direct attorney, and the defendant by Mr. Geo. M. Green one of its attorneys.

Q. You are the H. F. Moore who gave direct testimony in this case on the 17th day of August, 1908.

A. Yes sir.

Q. How old are you, Mr. Moore?

A. I am going on 23.

Q. How long have you known Mr. S. H. Smith, plaintiff in this case?

A. Have known him about eight years.

Q. How long have you known Mr. C. E. Robinson, the other plaintiff?

A. About three years.

A. What interest, if any, did C. R. Robinson have in 170 Sousie Mac?

Mr. SMITH: That appears to be a cross examination in the case of H. F. Moore and others against the defendant. We have no objection to the reading if the statement is made so far as it applies to this plaintiff—

Mr. GREEN (interrupting): Later on the deposition confined itself more to this horse, and there was a stipulation entered into at the time that this deposition would be considered the deposition in both cases.

Q. What interest if any did C. E. Robinson have in Susie Mac?

A. I do not know what interest Mr. Robinson had in Susie Mac.

Q. Do you know where Susie Mac was raised?

A. No sir, I do not.

Q. Where did you first know her?

A. When she was shipped from Kentucky about the first of March 1907.

Q. How old was she then?

A. I would judge from her appearance that she was a three year old.

Q. Where was she next shipped?

A. We shipped her from here to Courtney, No. Dak.

Q. When was that?

A. That was in the first part of June, 1907.

Q. Did you accompany her?

A. I did.

A. What other horses, if any did you have in your charge.

A. I had two other horses in my charge, John Drue, and Don Ex Tallion.

Q. Was Mr. Robinson with you at that time and with his horse?

A. He was.

Q. Deom Courtney where did you then ship?

A. We shipped to Carrington, No. Dak.

171 Q. Did Mr. Robinson ship with you?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Were your horses all in the same car?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Where did you next ship?

A. We shipped to New Rockford, No. Dak.

Q. Then where did you next ship?

A. We shipped to Valley City, No. Dak.

Q. Now just state from what place you shipped from Valley City until you arrived at Kansas City?

Q. I shipped from Valley City to Kensal, from Kensal to Fessenden, from Fessenden to Harvey, from Harvey to Armour, So. Dak.,

from Armour to Manhattan, Kansas, that is I shipped this black mare to Manhattan.

Q. Was Mr. Robinson with you from the time you left Armour until you returned to Armour?

A. He was with me, yes sir.

Q. He was not with you when you shipped to Manhattan?

A. No sir.

Q. Where did you ship from Manhattan?

A. To Clay Center, Kan.

Q. Where did you ship from Clay Center?

A. To Topeka, Kansas.

Q. What horses did you have with you?

A. I had Susie Mae.

Q. Then you shipped from Topeka to Kansas City?

A. I did.

Q. Then Mr. Robinson joined you there?

A. Yes sir.

Q. What horses did he have?

A. He had Nancy Alden, John Drue, Don Ex Tallion and Cheerful Mary.

Q. How many horses did you and Mr. Robinson ship from Kansas City to Lawrence?

A. Four.

172 —. Kansas City?

A. We left Cheerful Mary at Kansas City.

Q. When did you arrive in Kansas City with your horses?

A. On the 14th of Sept. 1907.

Q. When did Mr. Robinson join you there?

A. Mr. Robinson was there when I arrived.

Q. What day did you ship from Kansas City to Lawrence?

A. It was on Mond-y, I think September 16, 1907.

A. What tie did you call at the freight office of the R. R. Co., and who was with you?

Ex Mr. Goheen objects to the question that the proper foundation isn't laid for the question.

e? A. Went to the freight office about noon, and Mr. Robinson was with me.

Q. Who did you talk to at the depot?

A. Mr. Robinson did the talking.

Q. What did Mr. Robinson say?

A. I couldn't say positively. He ordered a car and they told him to be ready to load at 4 o'clock.

Q. With whom did Mr. Robinson talk?

A. I do not know.

Q. Can you describe the appearance of the man?

A. No sir.

Q. Did you take any part in the conversation?

A. No sir.

Q. Did you secure a B/L or contract?

A. I do not know.

Q. In whose name were the horses shipped?



A. In my name.

Q. Why did you ship in your name, were you in charge?

A. I was not in charge but we just shipped in my name as I was with them.

173 Q. That is the shipments you had made with these horses when Mr. Robinson was with you were always made in your name?

A. They were.

Q. Did you secure any ticket or transportation for the horses or for yourselves?

A. We never secured any transportation for ourselves.

A. Did you have a contract?

Mr. SMITH: This portion of the deposition elicited in this question, Plaintiff objects to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial for the reason that the contract as pleaded in the defendant's answer is valid under the laws of Missouri, and under the interstate commerce act, and is not such a contract as is permissible even if the contract was properly and regularly signed because the same is a contract of limitation on the damages to the horses, and not a valuation fixed by the parties for the purpose of securing a reduced rate, and because the same is not proper cross examination, no contract having been asked about in chief, and I don't know whether it would be permissible then or not—to save any exception.

The COURT: The objection is overruled.

Mr. SMITH: I don't care to make it over again, but move to strike out this evidence. The plaintiff further states that at the close of the evidence of this deposition that he will move to strike it out, all the evidence about this contract, and reserves the right to make the objection in that way.

A. I did not, but I presume Mr. Robinson had one.

Q. What time of day did you load the horses?

174 A. We loaded them about six o'clock or half past on Sept. 16th, 1907.

A. You say you did not secure a bill of lading, or shipping contract for these horses?

A. I did not.

Q. I ask you to examine the paper which I herewith hand you, which is marked by the stenographer Exhibit A, and state whether you have seen it before.

A. I have never seen it before that I remember of.

— Can you state whose signature that is?

A. That is my signature made by Mr. Robinson.

A. That is your signature, and Mr. Robinson was authorized by you to sign it?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you have this contract?

A. I presume Mr. Robinson had it.

Q. Do you know Mr. L. E. Dubois.

A. No sir.

Q. What time did you get out of Kansas City for Lawrence Kansas?

A. We got out of Argentine, Kansas City stock yards, I should say about six o'clock in the morning.

Q. And arrived in Lawrence next day?

A. Yes sir.

Q. These horses were placed in the car about 8 o'clock at Kansas City?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And taken to Argentine, you got out of there about six o'clock in the morning?

— Yes sir.

Q. What time of the day did you move from the *darick* track to Argentine?

A. About 10 o'clock, or may be a little before.

175 Q. Where were the horses knocked down as you testify by direct examination?

A. In the Argentine yards.

Q. Was Mr. Robinson with you there?

A. Yes sir.

Q. You discovered the horses were injured before you left Argentine?

A. I discovered this filly that I took particular interest in was injured.

Q. When did you discover that Nancy Alden was injured?

A. During the night sometime while we were in the yards at Argentine.

Q. She showed injury in both her front legs?

A. She did.

Q. You knew that both Susie Mac and Nancy Alden had been injured before you arrived at Lawrence?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Now after you arrived in Lawrence what did you and Mr. Robinson first do.

A. We both sent to the station, Robbie and I both, and asked the agent to tell us how much the freight was on the horses?

Q. Did you pay the freight then.

A. We did not pay all of the freight, we paid part of it.

Mr. GREEN: "We was expected to go on the fast freight in the morning and the conductor had the bill, and the agent did not know how much the freight was, so he charged us what he thought it would be then he said it it was any more he would collect, and if he would refund the money, then we paid him later \$2.60 more."

I move to strike out that part as not responsive.

176 Sustained.

Mr. SMITH: Exception.

Q. Was that all you asked to the agent about, the freight?

A. I do not know.

Q. You just talked about the freight was all?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you give a receipt, or did the Railroad Co. give you a receipt?

A. I do not know.

Q. I herewith hand you a paper marked Exhibit B. by the notary, for identification, and ask you whose name is attached.

A. It is my name made by H. H. Smith, I presume, I did not sign it.

Q. Who is H. H. Smith.

A. Why, Mr. Smith was vice president of the First National Bank of Armour.

A. He was interested in the horses.

A. Only that he loaned money on them.

A. Mr. Smith had money loaned on these horses?

A. That is the way I understand.

Q. Had you authorized Mr. Smith to pay the freight and receipt the Railroad Co. for these horses?

A. No sir.

Q. Why did he act for you then?

A. He was there, and when the agent presented his bill I did not happen to be around, and he paid it and signed by name to the expense bill.

Q. Are you acquainted with S. H. Smith one of the defendants in this case?

A. Yes sir.

Q. He was interested in these horses also?

A. Yes sir.

177 Q. Both Susie Mac and Nancy Alden?

A. He was interested in Susie Mac I know, and he and Mr. Robinson had some deal with Nancy Alden, that I don't know.

Q. What day did you first attempt to race the horses at Lawrence?

A. We got there on Tuesday and I can't say positively whether it was Wednesday or Thursday that we raced the horses.

Q. How long had the fair association been open when you arrived at Lawrence?

A. I think it opened the day we arrived, if I am not mistaken.

Q. Did you ever serve any written notice upon the Railroad Co. that Susie Mac had received any injuries while being transported from Kansas City to Lawrence, Kansas.

A. I never did.

Q. Did you serve any written notice on the railroad company before the horses were removed from the car, or before they were transported from Lawrence Kansas of the injuries they received from Kansas City to Lawrence, Kansas?

A. No sir.

Q. Have you seen either one of these horses since you left them at Lawrence, Kansas?

A. No sir.

Q. Mr. Moore, what business or occupation did you occupy before you came to Armour?

A. I worked for the Southern Pacific R. R. Co. at Washington.

Q. What position did you occupy?

A. Ticket disbursing clerk.

Q. Well, what else have you done?

A. I have trained and raced horses ever since.

178 Q. Did you work for the Frisco at Muskogee at on-time?

A. Yes sir.

Q. What position did you occupy with them?

A. I was billing clerk for about three months with them.

Q. While you and Mr. Robinson were shipping these horses did you or he usually look after the shipping arrangements?

A. Either one or both of us.

Q. They were usually shipped in your name?

A. Yes sir, when I was with them.

Q. When Mr. Robinson arranged for the shipping of these horses in your name this was satisfactory to you?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you take part in any of the conversation with the clerk at Kansas City when these horses were shipped?

A. I went up after they were loaded and asked when we were going to get out.

A. Did you have the horses at the freight office when you made arrangements to ship to Lawrence?

A. No sir, we made arrangements for the car before we brought the horses down.

Q. You did not show the horses to the clerk or agent at Kansas City?

A. No sir.

Q. Did you or did Mr. Robinson talk with more than one party at the depot at Kansas City when you arranged for the shipping of the horses at Kansas City?

A. I do not know.

Q. You were with him all the time, where you?

A. Most of the time, but I was in the car part of the time while he was up there.

Q. When you shipped horses did you usually secure a bill of lading or shipping contract.

179 A. We usually secured a shipping contract as a general rule.

Redirect by Mr. GOHEEN:

Q. Mr. Moore, were you present when the car was ordered from the Railroad Co. at Kansas City?

A. I remembering being with Mr. Robinson, but I do not know whether I was present when he ordered the car or not.

Q. I believe that you testified that the Railroad Co. said that the car would be ready at four o'clock?

A. Yes sir.

Q. What time did you load?

A. At six o'clock.

Q. What time did you get out of Kansas City?

A. About six o'clock in the morning, I think about daylight.

Q. How did it happen that you did not get out of Kansas City before 6 o'clock?

Mr. GREEN: Objected to for the reason it calls for a conclusion of the witness.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. This Red Ball freight which was to carry us went off and left us.

Q. Did the Co. promise to get you out on the Red Ball freight?

Mr. GREEN: Same objection.

The COURT: That is your cross examination.

180 Mr. GREEN: No it is Mr. Goheen's redirect examination.  
Overruled.

Mr. GREEN: Save us an exception.

A. Yes sir.

Q. I believe Mr. Moore that you testified that you had more or less experience training horses?

A. Yes sir.

Q. You are able to judge from your experience as to the condition of a horse, its age, etc.

A. Yes sir.

Q. I will ask you now, Mr. Moore, the condition these horses were in when they were loaded at Kansas City.

To which defendant objects — incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Mr. GREEN: Insist on the objection.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. They were sound.

Q. Did you authorize any one to serve notice of injury on the railroad company?

A. No sir.

Mr. GREEN: Now the rest of this testimony was stricken out yesterday (in the Moore case) because it developed later he gets his information of the notice from Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH: Isn't that your cross examination?

Mr. GREEN: No Mr. Goheen's redirect examination. Come up here.

(And thereupon the counsel for plaintiff and defendant held a whispered conversation, and the Judge's desk and the Court  
181 remarked, "Sustained" and Mr. Green resumed reading the deposition omitting the portions indicated by the two following indented portions of this transcript.)

Q. Did you know that notice of injury had been served on the railroad Co.?

To which the defendant objected for the reason that it assumes a fact not in evidence.

A. Yes sir, I knew that notice had been served.

Q. You testified you always took a bill of lading when the horses were loaded?

A. We took a contract.

Q. Did you, or do you know the conditions of the contract.

To which the defendant objects as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, I presume he did know.

A. Certainly I know, I never read the dam- thing, but I know what it means.

Recross-examination by Mr. GEO. M. GREEN :

Q. You testified that you knew that notice had been served on the railroad Co. of the injuries to the horses shipped. Where, and how did you receive this information?

A. I received the information from Stanley County, S. D. by a letter from Mr. H. H. Smith.

Q. When was that?

A. It was in 1908, sometime last spring, I can't remember the exact date.

Q. This is the first information you had the notice had been served on the railroad Co. that the horses had been injured?

A. Why, Mr. Smith, was here in the fall later on, and we were talking about it, this is the first information I had received.

Q. Did you at any time ever ask the agent at Lawrence, Kansas to examine the horses as to their injuries?

A. No sir.

Q. You say you are familiar with the — and were familiar with the bill of lading and contract of shipment.

A. Yes sir, I know what it looks like, and know what it is there for.

Q. Are you familiar with the shipment of goods over railroad and did you know that they had two rates of freight, one at a released value, and one at a non released value.

Mr. SMITH: Same objection to the question and answer as at the beginning, question of his knowledge of the released rates with reference to the contract.

Mr. GREEN: All right that may be stricken out.

A. Why, I do not remember exactly how it was, as it has been so long since I was in a railroad office.

Q. You know that the railroad had two rates of freight on the same commodity?

A. I did not know that they had two rates on all commodities.

Q. Did you know that they had two rates on horses?

A. I know they made us pay more for a stud.

183 Q. You knew that this shipment moved on a reduced rate of freight, did you not.

A. I can't say that I did because I didn't.

Q. Did you tell the clerk or agent that you wanted a reduced rate of freight?

A. No sir.

Q. What, if anything did you say about the freight.

A. I didn't say anything that I remember.

Q. Did the agent say anything about the freight?

A. No sir, not that I remember.

Q. Did he say anything to Mr. Robinson?

A. No sir.

Q. Did Mr. Robinson say anything to him about the freight rate?

A. No sir, not that I can remember.

Q. You knew that there were certain conditions in the Live stock contract that were to be performed by you did you not?

A. Yes sir.

At this time the defendant offers in evidence exhibits A. and B. which have been identified by the Notary, and ask that they be attached to the deposition, and that said exhibits A. and B. be received in evidence.

Mr. SMITH: Same objection.

Overruled.

Exception.

(Mr. Green continuing reading.)

184 *District examination by Mr. THOMAS GOHEEN:*

Q. I will ask you Mr. Moore have you read the contract introduced in evidence.

To which the defendant objects as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

Mr. GREEN: I will withdraw that.

A. No I have never read it over fully.

Q. Did you know at the time the contract was entered into the conditions and stipulations of the contract?

A. I did not know all of the conditions, only about me riding with the horses.

Q. Are you familiar with the different tariffs of the Railroad Co. on stock?

A. No sir.

Q. Are you familiar with the different tariff rates on horses?

A. No sir.

*Recross-examination by Mr. GEO. M. GREEN:*

Q. You can read and had the opportunity to read this contract?

A. I can read, but never had the opportunity to read this contract.

Q. Mr. Robinson had this contract and would have let you read it had you asked him, would he not?

A. Yes sir, I presume he would.

*Redirect by Mr. THOMAS GOHEEN:*

Q. Did you say that you could fully understand the conditions of the contract had you read it.

185 & 186 To which the defendant objects; incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

A. Yes sir, I think I could understand it.

I, John P. Hand, a Notary Public in and for the county of Douglas, State of South Dakota, do hereby certify that the above named witness, Mr. H. F. Moore, whose name is subscribed to the foregoing deposition appeared before me on the 8th day of December, 1908, and pursuant to the stipulations hereto attached, and that said deposition was reduced to writing by E. E. Dubes, a disinterested person, and subscribed by the witness in my presence, and that same was taken in my office in the town of Armour, in the county of Douglas, and in the state of South Dakota, as specified in the stipulations hereto attached, and that I am not an attorney for either of said parties or otherwise interested in the event of said actions.

[SEAL.]

JOHN P. HAND,

*Notary Public.*

My commission expires, March 11, 1911.

187 H. F. Moore

Sept. 18, 1907.

Freight }  
Bill } 1892.

Via

Received from The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.,

Way-bill.	Car.	From—	Original point shipment and consignor.
Date. Number and series.	Initials. Number.	Kansas City.	H. F. Moore.

9/17 111921 At 29207

The following property:

	Weight.	Rate.	Freight.	Advance.	Total.
4 Horses/					
O. R. as per contract		36	17.60		
Owner in charge	20,000	At car			

Location	Transfers (if any)		Switching
Delivery	In good order or condition noted	191	Inspection
			Total charges
			17.60

By

H. F. MOORE.

Exhibit B, Jon P. Hand, *Exhibit B. Jon P. Hand.*



188 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma,

H. F. MOORE, C. E. ROBINSON, and S. H. SMITH, Plaintiffs,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Defendants.

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto that the cross examination and redirect examination of the witness, H. F. Moore, taken on this, the 8th day of December, 1908, before John P. Hand, a notary public in and for the county of Douglas and state of South Dakota, at Arneur, South Dakota, may be used in evidence in the case of C. E. Robinson, Plaintiff, vs. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, pending in the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

It is the intention of the parties hereto that the deposition of the above named witness is to be used in both of said causes.

THOMAS H. GOHEEN,

*Att'y for Plaintiff.*

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Att'y for Defendant.*

189 Mr. SMITH: Plaintiff now offers in evidence the deposition of H. W. Ayres, taken on the 12th day of November, 1908, before Albert T. Hardner, notary public, at the office of H. H. Smith in the city of Shawnee, and the same is now offered in evidence in behalf of the plaintiff in this action.

(Mr. Smith reads deposition which is in words and figures as follows:)

Depositions of witnesses taken to be used in an action pending in the District Court within and for the county of Lincoln in the state of Oklahoma, wherein C. E. Robinson is plaintiff, and The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, defendant, in pursuance of the notice hereto attached and at the time and place therein stated. The said C. E. Robinson appeared by his attorney H. H. Smith, and the said The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company defendant by Geo. M. Green, attorney.

And thereupon the said plaintiff produced the following witness to-wit: H. W. AYERS, Veterinary Surgeon, of lawful age, being first duly sworn, deposes and saith.

Direct examination by H. H. SMITH:

Q. State your occupation, residence and name.

A. Veterinary surgeon, I live at 314 North Beard, Shawnee, Oklahoma, name H. W. Ayres.

Q. How long have you been a practicing veterinary surgeon?

A. Two years under a preceptor, and here since April 1908.

190 Q. How long have you been practicing here in Shawnee?

A. Since April 11, 1908.

Q. Are you acquainted with C. E. Robinson?

A. Yes sir.

Q. How long have you known him?

A. Since about the middle of June.

Q. Are you acquainted with the pacing mare, Nancy Alden?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Have you at any time made an examination of her.

A. Once.

Q. State when that was.

A. About a week ago.

Q. From your examination are you able to say whether she is sound or unsound.

A. She is unsound.

Q. State in what respect she is unsound, and what the result of your examination was.

A. The left front leg has had a bad rupture of one of the suspensory ligaments leaving a chronic thickness and weakness of this knee part, and the right hind leg is in a chronic *oedema* condition of all the tendons and ligaments of the fetlock joint.

Q. What effect would this condition of the leg as described by you have upon her capacity and ability as to being able to race

A. Well her forward leg is predisposed to a complete breakdown.

Q. What did you say as to her right hind leg.

A. Her right hind leg the trouble interferes with the suspensory ligaments.

Q. What would you say as to her racing, sound or unsound on her leg in the condition she was in at the time you examined her?

A. It is predisposed to breaking down completely. Weak-

191 ness of all parts.

Q. What kind of a mare is she, just describe her, Doctor, her individuality.

A. As I remember she is a bay mare, a pacer, good acting.

Q. About how high?

A. I should think about fifteen and one hands high

Cross-examination by Mr. GEO. GREEN:

Q. How long have you known this mare, Nancy Alden?

A. Since about the middle of June, 1908.

Q. Where did you examine her?

A. At Fibus barn, Shawnee, Oklahoma.

Q. How did you determine her condition, or in what way did you examine her?

A. By sight and manipulation.

Q. How long did it take you to examine her?

A. In the examination and watching her movements, it took about half an hour.

Q. Who requested to examination?

A. Mr. H. H. Smith.

Q. You examined her but the once?

A. No sir.

Q. How old is the mare?

A. I don't know.

Q. In your judgment how old is she.

Q. I think she is about eight years old. I never paid any attention to her age.

Q. You say you have been practising since April, 1908?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Where were you located before coming to Shawnee.

A. I came from Ontario Veterinary College, Toronto, Canada.

Q. Do you know whether Nancy Alden has been worked any since you have known her.

192 A. I have seen her in one race and exercise.

Redirect examination by Mr. H. H. SMITH:

Q. Do you know anything about any lameness she had during the summer, of your own knowledge?

A. No sir.

Q. What is the name of the college that you attended.

A. Ontario Veterinary College?

Q. Are you a graduate of that college?

A. Yes sir.

Q. What is the standing of that college amongst the institutions that teach veterinary?

A. Well it is in the first ranks.

H. W. AYRES.

I, Albert T. Gardiner, notary, within and for the county of Pottawatomie, in the state of Oklahoma, do hereby certify that the above named H. W. Ayers, the witness whose name is subscribed to the foregoing deposition, was by me duly sworn, to testify the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, in the case aforementioned, and that the deposition subscribed by him was reduced to writing by Minnie Morford, a disinterested person, and subscribed by the witness in my presence, and the same was taken on the 12th day of November, A. D. 1908, between the hours of 8 o'clock A. M. and 6 o'clock P. M. of said day at the office of H. H. Smith in the town of Shawnee, in the county of Pottawatomie and state of Oklahoma, as specified in the notice thereto attached, and that I am not related to nor an attorney for either of said parties, or otherwise interested in the event of said action.

[SEAL.]

ALBERT T. GARDINER.

*Notary Public.*

My commission expires April 20, 1912.

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*Notice to Take Depositions.*

In the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Oklahoma, Sitting within and for Lincoln County.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Defendant.

The said defendant, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. and Cottingham and Bledsoe, attorney- of record therefor, will take notice that on November the 12th day of said month, A. D. 1908, the plaintiff above named will take the depositions of sundry witnesses to be used as evidence in the above case at the office of H. H. Smith, Attorney, over the Oklahoma National Bank, and before A. T. Gardener, a notary public. At the city of Shawnee, in the county of Pottawatomie, in the office of H. H. Smith, and before A. T. Gardiner, Notary, between the hours of eight o'clock A. M. and six o'clock P. M. of said day, and that the taking of the same will be adjourned and continue from day to day at the same place and between the same hours until they are completed.

H. H. SMITH AND

RITTENHOUSE AND RITTENHOUSE,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

Service of the above notice is hereby acknowledged to have been made on Saturday, this the 7th day of November, 1908.

COTTINGHAM AND BLEDSOE,

*Attorneys for Defendant.*

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Mr. SMITH: The deposition of O. B. Graves, taken at 413 N. Y. Life Building, before T. D. Judy, notary public, at Kansas City, in the state of Missouri, to be read as evidence, etc. is now offered in evidence in behalf of the plaintiff, the caption being waived is omitted.

In the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District of the State of Oklahoma, Sitting in and for County of Lincoln.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Defendants.

*Depositions on Behalf of Plaintiff.*

Deposition of witness taken to be used in an action pending in the District court within and for the county of Lincoln, in the Territory of Oklahoma, wherein C. E. Robinson is plaintiff, and the

Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway company is defendant, in pursuance of the notice hereto attached and at the time and place therein stated. The said C. E. Robinson, plaintiff, appeared by his attorney H. H. Smith, Esq., and the said The Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Company, defendant by its attorney J. F. Gilmore. And thereupon the said H. H. Smith produced the following witness, it first being the agreement of counsel that the taking of this deposition was to be started on the 18th day of December,

1908, A. D. and for their convenience was continued and postponed until the 19th day of December, 1908, A. D., and also it was further agreed by interested parties and stipulated at the taking of this deposition that any and all objections to questions and answers as to substance and form may be recited and made at the trial with the same force and effect as if made now.

Mr. O. B. GRAVES, of lawful age, being first duly sworn, deposeth and saith:

Direct examination by Mr. H. H. SMITH:

Q. What is your name, occupation and residence?

A. O. B. Graves, training and dealing in horses and living here in Kansas City, living at 171 Penn street.

Q. How long have you been engaged in training and dealing in horses?

A. About twenty years or a little more.

Q. What kind of horses have you been training and dealing in?

A. Harness, trotters and pacers.

Q. Where were you engaged before you came to Kansas City?

A. That means just recently before I came here or all the time in a general way?

Q. All in a general way.

A. Principally in Kentucky and recently in Oklahoma.

Q. Where did you begin training and buying and selling horses?

A. Near Lexington, in Kentucky and in Woodford county.

Q. How many years did you train horses in that vicinity about?

A. Well right around ten or twelve years.

Q. I will ask you if you ever trained and dealt in trotting horses at Lexington, Kentucky?

A. I have.

Q. How long did you deal and train in horses there?

196 A. Several seasons. I don't know just exactly, farm was near Lexington.

Q. Is Lexington, Kentucky, a market for trotting and pacing horses?

A. It certainly is.

Q. I will ask you whether or not it is not regarded one of the leading markets of the United States of that class of horses?

A. It is the "Hub" of horse breeding and dealing.

Q. I will ask you to state generally Mr. Graves how trotting and pacing horses are sold outside and beyond private sales—what I am getting at now is auction sales.

A. Well, they are consigned by the owner, by description usually as to what they will show up to on the day they will be sold.

Q. Do you know what the principal auction markets for this class of horses are in the United States.

A. New York, Chicago, and Indianapolis, and Lexington, Kentucky, are the four principal places.

Q. Have you attended many of these special auction sales at other places?

A. I have.

Q. State the places you have attended these sales for the auction of these horses?

A. Four main towns that I named besides Cambridge City and Danville Kentucky.

Q. You bought and sold and handled this class of horses generally?

A. Yes sir.

Q. For your own account and for other people to any extent during the last twenty years?

A. I have during that time.

Q. I will ask you whether or not during this length of time you have bought and sold many of this class of horses, or I will put it this way, have you been during this time been dealing in this class of horses extensively or has it been limited?

A. Well, no sir, had not very large consignments *by* generally every season had some.

Q. You have been dealing principally on your own account?

A. Yes sir.

Q. How many horses have you given racing records that you have trained and didn't receive records of 2:10 but 2:10 in trials.

A. Well, some eight or ten, I guess.

Q. How many have you trained and given trials better than 2:15?

A. I hardly kept track of all those things, quite — number though—fifteen or twenty or more than that given trials, I can't tell exactly.

Q. Are you able to state about how many you have trained and given records and trials better than two thirty?

A. Well the last time I counted was something like from forty to sixty. I think something right around *forth*.

Q. Do you know what the largest purses are that are given for horses in this city? What I am trying to get at is the largest states being given for them.

Mr. GREEN: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. Not proper measure of damage, tends to vary the terms of a written contract.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. At the leading training stakes they run from a thousand to twelve hundred or fifteen hundred dollars, but generally about a thousand dollars.

Q. When you speak of states this size you mean half mile tracks and not Grand Circuits?

198 A. I did not mean grand circuits, I meant through mouth and southwest.

Q. What is the purse offered in races for two and three year old futurities?

Mr. GREEN: Same objection.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Well for two and three year old trotters, trotters 2 year old ranges from one to \$5,000 and 3 year old from ten to twenty in the two year old.

Q. Did you ever train a race—train and race a horse in either of these stakes either the two year old or the three year old division?

A. I have.

Q. Did you ever win any division of them.

A. Won two year old division.

Q. I will ask you if it isn't a fact if you did not win two year old pacing division with Alices Maypes?

A. I did.

Q. Baroness Marguerite?

A. I did not.

Q. I will ask you if you have Baroness Marguerite her record of 2:15¾?

A. I did.

Mr. GREEN: Defendant objects as immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

Mr. SMITH: Just qualifying him.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. What was it?

Mr. GREEN: Same objection.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. 2:09½.

199 Q. I will ask you if you gave Gen. Adelle his record?

A. I did.

Q. What was it?

A. 2:;0¼ at four year old.

Q. Did you give Lizzee S. his record?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you give Dr. Mason his record?

A. Yes sir.

Q. What was it?

A. 11¾.

Q. How about Jean Ingelow?

A. I have him 11¾.

A. And Lilly Clay.

A. I gave it 2:12½.

A. And Alverda Akins?

A. I gave her 2:12¾.

Q. What about Paddy B.

A. 2:13¼.

Q. Heatie B.

A. 2:13½.

Q. Queen of *kind*?

A. 2:14½.

Q. Joe Harriman?

A. 2:15¼.

A. How about Allice Maypes?

A. 2:14¾.

Q. You gave all these horses fast trials did you not?

A. Yes sir.

Q. I will ask you if you are acquainted with a pacing horse, Geo. Gano?

A. I am.

Q. What is his record now?

A. His record is 2:12¾.

Q. I will ask you whether or not you developed, trained and sold him?

A. I developed and drove his in 2:10 was his first race at three years old.

Q. What is his trial now for a mile?

A. Second in 2:2¼.

Q. What is the largest purse given for a trotting horse in the year 1908, Mr. Graves, speaking about the grand circuit now?

A. Think it was \$50,000.00.

Mr. GREEN: Objected to as incompetent, and immaterial, not a proper measure of damage what a horse might earn in 1908, not a proper measure of damage, certainly..

200 Mr. SMITH: That is not the question it is what was the largest purse, it is a question to test knowledge, to qualify him. This deposition was taken in 1908, it is to show his competency at this time, his knowledge of the business.

Mr. GREEN: I don't see how that would *hear* on an accident occurring in 1907.

The COURT: Objection is sustained.

Mr. SMITH: Exception, Mr. Stenographer.

Q. I will ask you to state now if you can, what purses are given on what is known as the grand circuit for \$5,000.00 and now each season since you have been in the business the last four years, limit it to the last four years beginning at Detroit and along down the line.

A. Purse in the M. & M. just one meet at Detroit, 24 trots first ten thousand.

Mr. GREEN: Same objection.

Objection is overruled.

Mr. GREEN: Exception.



Q. Now you can go right on down.

A. Buffalo one \$10,000 trot, one \$5,000 trot, one \$5,000 pace and at Syracuse a \$10,000 trot, and a \$5,000 trot and a \$5,000 pace, at Redville they gave \$15,000 trot and a \$10,000 trot; at Columbus the M. & M. gave a \$10,000 trot, a \$5,000 pace and a \$5,000 trot besides, there were pulled off at Cincinnati a \$10,000 trot and a \$5,000 trot; at Lexington a \$5,000 trot 2

201 year old and 3 year old trot ranged from \$10,000 to \$22,000.

Mr. GREEN: Move to strike out all that part of the answer for the reason it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, not proper measure of damages, and tending to prove no issue in this case.

Objection is overruled.

Exception.

Q. Will ask you if they don't now give a handicap race for \$50,000?

— At Reedville they do.

Q. I will ask you to state how the information as to the training and as to the sale of horses is disseminated to the general public; that is to say how is this information placed before the public.

A. American Horse Breeder *per* New York, Trotter and Pacer, of Cleveland, Horsemen's Spirit of the Times, and Horse Review of Chicago, Western Horsemen of Indianapolis, Kentucky Stock Farm, Lexington, Kentucky, and Breeder and Sportsman, of San Francisco.

Q. I will ask you whether or not these said journals contain the names and the prices of all the horses sold during the season of the special public auction sales?

Mr. GREEN: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, and not the best evidence.

Objection is overruled.

Exception.

202 A. They do.

Q. In this way you know what the price of horses that sell at these sales are that you are acquainted with on the turf, is it not.

Mr. GREEN: Same objection.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. It is.

Q. Now, Mr. Graves, I will ask you if you are able to state when you have seen the individual horse, and what its conformation is, what its speed and size, soundness and breeding and general quality as a race horse, if you are able from your experience as a trainer and driver and a dealer in this class of horses, to say that the market value of such horse is, that is to say when you know all about them.

A. I do.

Q. Did you see a mare called Nancy Alden here when you were here at Kansas City on or before September the 17th on Sunday?

A. I did—that's the name they gave me.

A. A Pacing bay mare?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Are you able to state from your experience with that horse as a trainer and dealer and driver and what the market value of a good headed, sound, 16 hand pacing mare by McRoberts out of a mare that had produced three other race horses which records better than 2:23, which mare herself had a record of 2:23 at that time and could pace five or six heats better than 2:15 and over a half mile track and three heats better than 2:10 over a mile track—do you know that the market value of such a mare is?

203 Mr. GREEN: To which the defendant objects as not a proper measure of damage, and for the reason that the answer is not responsive to the question.

Objection is overruled.

Exception.

A. \$2,000 to 2,300.

A. Did you notice this mare close enough when you saw her to say whether she was sound or unsound?

A. I can say what I did.

Q. If she could pace three or four heats in 2:15 and better over a half mile track and was good headed and game would she be worth \$2,000 or 2,300?

A. She would.

Mr. GREEN: Move to strike out for the reason it tends to vary the terms of a written contract, incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. Is a mare that can pace this fast in racing her first season and has paced this fast regularly in racing, is she or not more valuable than a mare who has raced several seasons and which can pace as fast?

Mr. GREEN: Objected to as leading and suggestive.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. The one which can do it her first season is the more valuable.

Q. In the Oklahoma, Kansas and Texas Circuit how much, if you know, could a mare like this earn per week, that is in the ordinary purse racing.

A. 23 class?

A. Yes sir.

Q. How much could — mare like that earn a week?

204 Mr. GREEN: Defendant objects as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial tends to vary the terms of a written contract not a proper issue in this case.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Right around \$200 I should think.

Mr. GREEN: Move to strike out the answer it shows it is a conclusion of the witness what he thinks?

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. Right around \$200.00.

A. Yes, I should think so.

Mr. GREEN: Same objection.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. I will ask you if this mare, if she had that amount of speed, if she was good headed and game, I will ask you whether or not, if she could win every week she was in this class or about how often?

Mr. GREEN: We object for the reason it calls for a conclusion of the witness. Certainly a question of fact for the jury. Incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Objection is overruled.

Exception.

A. She would win anyhow 80% I should judge.

Mr. GREEN: Move to strike out, speculative and a conclusion.

Overruled.

Exception.

205 Q. On this Sunday or at the time you saw her at Kansas City did you make a sufficient inspection and examination of how to enable you to state what kind of a mare she was as to soundness and general condition?

A. I did.

Q. Was she sound or injured?

A. She was sound.

Q. Was her individuality and general make-up such as you would regard necessary in the making of a good race horse?

A. It was.

Q. You speak of half mile track. What is the difference in space of time between mile and half mile track to the average horses?

A. You say what is the difference?

Q. Yes sir?

A. Three to five seconds.

Q. Is a race horse which can pace, for instance 2:12 to 2:15 with a record of 2:29 more valuable or is a horse more valuable when they have a slow record and can pace faster.

Mr. GREEN: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial not a proper issue in this case.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. They are more valuable when they have a slow record and can pace faster.

Q. Are they able to win more money?

A. They are.

Q. Are you acquainted with the Stallion McRoberts?

A. I am.

Q. Was he considered a good sire of race horses?

A. He was.

Q. Would you say that a mare sired by McRoberts and out of a mare with a good record was good breeding for a race horse or not?

A. It is.

206 Cross-questioned by Mr. GILMORE:

Q. How long have you been in Kansas City, Mr. Graves?

A. A little over a year.

Q. Mr. Graves, your business has been largely that of training and handling horses on the track?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And where have you handled them, in Lexington, Ky.?

A. Yes sir, in Kentucky.

Q. As I understand your information as to a good many of these horses is obtained through various journals devoted to the racing and stock breeding?

A. Yes sir.

Q. The price and a good deal of information, of course, you are not able to view the horses personally on the various circuits?

A. No sir.

Q. And you don't do this?

A. No sir.

Q. Now Mr. Graves, this question of race horses involves a certain degree of uncertainty always does it not.

A. Yes sir.

Q. Now, as a matter of fact, Mr. Graves, a race horse always performs differently on one tract from another, that is they do not always perform as well on all occasions?

A. Usually around the same time.

Q. Not exactly?

A. No not exactly, it depends on the driver somewhat.

Q. Isn't it a fact that when race horses are matched in races and are very close in time that one will beat some times and others will beat at other times?

A. Sometimes they will in a close match.

Q. Mr. Graves, the winning would always depend on the speed of other horses that were in the races would it not?

207 A. I always found it to depend on the one I was driving.

Q. The chance of the horse winning was whether or not another horse was in there as speedy?

A. You have got to take driving into consideration.

Q. That then would depend on the speed of the horse and the individual driver?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Then in forecasting the races of a circuit you would have to know every horse, their speed, the drivers and a great many other things?

A. Well, speed comes above all.

Q. Speed is the main thing?

A. Yes sir.

Q. If a horse passing through a circuit should meet more speedy horses, of course the chance would be very much against her?

A. Yes unless speedier ones got bad drivers.

Q. But you could consider the speedier ones would have the best chance?

A. Yes sir that is what I would always try to beat.

Q. In these races of course they are always contingent upon the winning of the showing the higher speed in the larger number of heats, what I was getting at was this, that the winning horse in each race would have to win a certain number of heats?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And in these number of heats the speed in each particular heat would have to be the highest in that heat?

A. If he wins that heat, yes sir.

Q. Now at the time you examined her in Kansas City did you put her to any test, personally, yourself?

A. I did not.

Q. Your knowledge of her then comes from what you obtained what other people say about her record, etc.?

A. Not altogether.

Q. When did you test her?

A. The summary of her races.

208 Q. You got that through the journals as you kept track of these horses?

A. In various ways.

Q. Now in these auction sales that you have spoken about the horses are put up at those auctions and various parties bid on them?

A. Yes sir.

Q. It is not a fact that horses bring uniform prices at those auction sales, do they.

Q. Well, there is a difference in horses, you take a draft horse, they usually bring about the same price.

Q. I am speaking of race horses, whether or not their prices vary?

A. Yes sir.

Q. The purchaser must have or may have individual ideas that wouldn't appeal to everybody else in these sales. Some buy for one purpose and some for another?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Now I don't know whether I understand it right or not, but didn't I understand you to say that a horse with a record for  $1\frac{1}{2}$  mile was of more value than a horse with a record for a mile track?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Now Mr. Graves there is no way by which you could forecast at the beginning of the season, or at any period in a season the earnings of a particular race horse would make, no way to estimate it.

A. Only by what you have got according to speed.

Q. There is no way by which you can actually estimate that?

A. Not exactly.

O. B. GRAVES.

I, Tolbert D. Judy, a Notary Public within and for the County of Jackson, in the State of Missouri, do hereby certify that the above named party, O. B. Graves the witness who has subscribed  
209 to the foregoing deposition, was by me first duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, in the case aforesaid, and that the depositions by him subscribed was reduced to writing by me, a disinterested person and subscribed by the witness in my presence, and the same was taken on the 19th day of December, A. D. 1908, between the hours of 8 o'clock A. M. and six o'clock P. M. of said day and at the office of Ross B. Gilluly, 13 New York Live building, in the town of Kansas City in the county of Jackson, and State of Missouri, as specified in the notice thereto attached, and that I am not related to nor an attorney for either of said parties, or otherwise interested in the event of said action.

TOLBERT D. JUDY,  
*Notary Public within and for  
Jackson County, Missouri.*

My commission expires Sept. 4, 1912.

210 C. E. ROBINSON, called as a witness in his own behalf, being first duly sworn, was examined in chief by Mr. Smith, and testified as follows:

Q. Give your name to the stenographer.

A. My name is C. E. Robinson.

Q. Are you the plaintiff in this action?

A. I am.

Q. Where do you reside?

A. Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

Q. Where did you reside in 1907?

A. I was in South Dakota.

Q. What was your,—what is your business at this time.

Q. Training and handling race horses, trotting and pacing horses.

Q. What was your business in 1907?

A. Same business.

Q. Are you the owner or were you the owner of Nancy Alden, in 1907, a pacing mare?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Are you the owner of Nancy Alden at this time?

A. I am.

Q. Where is she.

A. At Blackwell, Oklahoma.

Q. Racing or training, or what?

A. She is in the pasture.

Q. What is her condition at this time?

Mr. GREEN: Defendant objects as immaterial.

Overruled.

Q. Withdraw the question.

A. Her right hind leg is twice the size of the other three that is, either one of the other three.

Exception.

Q. Tell the condition she is in as to soundness or un——

211 Mr. GREEN: Objected to as immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Her left front leg is swollen to a considerable extent above the ankle, and suspensory ligament on the outside on her right hind leg is about the—about twice the size of the other one, of either one of the others, permanently swollen or enlarged, I mean enlarged.

Q. Mr. Robinson, How long have you been training horses?

A. I have been training horses steady since 1900.

Q. What was you doing before that time.

A. I was riding running horses.

Q. Where were you born?

A. I was born in Kansas.

Q. How long did you ride running horses?

A. Five years.

Q. You began with horses then five years prior to 1900, and have been working with them up to the present time?

A. Yes sir.

Q. In that time have you been engaged constantly in the horse business or incidentally?

A. Constantly.

Q. In what capacity? All the time trainer?

A. Trainer and driver in races, and running horses, trotting horses, pacing horses.

Q. Were you ever employed by the Runnymead stock farm.

A. Seven years. About four years all told, all together.

Q. In that time did you have any experience in buying and selling horses outside of training?

A. Yes sir, I did.

212 Q. You may tell the jury just what experience you had in buying and selling horses for that farm, and for yourself.

A. Each and every fall while I was there I conditioned or helped condition the three and four year olds for the saleing; learned them to step fast.

Q. Did you accompany the horses to the markets at any times?

A. Yes sir two different times.

Q. Where?

A. Chicago, and Indianapolis.

Q. Now, Mr. Robinson, you say the mare, Nancy Alden belonged to you at the time of this injury?

A. Yes sir.

Q. When did you first become acquainted with the mare, Nancy Alden?

A. Spring of 1907, at Armour, South Dakota.

Q. Tell the jury what kind of a mare she is as to size, formation, and age, in 1907?

A. She was seven years old that spring, she was a large bay mare for a race mare. She was about sixteen hands high, sixteen hands and one inch, big gaited, strong going mare, game, cool-headed and a constant racing mare.

Q. Now, about what time did you begin her training in 1907?

A. I began.—Well, she started to be jogged the first of April, and I began to train her the first of May.

Q. Did you start her in any races during that season?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Where did you first start her?

A. First started her at Courtney, North Dakota.

Q. What kind of race, and how many horses were there in the race.

213 —. It was a two thirty-five pace; there were about twelve horses in the race.

Q. Where did she finish in that race?

A. Finished third.

Q. Where did she next start?

A. Carrington, North Dakota.

Q. How many horses were in that race?

A. There were about ten.

Q. Where did she finish in that race?

A. She finished second.

Q. What was the purse that was raced for there?

A. \$400.00.

Q. What was the purse she raced for at Courtney, the week prior?

A. \$400.00.

A. Where did you next start?

A. New Rockford.

Q. Where did she finish there?

A. She finished second.

Q. What the size of the purse there?

A. I think it was \$400.00. I would not say positive as to that.

Q. What was the second money in a four hundred dollar purse.

MR. GREEN: Defendant objects as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Twenty-five per cent. One hundred dollars.

Q. Where did you next start her after New Rockford?

A. Valley city.



Q. Where did she finish there?

A. She finished second.

214 Q. What was the purse?

A. \$400.00.

Q. What was the second money in that race?

A. One hundred dollars.

Q. Where did you next start her.

A. Started her at Kensell, finished second, Purse \$400.00.

Q. What was the second money?

A. \$100.00.

Q. How fast were they pacing in the race at Kensell.

Mr. GREEN: Defendant objects as immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Two fifteen.

Q. What kind of a track was it.

A. It was a half mile track common half mile track.

Q. And what was the average time at Courtney and Kinsell in these races she was in.

A. They raced from fifteen to twenty, when they were raced slower than that was on account of muddy track.

Q. What do you mean by fifteen to twenty.

A. I mean each heat was two minutes and fifteen seconds, twice a round a half mile track.

Q. Where did you start her next after Kinsell.

A. Fessenden, North Dakota.

Q. Where did she finish at Fessenden?

A. She was second at Fessenden.

Q. What was the purse?

A. \$400.00.

Q. What winning did she make there?

A. She won \$100.00 clear money.

Q. Where did you next start her.

A. I next started her at Harvey, North Dakota

Q. Where did she finish there?

215 A. She won the race in three straight heats.

Q. What was the size of the purse there?

A. \$400.00.

Q. I will ask you to state to the jury what kind of a track she was paced on at Harvey, North Dakota?

A. A real muddy track, after a big rain.

Q. What record, if any, did she get in that race?

A. Twenty-three and a quarter.

Q. Was that or not her record at the time she was injured?

Mr. GREEN: Objected to as immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. That was the same record she had when she was injured.

—, —.

Q. What did you do with her then, where did she next race.

A. From Harvey I shipped her to Armour, South Dakota; we started her in the twenty pace and the two twenty-four pace.

Q. Where did she finish there.

A. Both of them for three straight heats.

Q. What was the size of the purse?

Mr. GREEN: Objected to as immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. \$300.00 each.

Q. Then where did you start her, What did you do with her then?

A. I shipped her from there to Kansas City Missouri; took her out on the Elm Ridge race track.

216 Q. What kind of a race track was it at Elm Ridge?

A. One mile track, one miles around it, it is a heavy track, kind of a sandy track.

Q. Did you work her at speed over this track.

A. I did.

Q. Tell the jury whether or not you timed her at speed over this track, and how fast she paced.

Mr. GREEN: Objected to as immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. I timed her a mile in two twelve, last half in one three over the Kansas City track.

Q. Did you drive her at this time?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Was she or not at that time, was this mile the limit of her speed?

Mr. GREEN: Defendant objects for the reason it is incompetent irrelevant, and immaterial. Question for the jury.

Mr. SMITH: He is testifying as an expert, and in addition to that he is testifying about his knowledge of the facts and circumstances that he sees in connection with this mare's speed. It would be competent as an expert, and the facts and circumstances in connection with her performance.

The COURT: He can testify.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. You were the driver?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Carried your watch with you?

217 A. Yes sir.

Q. Tell the jury in your opinion about how fast she could have paced the mile?

Mr. GREEN: Same objection.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. I should judge two eight. She stepped the first half easy, and I only drove her on the last half in one three.

Q. Then what did you do with her?

A. I loaded her on the Santa Fe road the 16th of September, and shipped her to Lawrence, Kansas.

Q. Mr. Robinson, About what time did you load this mare to ship her to Lawrence, Kansas?

A. I loaded her at six o'clock in the afternoon. I had her loaded at six o'clock.

Q. You may tell the jury whether you ordered the car yourself for this shipment?

A. I phoned from the Elm Ridge Race track at noon, for a car.

Q. Do you know who you talked to.

A. I called for the agent, I don't know who answered; he said he was the agent.

Q. What did you say to him?

A. I told him I had a bunch of race horses I wanted to ship to Lawrence, Kansas in time to race them, and wanted them in good shape, he told me he could get them out at nine o'clock that night, and have the horses loaded at four o'clock.

Q. What did you do then, what did you do after that?

A. We took the horses down and put them in the Hunter's transfer barn at noon.

218 Q. What time did you load them?

A. Loaded them at six o'clock.

Q. Did you have any further conversation with this agent about shipping this horse after you got down there?

A. Yes sir, I did.

Q. This conversation occurred at their yards?

A. Santa Fe freight depot in Kansas City.

Q. Where is that.

A. Kansas City, Missouri, that is down on Hickory Street.

Q. Just tell the jury what this conversation was after you got in there.

A. After I took the horses to the livery barn I went up to see the agent, or the Clerk or whoever it was had anything to do with it.

Q. Who did you see?

A. I saw the agent at this time to find out when the car would be ready to load, that is, when it would be spotted, and he told me six o'clock.

Mr. GREEN: We object to that he told him. I think he should state what was done.

Q. Just tell the conversation that occurred between you and the agent; what you said and what he said in reference to this shipment.

A. I went in there and asked him when the car should be spotted, and asked him when I should load the horses, and he told me the car would be spotted about six o'clock, or somewhere near that.

Q. Was there any further conversation?

A. Yes sir.

Q. What was that.

A. I asked him what time the train got out, and he said  
219 it was due out at nine o'clock.

Q. Did he tell you what train it was.

A. He said it was the Red Ball Freight—no stops.

Q. Did you tell him anything about what you wanted to go to Lawrence for?

A. I did.

Q. Tell him what kind of horses you had?

Mr. GREEN: Objected to as leading and suggestive.

The COURT: It is suggestive.

Q. Just state what your conversation was?

A. I told him I had some race horses, and wanted to go through on a through freight, I wanted them to get through in good shape so they would be sound and would not be stove up. I wanted to win my race, and I would like to go on a through freight, and he told me this Red Ball went out at nine o'clock we could go on that, and with that understanding I loaded the horses at six o'clock.

Q. Well, was there any way by which this car was indicated, the car that you shipped the horses in; was there anyway by which it was indicated to you or the yard master or the person in charge of the switching of these cars, what train it was to go in.

A. Yes sir, it was.

Mr. GREEN: Objected to as leading and suggestive.

Objection is overruled.

Mr. GREEN: Competency of the witness has not been shown.

Objection is overruled.

Exception.

A. Yes sir, there was.

Q. What was it.

A. There was a square pasteboard stuck on the corner on  
220 the front corner of the left hand side of the car that said "Red Ball Freight" showed what train the car was to be taken into to be taken away.

Q. What time were you moved from where you loaded.

A. We was pulled out of there about nine o'clock, some where between nine and ten o'clock.

Q. Do you know how long you were in the freight yards on the Missouri side?

A. I could not say exactly, but over half the night, to, say, midnight.

Q. Just tell the jury how you were handled in the yard there, did you get out on the Red Ball freight?

A. No sir.

Q. Just tell the jury how your horses were handled while you were in the yard there.

A. Well, the switch engine took us up between nine and ten

o'clock and pulled us up in the yard and bumped us around, and bumped our car into other cars, and others into ours, most of the night, and knocked these horses, and this mare, Nancy Alden, and Sousie Mack down a good many times, most of the night, and about midnight they took us over to Argentine, a suburb of Kansas City, and kept us there the rest of the night making up the train, and bumped us around there in the morning until six o'clock continually switching the car.

Q. When did you first notice any injury that this mare had that you have referred to in the first part of your testimony?

A. When did I notice her to be injured?

Q. Yes sir.

221 A. Right immediately after six o'clock, immediately after we got out of Argentine, that is what I mean. I know she was hurt, but I did not know what was the matter with her until I got out. I would not remove the bandages while the train was switching for danger of being hurt myself.

Q. Just tell the jury now how the bandages were on this mare for shipment.

A. Well, we have long bandages about three feet long, that we roll, start out at the ankle, and roll around the legs to the knees to keep them from getting bruised when we are shipping, we generally put a little cotton under it.

Q. Well, what condition was she in at that time?

A. At the time I pulled the bandages off?

Q. Yes?

A. Her leg was swollen.

Q. Where?

A. Her right hind foot and her left front one.

Q. Well, did you do anything for her at that time?

A. Not right there I didn't until I got to Lawrence.

Q. What time did you get to Lawrence?

A. I got to Lawrence at eleven thirty the next day.

Q. Do you know how far it is from Kansas City of Lawrence?

A. Well, it is between forty and fifty miles.

Q. When you got to Lawrence, what did you do.

A. I went up to the depot to talk to the agent.

Q. What conversation—just give the conversation that you and the agent had?

A. I asked the agent what the freight was, and he told me to talk to the cashier.

Q. Well, did you talk to him?

222 A. I talked to the cashier, and asked him what the freight was, and he said he didn't know. He said the conductor that went through the night before on the red ball freight—

Mr. GREEN: We object to what the conductor is purported to have said.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. I said that the cashier told me that the conductor that went

through the night before took the bill through with him, and he had no bill, and did not know what the freight was, and did not know what to charge us until that conductor came back and give him the bill. He told us he would collect twenty dollars, and if there was any more he would collect that afterwards.

Q. Well, then what did you do?

A. I went back to the car and unloaded the horses, and took them down to the livery barn.

Q. Do you recollect what livery barn?

A. I do not recollect the name of the livery barn, I know where it is, about a block from the post office.

Q. About how far from the freight depot where you unloaded them?

A. About a quarter of a mile.

Q. Now did you start this mare there?

A. Nancy Alden? No sir.

Q. Mr. Robinson, after you took her to the livery barn did you make an examination of her?

A. Yes sir I did.

Q. What condition then did you find her in?

223 A. I found her swollen in the left front leg and right hind one from her knees down.

Q. Then what did you do?

A. I gave her hot applications and lotions to take out the fever, and afterwards applied an astringent.

Q. How long did you remain at Lawrence?

A. I remained there a week. That is the week during the races.

Q. Then what did you do, and where did you go from there?

A. Mr. Moore—brought me from there, and I shipped the horses to Oklahoma City.

Q. Was Mr. Moore with you—you heard his deposition this morning—was that the same party you referred to H. F. Moore?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Was he with you during this time?

Q. During the time I was from Kansas City to Lawrence, and during the races at Lawrence.

Q. Was he with you in Dakota?

A. He was—that is, in North Dakota. He was not with me when I raced at Armour.

Q. Now, where did you go from Lawrence?

A. I went to Oklahoma City.

Q. What did you do there, did you start the mare there?

A. Yes sir, I started her in the two twenty-four pace.

Q. What was her condition—tell the jury.

A. Her leg was swollen, she was limping.

Q. Where did she finish.

A. She did not finish anywhere she did not finish.

Q. Well, what did you do with her then?

A. I kept her there and treated her a while, and sent her over to Shawnee.

Q. Did you have this mare entered at any place besides Oklahoma City at the time she was injured?

A. Yes sir.

224 Mr. GREEN: To which the defendant objects for the reason it is incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, not a proper measure of damages.

Objection is overruled.

Exception.

Q. Did you have this mare entered in any race at any place besides Oklahoma City?

A. Four other places.

Mr. GREEN: Same objection.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. Where were they?

A. Concordia, Kansas, Dallas, Texas, and Wichita Kansas.

Q. Did you race her at any of those places?

A. No sir.

Q. Now, after the Oklahoma City race, what did you do with her?

A. I shipped her over to Shawnee, Oklahoma. And I come down with the measles there myself and turned her over to Mr. Skaggs to handle while I was sick.

Q. How long did you keep her at Shawnee?

A. I kept her all that winter.

Q. Mr. Robinson, at the time you were at Lawrence,—Kansas City—did you have any other conversation than the one you have detailed before you unloaded the car, with the agent or any person connected with the Santa Fe about the shipment of these horses?

Mr. GREEN: To which the defendant objects as leading and suggestive and incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

225 Objection is overruled.

Exception.

A. Yes sir.

Q. Do you know who it was.

A. Why, I started to tell him, tell the cashier the way the horses had been handled, and he told me to talk with someone further up in the building, and I did not know who it was, and I talked with that man about the shape they were in.

Q. What did you say to him?

A. I told him just the way they had been bumped around and the way they had been injured, but I did not know what the injuries were, and I told him where I was going to take them, and he could see where they were.

Mr. GREEN: Object to the answer as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. Did you see him at any time after that time?

A. Yes sir, I saw him in the livery barn.

Q. That same man?

A. That same man.

Q. Did you have any conversation with him there?

A. Only that he asked me how the horses were, and how they were getting along.

Q. Now how long was it after this mare was injured—was it after she was injured before you could determine the extent of these injuries, and how these injuries affected her as to racing?

Mr. GREEN: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

226 A. A person would have to take six months in order to tell whet-er they were permanent or not.

Q. Yes sir.

A. Because a fresh injury that way, just from the fever you know would make her limp unless you give it time for the fever to get out of it, to know for sure whether she was permanently broken down or not.

Q. Now, after you had unloaded the mare and were at Lawrence did you communicate with any one with reference to the injuries to these horses?

A. Yes sir, I did.

Q. Have you got a copy of that letter?

A. No sir, I have not.

Q. Do you know where it is?

A. The letter that I sent?

Q. Yes sir.

A. Why the last time I saw it I put it in the post office.

Q. What direction did it have on it?

A. I addressed it to a man by the name of Conway in Kansas City, Missouri.

Q. Who was he?

A. Freight Claim Agent for the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company.

Q. How long after the injuries to the mare was this mailed?

A. The next night after I loaded in Lawrence, Kansas.

Q. What did you tell him, if anything, in the letter about the injuries to the mare?

Mr. GREEN: Objected to for the reason it is not the best evidence. Sustained.

Exception.

227 Q. Mr. Robinson, after you left Lawrence and went to Oklahoma City, did you say you started the mare there and she did not finish in the race—Did you incur any expenses in the entry of the mare at Fort Worth, and Dallas Texas, and if so—did you or not?

Mr. GREEN: Defendant objects as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, not proper measure of damages.



Overruled.

Exception.

A. Yes sir, I did.

Q. What expense, just tell the jury how you entered her and how she was entered, and what the expense was.

A. Well, I entered her in four different races, one at Concordia, Kansas, one at Fort Worth. The Race at Concordia was Four Hundred, and the race at Fort Worth, was six hundred, the race at Wichita Kansas was six hundred, and the race at Dallas Texas, was one thousand.

A. And when you enter a horse in a race you have to pay five per cent of the entry whether you start the horse or not. If you enter him and don't start the horse, you have got to send this in to the American Trotting Association before you can start the horse in another race, that would make two six hundred dollar races, and one one thousand dollar race would be \$2,200 and one four hundred would be \$2,800.00, and five per cent would be the entry, and would be held up before I could start another horse, or be allowed to drive in a race again.

Q. Well, Did you pay these entries?

A. I paid some of them last summer before I could race over an Association track.

228 Q. Did you start this mare last year at any time?

A. I did.

Q. Where?

A. I started her at Chickasha, Oklahoma.

Q. What did she do?

A. She won in three straight heats.

Q. Did you start her any other place?

A. Oklahoma City.

Q. What was her condition at the time you started her in Oklahoma City?

A. She was limping.

Q. How long after the race at Oklahoma City—after the Chickasha race?

A. About ten days, eight days.

Q. Was she lame at that time?

Q. She was limping at the Oklahoma City races, she was not at the Chickasha to amount to anything, there was a little limp, but she had an easy bunch of horses and it did not make much difference.

Q. Where did she finish at Oklahoma City?

A. She finished.

Q. In the money or behind the money.

A. Just inside of the money, just saved my entries.

Q. You say she was limping, what did you do after that?

A. Sent her to Blackwell, Oklahoma, sent her out on the farm.

Q. What was her condition after that race?

A. Lame.

Q. Do you tell the jury now whether she is *sould* or unsound?

A. She is unsound.

Q. Do you tell the jury she is in such a condition in view of the circumstances and your knowledge of her injuries and your treatment of her since she was injured in 1907, will she ever be able to race again?

229 Mr. GREEN: Objected to as immaterial.  
Overruled.

Exception.

A. I worked on her all summer in order to get her to this one race. I started in early and doctored her on that leg, and every time I would work her a fast mile she would pull up limping, and I finally got her to go through this one race at Chickasha, and I had to pay up all of these back entries before I could start her in this race—pay all the entries made against her in the fall of 1907, and I won that race, and then took her to Oklahoma City for the week's racing, and she was no good, would not stand up on her legs, and I sent her to Blackwell to my sister's farm to raise colts from her.

Q. Now, in view of the present condition of the mare, and what you know of her injuries, are you able to state what would be the reasonable market value of this mare immediately after her injuries at Lawrence.

A. Yes sir, I would.

Q. About what would she be worth?

Mr. GREEN: Defendant objects as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, not proper measure of damages, and attempt to vary the terms of a written contract.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. She would be worth about \$375.00.

Q. Basing your opinion on what you know of this mare and your knowledge of her speed and her ability as a racing mare, are you able to state to the jury what was her market value immediately prior to her injuries at Kansas City?

A. Yes sir.

230 Q. Tell the jury just what it was?

Mr. GREEN: Defendant objects as—the same as above.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Yes sir, I would.

Q. Tell the jury what it was?

A. Well, she would bring anyway \$2,500.00 in any of the leading four markets of the United States, Madison Square, Chicago, Ill., Indianapolis, or any other place.

Mr. GREEN: Move to strike out for the reason it is not the proper measure of damage.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. Mr. Robinson, Do you know what her market value would

be immediately prior to these injuries, what would be her intrinsic market value as a racing mare, racing and breeding mare?

A. Taking into consideration all what she would be able to win, and everything?

Q. Yes sir, everything, without reference to the markets you spoke of?

Mr. GREEN: Same objection.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Well, she would be worth,—five thousand, taking everything into consideration.

Q. Well, if this mare had not been injured, and had remained sound and had been trained another season, how fast, in your opinion, could she have paced.

231 Mr. GREEN: Defendant objects as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, what she could have been the next season.

Mr. SMITH: It is only speculative to the extent of his opinion, and his opinion is only worth anything except as a trainer and expert. It is not competent to show what her value would be the next year, but what she was worth at that time.

The COURT: Let him answer the question.

A. Well she would step a mile in two five or six anyway on a mile track.

Q. Now you say she is at your sister's farm in—Blackwell?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And bred?

A. Yes sir, in foal.

Cross-examination by Mr. EMERY A. FOSTER:

Q. You say you owned the mare for some time?

A. I have owned her since the spring of 1907.

Q. How old are you?

A. Me. I am twenty-nine years old.

Q. Twenty nine now?

A. Coming thirty.

Q. What was your business before the spring of 1907?

A. I was riding running horses.

Q. You were riding running horses?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Where?

A. Over Iowa, Nebraska, and South Dakota.

Q. Did you have any interest in that stock farm up there?

A. No sir, no interest.

Q. Did you work for them?

A. I worked for them.

Q. Worked for this man here (indicating)?

232 A. Not only him, him and his brother and his father.  
Q. And they owned some horses up there at that ranch, did they?

A. Yes sir.

Q. You took them out in 1907, you say?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Made a circuit up there in Dakota?

A. Yes sir.

Q. How many horses did you take along.

A. We took five horses.

Q. Did Mr. Smith go along?

A. No.

Q. Who went?

A. Mr. Moore, and myself went with the horses. Smith came afterwards, he did not go with us, but he went up there.

Q. Went up where?

A. To the races.

Q. Who carried the money?

A. Well, all of us carried it.

Q. Who paid the bills?

A. Whoever came handy, whoever made it.

Q. How many places did you say you raced in 1906 or seven?

A. 1907.

Q. When you made that circuit in North Dakota, how many places did you race.

A. We raced at Courtney, Carrington, New Rockford, Kensal, Fessenden, Harvey, seven in North Dakota.

Q. All on the railroad.

A. Every one of them on the railroad.

Q. Shipped from each place?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Who shipped?

A. Either one of us.

Q. Who?

A. Mr. Moore or myself.

Q. Did you ship any of them in your name.

A. I can't remember now.

Q. Well, that was in 1907, wasn't it?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you pay any freight bills?

233 A. Mr. Moore shipped them in his name most of the time.

Q. Did you pay any freight bills.

A. Yes sir, I helped pay them.

Q. Did you sign any receipts and pay any freight bills in Dakota.

Q. I just told you Mr. Moore shipped them mostly in his name.

Q. Did you ever do such a thing?

A. I have, I would not say when.

Q. In Dakota?

A. In Dakota, why I have, I reckon.

Q. You don't remember it now, though, do you, any particular town?

A. Well, I would not say, I know I have signed bills, I would not call attention to any one particular spot.

Q. Are these the same horses in Dakota that you had in Kansas City?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Who did they belong to when you had them in Dakota?

A. Nancy Alden belonged to me, Don Castleton and John Drew belonged to H. H. Smith, and Sousie Mack belonged to S. H. Smith.

Q. Now, did you enter Nancy Alden in these races in your name?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Before you owned her?

A. Sir.

Q. Before you owned her?

A. I never raced her before I owned her.

Q. Who owned her before you did?

A. Runnymead Stock Farm.

Q. Was there a division of the property of that farm?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Who owned her then after the division?

A. I did.

Q. You bought her then?

A. I bought her.

Q. Who did you give the note for her to?

234 A. I did not give no note.

Q. How did you pay for her?

A. I give a mortgage.

Q. Who did you give the mortgage to.

A. First National Bank, Armour, South Dakota.

Q. And Mr. Smith here, as president of the bank?

A. Yes sir, Vice President.

Q. Why did he travel around with you at all these places and go to Kansas City with you.

A. Because he owned two of the horses, and was interested in them.

Q. At all of these places you say you did the shipping?

A. They were mostly shipped in Mr. Moor's name.

Q. You did.

A. I helped.

Q. Moore was an ex-railroad employee.

A. Sir?

Q. Moore had worked for the railroad?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as improper cross-examination.

A. I don't know whether he did or not.

Overruled.

Q. You were familiar with shipping race horses before you went to Kansas City?

A. Why, not very.

Q. You had been shipping all summer?

A. I had been riding with the horses all summer.

Q. Signing Moore's name.

A. No, that is the only time I signed Moore's name, was in Kansas City.

Q. What did you do in North Dakota when you wanted to ship your horses.

A. Why we always ordered a car in the first place for a certain point?

235 Q. Then what did you do.

A. Then have the car spotted and ask them where we would get out, and along and explained to them what kind of horses we had where we were going, and what for and tried to get them to put us on a good train that did not stop, and make everything as convenient as possible.

Q. Now, is that all that you did.

A. We generally loaded the horses.

Q. Is that all?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial improper cross examination, and cannot be competent for any purpose, whether they signed a contract in North Dakota is immaterial in this case.

Objection is overruled.

Exception.

Q. Well, you always went up and signed a contract, didn't you?

A. Generally signed a contract.

Q. Well, you know you always did.

A. Yes always, pretty near always.

Q. And you did that all the time.

A. Well, sometimes I did not sign a contract before I loaded the horses. I have loaded the horses when I never saw a contract until I got on the train.

Q. You know you always had signed a contract.

A. Some places.

Q. Why didn't you, a while ago, when counsel asked you to tell your story, why was it you did not mention a conversation about the contract.

A. He never asked.

Q. You are only telling what you are asked?

236 A. What do you mean?

A. You don't put things where we can understand them.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Q. You left out the fact you signed a contract in Kansas City.

A. I didn't tell you I said everything that I knew, did I?

Q. Well, you left that out, didn't you.

A. Well I said so much I don't know what I left out.

Q. Well, you left it out purposely, didn't you?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. Can he argue with the witness?

Sustained.

Q. Well, did you leave it out purposely or did you just forget it.

A. I did not leave it out purposely, I never thought about it when I was talking.

Q. You testified yesterday?

A. Yes sir, testified on the stand.

Q. Told a good deal about a contract yesterday, didn't you?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Sustained.

A. I don't know what you mean, I can't catch the idea.

Q. Is your memory good? Is your memory good?

A. Am I supposed to talk now. My memory is pretty fair.

Q. Do you remember what you testified to yesterday?

A. I remember most of it, yes sir.

Mr. SMITH: We object to that as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, what he testified to yesterday. If he wants to impeach him it is not a proper way to impeach him.

Sustained.

Q. I will ask you if you did not testify yesterday that you went down to the freight depot in Kansas City, and signed a contract for these horses, and signed Mr. Moore's name to the contract.

A. You are getting way ahead of your story, I signed that before I loaded the horses at—

Q. I say didn't you testify to that yesterday?

A. That I signed Mr. Moore's name to that contract? Yes sir.

Q. Why did you give this notice before you unloaded them at Lawrence?

A. What notice?

Q. That the horses were hurt.

A. So that he would know they were hurt.

Q. Did you testify to that yesterday?

A. I did.

Q. Why did you give them notice.

A. So that the agent would know that the horses were hurt.

Mr. SMITH: Object.

Sustained.

Q. That was a provision of the contract you should give the notice before you unloaded the horses.

A. I didn't know whether it was provided in the contract or not about giving the notice. I gave the notice because I thought I ought to.

Q. Can you read and write?

A. I can.

Q. And you don't pretend to say that you ordered this car  
238 do you—

A. I did order this car.

Q. Was Smith with you.

A. He was with me when I phoned for it at the barn at Elm Ridge.

Q. Did Smith tell you who to phone to.

A. I knew who to phone to.

Q. How did you know who to phone to.

A. Common sense.

Q. Did common sense teach you the fellow's name.

A. It taught me to phone to the agent, at least that I ought to.

Q. How did you get the agent over the phone?

A. Called for him.

Q. What did you say to central?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Sustained.

Q. What did you say when you called.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Objection is sustained.

Exception.

Q. What did you say. What words did you say. Just give your words.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial unless it was a conversation with the agent.

The COURT: If it is a conversation with the agent or one supposed.

Q. What did you say?

A. Who to.

Q. Anybody.

239 A. I had a book there and found out the number of the agent, and rung for that number and he said that he was the agent.

Q. That was in the book at the Elm Ridge track?

A. His number was in the telephone book.

Q. Was his name?

A. I don't remember whether his name was or not, I remember looking, looking in a book for his telephone number.

Q. What did you call for.

A. Called his number.

Mr. SMITH: Object to this conversation. If he got the agent by number or asking. We have no objection to any conversation between them, but how he got him, or what the sign was, or whether there was any telephone book we object as incompetent.

Q. As a matter of fact the agent's name or the agent's number was not in the book at all, was it.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. And the witness has testified that he did not know. He called for the number of the agent of the Santa Fe railroad.

Objection is sustained



Q. You did not get what you called for out of the book, did you?

A. I got the agent.

Q. Out of the book?

A. I think it was out of the book.

Q. You don't know, though, do you?

A. That is where I got my information, was out of the book got the agent, got the depot from the book and got the agent  
240 from the depot.

Q. And what did you tell him?

A. I told him—I have done told you what I told him long ago, I told him I wanted a car to go to Lawrence Kansas, and told him what kind of a car, and what kind of horses I had.

Q. Just tell exactly what you said.

A. I am telling the conversation.

Q. No, you are not. You are repeating your conclusions. Just say what you said.

A. What I said to the Agent?

A. Certainly.

A. I told him I had a bunch of race horses that I wanted to go to Lawrence for the races, and wanted to get through with the horses in good shape, and I wanted to get on a through freight, did not want to go on the local freight that stopped and switched on the way over there, and I asked him about it, and he told me there was a freight called the Red Ball that went at nine o'clock, and for me to get my horses down at about four o'clock, and be loaded at six and I could get out, and I told him to spot the car.

Q. You knew all about this spotting the car before that.

A. I knew they would spot the car before I could load.

Q. You were thoroughly familiar with the arrangements you had to make to ship race horses?

A. Well, I am pretty familiar with race horses.

Q. Did you ever ask an agent in your life how much it cost to go from one town to another?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and  
241 immaterial. The conversation must be confined to this agent and this shipment.

Objection is overruled.

Exception.

Q. Read the question. (Question read.)

A. You mean with horses?

Q. With horses?

A. I suppose I have, yes sir.

Q. What for. Why did you ask him that.

A. Why sometimes I have prepaid my freight.

Q. Now is that the reason?

A. Well I have—

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial he asked him what the reason was and he said.

Sustained.

Q. Now as a matter of fact you asked him how much was the car from Kansas City to Lawrence, didn't you?

A. You say I asked him?

Q. Yes, how much it would be?

A. I did not.

Q. Why didn't you?

A. Because I did not.

Q. Well why didn't you.

A. Because it was immaterial there whether I knew or not.

Q. Did not make any difference how much you paid.

A. Yes it made a difference.

Q. What.

A. Why certainly it did.

Q. Now, Smith told you how much it was, didn't he.

A. Who?

Q. Smith?

A. What.

Q. Smith was going to pay the bill wasn't he.

A. Why not necessarily.

242 A. I would not say for sure, but I think he did, yes.

Q. You were under his orders were you?

A. No no more than I was mine, or Mr. Moore's.

Q. Now, was you under anybody else's orders?

A. No sir.

Q. Well, who suggested that you go to Lawrence?

A. All of us.

Q. You agreed to that, did you?

A. Yes sir.

Q. How did Smith come to be with you when you ordered the car?

A. He was out there, and I suggested to him about ordering the car now at noon; told him we would go down and phone when we could ship out.

Q. Did he give you any directions to ship the horses in your name or anybody else's?

A. Yes sir, he did.

Q. What did he say?

A. He gave me directions to ship in my name if he was not there to make out the billing.

Q. You worked these horses out with harness?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you have any harness to make them pace?

A. Didn't need any harness she was a natural pacer.

Q. Well, did you have harness to make her pace?

A. Not to make her pace—we used—

Q. What are the traps you put on their legs?

A. A pair of quarter boots.

Q. Was she ever lame?

A. Yes sir, after she was loaded on the Santa Fe road at Kansas City.

Q. Was she ever lame before you loaded her?

A. No sir, she was not.

Q. Never had been lame?

A. No sir.

Q. Ever have any puffs on her legs?

243 A. No sir, she was a very cleaned limbed mare.

Q. Now, when you went down to the station you say you signed Mr. Moore's name to the bill of lading.

A. Yes sir, I did.

Q. You got your contract, did you?

A. I got my contract—

Q. Now did you and Moore come to ride in that car, did anybody let you ride in it.

A. We paid our way.

Q. How did you pay it?

A. Paid it to the conductor.

Q. How do you mean?

A. Well, how would a person pay his fare if he was going—with money of course.

Q. You mean you bought a ticket?

A. No, we did not buy a ticket that I remember of. It is not necessary to do it as long as you pay for your fare, the rate is two cents a mile or three cents.

Q. So during that trip you paid the conductor of that freight train that you went out to Lawrence on how much?

A. We paid him one fare.

Q. For both of you?

A. No sir.

Q. Well two fares?

A. I paid him one fare, I don't know whether he paid him two fares or not.

Q. Did he collect for the other fellow?

A. I would not say whether he did or not. I did not pay any attention.

Q. Under your contract you signed you was allowed to ride in the car.

A. It depends on how you ship.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as improper cross examination, incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial for the reason that the wit-

244 ness was not asked on direct examination about a contract. Objection is sustained.

Q. Then you were just beating your way on the train and the conductor found you, you had no right on there whatever, you got on—

A. I did have a right.

Q. Because.

A. Because I was riding with the horses.

Q. What gave you that right?

A. The conductor.

Q. He told you?

A. Yes sir.

Q. You had seen him about riding with the horses before you got on?

A. I did not.

Q. How did he tell you.

A. He came around to the car to see the contract.

Q. Came around to the car and read the contract, did he, you showed it to him didn't you.

A. I don't remember whether I showed him the contract or not.

Q. Your memory is not getting bad again is it.

A. No sir, it is not.

Q. You just said he came around and looked at the contract, and said you could ride.

A. Well, I will tell you——

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

A. a fool can ask more question——

Objection is sustained.

Q. Was this the way you came to ride by virtue of this contract.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. Does not tend to prove any issue in this case.  
Sustained.

Mr. FOSTER: It might affect his credibility.

Q. Now after he read the contract did he give it back to you.

A. I told you I don't remember whether he saw the contract or not, or whether he got it.

Mr. SMITH: Same objection. Witness stated that he paid the fare to the conductor, and he had a right to pay it, and that is the end of that bargain. It is incompetent, anyway.

Sustained.

Exception.

Q. Now you had a whole lot of your own property in there besides these horses.

A. We had some property in there besides the horses.

A. We had a little belonged with the horses.

Q. How did you have that.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. No action to recover for any other property.  
Sustained.

Q. At the time you got to Lawrence you were told there before you could unload the horses you would have to make some settlement to pay for—about the extra stuff you had in the car, weren't you?

A. No sir.

Q. Some sulkeys and stuff that you had no right to have them in there?

A. I was not.

Q. Was nobody told?

A. No sir, not that I know of.

246 Q. Was anything said about it?

A. There was nothing said about it.

Q. Where did you unload.

A. At the depot platform at the freight depot.

Q. What did you do with your contract that you got?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Objection is sustained.

Exception.

Q. Now, you were trying to live up to the contract, weren't you?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

Objection is sustained.

Exception.

Q. Before you shipped the horses what was the last thing you did?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as indefinite, incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and not proper cross examination.

Objection is sustained.

Exception.

Q. I will ask you before the horses went out if you didn't go down to the depot, freight depot, and go to the proper office and sign up your contract to take your horses over to Lawrence,

A. I went to the office and signed a contract about eight o'clock.

Q. Now, did you say Smith told you to sign for him too?

A. No, sir, I didn't.

Q. Well, how did you sign it?

A. I did not sign it.

247 Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. The contract is plead in their answer and they're bound by it, and it shows how it was signed itself.

Overruled.

Q. Read the question. (Question read.)

A. I meant I did not sign it for Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith's name, that is what I got started to say.

Q. What did Mr. Smith tell you about it.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. Smith is not party to this action.

Objection is sustained.

Q. Mr. Smith was at that time the owner of the mortgage on your horses, wasn't he.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, and not tending to prove any issue in this case.

Sustained.

Q. Mr. Smith had an interest in the horses, didn't he.

Mr. SMITH: Objected — as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. The witness stated how he came in possession of the horse. Said she belonged to him, and he executed a mortgage on her.

The COURT: Objection is overruled.

A. What was the question.

Q. When you wanted to ship to Lawrence what did Mr. Smith and Mr. Moore and yourself agree upon?

The COURT: That is not the question. (Read the question.)

Q. Just answer what Mr. Smith said.

The COURT: The last question asked. Read it.

(Question read: Mr. Smith had an interest in the horse.

248 A. He owned John Drew and Don Axtrillim(?).

Q. How was it agreed that you should ship them.

A. It was agreed we should ship them to Lawrence over the Santa Fe railroad, the three of us in the car together, the three owner's horses.

Q. You say you shipped your own horses and Moore's horses, and Smith's horses in Moore's name?

A. We billed out the car in Moore's name, yes sir.

Q. Did Moore own any of the horses in the bunch?

A. He did not own any?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. Moore is not a party to this action.

Sustained.

Exception.

Q. Now what was your reason in shipping in the name of a person who had no interest in the horse.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, incompetent, and irrelevant.

Sustained.

Exception.

Q. You did sign the name of Moore to the contract, did you?

A. Yes sir.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

Overruled.

Q. Why did you sign that contract in the name of Moore.

A. Because Mr. Moore would be there I knew for sure, when he got there he would have something to show he could get them off. And Mr. Moore told me I could sign them that way and when I

249 went up to see when these horses were going out, and the agent told me the bill was ready to be signed, and I told him

Mr. Moore was down in the car, and he said it would be all right for me to sign the name, and I signed the name.

Q. Did you tell him who owned these horses?

A. Tell who.

A. Anybody?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial as to who owned them. The motion is for an injury to Nancy Alden, he has testified he owned her.

The COURT: Objection is sustained.

Exception.

Q. Now you did not have any other talk with anybody then, than what you have told about, did you?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, unless he was in the employ of the defendant.

Objection is overruled.

A. What was the question.

Q. Have any other talk about the stock?

A. Where-bouts?

Q. Down at the depot?

A. You mean at the depot while they were standing there at the platform.

Q. Yes. Yes.

A. Yes sir, I talked to a man on the platform that loaded freight, and I talked to the yard master.

Q. Who wrapped these horses' legs before you put them in the car.

A. I and Mr. Moore.

250 Q. You wrapped them up above the knee?

A. No sir, below the knee.

Q. Wrapped them tight?

A. Well not very tight, just tight enough so that they would not interfere with the circulation.

Q. If you would wrap them so tight it would interfere with the circulation what would it do to the horses.

A. Just interfere with the circulation.

Q. It would not give him a bound tendon or—

A. It would—might—night, We did not wrap them tight.

Q. Do you know any way this horse could get this injury anyway except by being hurt in the railway car.

A. Why there is lots of ways.

Q. This injuries to your horses do you know any way that could be done except in a railroad car.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial unless confined to some particular time or place.

Q. Well, that character of injury.

Objection is sustained.

Exception.

Q. What was the matter with your mare?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and imma-

terial. No particular injury fixed, not particular place on the mare and no time fixed.

Objection is overruled.

A. When do you mean what was the matter with her.

Q. What are you complaining about now.

A. You mean how was she hurt on the car?

Q. What was the matter with her after you got her to Lawrence?

251 A. She was injured by the Santa Fe Railroad in the yards.

Q. Well, what was the matter with her? How was she injured?

A. The suspensory ligaments on the side of the tendons from her knees down were pulled loose, and the front leg she had a half broken down—a rupture of the synovial membrane and one of the suspensory ligaments pulled loose.

Q. You are sure they were pulled loose when you took her off the car?

A. I was not sure they were pulled loose when—took her off the car, I started before I did not know what her injuries were. Her leg was swelled so, but I could tell later, I could go to the barn later and look at it.

Q. What time did your horse make before you got to Lawrence?

A. What do you mean.

Q. What time on the track?

A. She could—

Q. What is her record.

A. About two twenty-three and a quarter on half mile track.

Q. Where was it made?

A. At Harvey, North Dakota.

Q. What is her record in a race after the injury?

A. Two nineteen and a quarter.

Q. Since that injury she made seven second- better time than before.

A. No sir.

Q. Well the difference between two twenty-four and two nineteen.

A. Only four.

252 Q. Only four?

A. Yes sir.

Q. That was going some.

A. No sir, she could step a mile in eight.

Q. In ordinary winnings—for that year how much did you win in purses on your horses, and received and receipt for at any places in North Dakota?

A. Sir.

Q. Read the question (Question read.)

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. Not confined to this mare in controversy.

Mr. FOSTER: Yes sir, this mare.

Overruled.

Exception.



Q. How much did you receipt for yourself?

A. Well, I just got through on my cross examination telling how much it was.

Q. I want to know any places where you receipted for and received any money yourself?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial not proper cross examination not shown it is necessary to receipt for money you get at the races.

The Court: Objection is overruled.

A. You mean how much money I drew?

Q. Well, before you get any money for a race you go up and sign a receipt.

A. No you don't, Sign after you get the money.

Q. Where did you ever sign a receipt yourself, in your name for any money you won on this mare in the Dakotas what town or what place.

253 A. Let's see, Courtney, Carrington, New Hockford, Valley City, Kinsell, Fessenden, and Harvey.

Q. And your horse won at all those places.

A. And my horse won at all those places.

Q. And you signed a receipt on the books and got your money.

A. I got the money, I would not say anything about signing the receipts.

Q. I asked you a while ago where you signed the receipts Did you ever sign a receipt in any of these towns?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial the question of—the question is whether he generally signed receipts not whether he did at any particular place or for this particular money.

Q. You don't pretend to say you signed any receipt up in North Dakota and got any money on this horse, do you?

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

The Court: Double question there.

Mr. FOSTER: About the receipt I am asking.

The Court: Answer the question.

A. I don't remember where I did sign—any particular place where I signed receipts.

Q. Do you know of any one place.

A. I would not say definitely of any one place. No. I presume I have signed receipts there, but I would not say definitely what place it was or when it was.

254 Q. You presume you have signed receipts?

A. I presume I have.

Q. Do you believe you have?

A. I presume I have.

Q. I am asking you for your belief now?

A. Yes.

Q. Now where.

A. I told you I would not say where at one—some of these points.

Q. As a matter of fact you did not have nothing to do with that horse except to drive her and take care of her. Smith owned the horse all the time, didn't he.

A. He did not.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Overruled.

Q. And you were just taking that horse around as a kind of a plant for Brother Smith.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial and object to the counsel making that statement before the jury.

Sustained.

Q. Well, I will ask you if you were taking this horse around—

A. I was racing that horse for myself.

Q. What was Smith doing.

A. Smith had two horses.

Q. Who was racing them.

A. I and Mr. Moore and Mr. Smith when he was with them.

A. Who paid the freight on this shipment there from Kansas City to Lawrence?

255 A. I would not say for sure, but I think Mr. Moore paid it. I know it was paid.

Q. How many damage suits have you had over that car of horses.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Objected- is overruled.

A. This one.

Q. Just one?

A. This one.

Q. How many suits grew out of that shipment.

A. Another besides this one.

Q. Wasn't there another horse injured in the shipment.

A. I mean another case besides the two horses injured in the one shipment.

Q. Have you been a witness in the other case?

A. Souse Mack, yesterday.

A. Have you been a witness in any other suit for injury to horses.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. Sustained.

Q. Are you an expert on horses?

A. I am.

Q. Have you been a witness as an expert in cases for damages to horses lately?

A. No sir, not only these two suits.

Mr. SMITH: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, and move to strike out the answer and question not proper

cross examination, unless he wants to determine his ability as an expert, and it is not a proper way to determine that.

256 Sustained.

Q. You say these two suits are the only suits you have testified to—

A. What do you mean?

Q. Since 1907?

Mr. SMITH: Object, the Court has already sustained an objection to the question and answer.

Sustained.

Q. The suit in which Smith was interested or that firm farm up there.

Objected to as incompetent irrelevant and immaterial.

Sustained unless the question is confined to this particular horse.

Sustained.

Exception.

That is all.

Redirect examination by Mr. SMITH:

Q. Mr. Robinson, as a matter of fact while you were in North Dakota, all the horses that raced there, including Sousie Mack,—you say you had five horses up there?

A. Yes sir.

Q. I will ask you if it is not a fact all the horses raced up in North Dakota, including the two belonging to me, were not entered and raced in your name.

Mr. FOSTER: Objected to incompetent, not proper rebuttal, leading and suggestive.

Sustained.

That is all.

257 Recross-examination by Mr. FOSTER:

Q. Then when Smith got the money he signed your name to the receipt.

A. He never signed my name to any receipt that I knew.

Q. Did you make the entries in these races.

A. I and Mr. Smith together and sometimes he did. We usually consulted.

Q. He was the owner and you were the manager.

A. I stated how the proposition laid about owning the horses.

Q. But you raced them in your own name.

A. In North Dakota we did.

Q. In whose name did you ship them. In whose name did you ship them?

A. Where to?

Q. Any where.

A. H. F. Moor's name.

Q. Why did you always ship these horses in the name of H. F. Moore?

A. It was understood he would always be with them, Mr. Smith wasn't with them all the time, and I was not with them all the time, Mr. Moore was always with the horses. That is all.

That is all.

258 H. H. SMITH, called as a witness in behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly sworn, was examined in chief by Mr. Rittenhouse, and testified as follows:

Q. State your name to the Court.

A. H. H. Smith.

Q. Where do you live?

A. Shawnee.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. Lawyer.

Q. What was your occupation in 1907?

A. I was practising law and running a stock farm at Armour, South Dakota, breeding trotting and running horses.

Q. What experience have you had, if any, as a breeder, owner and trainer of horses?

A. Considerable experience all my life. Up to 1907, since that I have not owned but one horse since that time.

Q. Been constantly in the business of breeding, training trotting horses.

A. Yes sir, in that business all my life, and exclusively.

Q. Are you acquainted with the animal in controversy in this suit, known as Nancy Alden?

A. Yes sir.

Q. How long have you known her?

A. I have known her since 1906.

Q. Where was she raised.

A. She was raised at Vine Grove, Kentucky.

Q. Who was the owner of Nancy Alden in 1907?

A. Well, she belonged, really belonged to the First National Bank of Armour. She was shipped there by my brother, and I took her in the division of the property.

259 Q. Do you know the breeding of Nancy Alden?

A. Yes, she was sired by McRoberts, and the dam was by a horse called Freeman Son of Abdallah and the second dam was by Measenger son of Homer 2.24; third dam was by a Morgan horse I have forgot his name. The dam was the dam of J. B. McRoberts, 2.24 1/4 and three others with records the slowest of 2.6 1/2.

Q. Now for the benefit of the jury, what kind of an animal was Nancy Alden?

A. Was a bay mare, 16 hands high, nervy, weigh- about eleven hundred, in fair flesh, pacer.

Q. Did you on or about September 16th, 1907, Did you see Nancy Alden at Kansas City?

A. Yes sir.

Q. In what kind of condition was she in physically?

A. In good condition when I saw her. I only saw her. You

mean to race? I did not see her but twice that year, I saw her once in North Dakota at Courtney. I did not see her race up there at all except the first meeting. I saw her race at Armour in the two races she raced in there; that is the only time I ever saw her race except the time she attempted to be started at Oklahoma City.

Q. Did you see her at Kansas City, did you say?

A. I saw her at work at the Elm Bridge track, but I never saw her race but twice that year.

Q. What was her time at Armour, Nor—South Dakota, when you saw her, if you know?

A. The mile that she went was in 16 and a half, the time was two twenty-three and a quarter, that was her record at the time she was in the race.

Q. And it was sixteen?

A. Sixteen and a quarter. She would have that kind of 260 a record if the Trotting Association knew it.

Q. Do you know what time she made at Kansas City about the 16th of September, 1907?

A. I saw her work three heats, and I think the fastest was twelve and a fraction.

Q. By that you mean two twelve?

A. Two twelve for the mile, yes sir.

Q. Now, did you have anything to do with shipping her out of Kansas City?

A. Nothing only I called up the chief clerk from the Baltimore Hotel, and I went out with him to the track and Mr. Robinson called up. The time I did the talking was at the Baltimore Hotel.

Q. What was done after you had the conversation with the agent of the Santa Fe from the Elm Ridge track?

A. They were sent in to the freight depot of the Santa Fe in Kansas City.

Q. Did you go down to the depot?

A. I went down there about five o'clock, four or five o'clock, something like that time in the afternoon.

Q. Well, did you have at that time any conversation with any of the agents or any of the employees of the Santa Fe?

A. Why, I talked with two or three of them just about getting out of there, and about the races, I think I talked to somebody in where the clerks all were about the horses or something about shipping them.

Q. Well, what was that conversation.

Q. I do not recollect any particular person, but I just inquired about the certainty of getting out on that train, and what kind of a train it was, and the time I talked to the clerk, I think it 261 was upstairs, he said they would get out of there for sure about nine o'clock, and they would put them on the fast freight.

Q. Did he name the freight?

A. Yes, a freight called the Red Ball.

Q. Well, you saw the horses just prior to the time they were loaded on the car?

A. Yes sir.

Q. What condition was Nancy Alden in, at that time, do you know?

A. She was in good condition, and sound, when I saw her at the track. I saw her at Hunt's barn, I think it was Hunt's down close to the Santa Fe depot when they were led out to be loaded.

Q. She did not limp at that time did she?

Q. No, she had on bandages at that time, Bandages with cotton under the bandages, between the leg and the bandages.

Q. Well, now, when did you see this mare again?

A. At Mr. Gallaher's barn at Lawrence, Kansas.

Q. How long after you had seen her at the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Station in Kansas City?

A. Oh, it was the next day some time about one or two o'clock when I saw her.

Q. What condition was Nancy Alden in at that time?

A. At the time I saw her at Lawrence?

Q. Yes sir.

A. Well, her right hind leg was swollen from her hock down to her fetlock joint, and the left front leg was swollen from the knee down to the fetlock joint.

Q. Now at that time could you tell whether or not it was a permanent injury or not.

A. No sir, nobody could, I could not.

Q. Was Nancy Alden entered in any race at Lawrence at that time?

262 A. There was a twenty four pace there, and she was to start in that race, although she was not entered, I was stopping with Mr. Dunkle and the Secretary was a friend of his and mine, and he told me I could start her in any race and they did not need to enter unless they were named before they printed the racing card.

Mr. GREEN: Object to his testifying to the conversation.

A. —She was too lame to start.

Q. Have you seen that mare at any time since you saw her at Lawrence, to which you have just testified?

A. Well, I saw her at Oklahoma City in October, 1907.

Q. What condition was she in at that time?

A. Well, her legs were not swollen so bad, they had gotten kind of calloused and hard; she was still lame. She was limping in both of these legs when I saw her at Oklahoma City, that is not to walk or anything, but when she speeded up.

Q. Do you know what races she was entered in other than the races at Oklahoma City which followed the one at Lawrence Kansas?

A. I think she was entered at Wichita, I think I entered her for Mr. Robinson, at Fort Worth, Dallas—

Q. Was she able to perform in these races at Dallas, Fort Worth and Wichita?

Mr. GREEN: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. No, she was not able to race.

263 Q. Now at the time that you say you went to Lawrence, Kansas, state what conversation you had with the agent or employees of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Company at Lawrence, relative to this horse, Nancy Alden?

A. I was down a couple of time with Mr. Dunkl- before they came in, and I had some desultory conversation with the agent or clerks or whoever they were in there, about when they would get there, and the agent told me—I think it was the agent, I am not certain whether it was he or not—He said—he sat up in the end anyway. He was the man I was directed to, he said the horses would be in there about noon, that they had missed the red ball freight in Kansas City, and that was the cause of the delay. That was the statement that he gave in reference to it.

Q. And what time did they come in?

A. Well, I did not see them when they came in. I saw them about one o'clock or a little afterwards.

Q. Do you know who paid the freight on that car of horses from Kansas City to Lawrence?

A. Well, I suppose I did. I am not certain about it. I talked with the agent about it, or the cashier about it, but I suppose I paid it. I was under the impression Mr. Moore paid it, but I guess I paid it.

Q. Now, at the time you paid that freight, did you have any conversation with the agent or any employee of the Santa Fe relative to the condition of these animals?

MR. GREEN: To which the defendant objects.

Overruled.

MR. GREEN: Incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Exception.

264 A. I had a conversation with a young man that acted as cashier, talked to him about it. I talked to him about the car; the car was padlocked. Mr. Moore told me, and I talked to him about unlocking the car so they could get their bikes, and carts and so on out, and he said the car had been sealed or padlocked or something, as the inspector, I suppose it is, the inspector had found the carts or trunks or something of that kind in there, and I had better—I don't know whether he said there would be some freight on the bikes or carts or whether the freight had better be paid, or something of that kind. I do not recollect the conversation exactly in detail, but he said that he did not have the freight bill, and he did not know what it was or something to that effect. I paid him some money, I guess. It seems to me that I paid him twenty dollars, or twenty dollars was paid, I gave Mr. Moore twenty dollars to pay that freight with sometime during the noon hour, but I must have paid it down there at that time I had that conversation. I am not positive whether I paid the twenty dollars.

Q. At that time did you have any conversation with him relative to the condition that the horses were in after they had arrived at Lawrence.

Mr. GREEN: Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. But we talked about the delay in the shipment and talked about the condition of the horses, and I told him something about that, told him they had done that. Told him they had kept the horses that way shipped them that way, told him where they were, that they would not — fit to race I did not think. I don't believe I said anything to him about their permanent injuries, or anything particular as to telling him what shape they were in.

Q. Basing your opinion upon the class, speed and conformation of this mare, Nancy Alden, just prior to the shipment from Kansas City to Lawrence, can you say what her market value was.

A. At the time I saw her in Kansas City?

Q. Yes.

Mr. GREEN: You asked him whether or not——

A. Yes sir, I think I do.

Q. What was her market value, just prior to the injury, in Kansas City, just prior to the injury?

Mr. GREEN: Defendant objects as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial not proper measure of damages, an attempt to vary the terms of a written contract.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Well, she was worth around two thousand dollars, about two thousand dollars, somewhere near that.

Q. Now, basing your opinion upon the injured condition of Nancy Alden, after she arrived in Lawrence.

A. You see she is a pacer, and pacers are not worth near as much as a trotter. If she had been a trotter and raced as fast, she could—her value, why she would have been worth at least twice as much money, but a pacing gait is not so valuable as a trotting gait, a pacing gait is a half run, go much faster than you do at a trot, and develope speed very much quicker, and that accounts for the speed.

266 Q. Now basing your opinion upon the injured condition of Nancy Alden, as you found her at Lawrence, as you have testified, can you state what — market value is or was?

A. Yes sir.

Mr. GREEN: Defendant objects the same as above.

Objection is overruled.

Exception.

Q. State what her market value was, would be under those conditions.

Mr. GREEN: Same objection.

Objection is overruled.

Exception.



A. Well, she would be worth about three or four hundred dollars for breeding purposes, and she might have some prospect for racing purposes, not to speak of though.

Q. Was she in such condition that she could make a continuous campaign for an entire season.

A. No.

Q. She would never be able to do that?

A. You might be able to get her to go a race.

Q. One race.

A. Yes, but to go to a campaign she could not undergo the preparation, she would go lame before she got the preparation. That is all.

267 Cross-examination by Mr. GREEN:

Q. You are the Mr. H. H. Smith who is attorney in this case?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you, as vice-president of the First National Bank, hold a mortgage on this mare.

Objected to as incompetent irrelevant and immaterial not proper cross examination.

Sustained.

Mr. GREEN: Save us an exception.

Q. Did you have any interest in this mare, Mr. Smith?

Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial not proper cross examination.

Objection is overruled.

Exception.

A. At what time.

Q. At this time of the injury?

A. No sir. No, I never had any mortgage on the mare. The mortgage was on Mr. Robinson's farm.

Q. Did you have any interest in the mare at this time.

Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. No sir, none whatever.

Q. Have you seen her lately?

A. No sir, I have not seen her since last fall.

Q. You had her in your possession over at Shawnee?

A. No, I never had her in my possession.

Q. Didn't have her over at Shawnee?

A. Mr. Robinson had her there. Mr. Robinson had her there a while, I didn't.

268 Q. You are not positive who paid the freight on this horse or how much it was.

A. No sir, I am not.

Q. The receipt in this case shows \$17.60?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Is that about what it was?

A. My recollection is Mr. Moore, my first recollection was that Mr. Moore, I gave him twenty dollars to pay the freight. Then it seemed to me since my attention is called to it, I paid the freight in there during that conversation that I spoke of. My recollection is that I gave the clerk twenty dollars and he said if there is any more freight I will collect it, and if there is anything coming I will give it back to you, but now——

Q. You might have given him fifteen.

A. Yes, I might have given him twenty and he might have given me five back.

Q. Afterwards got \$2.16?

A. Yes sir. But I have got the \$20.00 in my mind.

Q. You don't know whether you gave the twenty to Mr. Moore to pay the clerk or whether you *you* gave it to Mr. Moore and Mr. Moore gave it back.

A. I am pretty positive I gave it to somebody, and I had the conversation before he gave me back the \$20.00, and that is what made me think Moore paid the freight, but I probably paid it myself at that time.

Q. At the time you were there and until the time the horses were moved away, did you at any time serve any written notice upon the agent at Lawrence, Kansas, notifying him of the injury to  
269 this horse.

Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. Not proper cross examination, tending to prove no issue in this case.

A. No sir? I didn't.

That is all.

A. I did not have any interest in them except two of them.

That is all.

Plaintiff rests.

Mr. GREEN: Comes now the defendant and demurs to the evidence upon the ground that the plaintiff has failed to prove a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and for the further reason that there is a variance between the pleadings and the proof.

Motion is overruled.

Mr. GREEN: Save us an exception.

270 At this time the defendant offers in evidence the deposition of —— Gilmore.

Mr. SMITH: Now comes the plaintiff in the above entitled action, and objects to the introduction of any evidence under the answer of the defendant, and under its amended answer wherein it undertakes to plead a contract made and executed by and between the plaintiff and defendant in this action, because under said contract or any evidence in reference to the execution of the same under the laws of the state of Missouri or Kansas, applicable to such contracts, is incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, and not binding on this plaintiff.

And for the further reason that the said answer is insufficient in law, and fails to allege facts which under the laws of Missouri, or the act known as the Hepburn Act constitute a legal defense to the plaintiff's cause of action as stated in their position, and amended petition.

And for the further reason that the value of the limitation expressed in the contract was not a reasonable valuation, was not a bona fide valuation, and was in fact disproportionate to the real value of the mare, and that said contract plead by the defendant's in their answer and amended answer does not fix or purport to fix a value, but limits the value to be recovered in case of negligence and is a contract of limitation to limit defendant's liability in case of their own negligence.

And for the further reason that under the laws of Missouri as pleaded by the defendant, the contract is void, because the same was an arbitrary form of contract and not fairly entered into, and was a regulation, and not a reduced rate, and no fixed value was placed in said contract by the defendant nor the parties to this action at the time of this shipment, and no rate was made in said contract and that the purported reduced rate was not in fact a reduced rate, and was without any consideration.

And for the further reason that under the rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission in accordance with the answer of defendant said shipment is an interstate shipment from the state of Missouri to the state of Kansas, and the contract as pleaded in this case is void and invalid under this act.

And for the further reason it is insufficient as a plea of estoppel, because it does not allege that the valuation was an agreed or adequate valuation, but was in fact a contract of limitation made for the purpose of avoiding liability and made in anticipation of the defendant's own negligence and is against public policy.

It is stipulated and agreed, by and between the counsel for the plaintiff and for the defendant in this action that the above just dictated in the record is considered made to all of the offers of the defendant hereafter for the purpose of proving a reduced rate or for the purpose or purposes hereinafter required in the form of objections as to the competency, materiality and relevancy of the testimony, this objection obtains as if made at the proper time.

The COURT: The objection is overruled.  
Exception.

Mr. Green reads the deposition of ——— Gilmore, which is in words and figures as follows:

273-294 STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
Lincoln County, ss:

In the District Court of the — Judicial District of Oklahoma, Sitting within and for the County of Lincoln.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

VS.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Defendant.

The said H. F. Moore, C. E. Robinson, and S. H. Smith, and H. H. Smith, their attorney of record, will take notice that on Thursday, the nineteenth day of November, A. D. 1908, the defendant above named will take the depositions of Sundry witnesses to be used as evidence on the trial of the above entitled action in said court, at the offices of Lathrop, Morrow, Fox and Moore, First National Bank building, at the city of Kansas City in the county of Jackson in the state of Missouri, between the hours of eight o'clock A. M. and six o'clock P. M. of said day, and that the taking of the same will be adjourned and continued from day to day, at the same place and between the same hours until they are completed.

COTTINGHAM AND BLEDSOE,

*Attorneys for Defendant.*

Service of the above notice is hereby acknowledged to have been made on me this 13th day of November, 1908.

H. H. SMITH,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

\* \* \* \* \*

295-306 Mr. SMITH: Now at this time comes the plaintiff and renews his objection dictated in the record at the time of offering the deposition of said witnesses, renews the same objection, and moves to strike out all of the evidence as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial under the issues as made by the pleadings in this case.

Motion is overruled.

Exception.

\* \* \* \* \*

307-309 Mr. SMITH: Now comes the plaintiff in this action and moves the court to strike the deposition of the witness Smith for the reasons given at the introduction of the deposition, that the same is incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial under the issues as made by the pleadings in this case.

Overruled.

Exception.

\* \* \* \* \*

310 Mr. GREEN: At this time the defendant offers in evidence the rule of the board of Railroad Commissioners of Kansas.

It is not here. Mrs. Adams has it, but I think it may be considered in evidence. Exhibit A. Record page 409-410.

Mr. SMITH: We have no objection to its being considered in evidence, but the plaintiff objects to the ruling of the railroad Commission of the state of Kansas being admitted in evidence in reference to the laws of the state of Kansas as to the validity of a contract, of the contract pleaded in the defendant's original answer in this case. For the reason that the same is incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, and for the same reason offered by the plaintiffs in the objection to the introduction of any testimony in reference to the contract in this case, and to the testimony of the witness Gilmore, and W. R. Smith, and the introduction of the law as to the validity of the contract in Missouri.

Objection is overruled.

Exception.

311 It is agreed by and between counsel for both parties that the testimony of the witnesses L. E. Dubois and J. E. Hult as given in the trial of the H. F. Moore case, may be read in this case and considered as their testimony, subject to all objections.

Mr. SMITH: Same objection as given at the beginning to the introduction of any evidence.

Mr. SMITH: The plaintiff makes the same objection to the evidence of the witnesses as appears from the record from which counsel for defendant is reading, and it is stipulated and agreed by and between the counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant that the objections therein contained shall constitute the objections as made in this case, and the same advantage may be taken by the plaintiff of the objections as if they were made in the regular way upon the introduction of the witnesses in giving the testimony in this case.

Mr. GREEN: Reading testimony of L. E. Dubois and J. E. Hult, which is in words and figures as follows:

L. E. DUBOIS, being called and duly sworn as a witness on behalf of the defense, testifies as follows upon direct examination by Mr. Green:

Q. State your name to the jury?

A. L. E. Dubois.

Q. How old are you Mr. Dubois, and where do you reside?

A. Thirty, Kansas City, Mo.

Q. What position do you occupy with the defendant, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, what position did you occupy in September, 1907?

A. Night clerk. Night Chief Clerk.

312 Q. Were you in charge of the office of the Station at the time this shipment was made?

A. Yes sir.

Q. What are your duties as Chief Clerk, Mr. Dubois?

A. Just in charge of things generally of the division.

Q. Did you have general supervision of the office while you were on duty?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Do you recall the shipment of horses in question?

A. Only from the records.

Q. You have heard the testimony of Mr. Robinson here in reference to the shipment of the horses?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you issue any live stock contract for those horses?

A. Yes sir.

Now comes the plaintiff at this time and objects to the evidence of the witness for the reason that the same is incompetent, immaterial and irrelevant under the issues in this case and for the reasons stated to the introduction of the testimony in the depositions of the witnesses Gilmore and Smith in relation to the contract as offered in evidence heretofore.

Objections overruled.

Exception taken.

A. Yes sir, I did.

313 Plaintiff moves to strike out answer and question of witness because he has stated he only knows from the record and not of his personal knowledge.

Objection sustained.

Exception.

Q. Have you refreshed your recollection from the record?

A. I have.

Q. And you have an independent recollection other than the record as to what was done there in relation to issuing the live stock contract.

Objected to by plaintiffs because witness has already said he had no recollection except from the records themselves.

The Court: Let him answer, if he knows.

Plaintiff excepts.

Q. Well, no, we handle so many there we can't tell anything about them only from the records.

Q. Have you examined this contract that has been introduced in evidence?

A. I made it.

Q. Is your signature attached to that contract for the railroad company?

A. Yes sir, two places.

Q. Who else signed that contract?

A. H. F. Moore.

Q. Do you know H. F. Moore?

A. No sir.

Objected to by plaintiff unless he saw him sign that contract.

Q. Did you see that party sign that contract?

A. Yes sir.

Q. It was signed in your presence?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you see the horses?

A. No sir.

Q. Did the party signing this contract ask you to look at the horses?

A. No sir.

Q. Did he tell you anything about the horses as to the kind or character of horses?

314 A. No sir, just four horses is all the bill of lading calls for.

Plaintiff objects as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and moves to strike out the answer because he says it is all the bill shows for, and he don't show he is going by the contract or his own independent recollection.

Sustained and ordered that answer be stricken out.  
Def-ndant excepts.

Q. Did you see the horses, Mr. Dubois?

A. No sir.

Q. Did he ask you to see the horses and look at them?

A. No sir.

Plaintiff objects to any further questions along that line for reason witness said in the beginning there was nothing whatever said about them there and he didn't remember.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. Was there any other contract of shipment made at the time these horses were delivered to the railroad company other than this contract?

A. Well, there would only be one contract.

Plaintiff moves to strike out the answer of witness as not responsive to question.

Motion sustained.

Exception.

Q. Is that the contract that you have upon which this shipment was made.

A. This is the original contract. Yes sir.

Q. What did you do in relation to having a way bill or anything done after the contract was signed up?

A. Well, the way bill would be made up after he left.

Plaintiff moves to strike out answer as above.

315 Sustained and ordered that the answer be stricken.  
Exception.

Q. Did you cause a way bill to be issued and made for these horses?

A. Yes sir.

Objected to by the plaintiff as leading.

Q. Do you know what length of car, what kind of a car these horses were loaded into?

A. A 36 foot car.

Q. Was it a stock car or a box car.

A. A box car.

Q. I here hand you Exhibit B and ask you to state what it is.

A. That is the way bill for the car.

Q. Is that the original way bill?

A. Yes sir.

At this time defendant offers in evidence original way bill of the car in question.

Admitted in evidence.

Objected to by the plaintiff as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial and not competent for any purpose except to show the contract of shipment was entered into and defendant does not testify from his own personal knowledge, he knows the way bill was made and for reasons offered in objection to previous witnesses and testimony in relation to the contract in this case?

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Permission is given defendant to withdraw original and substitute copy of the way bill.

Q. I want to read to the jury part of the original way bill. It is dated Kansas City, Mo., September 17, 1907, number car 1829297, H. F. Moore, consignee, shipper; consigned to H. F. Moore, 4 horses, 2000 pounds, rate of freight \$17.600. R. L. C. Relates value as per contract. Owner in charge. Mr. Dubois O. R.?

A. Owner's risk.

Q. What is L. C.?

316 Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, and plaintiff moves to strike out answer.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. As chief clerk of the railroad company do you have in charge the tariff and publications in relation to rates.

A. Yes sir.

Q. I hand you here a copy of the Santa Fe system tariff No. 6180 D. and other tariffs with the certificate attached of Edward A. Mosley, Secretary of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and bearing the seal of that Commission, I will ask you to refer to the tariff and state what the rate of freight was on this car and the conditions of the tariff in relation to its moving and handling?

Plaintiff objects to introduction of testimony for the reason heretofore given in reference to the contract in reference to other evidence in this case and for the further reason the record of rates is the best evidence; no proper foundation laid for the introduction of this evidence and the witness can only testify as to what he knows and not from the record itself.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. Now Mr. Dubois, did you have this tariff on file in the office at Kansas City at the time the shipment was made?



A. I might not have had this particular one but we had a copy of it.

Q. You had a copy of this tariff on file?

A. Yes sir.

Plaintiff moves to strike out because witness — not shown competent and his own answer makes him incompetent to testify in reference to the rate.

Sustained.

Exception.

317 Q. Mr. Dubois, did you have the tariffs in charge?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Do you know whether a copy of this tariff was on file in the office at Kansas City at the time this shipment was made?

A. We have a copy of all the tariffs in use on the system.

Move to strike out answer as incompetent, irrelevant immaterial.

Sustained. Exception.

Q. Did you have a copy of this tariff on file at Kansas City at the time when this shipment was made?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you have occasion to consult this particular tariff at the time this shipment was made or about that time?

A. I did, to get a rate on the car.

Plaintiff objects to question and moves to strike the answer out.

Q. Did you consult the tariff in this particular case?

A. I did.

Q. Now, Mr. Dubois, I will ask you whether there were notices published in the depot, in the office in which this tariff was filed, calling the attention of the public to the fact they were on file and subject to public inspection?

A. There was one upstairs and one down.

Q. Now, I will ask you to refer to the tariff and read to the jury the rate of freight that would govern on this shipment and the provisions relating thereto.

The plaintiff objects to further question in reference to the contracts in this case in posting rates for the reason the witness testified in former answer that his posting of the rate was had in the depot and one upstairs in a place called the hall or not  
318 named and that his testimony called the office, or not named, and that his testimony showed the defendant failed to comply with the Interstate Commerce act and the plaintiff now objects to further introduction of any evidence on that question, the question of the reduced rate and the contract, and moves to strike out all of witness's testimony heretofore introduced with reference to the posting of rates for the reason his testimony shows the defendant failed to comply with the requirements of the interstate commerce act.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. Now refer to the tariff, Mr. Dubois, and read to the jury that portion of the tariff which relates to the shipment in question.

Same objection as above.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. Well, the tariff shows a rate from Kansas City to Lawrence on horses in standard cars \$16.00.

Q. Go on and read the rest of it, refer to that part of the tariff.

A. When the rates named in section one—

Plaintiff objects to witness reading from the schedule of rates. They are the best evidence themselves, and same is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. He can testify of his own independent recollection if he knows what the rates are but cannot introduce the evidence by reading from a copy of the rates on hand without showing what has become of the original.

Sustained.

Exception.

319 Attorney for Defendant asks at this time to read that portion of the tariff and introduce in evidence item 27 page 35 of the tariff.

Defendant objects to the introduction and reading of that portion of the tariff because it is not shown it is the original tariff on file at that time and for the further reason the rates were not properly posted. It is not shown it was the rate incorporated in his contract of freight pleaded in defendant's answer and that the evidence is incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial because no proper foundation has been laid in that respect.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. Mr. Green, Section 27 charges for cars under that standard, where the rates in Section one are named in dollars and cents per car. Such rates will apply on live stock either common or palace cars of under 29 feet to and including 30 foot 6 inches inside measurement such cars to be known as standard cars. Cars less than 29 feet will be charged forty-nine percent of the tariff for standard cars. Cars full 32 feet will be charged a hundred and four per cent of tariff for standard cars. Cars over 32 feet to and including thirty three feet nine inches will be charged 107 per cent of the tariff for standard cars. Cars over thirty three feet nine inches and including thirty-six feet six inches will be charged one hundred and ten per cent of the tariff of standard cars.

Now comes the defendant (plaintiff) and moves to strike out all that portion of rate read by the defendant's counsel in this action because the contract presented by defendant does not specify  
320 nor set up any rate, but says the rate is a reduced rate without referring to the rate which defendant's counsel is undertaking to read into the evidence in this case, and same for that reason is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, and further objects to the introduction of the rate in the answer of the witness and

questions of counsel for the reason there has been no proper posting to comply with the interstate commerce act.

Overruled.

Exception.

Mr. GREEN: Section 18, live stock at Owner's Risk, page 34 of tariff. Rates named in section one will apply only to shipments of live stock made at owner's risk and limitation, upon declared valuations shown below, of the liability of this company or other companies, parties to this tariff as common carriers under the terms and conditions of the current live stock contract provided by the said railroad companies, said contract to be first duly executed in manner and form provided for therein.

(a) Rates named are based upon declared valuations by shipper not to exceed the following:

Every horse or pony, gelding, mare or stallion, mule or jack, \$100.00.

Every Ox, bull or steer \$60.

Every cow, \$30.00.

Every calf \$10.

Every hog \$10.

Every sheep or goat \$3.00.

(b) Where the declared value exceeds the above an addition of 25% will be added to the rate for each one hundred per cent or fraction thereof of declared additional valuation per head.

Animals exceeding in value \$800.00 per head will be taken only by special agreement.

321 (c) One hundred and fifty per cent (150%) of the rates named herein will be charged on shipments of livestock made without limitation of company's liability at common law and under this status shippers will have the choice of exercising and accepting contracts for shipment of live stock with or without limitation of Liability and rates accordingly.

Plaintiffs object to the reading from the rates as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial under the issues in this case and move to strike out all that portion of rates in reference to the reduced rates read from the copy of rates purported to be on file with the interstate commerce commission for the reason that the reading of the provision from the quoted rates specify that the contract referred to must be a contract where there is an agreed or declared valuation and the contract pleaded in the answer of the defendant shows there was no agreed or declared valuation but that the settlement was to be upon the total case-value and that it is a contract of limitation and not a contract of agreed valuation.

Overruled.

Exception taken.

Q. Mr. Dubois, I believe you answered a while ago this was a thirty six foot car?

A. Yes sir.

Q. What would be the rate according to this tariff from Kansas City to Lawrence, Kansas, on the four horses shipped in this car, under this tariff?

Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. In a 36 foot car? \$17.60.

Q. \$17.60?

A. Yes sir.

Answer objected to as incompetent, and plaintiff moves to strike it out because he read from book and has no independent  
322 recollection of same, and not competent — testify.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. If these horses had been valued at more than the declared value of \$100, what rate, according to this tariff, would the shipment take.

Objected to by plaintiff, the witness is not shown himself competent to testify, and counsel must hand him the rate which is not proved to be the rate provided and posted by the interstate commerce act, to refresh his recollection, that his statements are hearsay and incompetent.

Sustained.

Exception.

Q. From the tariff which you have before you, I will ask you to state if the horses had been valued at more than \$100.00 what rate would have been on the shipment?

Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Q. Do you know what it would be?

A. If there was more than \$100.00.

Q. Yes sir.

A. That depends on what the valuation was.

Q. Well, say they were valued at \$200, what would the rate have been?

Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial under the issues in this case, defendant has plead \$100 limitation, and not \$200.00.

Sustained.

Exception.

Cross-examination by Mr. SMITH for plaintiff:

Q. How long have you worked for the Santa Fe?

A. It will be seventeen years next September.

Q. How long have you worked in this office at Kansas City?

323 Q. How long have you occupied the position of chief clerk.

Q. Three years in September, that is night chief clerk.

Q. What time are you on duty.

A. At 6 P. M.

Q. About what time—do you know the kind of a man Mr. Moore is, do you know who he is?

A. No sir.

Q. Do you know Mr. Robinson over there, he is the man who signed the contract?

A. I cannot tell you now.

Q. Do you recollect what kind of a looking man signed it?

A. No sir.

Q. Did you see him more than one time?

A. Why, I don't know that, no sir.

Q. Was it your duty to make out these contracts?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you tell him about a reduced rate before you took the contract?

Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. Did he say anything to you about wanting a reduced rate?

Objected to as above.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. No sir.

Q. No conversation whatever was there about a reduced rate Mr. Dublis?

Objected to as above.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. No sir.

Q. What did he say when he said he wanted to ship those  
324 *those* horses, just state the conversation.

A. Well, I cannot state the conversation word for word, he probably came and asked for a contract.

Plaintiff moves to strike out answer, the latter part of it as not responsive to the question.

Sustained.

Q. You don't know whether Mr. Robinson or Mr. Moore came up there, do you, Mr. Dublis?

A. No sir.

Q. You don't know who signed that contract except by the name of it?

A. That is all, I wouldn't know the man.

Q. You don't know whether it was Mr. Moore or Mr. Robinson, do you?

A. No sir.

Q. You couldn't tell what kind of a looking man now he was who signed that contract?

A. No sir.

Q. Did you have any conversation with him prior to the signing of the contract?

A. No sir.

Q. When did he sign this contract?

A. Why, I think it was about 8 o'clock in the evening.

Q. Two hours after you went on duty?

A. Yes sir.

Q. You go on at six?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Horses had already been loaded then had they?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Mr. Dubois, where is your office now, tell the jury, just describe the building.

A. You mean the location of it.

Q. No the arrangement of it, where is your office?

A. The office is on the north end of what they call the freight house.

Q. Up stairs?

A. Yes sir.

Q. First floor?

325 A. Second floor.

Q. Where is the agent's office?

A. Down stairs, in the superintendent's office.

Q. Where were the bills of lading always made out?

A. Upstairs.

Q. Where are the contracts for freight made, with the agent or chief clerk?

A. No, the clerk, the clerk is upstairs.

Q. But the understanding and agreement etc. is made with the agent is it not, that is ordering of cars, etc.

A. No sir, the agent has nothing to do with that at all.

Q. Is there a depot there at this particular place?

A. A freight depot. No passengers there.

Q. Now you say you had one of these publication notices posted down—was it in the agent's office.

A. No, it was in the hall, downstairs.

A. And you had one posted up in your office?

A. In the hall upstairs.

Q. Mr. Robinson or Mr. Moore say anything to you about—you say they didn't tell you those were race horses?

A. No sir.

Q. Did they tell you what they were going to Lawrence for?

A. No sir.

Q. Did they tell you what kind of a freight they wanted to ship on, what kind of a train they wanted to ship these horses on?

A. No sir.

Q. Did they have them billed out to go on the Red Ball fast freight?

A. Yes sir—that night? A. Yes sir. We always bill everything to go on the first train.

A. Yes sir. We always bill everything to go on the first train.

Q. Isn't it a fact the red Ball is what you call a fast freight?

A. Yes sir.

326 A. You say Mr. Robinson and Mr. Moore never said anything to you about going on this train?

A. No sir.

Q. Did you say anything to them about going on this train?

A. No sir.

Q. What do you say now as to how the horses were billed, were they billed to any particular train?

A. No sir, we don't put anything like that on the billing.

Q. How does the conductor get the billing?

A. From the yards at Argentine.

Q. How do you get the billing there.

A. By messenger boys.

Q. Do you designate the train the particular stock is going on, the number of it?

A. No sir.

Q. Do you designate the car?

A. Well, every way bill has the car number on it.

Q. And the conductor gets the way bill?

A. Yes sir.

Q. When you make up a train out in the yards at Kansas City or Argentine, how do you indicate the cars that make up that train.

A. Well, the cars are carded in the yard.

Q. They are on the way bill are they not, and where they stop?

A. No, the carding is not on the way bill.

Q. What is in the way bill?

A. The contents and the consignee and the consignor, and character, and destination.

Q. Do you know who got this particular way bill that night?

A. No sir.

Q. Whom did you deliver it to?

A. To Argentine

Q. You sent it over there by messenger?

327 A. Yes sir.

Q. You don't know whether the conductor on the Red Ball freight got it there?

A. No sir.

Q. Do you know when the horses were delivered over into the Argentine yards?

A. No sir.

Q. Know how long they were in the Kansas City yards?

A. No sir.

Q. You say Mr. Moore or Mr. Robinson got the billing about 3 o'clock.

A. About 8 o'clock.

Q. Now, Mr. Dubois, Mr. Robinson never represented to you the value of these horses did he, as being worth \$100.00?

Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. Did Mr. Moore or Mr. Robinson or anybody say anything to you about these horses being worth \$100.00.

Objected to as above.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. Didn't ask you anything about any reduced rate?

Objected to as above.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. No sir.

Q. Where did you deliver this contract to him?

A. At the offices upstairs.

Q. Horses were then already loaded?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Had he made arrangements with you to ship those horses before that time?

A. No sir.

Q. Whom had he made the arrangements with?

A. I never saw him or heard of him till he came up after the contract.

328 Q. Who usually makes the arrangements?

A. They have an empty car man there.

Q. When an order is telephoned into your office what do you do with it?

A. At night.

Q. Yes sir.

A. I would give the yard master an order to set the car.

Q. What is done with it during the day?

A. I think that is the same thing he does with it.

Q. He tells the yard master to set it?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Do you know of anybody that had any conversation with Mr. Robinson and Mr. Moore prior to the loading of these horses?

A. No sir.

Q. You don't know of any solicitation on their part for a reduced rate?

Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. No sir.

Q. You testified Mr. Dubois that this contract was the same rate as specified in the circular from which you testified on file with the interstate commerce commission. I will ask you to state what rate is specified in the contract that was signed there at that time by Mr. Moore.



A. There is no rate specified in the contract.

Q. You tell the jury that there was no rate specified in that contract? for the shipment of those horses?

Objected to for the reason that the contract is the best evidence.  
Sustained.

Exception.

Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. Dubois, this is a printed contract that you keep on file in your office, isn't it?

Q. Yes sir.

Q. It is the same kind of a contract that you had out to everybody that ships horses, ain't it?

Objected to as above.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Why we would change it if they put in a bigger valuation on the horses than stated in the contract.

Q. Yes, it's the regular one sent out, unless they put a bigger valuation on the horses?

A. Yes sir.

Q. It's the regulation contract of the company, printed in there before it is handed over to you?

Objected to as calling for a conclusion of the witness.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Yes sir.

Q. It's the regular rate specified in there for shipment of horses unless a man comes along and says he wants to pay a higher rate, isn't it?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Now, do you know how many horses were in this car.

A. Four.

Q. You don't know what time it got to Lawrence?

A. No sir.

Q. How far is it from Kansas City to Lawrence?

A. I think it is about 44 miles.

Q. How long ordinarily does it take the Red Ball freight to run from Kansas City to Lawrence?

Objected to as immaterial.

330 Overruled.

Exception.

Object in addition to the competency of the witness.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. About two hours.

Q. What time is the Red Ball due out of Kansas City?

Defendant objects as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, competency of the witness not shown.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Well, the train that would handle that car now leaves Argentine at 10:15.

Q. I mean at that time.

A. I don't know, they change time card every three or four months.

Q. You say you don't know when the Red Ball went out at that time?

A. No sir.

Q. Didn't you tell Mr. Moore or Mr. Robinson when it went out?

A. No sir.

Q. You didn't tell them what train they could get out of Kansas City on?

A. No sir, we don't promise any particular train.

Q. Did you tell him when he would get to Lawrence?

A. No sir.

Q. You didn't tell him whether he would get there next day in time for the races or not, then or when?

A. I wouldn't have any means of knowing when he would get there.

331 Q. Neither of them said anything to you about it?

A. No sir.

Q. Didn't make any inquiries?

A. No sir.

Q. You were the man who arranged the shipping—wrote out the contract for them?

A. Yes sir.

Q. It was your business to tell him if he had asked you?

A. Yes sir.

Q. It was your business to know, wasn't it, if you were asked?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Now, you say you didn't know what time he would get there, and he didn't ask, is that the way you want the jury to understand it.

A. If he had asked I would have told him.

Q. You knew that.

A. Yes I knew, I had a time card.

Q. But you have forgotten since that time.

Q. They change the time card every few months—I don't know when the train left then.

Q. Do you know what time those horses actually got out of the yards at Kansas City?

A. No sir.

Q. You don't know anything about how long they were at Argentine?

A. No sir.

Q. Don't know anything about that?

A. No sir.

Q. Did you call Mr. Robinson's or Mr. Moore's attention to the posting or any rates or anything in that contract?

Objected to by defendant.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. No sir.

332 Q. You just handed him the contract and showed him where to sign it and he signed it?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Took his contract and went on his way rejoicing did he?

A. Yes sir.

Redirect examination for defendant by Mr. GREEN:

Q. When did the way bill go out of the office for this shipment?

A. Some time the next day.

Q. It was not delivered to the conductor of the Red Ball that night was it?

A. No sir.

Q. How are those way bills handled usually that are made out that way?

A. Well, those cars that are gone are mailed.

Q. When was this mailed?

A. Well, I couldn't say now.

Q. Was it mailed to the agent at Lawrence, Kansas?

A. Yes sir, I- should have been if it went right.

Move to strike out answer as not responsive to question.

Overruled.

Exception.

Recross-examination for plaintiff by Mr. SMITH:

Q. Mr. Dublis, you don't know whether this contract here in evidence is the contract Mr. Moore signed or not, do you, except you just see his name on there.

A. I say I made the contract, I don't know who signed it. It's signed Moore is all I know.

Q. You are certain now that you gave him the contract to sign?

A. Whoever signed the contract, I gave it to him.

333 Q. And you got that contract about two hours after the horses were loaded.

A. I don't know when the horses were loaded.

Q. You didn't see the- to that or have anything to do with that?

A. No sir.

Q. Did you give this contract to him about the time the horses left the yards there, and do you know when they left?

A. I don't know when they left.

Q. You don't know whether the conductor in charge of the train the horses were shipped in had any way bill or anything else?

A. He didn't have the regular way bill, he might have had a card bill.

Q. Don't you know as a matter of fact the agent at Lawrence next day tried to get the freight, a way bill and amount from your office?

A. No sir, I don't know anything about the agent at Lawrence.

Q. They never make any inquiries from you, the agents do not, during the night, about way bills?

A. No sir.

Q. Never call for them when they don't know where they are, what the rate of freight is to be charged?

A. No sir.

Q. You didn't send this rate of freight out until after the horses were shipped did you?

A. The bill was mailed next day, the 17th.

A. And then you wrote this particular tariff or rate on that way bill?

A. No I didn't make the way bill at all.

Q. Who made it?

A. The man's name is on there.

Q. How do you know it was sent the next day?

A. Why it's dated next day, the 17th.

Q. That's the way you know it was sent the next day?

334 A. Yes.

Q. As a matter of fact the way bill itself shows the rate of freight was never communicated to the shipper of that load of horses, don't it?

Defendant objects as immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. It was not made out until after they left there, next day.

A. It was made out next day, the 17th.

Q. And he couldn't have seen it?

A. No sir, he wouldn't have any business with the way bill.

Q. That's the only way he knew anything about the rate of freight, you say it was not specified in the contract, that's the only way he would know the rate of freight?

A. Yes sir.

Q. You never called his attention to it?

A. No sir.

Q. The way bill shows it was not sent out until next day?

A. Yes sir.

Redirect examination for defendant by Mr. GREEN:

Q. The tariffs were on file in your office and open to public inspection were they not.

A. Yes sir.

Q. And would have been explained to the shipper had he asked you about the rate?

A. Yes sir.

Now comes the plaintiff and moves the court to strike out all evidence of witness for the reason he testified the contract shows no rate of freight was specified and for the further reason the witness

testifies the way bill which set out the amount of freight paid  
 335 was never brought to the attention of the shipper; that he  
 had no opportunity to know what that rate was; that the  
 way bill specifying the amount of freight and the rate- as not sent  
 out until next day after the shipment was made and never brought  
 to his attention, and further could not be any consideration that  
 would bind him under that contract under the laws of Missouri;  
 and for the further reason the witness shows the rates were not  
 posted according to requirements of the interstate commerce com-  
 mission which would put in force rates sought to be plead here by  
 the answer and contract.

Overruled.

Exception.

336 J. E. HULT, being duly called and sworn as a witness in  
 behalf of the defendant, testifies as follows upon direct ex-  
 amination by Mr. Green.

Q. State your name?

A. J. E. Hult.

Q. Where do you live, Mr. Hult.

A. Fremont, Nebraska.

Q. Where were you employed in September, 1907?

A. In the local freight office of the A., T. & S. F. at Lawrence,  
 Kansas.

Q. Who was the agent at Lawrence at that time?

A. George C. Bailey.

Q. Do you know where he is now?

A. He died on the 27th of November, 1907.

Q. What position did you say you occupied there?

A. Cashier and chief clerk.

Q. As cashier and chief clerk what were your duties?

A. As cashier, I kept the accounts of the station and as chief  
 clerk had general supervision of the local freight station.

Recess of five minutes and jury admonished.

Q. Did you as chief clerk have supervision of the tariffs and pub-  
 lications in relation to rates in the office?

Mr. SMITH: Same objection as made heretofore in all particulars  
 as to testimony of witness in reference to evidence and contracts is  
 now made to any evidence this witness may give in this cause as  
 to the rate and as to the contract etc.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. Well, we had a rate man whose duty it was to make all rates,  
 and to keep the tariffs and the supplements filed, but it was  
 337 my duty as chief clerk to check them up and see that they  
 were kept properly filed.

Q. I /and you herewith Santa Fe tariff number 6180 D. and ask  
 you if that tariff and supplements was on file and open to public  
 inspection at the depot at Lawrence, Kansas in September, 1907?

A. Yes sir, it was.

Q. I will ask you to state whether or not notices, and if so, how many, were posted in the depot calling the attention of the public that the tariffs were on file and open to public inspection?

A. We really had three notices, two in the lobby, one on a bulletin board we used for the purpose and one over the counter where everyone who had business there couldn't help but notice it; we also had one in the front room. We had a bulletin board in the front room, we kept all circulars and notices of changes and everything that would interest the shipping public.

Q. Do you recall the shipment in question—these horses?

A. Only parts of the transaction I recall.

Q. What parts of the transaction do you recall?

A. Well, I don't remember, Mr. Smith personally, but he was with Mr. Dunkle and I remember Mr. Dunkle came down inquiring about the horses early in the morning, and my other recollection is in regard to the collection of the freight charges.

Q. How much were the freight charges you collected on this shipment?

A. When the shipment came in we had no way bill we did not know at that time whether the shipment had been accorded  
338 car load privileges; there was four horses in the shipment and the western classification provides one horse should be minimum 2000; 2 horses 3500; 3 horses 5000, and every additional horse 1000 pounds, making 6000 pounds which would be a first class rate from Kansas City to Lawrence, is 25 cents per hundred. At the time the shipment was delivered I was not in the office, I was up town making a collection, but when I came back the matter was called to my attention and a deposit of \$15.00 was made to cover the less than car load charges from Kansas City to Lawrence with the understanding any additional charges would be collected later.

Q. Were any additional charges collected?

Q. When the way bill came in I was carrying the freight charges; I gave the freight bill to the agent, Mr. Bailey, and he first went over to Mr. Gallagher's, the livery man who run the livery barn there and wanted to make the collection there but he referred him to the fair grounds where Mr. Smith could be found and I presume Mr. Bailey went out and collected the balance of the charges, because he turned the money over to me, \$2.60, making a total of \$17.60.

Q. \$17.60 which would be the car load rate from Kansas City to Lawrence? I had you here a paper which has been introduced in evidence marked "B" and ask you to state if that way bill passed through your office?

A. It did, it passed through the station agent September 18, 1907, there's the local station stamp; the date it was recorded, and here's the date received.

Q. And what were the freight charges on that way bill?

A. \$17.60.

339 Q. Did you examine the receipt that was introduced in evidence here attached to the deposition of Mr. Moore and introduced in evidence?

A. I have seen it, yes sir.

Q. Is that the receipt that was executed by the railroad company by Mr. Moore or someone representing him, covering the freight charges in question?

A. That was the receipt we held for the shipment.

Q. I here hand you the receipt and ask you to identify it?

A. Yes sir, that is the receipt for the freight, that is for the four horses.

Q. Now did anyone representing the plaintiff, either Mr. Smith, Mr. Moore or Mr. Robinson, make any complaint to you or serve any written notice on you in relation to any damage that these horses are alleged to have sustained.

Objected to as incompetent, not claimed any notice was served on him, or any notice given to him.

Overruled.

Exception.

Q. No sir, they did not.

Cross-examination on behalf of plaintiff by Mr. SMITH:

Q. You were then the cashier?

A. Yes sir, I was.

Q. You don't know whether you collected \$15.00 or whether somebody in your office did.

A. That was collected during my absence.

Q. You don't know when this receipt was given?

A. I cannot say.

Q. You only go in your testimony from the fact the receipt was given, and you only go of your own knowledge of the amount of money charged on the way bill that you indicate there?

A. How is that?

Q. Question repeated.

340 A. No sir.

Q. Do you recollect independently that amount of money was paid?

A. I remember the transaction because I remember giving the freight bill to the agent to collect the balance.

Q. Who went up to Mr. Gallager's livery stable?

A. Mr. Bailey.

Q. You don't know what was said to Mr. Bailey about the horses do you?

A. I do not.

Q. He was your superior there in the office?

A. Yes, he had charge of the station.

Q. Just tell the jury where your particular part of that office was with reference to where Mr. Bailey was?

A. Well, Mr. Bailey had his desk at the passenger station but he spent but very little time there; he kept all his personal papers or anything that was handled personally by him, he kept in that desk, but he spent a part of the time at the ticket office and part at the freight depot.

Q. Now, we will say this is the railing, the building is long, runs this way?

A. Yes, north and south.

Q. Parallel with the railroad track, now you come in here about the center from the street?

A. The office is on the north end of the building.

Q. Now, Mr. Bailey's wicker or railing run- up here and then comes across to the north end of the building? Just tell the jury how that was formed?

A. The office is build about forty feet square, built on the end of the warehouse, this would represent the north side, on this corner is a lobby 12 or 14 feet square; in the southeast corner of the office there is a car clerk's desk and the lobby is cut off from the office by a counter, there is no wicker or anything, just a counter that opens over in the balance of the office.

Q. Mr. Bailey's desk now was up in that end?

A. Just in the north side, in the center of the room he had a small desk there, but he didn't use it, just a very small desk about the size of that one there.

Q. That's about there the door went in?

A. Well it would be down here, this would be north and that east, south and west, the lobby of the office is about like this, the door of entrance about here, my desk was right in this northwest corner; Mr. Bailey's right there as I remember in the center in front of the window. All the cash transactions were carried on at this counter right here, I had an assistant in the office. His desk was here. He generally made the deliveries over the counter that way, the cash I handled was only collected; I arranged for the settlements.

Q. You don't recollect seeing me there?

A. I do not remember you, no.

Q. You don't remember Mr. Robinson?

A. No, I don't think I saw Mr. Robinson.

Q. You were not up at Mr. Gallagher's barn at all?

A. No sir, I was not.

Q. You were not out at the track at the races?

A. I was out one afternoon to the races, but not in connection with this matter.

Q. Mr. Bailey, you say, collected out at the track, or was it the clerk in the office.

A. It was Mr. Bailey that made the collection.

Q. He was the agent?

A. He was agent, yes sir.

Q. Tell the jury again how these postings were made around there?

342 A. We had one on a bulletin board on the south side of the lobby; the bulletin board was on the south wall of the office, and we had one on that; and one on the side of the wall just over the counter where anyone who came up there couldn't help but see it and also had one on the bulletin board in the warehouse.

Q. Just had one in the lobby.

A. No sir, two in the lobby.



Q. What time were those postings made there?

A. What time were they?

Q. Yes, sir, about what time of the year?

A. I don't know what time of the year. We had them.

Q. You had them four or five months?

A. Longer than that, I think.

A. Longer than that?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Had them there, well you had them there—tacked up, well, and they had been there a long while had they not, this western classification freight you speak of?

A. No sir, we put those up in compliance with circ—  
by C. W. Cook, assistant general freight agent, —  
of the tariff of the system at that time, —.

Q. Was it a year before this?

A. I coul—.

Q. You stated in reply to a question—  
the rate referred to there in the—  
what is known as the western—.

A. I said we collected, —  
named in the western—.

A. *Thasidsweche* re—  
classif-action—.

A. It sim—  
rates—.

Q. —.

343 Q. It was the regular rate controlled by the western classification, minimum, on all the roads members of that classification was it not?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Do you know how that rate is agreed on—you know how they are agreed on?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Agreed on by the traffic men of each road are they not?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And then they are promulgated as the regular schedule rate to give all shippers and the agents themselves?

A. Yes sir.

Redirect examination for defendant by Mr. GREEN:

Q. The deposit was made with the understanding if there were any additional freight charges they were to be collected later on?

A. Yes sir, that was what I was informed when I returned, when they turned the money over to me.

Recross-examination by Mr. SMITH:

Q. You didn't have any information at the time of the payment of the \$15.00 about what the charges were did you?

A. We couldn't—well as I said, I was not present.

Q. You didn't have any means of knowing?

A. When I returned the money was turned over to me and the explanation made.

Q. You don't understand my question—you didn't have any means of knowing what the amount of freight way collectible was at the time the \$15.00 was advanced, did you?

A. Yes sir, we could have told, if we had known what service had been accorded; whether a car had been ordered or whether ordered as less than a car load lot shipment.

344 Q. You had no notice from Kansas City?

A. No, we had no notice from them.

Q. They afterwards sent you this way bill which *snowed* what the freight was?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did they send you that by mail or how did you get it?

A. I cannot say at this time, I presume by mail. I will say in explanation, on shipments of this kind out of Kansas City at night, they couldn't make the way bill in time to accompany the shipment.

Q. And they had to make it out the next day?

A. Yes sir, and mail them.

Q. You have seen the contract here, Mr. Green showed you the contract in this case?

A. I have looked it over, yes sir.

Q. You are familiar with it?

A. Yes sir.

Q. It is the regular printed form the Santa Fe uses isn't it?

Objected to as incompetent, not proper cross examination.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Yes sir, it is regular form 67.

Q. The printed form they sent out for their agents to use in the freight shipments, isn't it?

Objected to as above.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Yes sir;

Q. There is no freight rate named in that is there.

Same objection, contract itself is the best evidence.

Plaintiff excepts.

345 Q. Well under that contract, it shows no contract is made in it; that a shipper can know the rate he is being charged in a case of this kind, if he is not informed by the clerk who makes out the way bill or presents him the contract of the rate of freight, and the way bill is not made out till after the shipment is made; the shipper wouldn't have any means of knowing what the rate of freight was unless the agent at the time would inform him of the rate of freight, would he.

Defendant objects, incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial not proper cross examination.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. He would not get it from the way bill in any case.

Q. He would have no means of knowing, would he?

A. Not unless he inquired. If the way bill accompanied the shipment he couldn't have got any more information.

Q. If he hadn't inquired and the agent hadn't informed him he would not know?

A. No sir.

Q. There is none specified in that contract is there?

Objected to as above.

Sustained.

Exception.

Redirect examination by Mr. GREEN:

Q. He could examine the tariffs could he not and ascertain.

A. Yes sir, he could.

Recross-examination by Mr. SMITH:

Q. You required always didn't you on the Santa Fe at the time you were employed when a shipper made those shipments, before he could make the shipment that he must sign one of those contracts of a freightman? (Affreightman.) (?)

Defendant objects as immaterial.

Overruled.

Exception.

346 A. You mean we wouldn't accept a shipment to be forwarded without executing a live stock contract?

Q. Yes sir.

A. No sir, we would not do that.

Q. The shipper would be compelled to sign one before he got his shipment?

A. Before we accepted the shipment.

Q. Before he shipped his stuff away from your place at Lawrence, if a shipper came in and offered you horses to ship he couldn't ship those horses until he signed that bill could he?

A. Why, we wouldn't accept it without his signing the contract, but he is not obliged to ship it, or release his shipment to any specified value, he can place any valuation he wants to up to \$800.00.

Q. Now where the horses are loaded before and ready to go out and then a contract is brought to him for his signature he would have no other choice than to sign it would he?

A. If he wanted the shipment to go forward he would; he wouldn't have to ship his horses at \$100 if he didn't want to.

Q. Does the shipper come in there and tell you to place that valuation of \$100 on it generally?

Objected to as immaterial.

Sustained.

Exception.

Q. I will ask you if it is the custom in that office there on the Santa Fe to call the attention of shippers to the reduced rate, or do you ever say anything to them about it unless they inquire?

Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, not proper cross examination.

Overruled.

Exception.

347 A. Well sometimes we do and sometimes we don't; it depends, with a regular shipper, most of the live stock was shipped by regular shippers, and it was generally understood that they released us because none of them wanted to pay the excess freight, but with an irregular shipper we would call their attention to these things.

Q. It was customary generally—it was the customary contract that most everybody shipped under and it was the exception when they shipped under a higher rate, wasn't it; it is the regular contract of the average shipper who shipped horses is it not.

Objected to as above.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. It is the regular contract, yes sir.

Q. Question repeated.

A. It is the regular contract and they usually elected to take the lower rate.

Q. It is the regular contract most people ship under isn't it?

A. They all use the same contract, yes sir.

Q. You poked that out to them and they signed it without asking any questions, didn't they.

Objected to as above.

Overruled.

Exception.

A. Well, with a regular shipper they did, yes, but with them we knew they understand the provisions of the contract. To anyone who was not familiar with it we usually explained it. We wouldn't read it all to them, but explained it and made known what the contract was.

Q. Do you know whether they explained it in the office at Kansas City or not?

A. I cannot say as to Kansas City. No sir.

348 Q. You didn't know Mr. Conway did you, the claim agent, is Mr. Conway dead?

Objected to by defendant as not proper cross examination.

Sustained.

Exception.

349 Mr. GREEN: At this time defendant offers in evidence the certificate of the Interstate Commerce Commission signed by Edward A. Mosley, and in relation to the filing of the tariffs. It is marked Exhibit "C." Record page 411.

Mr. SMITH: To which offer plaintiff objects as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and the same objection that was made to the offer of the testimony in reference to the contract heretofore

made in reference to the testimony of W. R. Smith and Gilmore, and as to what the law of Missouri and Kansas was with reference to a written contract, and for the further reason that as the evidence now stands and shows, the record discloses that the rate was not published according to the interstate commerce act, and is void.

Objection is overruled.

Exception.

Mr. GREEN: Defendant rests.

Mr. SMITH: Now comes the plaintiff and moves the court to exclude from the consideration of the jury all of the evidence introduced by the defendant in this action in reference to——

Mr. GREEN: Wait a moment. I do just want to read a little of this contract in evidence.

Mr. SMITH: All right strike that out Mr. Stenographer.  
350-450 (Mr. Green reads third and eighth clauses of contracts.)

Mr. SMITH: Move to strike the contract the places mentioned from the consideration of the jury.

Overruled.

Exception.

Defendant rests.

Mr. SMITH: Now comes the plaintiff and moves to exclude from the consideration of the jury all of the evidence heretofore introduced and objected to by the plaintiff that bears upon and has relation to the contract plead by the defendant in its original answer and amended answer for the reasons given in the objection—given at the beginning of the defendant's testimony and for the same reasons offered by the plaintiff in his objection to the testimony of the witnesses Smith and Gilmore and the contract itself, and the other evidence in reference to the same, and for the further reason that the evidence of the defendant discloses that the rate was not posted as required by the interstate commerce law known as the Hepburn act, passed by congress, and under that testimony the evidence in reference to the contract would be incompetent, and the contract would be void, because this is an interstate shipment.

Motion is overruled.

Exception.

451 Mr. GREEN: Save us exception.

Mr. GREEN: Comes now the defendant and moves the court to direct the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff in sum of \$100.00.

Overruled.

Mr. GREEN: Save an exception.

And the *written* and foregoing was all of the evidence introduced in said cause both by the plaintiff and defendant. And was all the evidence in said cause, written, oral or documentary, or both.

(Here follows Way-bill marked page 452.)



08 300 m  
Hall 250 M 4737

Form 1226

# The Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe

From *458 Kan City Mo* To *Lawrence Ka*

ROUTE

VIA JUNCTION	WITH	Ry.	VIA
VIA JUNCTION	WITH	Ry.	VIA
WEIGH-THIS CAR AT	LENGTH OF CAR FEET AND INCHES	MARKET	
	<i>36 4</i>		
AT	STOP THIS CAR	FOR	

SHIPPER Connecting Line Reference, Original Car and Way bill Number and Point of Shipment	MARKS, CONSIGNEE AND DES
<i>H. G. Moore</i>	<i>H. G. Moore</i>

AGENTS AT JUNCTION STATIONS RECEIVING THIS WAY-BILL FROM COM	
1 <i>H. G.</i>	2

STAMP OF JUNCTION FORWARDING AGENT.

STAMP OF JUNCTION FORWARDING AGENT.

CARD WAY-BILL MUST BE ATTACHED (NOT PASTED) TO THE REGULAR WAY-BILL  
BEFORE SENDING TO AUDIT OFFICE.

NOTE A - In this space billing agent will enter - ON 10A D8 01 tare weights of weight of load and to  
AGENTS - In column headed "Authority," agents will note the number Special Rate, number of Special Order or Tariff as the case may be. Agents  
are in no case to make a way-bill to cover more than one car. A way-bill must be made for each and every car. When billing carloads from a  
station having no track scales, agents must enter on the face of way bill the name of station at which car is to be weighed.  
• When a through rate is used and shipment is to be re-way billed en route the subdivisions must be shown in the rate column  
in road order, nothing opposite each proportion the initial of the road to which it accrues.

Form 1026 • Regular

# Opeka & Santa Fe Railway Company

Lawrence Kansas

Date Sept 17/07

Ry.	VIA JUNCTION	WITH	Ry.	"A" ESTIMATED FOR USE OF CONDUCTOR Of Car (fare) — Of Contents — Total —
Ry.	VIA JUNCTION	WITH	Ry.	
LENGTH OF CAR FEET AND INCHES 36 4	MARKED CAPACITY OF CAR POUNDS	GROSS WEIGHT OF CAR AND CONTENTS IN POUNDS		
FOR	STATION	FOR ADDITIONAL CHARGES SEE W-B		DATE

MARKS, CONSIGNEE AND DESTINATION J. J. Moore	No. of Packages 4 Horses	ARTICLES AND CLASSIFICATION CONDITIONS (O. R., C. R., Rel., Gtd., etc.)
---	--------------------------------	--

THIS WAY-BILL FROM CONNECTING LINES MUST STAMP IN SPACES BELOW, IN CONSECUTIVE ORDER

	3	4
JUNCTION FORWARDING AGENT.	STAMP OF JUNCTION FORWARDING AGENT.	STAMP OF JUNCTION FORWARDING AGENT.

**WAY-BILL**

**SERIES**

NUMBER

INITIALS

NUMBER

14921

## “X”

**EIGHT  
TOR ONLY**

Transferred at \_\_\_\_\_

Into Car Initials \_\_\_\_\_ No. \_\_\_\_\_

Transferred at \_\_\_\_\_

Into Car Initials \_\_\_\_\_ No. \_\_\_\_\_

**FREIGHT**

Leave this space for  
Symbol Stamp

AY-BILL MAKER AND BLOCK NO.

WEIGHT	RATE AND AUTHORITY	FREIGHT	ADVANCES	PREPAID	FREIGHT BILL No.
20000	17.60	17.60			
			<div style="text-align: center;"> <del> <i>10556</i> </del> </div>		


R, THE NAMES OF THEIR STATIONS AND DATE UPON WHICH THE WAY-BILL IS RECEIVED

SCALE WEIGHT AT

ENT.

DESTI-  
WILL  
HEREIN  
DATE REPORTED





453 *An Order Permitting Railroad Companies to Limit Their Common Law Liabilities Under Certain Circumstances.*

Whereas, it is deemed wise and expedient by the Board of Railroad Commissioners that railroad corporations doing business in the state of Kansas should have the privilege, under certain circumstances, of limiting their strict common law liability as common carriers:

Therefore, in accordance with the authority conferred upon this board by section 37 of an act entitled "An act concerning railroads and other common carriers, and repealing sections 1332, 1333, 1335, 1336, 1340, 1344, 1348 of the General Statutes of 1889, and all other acts and parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of this act," approved February 26, 1901, it is hereby ordered by the Board that hereafter where any railroad company doing business in the state of Kansas shall have in force two rates for the shipment of any class of freight within said state, the higher rate to apply to such shipments where no limitation of the strict common law liability of said railroad company is made and the lower rate to apply where such liability is limited, it shall be lawful for such railroad company, by contract entered into between such company and any shipper, to change or limit its common-law liability in such manner and to such an extent as may be specified by the terms of said contract; provided, that such contract shall not relieve such railroad company from any liability on account of the negligence of such Company. This order does not apply to express companies.

Dated Topeka, Kan., May 1, 1901.

454

EXHIBIT A.

STATE OF KANSAS,

*Shawnee County, ss:*

I, E. C. Shiner, hereby certify that I am the Secretary of the Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of Kansas, and that the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of an order of said Board permitting railroad companies operating in Kansas to limit their strict common law liability, as the said appears of record in the office of said Board.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Board this 16th day of November, A. D. 1908.

E. C. SHINER, *Secretary.*

455

## EXHIBIT C.

Interstate Commerce Commission.  
Office of the Secretary.  
Washington.

Edward A. Moseley, Secretary.

I, Edward A. Moseley, Secretary of the Interstate Commerce Commission, do hereby certify that the schedules hereto attached, and more particularly herein after described, are true copies of schedules (except the stencil stamps on the title pages thereof) filed with the said interstate Commerce Commission on dates specified below.

The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway "Santa Fe System" Tariff No. 6180-D., I. C. C. No. 3465, filed on November 24, 1905.

Amendment No. 9 to said "Santa Fe System" Tariff No. 6180-D, I. C. C. No. 3456, filed on May 17, 1906.

Amendment No. 12 to said "Santa Fe System" Tariff No. 6180-D, I. C. C. No. 3456, filed on August 30, 1906.

Amendment No. 25 to said "Santa Fe System" Tariff No. 6180-D, I. C. C. No. 3465, Filed June 10, 1907.

Amendment No. 31, to said "Santa Fe System" Tariff No. 6180-D, I. C. C. No. 3465, filed on August 23, 1907.

Amendment No. 42, to said "Santa Fe System" Tariff No. 6180-D, I. C. C. No. 3465, filed on May 12, 1908.

Amendment No. 43 to said "Santa Fe System" Tariff No. 6180-D, I. C. C. No. 3465, filed on June 25, 1908.

Amendment No. 44, to said "Santa Fe System" Tariff No. 6180-D, I. C. C. No. 3465, filed on July 30, 1908.

Amendment No. 45, to said "Santa Fe System" Tariff No. 6180-D, I. C. C. No. 3465, filed on August 18, 1908.

Amendment No. 47, to said "Santa Fe System" Tariff No. 6180-D, I. C. C. — filed on October 24, 1908.

Amendment No. 48, to said "Santa Fe System" Tariff No. 6180-D, I. C. C. No. 3465, filed on November 13, 1908.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Commission this 17th day of December, A. D. 1908.

[SEAL.]

EDW. A. MOSELEY,

*Secretary of the Interstate Commerce Commission.*

456 & 457 STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
*Pottawatomie County, ss:*

I, W. L. Ducker, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a complete, true, full and correct statement of the testimony given in the above entitled case as faithfully reported by me in shorthand and by me reduced to writing.

I further certify that I was at the time of reporting the same and am now the official stenographer of the District Court of the Tenth

Judicial District sitting within and for Lincoln county, state of Oklahoma, Tecumseh, Oklahoma, August 17, 1910.

W. L. DUCKER.

458 Whereupon on the 19th day of April 1910, the court gives the jury the following instructions, which instructions is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:

459 In the District Court of Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

No. 2808.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

A., T. & S. F Ry. Co., Defendant.

GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY:

This is an action brought by the plaintiffs to recover damages for injury alleged to have occurred on or about the 18th day of September 1907 between the city of Kansas City, Missouri, and the city of Lawrence in the State of Kansas, over the line of the defendant railway, to the racing mare, Nancy Alden. The plaintiffs in this action contends that the defendant undertook to transport the mare, Nancy Alden, to the city of Lawrence from the city of Kansas City in a reasonable time and that she was being transported for the purpose on the part of the plaintiffs of racing her there in races. That the defendant was guilty of negligence in that they left the mare in the yards at Kansas City or in the yards at Argentine near Kansas City, from about ten o'clock at night until the next morning, and that in moving the car about through the yards they handled the mare roughly and in such a manner as to injure her and damage her for racing purposes, and that her value for such purposes was practically destroyed, and that she was thereafter unable to race and that her marketable value was greatly damaged and injured. Plaintiff further alleges that he has been obliged to pay and did pay certain sums of money for entrance fees and for medicine and care of the mare certain other sums of money, in all the sum of \$125.00 for said entrance fees and medical attention.

Defendant excepts to the giving of the above instruction.

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorney for Defendant.*

460 2. To this petition the defendant filed an answer denying that it was guilty of negligence and denying that the mare was injured by its agents and servants in the manner claimed in the plaintiff's petition; and the defendants further set up in their answer that at the time of the shipment of said mare one Moore for the plaintiff, C. E. Robinson, signed the name of one H. F. Moore, to a contract in which contract plaintiff agreed that in consideration of a limitation of the value of the said mare in case of injury to a

sum not exceeding one hundred dollars, that he was granted a reduced rate upon the mare; and that said reduced rate was less than the regular rate made and provided and published and posted by the defendant for the shipment of horses at their actual value.

The plaintiff thereafter filed a reply denying that the facts as alleged in defendant's answer are true.

These pleadings constitute the issue in this case, and you are instructed that:

Defendant excepts to the giving of the above instruction.

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Att'y for Def't.*

3. If you find from the evidence in this case that the mare, Nancy Alden, was injured during the shipment by reason of the negligence of the defendant in roughly handling the car in which she was being shipped, and that the rough handling of the car in which she was being shipped was the proximate cause of the injuries which she is alleged to have received then your verdict shall be for the plaintiff, unless you further find from the evidence that such injuries to said mare resulted from the inherent propensities, or the vicious nature of the mare herself and in that event your verdict shall be for the defendant.

Defendant excepts to the giving of the above instruction.

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Att'y for Def't.*

461 4. If you find for the plaintiff you are instructed that the measure of damage which the plaintiff has incurred, is the difference between the market value of said mare, at Lawrence, Kansas, in the condition she was then in as a result of the negligence of the defendant, if you find there was any negligence, and what she would have been worth in the market at said place and time in her uninjured condition, provided you find that the defendant or its agents knew of her destination at the time of said shipment.

Defendant excepts to the giving of the above instruction.

GEO. M. GREEN.

5. You are instructed that in considering the amount of damage which the plaintiff has sustained in this case, you may take into consideration the amount of money the plaintiff expended in giving medical attention to the mare by reason of her alleged injuries; and this item of damage is to be considered by you in addition to the alleged injury to the mare.

Defendant excepts to the giving of the above instructions.

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Att'y for Def't.*

6. You are instructed that if you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff informed defendant's agent at Lawrence, Kansas, of

the injury to said mare, at or about the time that he was unloaded, then you are instructed that no written notice would be required.

Defendant excepts to the giving of the above instruction.

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Att'y for Def't.*

7. As to the contract pleaded by the defendant in its answer, alleged by it to have been executed by the plaintiff in this case, I instruct you as follows; that if you believe from the evidence  
462 that at the time of the shipment of the mare, the contract of shipment was entered into between the plaintiff, Robinson either by him or any one for him and he, Robinson, represented to the defendant or its agents at Kansas City, that the value of said mare did not exceed one hundred dollars, and that the defendant, through its agents at Kansas City, relied on said representation of value so made, and granted by reason thereof to the plaintiffs, a rate less than the regular rate for this class of shipment, on said mare, and was misled by said misrepresentations of plaintiff as to the value of said mare, in fixing said rate, and was induced to fix a lower rate than the regular rate, if you find there was a lower rate fixed on said mare than the regular rate, then you are instructed that if you find the defendant guilty of negligence, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the mare's injuries, you are limited in your findings to the sum of one hundred dollars.

But if you find that representations of value of said mare were not made by the plaintiff or his agents, but that the same was arbitrarily inserted by defendant or its agent at Kansas City, or printed in said contract when Moore's name was signed to it, you are instructed that plaintiff is not bound by the limitation of one hundred dollars, and you will find the actual damage which plaintiff has incurred by reason of the injuries to said mare, if any, not exceeding the sum of \$1,875.00.

Defendant excepts to the giving of the above instruction.

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Att'y for Def't.*

463 8. You are instructed that by proximate cause is meant that moving and efficient cause without which the injury would not have occurred.

Defendant excepts to the giving of the above instruction.

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Att'y for Def't.*

You are instructed that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to recover at the time of the filing of this suit, and by a preponderance of the evidence is not necessarily meant the greater number of witnesses, but by a preponderance of the evidence is meant that evidence which in the light of all of the facts and circumstances appearing upon the trial, is entitled to the greater weight and credit.

You are the sole and exclusive judges of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, but you are bound by the law as given you by the Court in these instructions. And in determining the weight and credit that should be given to the testimony of any witness you may take into consideration his appearance upon the witness stand and in the presence of the Court and Jury; his manner of testifying; his apparent candor and fairness or lack of the same; his intelligence or lack of intelligence, his relation to the parties, his opportunities or lack of opportunity for seeing and knowing the facts about which he testifies; his interest or lack of interest in the result of this action; and together with all of the other facts and circumstances appearing upon the trial, determine the weight and credit that should be given to the testimony of any witness and give credit accordingly.

464 And in the event that you find any witness has wilfully testified falsely relative to any material matter in issue, you are at liberty to disregard the whole of such witness's testimony, except insofar as the *sum* may be corroborated by other credible testimony, or by other facts and circumstances appearing upon the trial.

You are further instructed that you must consider these instructions all together. You have no right to consider any part or parts of the same to the exclusion of other portions thereof.

When you have retired to your jury room you will select one of your number as foreman, and when you have all agreed upon a verdict he will sign it as such, and you will all return with your verdict into Court.

You are instructed, however, that a conclusion may be reached by a concurrence of nine or more of your members, and in the event you reach a verdict by a concurrence of nine or more of your number, but less than your whole number, then each juror agreeing to the verdict must sign his name to the same, and you will all return with the same into Court.

After the argument of counsel, forms of verdict will be handed you by the Court.

JOHN J. CARNEY, *Judge*.

Endorsed on back of Instructions to Jury: No. 2808. Ent. In the district Court of Lincoln County, Oklahoma, C. E. Robinson, plaintiff, vs. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co., Defendant. Instructions to jury. Filed April 20, 1910, D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Okla.

465 Whereupon the 20th day of April, 1910, counsel for the defendant filed his exceptions to the instructions given to the jury by the Court, which exception is in words and figures the following, to-wit:

466 In the District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON

vs.

A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co.

Comes now the defendant and excepts to the instructions of the court given to the jury and to each and every of said instructions so given by the court to the jury.

The defendant excepts to the ruling of the court in refusal of the court in failure to give to the jury the requested instructions by the defendant numbered from one to seven inclusive.

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Att'y for Def't.*

Exceptions allowed.

JOHN J. CARNEY, *Judge.*

Endorsements on back of Defendant's Exceptions to Instructions to Jury: No. 2808. Ent. In the District Court of Lincoln County, Oklahoma, C. E. Robinson, vs. A., T. & S. F. R. Co. Defendant's Exception to instructions to Jury. Filed April 20, 1910, D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Okla.

467 Whereupon the 20th day of April, 1910, the defendant requested that the following instructions be given the jury which instructions *is* in words and figures the following to-wit:

468 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Defendant's Requested Instructions.*

Comes now the defendant in the above entitled action and requests the court to give to the jury the following instructions numbered from one to — inclusive.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Defendant.*

469 Instruction No. 1.

The jury are instructed in this case that the plaintiff has failed to prove a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. You shall, therefore, return your verdict in favor of the defendant.

Refused and excepted to.

JOHN J. CARNEY, *Judge.*



470

## Instruction No. 2.

The jury are instructed that from the pleadings and evidence in this case, that the horse was shipped upon a written contract of shipment attached to the defendant's answer and marked "Exhibit A", and that there can be no recovery had in this case for more than \$100.00, even though the jury find from the evidence that said horse was injured through negligence of the defendant.

Refused and excepted to.

JOHN J. CARNEY, *Judge*.

471

## Instruction No. 3.

The jury are instructed that under the pleadings and evidence in this case the horse was shipped upon the written contract attached to the defendant's answer, marked "Exhibit A", which provides as follows:

"In order that any loss or damage to be claimed by the shipper may be fully and fairly investigated and the fact and nature of such claim and loss preserved beyond dispute and by the best evidence, it is agreed that as a condition precedent to his right to recover any damages for any loss or injury to his said stock during the transportation thereof, or at any place or places where the same may be loaded or unloaded for any purpose on the Company's road, or previous to loading thereof for shipment the shipper or his agent in charge of the stock will give notice in writing of his claim therefor to some officer of said company, or to the nearest station agent, or if delivered to consignee at a point beyond the Company's road, to the nearest station agent of the last carrier making such delivery, before such stock shall have been removed from the place of destination above mentioned, or from the place of delivery of the same to the consignee, and before such stock shall have been slaughtered or intermingled with other stock and will not move such stock from said station or stock yards until the expiration of three hours after the giving of such notice; and a failure to comply in every respect with the terms of this clause shall be a complete bar to any recovery of any and all such damages. The written notice herein provided for cannot and shall not be — presented to the company within ninety-one days after the same may have occurred."

And if the jury find from the evidence that no notice in writing of the loss or damage to the horse of the plaintiff was given to the agent at Lawrence Kansas, as provided by said contract, then there can be no recovery in this case.

Refused and excepted to.

JOHN J. CARNEY, *Judge*.

472

## Instruction No. 4.

The jury are instructed that from the pleading and evidence in this case the horse of plaintiff was transported from Kansas City to Lawrence, Kansas, under and by virtue of a written contract; that said contract embodied all the terms for the transportation of

said horse and that said contract provided, among other things, that a claim in writing should be given to the agent at Lawrence, Kansas, before any liability could exist on the part of the defendant for the loss or damage to said horse and before the plaintiff could sue for such loss or damage.

That the filing of said claim, as provided by the contract is a condition precedent to the right of plaintiff to recover in this case, and if the jury find from the evidence that no such notice in writing was given or filed with the agent of the defendant at Lawrence, then there can be no recovery in this case.

Refused and excepted to.

JOHN J. CARNEY, *Judge*.

473

Instruction No. 5.

The jury are further instructed that from the pleading and evidence in this case the plaintiff's horse was transported from Kansas City, Mo., to Lawrence, Kansas, under and by virtue of the written contract of shipment attached to the defendant's answer, marked "Exhibit A", and by the terms of said contract the plaintiff represented and agreed that the live stock in question did not exceed in value the sum of \$100.00, it being understood that the rate of freight given was based upon such limit of valuation and which was the highest value accepted for the lower rate, (animals of a higher value being charged a higher rate, and in case of loss or damage from any cause for which the Company may be liable, payments shall be made therefor only on the basis of the actual value at the time and place of shipment and in no case to exceed the sum of \$100.00). And the defendant could not be liable in any event for more than said sum in case of loss or damage to said horses, whether said loss occurred from the negligence of the defendant or not.

The plaintiff cannot recover in this case more than \$100.00 even though the jury find from the evidence — negligently caused the injury to said horse.

Refused and excepted to.

JOHN J. CARNEY, *Judge*.

474

Instruction No. 6 Requested by Defendant.

The jury are instructed that where a railroad company has promulgated its rates under the interstate commerce law and has complied with the statute by filing a copy of the schedule with the interstate commerce commission, deposited a copy with its agent, and posted notices in its depot, shippers are presumed to know the existence of the schedule and the rates contained therein; and where a shipment of live-stock is made the shipper signing a live-stock contract which recites that he has secured the benefit of the lower rate and values his animals at a specified amount in consideration of such rate, he is bound by the terms of said contract, and cannot be held to say that he did not know what its conditions were and

where a shipper receives the benefit of a reduced freight rate applicable — is a limited liability contract.

Refused and excepted to.

JOHN J. CARNEY, *Judge*.

— — —,  
*Attorney for Def't.*

475            Instruction No. 7 Requested by Defendant.

The jury are instructed that the shipment in question is merely under the laws of Missouri, and that under said law a common carrier cannot contract to exempt itself from liability for negligence in transporting property; but, a contract limiting its liability to an agreed valuation such as one hundred dollars per *head*, is a valid contract, and if supported by a sufficient consideration such as a reduced rate of freight, the same is a valid and binding contract, and binding contract upon the shipper, and if you find from the evidence that the plaintiffs entered into such a contract, and valued his horse- at one hundred dollars per head, your verdict cannot exceed that amount.

Refused because covered by another instruction.

JOHN J. CARNEY, *Judge*.

— — —,  
*Attorney for Def't.*

Endorsements on back of Defendant's Requested Instructions: No. 2808. Ent. C. E. Robinson, vs. A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co. Defendant's Requested Instructions. Filed April 20, 1910. D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Okla.

476            Whereupon the 20th day of April 1910 the jury returned into open court their verdict in favor of the plaintiff, which verdict is in words and figures the following to-wit:

477            Be it remembered, That on this 20th day of April 1910, the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma, convened in regular session in the District Court room at Chandler, in said county and state, pursuant to law. Present and presiding the Honorable John J. Carney, Judge; also present, D. J. Norton, Clerk; John J. Davis, County Attorney; and L. E. Martin, Sheriff; and W. L. Ducker, and Lucy Adams Court reporters; and public proclamation of the convening of said court having been made, and said court having been opened in due form of law, the following proceedings were had, to-wit:

STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
*Lincoln County, ss:*

In the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, Sitting within  
and for said County and State.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Verdict.*

We the jury duly enpaneled and sworn to try the above case, do,  
upon our oaths find for the plaintiff and assess the amount of his  
recovery at Fifteen Hundred Dollars (\$1,500.00).

WALTER PHELP, *Foreman.*

Endorsements on back of Verdict: No. 2808. Ent. C. E. Robin-  
son Plaintiff vs. A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co., Defendant. Verdict.  
Filed April 20 1910. D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court. I. E. B.,  
Deputy.

478 Whereupon the 21st day of April 1910, the defendants  
filed a motion for a new trial, which motion is in words and  
figures as following, to-wit:

479 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

No. 2808.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Motion for New Trial.*

Comes now the defendant above named and moves the court to  
set said the verdict of the jury herein and to grant to the defendant  
a new trial herein upon the grounds and for the following reasons  
to-wit:

First. Because of excessive damages appearing to have been given  
under the influence of passion or prejudice:

Second. Because of error in the assessment of the amount of re-  
covery, the same being too large:

Third. Because the verdict of the jury is not sustained by suffi-  
cient evidence:

Fourth. Because verdict of the jury is contrary to law:

Fifth. Because of errors of law occurring at the trial and excepted  
to by the defendant at the time:

Sixth. Because over the objection of the defendant at the time,  
the court admitted certain irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial

testimony, to which the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts:

Seventh. Because the court refused to admit certain relevant, competent and material testimony offered by the defendant and to which ruling of the court, the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts:

Eighth. Because the court erred in its instructions to the jury, to the giving of which instructions the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts:

480 Ninth. Because the Court misdirected the jury as to matters of law, to which instruction of the court, the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts:

Tenth. Because the court erred in refusing to give to the jury the special instructions requested by the defendant, numbered one to seven inclusive, to which refusal of the court the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts:

Eleventh. Because the court erred in overruling the objection of the defendant to the introduction of any evidence by the plaintiff at the beginning of the trial, to which action of the court, the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts:

Twelfth. Because the court erred in overruling the motion of the defendant to render judgment upon the pleadings, to which ruling of the court the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts:

Thirteenth. Because the court erred in overruling the demurrer of the defendant at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence to which ruling of the court, the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts:

Fourteenth. Because the court erred in overruling the action of the defendant at the conclusion of the testimony for the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, to which ruling of the court, the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts:

Fifteenth. Because the court erred to the prejudice of the defendant in construing the Interstate Commerce Act as not only  
481 destroying the validity of a contract made for transportation at published rates, but in holding that the same destroyed all rights of compensation, and that said tariff so filed in accordance with the Interstate Commerce Act was not binding and conclusive upon the plaintiff as *the* the contract of shipment entered into between plaintiff and defendant at the time: to which ruling of the court, the defendant excepted at the time and still excepts.

Sixteenth. Because the Court erred in its construction of said Interstate Commerce Act in holding that a reduced rate of freight in consideration of the shipment being valued at a specific amount discharged the shipper from liability to said specific amount and in holding that the shipper was not bound by the terms and conditions of said tariff so filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and on file at the depot of this defendant at Kansas City, Missouri; to which ruling of the court, the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

That the verdict was arrived at by the respective jurors setting

down each a certain sum and then dividing the whole sum by twelve.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,  
GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Defendant.*

RITTENHOUSE & RITTENHOUSE.

Endorsements on back of Motion for New Trial: No. 2808. Ent. in the District Court of Lincoln County, Oklahoma. C. E. Robinson, Plaintiff, vs. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, Defendant. Motion for New Trial. Filed April 21, 1910. D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Okla.

482 Whereupon the 30th day of April 1910, the Court overrules the defendant's motion for new trial which ruling of the court is in words and figures as following, to-wit:

483 State of Oklahoma, Tenth Judicial District, Lincoln County.

No. 2808.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Order Overruling Motion for New Trial.*

Now at this time, the motion filed by the defendant in the above entitled action to set aside the verdict rendered therein and grant defendant a new trial in said action, coming on for hearing and the Court having heard the Attorneys for defendant in favor of said motion, and the Attorneys for the plaintiff opposing the same, and the Court having considered the same, and being fully advised in the premises, finds that said motion is not well taken and ought to be denied.

It is therefore on motion of the attorneys for the plaintiff, ordered and adjudged that said motion for new trial be, and is hereby overruled and denied, to which ruling the defendant excepts, which exception is allowed.

And now upon application of the defendant, it is ordered that said defendant be, and is hereby granted an extension of sixty days' time in which to prepare and serve a case made upon plaintiff's attorneys; plaintiff to have ten days thereafter in which to suggest amendments and serve the same upon the counsel for defendant, and the case made and amendments shall upon five days' notice by either party be submitted to the Judge who tried the cause, to be settled and signed.

It is further ordered that the defendant file its petition in error in the Supreme Court within One Hundred and twenty days from

this date, and that it file its undertaking and appeal within thirty days, from this date, in the sum of three thousand dollars (\$3,000.00), execution being stayed in the meantime and that upon filing of said undertaking, all proceedings and executions of said judgment, be and are hereby stayed, pending the expiration of the time for filing its petition in error in the Supreme Court.

Done in open Court, at the City of Chandler, Oklahoma, this 30th day of April, 1910.

By the Court,

JOHN J. CARNEY,  
*Judge of said Court.*

Endorsed on back of order overruling motion for new trial: No. 2808. Ent. C. E. Robinson vs. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. R. Co. Order overruling motion for new trial. Filed Apr. 30, 1910. D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County.

485 Whereupon the 30th day of April 1910, the journal entry of judgment was filed in said cause, which journal entry is in words and figures as following, to-wit:

486 Whereupon the 30 day of April 1910, additional journal entry of judgment was filed in said cause which journal entry is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:

487 STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
*Lincoln County, ss:*

In the District Court Thereof in and for the Tenth Judicial District,

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Judgment.*

At a General Term of the District Court in and for Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma, Begun and Held at the Court-house in the City of Chandler, in said County, and on the 20th Day of April, 1910.

Present: Honorable John J. Carney, Special Judge, presiding.

This action being at issue was thereupon called and trial before the court and a jury of twelve men, and the allegations and proofs on the part of the plaintiff, having been heard and considered; and the allegations, of the defendant and the proof and support of the same having been heard and considered, and the issues as thus made up and joined having been tried to the jury under instruction of the court, and a general verdict for the plaintiff having been ren-

dered on the 20th day of April, 1910, into open court which is in words and figures, to-wit:

"STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
*Lincoln County, ss:*

District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, Sitting in and for  
said County and State.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, De-  
fendant.

We, the jury duly empaneled and sworn to try the above case,  
do, upon, our oaths find for the plaintiff and assess the amount of  
his recovery at fifteen hundred dollars (\$1500.00).

(Signed)

WALTER PHELPS, *For-man.*"

488 Which said verdict is received and by the order of the  
court filed.

Now on motion of H. H. Smith and Rittenhouse & Rittenhouse,  
Attorneys of record for said plaintiff, it is adjudged and ordered, that  
said plaintiff, C. E. Robinson recover of said defendants, the Atchi-  
son, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Company, Fifteen Hundred  
Dollars (\$1500.00) found by the jury, with interest at the rate of  
six per cent per annum from the 20th day of April A. D. 1910,  
and the costs of this action for the sum of \$—; and have judgment  
for the sum of Fifteen Hundred dollars, and inserted at six per cent  
from the 20th day of April A. D. 1910, and for costs in the sum of  
\$— for which the plaintiff shall have execution.

JOHN J. CARNEY, *Judge.*

*Clerk of said Court.*

Endorsements on back of Journal Entry: No. 2808. Ent. C. E.  
Robinson vs. A., T. S. F. Ry. Co. Judgment Filed April 30 1910.  
D. J. Norton, Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

489 Whereupon the 30th day of April 1900, additional journal  
entry was filed which journal entry is in words and figures as  
follows, to-wit:



490 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND *Alanta* FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Journal Entry.*

Now, to-wit on this 20th day of April A. D. 1910, same being one of the regular judicial days of the regular — term of this court, this cause came on for hearing upon the demurrer of the defendant to the reply of the plaintiff, the plaintiff appearing by H. H. Smith and Rittenhouse & Rittenhouse, his attorneys, and the defendant appearing by Cottingham & Bledsoe, George M. Green, and Emery Foster, its Attorneys; and

Thereupon, said demurrer was presented to the court and the court being fully advised in the premises overruled said demurrer as to the general denial contained in said reply and sustains said demurrer as to the new matters set forth in said reply, to the sustaining of said demurrer the plaintiff at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Thereupon and on the 20th day of April A. D. 1910, said cause came on for hearing upon the motion of the defendant for judgment upon the pleadings, the parties appearing as heretofore, and the court being fully advised in the premises overruled said motion, and to the overruling of which said motion the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts; and

Thereupon and on the 20th day of April A. D. 1910, said cause having been duly and regularly assigned for trial and duly and regularly reached for trial, the parties appearing as heretofore; and

491 Thereupon, comes a jury of twelve good and lawful men, to-wit S. E. Earlbough, C. P. Phelps, S. J. Rowley, A. E. Mascho, T. N. West, Oscar Hoyt, R. H. Gibson, Walter Phelps, J. E. Young, M. A. Rackley, F. N. West, A. K. Bradley, who are duly empaneled and sworn to try said cause; and

Thereupon the plaintiff states his case to the jury and defendant states his case to the jury.

Thereupon the defendant objects to the introduction of any evidence in behalf of plaintiff for the reason that plaintiff's petition, amended petition and reply do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant; which objection is duly considered by the court and overruled, to which ruling of the court, the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts; and

Thereupon the plaintiff proceeds with the introduction of his testimony and concludes the same and rests his case; and

Thereupon the defendant files its demurrer to the evidence of the plaintiff upon the grounds and for the reasons that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff herein is not sufficient and does not

prove or tend to prove a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and for the further reason that there is a variance between the pleading and proof, which demurrer is by the court considered and overruled, to which ruling of the court, the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts; and

Thereupon the defendant proceeds with the introduction of its evidence and concludes the same and rests its case; and the plaintiff introduces evidence in rebuttal and rests his case; an-

Thereupon the defendant moves the court for peremptory instructions to find for the defendant and the court being fully, 492 advised in the premises overrules said motion, to which ruling of the court, the defendant at the time duly excepted and still excepts; and

Thereupon the Court instructs the jury in writing as to the law of the case and the case is argued to the jury by counsel for plaintiff and defendant; and

Thereupon the jury retire in charge of a sworn officer of the court to deliberate of their verdict; and

Thereupon and thereafter the jury return into open court with their verdict, which is in words and figures as follows to-wit: "We the jury empaneled and sworn to try the above cause do upon our oaths find for the plaintiff and assess the amount of his recovery at Fifteen Hundred Dollars (\$1500.00) which said verdict is received and filed.

Thereupon the jury are discharged from further consideration of this case.

Thereafter and on the 30 day of April A. D. 1910, said cause came on for hearing upon the motion of the defendant for a new trial herein, the parties appearing as heretofore and the court after argument of counsel for plaintiff and defendant, and being fully advised in the premises, overrules said motion for new trial, to which ruling of the court, the defendant at the time duly excepts and still excepts; and

It is therefore considered, ordered, and adjudged by the court that the plaintiff, C. E. Robinson do have and recover of and from the defendant, The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, the sum of Fifteen Hundred and no /100 (\$150.00) dollars with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the 20th day of April A. D. 1910, and costs of this suit.

Thereupon said defendant makes application to the court for extension of time within which to make and serve a case-made in said cause for review by the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, and the court upon the consideration of said application and for good cause shown grants said application, the said defendant being granted sixty days within which to make and serve a case-made, for review by the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, the plaintiff being granted ten days in which to suggest amendments thereto, said case-made to be signed and settled on five days' notice by either party to the other; 493

It is further ordered by the court that execution herein be stayed upon the giving of a good and sufficient bond by defendant in the sum of Twenty-six Hundred (\$2600.00) dollars, to be approved by

the clerk of this court, which bond is to be given within thirty days, execution to be stayed pending appeal of this cause to the Supreme Court of the state of Oklahoma.

It is further ordered that said appeal be filed in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, within one hundred twenty days from this date.

O. K.

H. H. SMITH,

R. & R.,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorney for Defendant.*

Dated this — day of April, A. D. 1910.

Endorsements on back of Journal Entry: No. 2808. Ent. C. E. Robinson Plaintiff, vs. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company. Journal Entry. Filed April 30, 1910. D. J. Norton, Clerk.

494 Whereupon on the 9th day of May 1910, the defendant filed its Supersedeas Bond, which is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:

495 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Supersedeas Bond.*

Know all men by these presents: That

Whereas, the above named plaintiff did on the 19th day of April A. D. 1910, in the above entitled court, procure a judgment against the above named defendant for the sum of Fifteen Hundred (\$1500.00) Dollars and the further sum of \$— costs of said action; and

Whereas, the above named defendant desires to appeal from said judgment to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

Now therefore, we, the undersigned, The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, as principal, and U. C. Guss of the County of Logan, State of Oklahoma, and the National Surety Company of New York, as sureties, are held and firmly bound unto the above named plaintiff in the penal sum of Three Thousand (\$3000.00) Dollars, that said defendant will prosecute its appeal to effect and without unnecessary delay and will pay any judgment and costs which may be awarded against it on said appeal.

In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands this 6th day of May, A. D. 1910.

[SEAL.]

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA &  
SANTA FE RY. CO.,

*Principal,*

By COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,

*Its Attorneys.*

W. C. GUSS,

NATIONAL SURETY CO.,

By E. A. JOYNSON,

*Its Attorney in Fact, Sureties.*

496 STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
*County of Logan, ss:*

U. C. Guss, of lawful age, being first duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and says:

That he is one of the sureties on the above and foregoing bond; that he has read the same, and know- the contents thereof; that he is a resident of the County of Logan and Pres. of the Guthrie National Bank of Guthrie in said county and state; and that he is worth the sum of Five Thousand (\$5000.00) Dollars over and above his just debts, liabilities and exemptions.

U. C. GUSS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of May A. D. 1910.

[SEAL.]

H. L. McCrackan,

*Notary Public.*

My commission expires 2/3/1912.

Endorsements on back of Supersedeas Bond: No. 2808, Ent. In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma, C. E. Robinson, Plaintiff, vs. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company. Defendant Supersedeas Bond. Approved May 9, 1910. D. J. Norton, Clerk. Filed, May 9, 1910. D. J. Norton Clerk District Court, Lincoln County, Oklahoma.

497 Whereupon the 30th day of June, the defendant filed an order granting extension of time in which to make and serve a case for the Supreme Court, which order is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:

498 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

*Order Extending Time to Make and Serve Case-Made.*

Now, to-wit on this 28th day of June, 1910, this cause comes on for hearing upon the application of the Defendant for an extension of time in which to make and serve case made herein, and upon good cause being shown and appearing.

It is ordered that said defendant be, and is hereby granted sixty days in addition to the time already granted within which to make and serve case-made in said cause, with ten days to the Plaintiff's herein to suggest amendments thereto; said case-made to be settled and signed upon five days' notice in writing upon either party to the other.

It is further ordered that the time within which said case-made and petition in error to be filed in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma is also extended sixty days in addition to the time already granted.

ROY HOFFMAN, Judge.

Endorsements on back of Order Extending Time to Make and Serve case-made. No. 2808. Ent. C. E. Robinson, Plaintiff, vs. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, Defendant. Order extending time to make and serve case-made. Filed June 30, 1910. D. J. Norton, Clerk.

499 Be it further remembered that the above and foregoing is all of the evidence taken upon the trial and introduced in said cause, both on the part of the defendant and plaintiff, and the foregoing is all of the evidence introduced and taken in the trial of said cause.

500 STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
*County of Lincoln, ss:*

I, D. J. Norton, Clerk of the District Court of said County and State, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct transcript of the record in the above entitled case.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal of said court this the 15th day of September 1910.

[SEAL.]

D. J. NORTON, Clerk.

501

*Certificate of Attorneys.*

No. 2807.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

vs.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA &amp; SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

We hereby certify that the foregoing case made contains a full, true, correct and complete copy and transcript of all the proceedings in said cause, including all pleadings filed and proceedings had, all the evidence offered or introduced by both parties, all orders and rulings made and exceptions allowed, and all of the record upon which the judgment and journal entry in said cause were made and entered, and that the same is a full, true, correct and complete case-made.

Witness our hands this 25 day of August, 1910.

COTTINGHAM &amp; BLEDSOE,

GEO. W. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Defendant.*

502

*Acceptance of Service.*

STATE OF OKLAHOMA,  
*Lincoln County, ss:*

We the undersigned attorneys for the plaintiffs in the foregoing suit, certify that the foregoing case made was duly served on us this 27th day of Aug. A. D. 1910.

H. H. SMITH,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

The plaintiff herein has no amendments to suggest.  
Sept. 3rd, 1910.

H. H. SMITH,

*Att'y for Plaintiff.*

503 In the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

C. E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

v.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Defendant.*Notice of Setting and Signing Case-Made.*

You are hereby notified that on the 12th day of September, 1910, at nine o'clock A. M. or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard the case-made will be presented to the Honorable I. J. Carney at his

Chambers in Oklahoma City for settling and signing that said case-made will be presented for settling and signing at that time or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,  
GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Defendant.*

Service of the above notice is hereby accepted this 3rd day of September, 1910, and I hereby waive my suggestions of amendments and agree that said case-made may be settled and signed at the time without further notice.

H. H. SMITH,  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff.*

504

*Certificate of Trial Judge.*

This is to certify that the foregoing case-made was presented to me as the case-made in the above entitled action, the plaintiff appearing by H. H. Smith, his Attorney, the defendant appearing by Geo. M. Green, one of its Attorneys, and it appearing to the court the plaintiff has no suggestions or amendments and that said Attorney of record for the plaintiff has agreed that said case-made may be settled and signed at any time, I now settle and sign the same as a true and correct case-made and direct that it be attested and filed by the Clerk of said court.

That I further certify that the above and foregoing case-made has been duly served, in due time, and that the Attorney for plaintiff has waived any suggestions or amendments and the same is duly submitted to me for settlement and signing, as required by law, by the parties to said cause; that the same as above set forth and as corrected by me is true and correct and contains a true and correct statement of all the pleadings, motions, orders, evidence, findings, proceedings and judgment had in said cause and I hereby settle, allow and certify and sign the same as true and correct, and I hereby order that the Clerk of the District Court of Lincoln County attest the same with the seal of said court and file the same of record.

Witness my hand at Oklahoma City this 12th day of September, A. D. 1910.

JOHN J. CARNEY, *Judge.*

Attest:

D. J. NORTON.

Filed in the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma this 15 day of September, 1910.

[SEAL.]

D. J. NORTON,  
*Clerk of District Court, Lincoln County.*

505-507      Endorsed on back of case-made: 2015. In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, Plaintiff in Error, vs. C. E. Robinson, Defendant in Error. Petition in Error and Case Made. Filed Sep. 26, 1910. W. H. L. Campbell, Clerk.

508 In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

No. 2015.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA — RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

*Stipulation.*

It is hereby agreed between the plaintiff in error The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, and the defendant in error, C. E. Robinson, and their respective Counsel, that the defendant in error will have ninety days from this date to prepare and file and serve brief in the above entitled action.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,

*Attorney for Plaintiff in Error.*

H. H. SMITH,

*Attorneys for Defendant in Error.*

Endorsed on the back as follows: 2015. Stip. Filed Dec. 13, 1910. W. H. L. Campbell, Clerk.

509 In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

*Amended Petition in Error.*

Comes now the Plaintiff in Error and by leave of court first had and obtained makes this its amended petition in error, and for cause of action in error, alleges and says;

First. That heretofore, to-wit, on the 30th day of April, 1910, a judgment was rendered against The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, plaintiff in error, in the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma, in the sum of Five Thousand and twenty five Dollars and costs of a said action; that the pleadings of said action, with all of the orders and judgment of said court, together with all the evidence introduced on the trial, the rulings of the court thereon, and all proceedings had in said cause, are embodied in a case-made by plaintiff in error, duly made and served and by the Honorable J. J. Carney, Presiding Judge at the trial of said cause, duly settled, signed and attested by the Clerk of the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma, which said original case-made has heretofore been filed in this action and at-



tached to the original petition in error of plaintiff in error, marked Exhibit "A", and here referred to and made a part of this amended petition in error, which said case-made contains all of the rulings of the court below, the proceedings on which said rulings were based, and all matters in connection therewith, to enable this court to review said judgment and proceedings on which the same was based and to treat the assignments of error herein made by reference to said case-made.

510 The Plaintiff in Error alleges that the court below erred to the substantial prejudice of the plaintiff in error in numerous, divers and sundry rulings in said proceedings, all of which more fully appear in said case-made heretofore referred to. That is to say:

First. That the court erred in overruling motion for new trial filed by the plaintiff in error.

Second. That the court erred in rendering judgment upon the verdict of the jury in favor of the defendant in error and against the plaintiff in error, said verdict appearing to have been rendered under the influence of passion or prejudice and being too large.

Third. That the court erred in rendering judgment against the plaintiff in error.

Fourth. The court erred in rendering judgment upon the verdict of the jury in favor of the defendant in error and against the plaintiff in error, said verdict not being supported or sustained by sufficient evidence and for the reason that the same is contrary to law.

Fifth. Because the Court erred to the substantial prejudice of the plaintiff in error in misdirecting jury as to matters of law, to which instructions of the court the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Sixth. That the court erred to the substantial prejudice of the plaintiff in error in errors of law occurring at the trial of said case and excepted to by plaintiff in error at the time.

Seventh. That the court erred in admitting certain irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial testimony over the objection of the plaintiff in error at the trial of said cause, to which ruling of the court the plaintiff in error duly excepted at the time and still excepts.

511 Eighth. That the court erred to the substantial prejudice of the plaintiff in error in refusing to admit certain competent, relevant and material testimony offered by the plaintiff in error at the trial of said cause, to which ruling of said court plaintiff in error duly excepted at the time and still excepts.

Ninth. That the court erred in its instructions to the jury, which instructions are numbered one to seven inclusive, and to the giving of each, all and every of said instructions the plaintiff in error duly excepted at the time and still excepts.

Tenth. The court erred to the substantial prejudice of the plaintiff in error in refusing to give to the jury certain pertinent, relevant and material instructions, requested by plaintiff in error, being instructions numbered from one to seven, inclusive, to which refusal of the court, the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Eleventh. That the court erred in approving the verdict of the jury and in rendering judgment against the plaintiff in error and in favor of the defendant in error; to which action of the court, the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Twelfth. That the court erred in overruling the objection of the plaintiff in error to the introduction of any evidence by the defendant in error at the beginning of the trial of said cause, to which action of the court, the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Thirteenth. That the court erred in overruling the motion of the plaintiff in error for judgment upon the pleadings in this cause, to which ruling of the court, the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

512 Fourteenth. That the court erred in overruling the demurrer of the plaintiff in error at the conclusion of the evidence of the defendant in error, to which action of the court the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Fifteenth. That the court erred in overruling the motion of the plaintiff in error at the conclusion of all the evidence, for the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in error, to which action of the court the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Sixteenth. That the court erred to the prejudice of the plaintiff in error in construing the interstate commerce act as not only destroying the terms of a contract made for the transportation of freight at published rates, but in holding that the same destroyed all rights of compensation and that said tariff so filed in accordance with the interstate commerce act was not binding upon the defendant in error as to the contract of shipment entered into between the plaintiff in error and the defendant in error, to which ruling of the court the plaintiff in error duly excepted at the time and still excepts.

Seventeenth. That the court erred in its construction of said interstate commerce act in holding that a reduced rate of freight in consideration of the shipment being valued at a specific amount discharged the shipper from liability to said specific amount and in holding that the shipper was not bound by the terms and conditions of said tariff so filed with the interstate commerce commission and on file at the depot of the plaintiff in error at Kansas City, Missouri, to which ruling of the court the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

513 Eighteenth. That the court erred in overruling the motion for new trial filed by the plaintiff in error, to which ruling of the court the plaintiff in error at the time duly excepted and still excepts.

Wherefore, the plaintiff in error prays that the court may review said judgment and examine the errors contained in said case-made, and that upon hearing said judgment of the court below may be reversed and this cause may be remanded to the court below with instructions to enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in error and for such other and further relief as may be proper, just and consist-

ent with equity and good conscience and that the plaintiff in error may have its costs herein expended.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,  
GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error.*

Endorsed on back: No. 2015. In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, Plaintiff in Error vs. C. E. Robinson, Defendant in Error. Amended petition in error filed Dec. 22, 1910. W. H. L. Campbell, Clerk.

514 In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

No. 2015.

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA — RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

*Stipulation.*

It is hereby agreed by the plaintiff in error, The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, and the defendant in error, C. E. Robinson, and their respective counsel, that the defendant in error will have ninety days from this date to prepare and file and serve brief in the above entitled action.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,

*Attorney- for Plaintiff in Error.*

H. H. SMITH,

*Attorneys for Defendant in Error.*

Endorsed on back as follows: #2015. Stip. Filed Dec. 26, 1910. W. H. L. Campbell, Clerk.

515 Thereafter, to-wit: On the 24th day of January, 1911, in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, the following proceedings were had in said cause:

Supreme Court, January Term, 1911. January 24th, 1911, Fourth Judicial Day.

#2015.

A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co., Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

And now on this day it is ordered by the court that the stipulation herein that defendant in error have an extension of time of 90 days in which to file briefs, be, and the same is hereby allowed.

516 In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

*Motion to Dismiss Appeal.*

Comes now the defendant in error, C. E. Robinson, and moves to dismiss the appeal herein and to strike the proposed case made herein from the records of this court. Said motion is based upon the following grounds, to-wit:

On the 30th day of April, 1910, in the District Court of Lincoln County, the defendant in error secured a judgment for the sum of \$1,500.00, and the motion for a new trial of the plaintiff in error was overruled, and the appeal to this court of the plaintiff in error, is prosecuted therefrom. At said time an extension to make and serve a case-made was granted by the court, and sixty days was given to make and serve a case-made for re-view by the Supreme Court, and the defendant in error was granted ten days thereafter in which to suggest amendments thereto, said case-made to be signed and settled on five days' notice by either party to the other.

Thereafter on the 28th day of June, 1910, a further extension of sixty days was granted by Roy Hoffman, the regular Judge of the Tenth Judicial District, and ten days thereafter for the defendant in error to suggest amendments, and five days' notice in writing by either party to the other. This would give one hundred and thirty days to the plaintiff in error to make and serve and sign and  
517 settle the case-made under the conditions as we contend exist here.

On the 12th day of September 1910, the said case-made was signed and settled by John J. Carney, at Oklahoma City, in Chambers. The time expired to serve said case-made and suggest amendments on the 8th day of September 1910, it being one hundred and thirty days from the 30th day of April, 1910, to the 8th day of September 1910, according to the contention of defendant in error, the plaintiff in error was three days over time in getting said case-made signed and settled. Service of notice to sign and settle case-made on the defendant in error, September 3rd, 1910.

It is here contended that John J. Carney, had no authority to sign and settle said case-made, except by virtue of an order made by him at the time he tried said cause, or it is possible that an order could be made by Hon. Roy Hoffman. As there never was an order made by either of them to extend the time to sign and settle, the time to sign and settle, expired on the 8th day of September, 1910.

Granite State Fire Insurance Co., v. Harn, 76 Pac. 822.

Judge Carney being a Judge pro tempore could not sign and settle the case-made, if he had been the regular presiding Judge of the District on five days' notice by either party, and he would stand

exactly in the same position as a Judge who was a stranger to the record, and whose term of office had expired. He could not sign and settle the case-made by virtue of doing a judicial act, but by virtue of the order made for him to sign and settle within a specified time.

In the absence of such order, the time to make and serve and suggest amendments must control, which time expired on the 8th day of September, 1910. His act in signing the case-made on the 12th day of September, is a nullity, and no valid case-made has been filed by reason thereof in this Court.

The case-made has not been certified according to law. The Judge's certificate is not sufficient; the Clerk's certificate is not sufficient. This court may take judicial knowledge of the fact that on the 30th day of April, 1910, Roy Hoffman, was the presiding Judge of the Tenth Judicial District, and John J. Carney was the presiding Judge of the — District.

There is no authority in the case-made showing that John J. Carney, certified to the case-made in the exercise of his judicial authority. There is no order preserved in the case-made, or certified in the case-made that he acted with authority as Judge pro tempore. He certifies to the case-made as Judge, not as Judge pro tempore, or presiding Judge, and while it may be possible that this court could take judicial knowledge of an order qualifying him to preside at said time in said District, his certificate to this case-made must show that fact, and his authority for so acting, otherwise this court would not know when a Judge acted within or without his authority.

In the absence of such an order and a certificate setting out that fact, we think he would be a stranger to this record. For the above reasons we find this case-made insufficient, and strike at the same as a transcript, and move to dismiss the appeal, and to strike the case-made as such from the records of this court.

As the judgment in this case was rendered on the 30th day of April, 1910, and no valid appeal has been made to this court from said judgment within twelve months, the certificate of the said Judge and Clerk cannot be corrected.

Wherefore, we pray, first; that the case-made be stricken from the records of this court, and that the appeal of the plaintiff in error be dismissed, and that the defendant in error be awarded his costs herein, including the printing and filing of his briefs, and for such other order as by the court may be just and proper.

H. H. SMITH,

*Attorney for Defendant in Error.*

Service of the above motion is hereby admitted by copy, and notice of the filing of this motion in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, on the — day of June, 1911.

June, 1911.

\_\_\_\_\_,  
\_\_\_\_\_,  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error.*

520

In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

*Argument.*

On the 30th day of April, 1910, judgment was rendered for the defendant in error, in the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma, in the sum of \$1,500.00, against the plaintiff in error. It prayed an appeal to this Court. We move to dismiss the appeal and to strike the case-made from the record. This motion is made because Hon. John J. Carney had no jurisdiction to sign and settle the case-made, this court has no jurisdiction of the appeal, unless upon transcript. Then the case-made must be stricken from the record.

At the time of the trial of said action, John J. Carney, signed and certified to said case-made as Judge. On April 30th, 1910, judgment was rendered and motion for a new trial was overruled, and plaintiff in error granted sixty days within which to make and serve a case-made, the plaintiff being granted ten days in which to suggest amendments thereto, "said case-made to be signed and settled on five days' notice by either party to the other."

On the 30th day of June, 1910, Roy Hoffman, signed an order extending the time to make and serve a case-made sixty days, and ten days given to defendant in error to suggest amendments thereto. From the 30th day of April, 1910, to the 7th day of September, 1910, is one hundred and thirty days, the full amount of the time to make and serve and sign and settle under said order, made by the said Roy Hoffman, the regular presiding Judge, together with the first order made by John J. Carney. The case was signed and settled by John J. Carney, on the 12th day of September, 1910. Adding the three days allowed under the authority of the case of Railway

Co. v. Corser, 3rd Pac. 569, the plaintiff in error is short of  
521 two days in which to make and serve a case and sign and settle the said case within the time to make and serve and suggest amendments, if no time is fixed in the order to sign and settle, then under all of the authorities the time to sign and settle expired on the 8th day of September, 1910, at most, but we think the time expired on the 10th day of September, by adding three days to the 7th day of September 1910. What authority did Judge Carney have to sign said case-made after the 10th day of September, 1910. He was a stranger to the record, unless permitted and authorized to sign the case-made by virtue of the order extending the time to serve and make and suggest amendments. He could not sign the same or certify to the same as the Judge of the Tenth Judicial District, because he was not Judge of this District. For the immediate purpose of this argument and motion, he must be considered presid-

ing Judge or Judge pro-tempore. A pro-tempore Judge has no authority to extend the time to make and serve a case-made unless he is acting as the court. He has no authority to sign and settle the case except in virtue of the order authorizing him so to do as the trial judge, and that order must be made either by himself, or by the regular judge of the District. This court takes judicial knowledge of the fact that Roy Hoffman was the regular Judge of the Tenth Judicial District, on September 8th, and on September 12th, 1910. The case-made is a nullity. Judge Carney stands in the same relation to the case-made, as a Judge whose term of office had expired. Being a presiding Judge at the trial he was out of authority to make an order in the case when he adjourned court at Chandler, and left the District, so that he stood in the position as a Judge out of office, and his authority expired during the time to make and serve a case-made and suggest amendments. However, by virtue of the order, he could have signed the case-made before the time expired to make and serve a case-made, but this he did not do.

522 See the cases in support of this contention.

Railway Company v. Wright, 36 Pac. 331.

Granite State Fire Insurance Co., v. Harn, 76 Pac. 822.

Butler v. Scott, 75 Pac. 496.

Railway Company v. Corser, 3rd Pac. 569.

Railway Company vs. Ft. Scott, 15th Kan. 435-437.

Railway Company v. Preston, 66 Pac. 1050.

Railway Company v. Guild, 59 Pac. 283.-

Burnett v. Davis, 111 Pac. 191.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma has held in 99th Pac. 654, that a trial court has no power to extend the time for making and serving a case-made after the time fixed by the original order, and in 108 Pac. 1101, has decided that a trial judge cannot extend the same, and in 105 Pac. 200, that where the extension of time granted by the District Court or Judge thereof, has once expired and the case-made served, signed and settled after the expiration of time, is void. The order made by the court in this case on the 30th day of April 1910, and the order thereafter made on the 30th day of June, 1910, extending the time to make and serve a case-made, provided for one hundred and twenty days and ten days for defendant in error to suggest amendments. Under this order the number of days in each month from the 30th day of April, 1910, to the expiration of that time, carries the time (130 days) up to the 7th day of September, 1910, and if three days is added to that time, the time expired at 12 o'clock on the night of the 10th day of September, 1910. Without presenting any argument on the record as it is certified and signed in the other particulars raised in the motion, we think the defect complained of is fatal to this appeal. The case-made must be stricken —, and the appeal dismissed.

Respectfully submitted,

H. H. SMITH,

*Attorney for Defendant in Error.*



Service of the above and foregoing brief is hereby admitted by copy on the 17th day of June, 1911, and the filing of the same in the Supreme Court, on the 19th day of June, 1911.

COTTINGHAM & BLEDSOE,

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error.*

[Endorsed:] 2015. A., T. & S. F. R'y v. Robinson. Motion to Dismiss.

523 In The Supreme Court of The State of Oklahoma.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error.

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

*Reply Brief of Defendant in Error on His Motion to Dismiss Appeal.*

We think Judge Hoffman had no authority to extend the time for an ex Judge or Judge Pro tempore, Carney, by order for him to sign and settle a case made, although the order of extension to make and serve might be good. If a Judge or Court can by order confer Judicial authority on an individual to do a Judicial act, that might be *do done*; but we regard this power as exclusively lodged in the General Assembly of Oklahoma. In an appropriate sense we think the law fixes Judge Carney's status as to this case as a private party unless he before going out of office in the Tenth Judicial District provided by order under the statute when he might settle that case, then his settling it according to that order would be within his authority, but even this question is not here. He did not in fact settle it until Sept. 12 1910, certainly after the expiration of the Hoffman order to make and serve and suggest amendments. The time *expired* to make and serve expired on Aug 27, 1910 and to suggest amendments on Sept. 7, 1910, so that Carney settled three days after the expiration of the order to sign and settle made by Hoffman, the order made by Carney having expired on June 27 1910 to make and serve and ten days thereafter to suggest amendments, and five days' notice as provided by the order to sign and settle must be within the time to make and serve; and in Missouri Railway Co. vs. Preston 66 Pac. page 1055 Kansas construction of the statute before and after its adoption here, applying is ample authority for holding the Judge could not sign the case made. "I place my concurrence upon the ground that this court having years ago, and not without reason, determined the period within which a judge pro tem. may settle and sign a case made, even though as an original proposition I should incline to hold that a Judge Pro-tem may settle within a year of the trial of a cause, the law applied in many cases and accepted as the law that his term expired after the last day fixed for suggesting amendments, approved." See the cases of Railway vs. Wright 36 Pac. 331 60 P. 320. Burnett vs. Davis 111



P. 191 Frisco vs. Corser 3 Pac. Railroad vs. Scott 15 Kan. 435, wherein it is said "judge pro tem may within time allowed by law (3 days) or order of court settle and sign case made." Same is Bacon vs. State 22 Fla. page 46, "He may settle the bill within the time allowed by the order." See also brief (printed reply filed herewith in case of M. K. & T. Ry. Co. vs. B. O. Johnson et al.

We respectfully submit the motion must be sustained.

H. H. SMITH,

*Attorney for Defendant in Error.*

[Endorsed:] 2015. Filed Aug. 12, 1911. W. H. L. Campbell, Clerk.

524 And thereafter, to-wit: on the 14th day of November, 1911, in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, the following proceedings were had in said cause:

Supreme Court, November Term, 1911, November 14th, 1911, First Judicial Day.

2015.

A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

And now this cause comes on for final decision and determination by the court upon the record and motion to dismiss, filed herein.

And the court having considered the same finds, that said motion to dismiss should be overruled.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court that said motion to dismiss the above appeal, be, and the same is hereby overruled.

Opinion by Williams, J.

All the Justices concur.

525 In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

(Filed Nov. 14, 1911.)

No. 2015.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

*Syllabus.*

1. Where a judge from one district is appointed or designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to hold a term of court in another district, and presides at the trial of a cause, he may, after

the expiration of the term he was appointed to hold, sign and settle the case-made in the State, outside of the district in which the cause was tried.

(a) The time for making and serving the case-made having been extended to August 28, 1910, with ten days thereafter to suggest amendments, the case-made to be settled in five days' notice by either party, said case-made having been served on August 27, 1910, and on September 3, 1910, the right to suggest amendments having been waived, on September 12, 1910, said case-made, after five days' due notice, was settled by such judge. *Held*, that under such state of facts as appear in this record he was authorized to settle the same.

Error from the District Court of Lincoln County.

J. J. Carney, Trial Judge.

Cottingham & Bledsoe, for Plaintiff in Error.

H. H. Smith, for Defendant in Error.

Motion to dismiss overruled.

Opinion of the Court by WILLIAMS, J.:

The verdict was returned in the lower court in favor of the plaintiff (defendant in error) on April 20, 1910, before the Honorable J. J. Carney, one of the regular judges of the Thirteenth District Court Judicial District, who was sitting in the Tenth District under appointment by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court by 526 virtue of section 9, article 7 of the Constitution.

On April 21, 1910, the motion for a new trial was filed. On April 30, 1910, the same having been overruled, the defendant was allowed sixty days within which to make and serve a case-made; the plaintiff to have ten days in which to suggest amendments thereto; the case-made to be settled and signed on five days' notice by either party to the other.

On June 30, 1910, the Honorable Roy Hoffman, the regular Judge of the Tenth District Court Judicial District, made an order allowing the defendant sixty days, in addition to the time theretofore granted, within which to make and serve the case-made; ten days to the plaintiff to suggest amendments; the case-made to be settled upon five days' notice in writing by either party.

The case-made was served on the attorney for the plaintiff on August 27, A. D. 1910, which was within due time. On September 3, 1910, plaintiff's attorney certified to the attorneys for the defendant that he had no amendments to suggest. On the same day notice was served upon him by the attorneys for the defendant that the case-made would be presented to Judge Carney at his Chambers in Oklahoma City for settling and signing on September 12, 1910.

The attorney for the plaintiff moves to dismiss this proceeding in error on the grounds: First, That Judge Carney had ceased to hold court in the Tenth District Court Judicial District, under the original appointment by the Chief Justice, and therefore had no au-

thority to settle the case-made, outside of said district; second, that the time allowed the defendant in which to make and serve case-made having expired, together with the time to suggest  
527 amendments, such time was of the essence of his jurisdiction to settle and sign the same, and, therefore, he was without authority after the expiration of such time to settle and sign such case-made.

The first proposition has been decided adversely to the movant's contention in *Grayson v. Perryman*, 25 Okla. 339, 106 Pac. 954. The second contention has also been determined adversely to him in the following Oklahoma cases: *Barnes v. Lynch*, 9 Okla. 11, 59 Pac. 995; *Burnett v. Davis*, 27 Okla. 124, 111 Pac. 191; *Richardson et al. v. Beidleman et al.*, No. 2523, and *Hamilton v. Havercamp*, No. 2482, decided at this time.

The motion to dismiss is, therefore, overruled.

All the Justices concur.

528 And thereafter, to-wit: On the 17th day of May, 1912, in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, the following proceedings were had in said cause:

Supreme Court, May Term, 1912, May 17th, 1912, Fourth Judicial Day.

2015.

A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co., Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

And now on this day the above cause is argued orally and the cause submitted on the record, briefs and oral argument.

529-542 And thereafter, to-wit: On the 23rd day of October, 1912, in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, the following proceedings were had in said cause:

Supreme Court, September Term, 1912, October 23rd, 1912, Ninth Judicial Day.

2015.

A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co., Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

And now this cause comes on for final decision and determination by the court upon the record and briefs filed herein.

And the court having considered the same finds, that the judgment of the court below in the above cause should be affirmed.

Opinion by Harrison, C.

By the COURT: It is so ordered, the above opinion is hereby adopted in whole, and judgment entered accordingly.

543 And thereafter, to-wit: on the 24th day of December, 1912, in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, the following proceedings were had in said cause:

Supreme Court, December Term, 1912, December 24th, 1912,  
Eleventh Judicial Day.

2015.

A., T. & S. F. RY. Co., Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

And now on this day it is ordered by the court that the petition for rehearing filed herein, be, and the same is hereby denied.

544 In the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

I, W. H. L. Campbell, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, do hereby certify that the foregoing 543 pages, numbered from 1 to 543, both inclusive, are a full, true and complete transcript of the record and all proceedings in said Supreme Court in cause No. 2015, The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, Plaintiff in error, versus C. E. Robinson, Defendant in error, as the same remains on file and of record in my office.

In witness whereof, I hereto set my hand and affix the seal of said Supreme Court, at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, this 25<sup>th</sup> day of January, 1913.

[Seal Supreme Court, State of Oklahoma.]

W. H. L. CAMPBELL,

*Clerk of the Supreme Court of the  
State of Oklahoma,*

By JESSIE PARDOE, *Deputy.*

545 In the Supreme Court of the United States.

No. 964.

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,  
Plaintiff in Error,

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.

*Statement of Errors and Part of the Record to be Printed.*

Comes now The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, plaintiff in error herein, and files with the Clerk of this Court

a statement of the errors on which it intends to rely, and hereby designates the parts of the record to be printed, which it thinks necessary for the consideration of this court, and designates the parts of the record to be omitted.

Part to be printed.	Pages.	Part to be omitted.	Pages.
Return of writ of error			
Citation and service thereof .....	1- 2		
Petition for writ of error .....	3- 16		
Assignments of error..	17- 21		
Order allowing writ of error .....	22		
Writ of error.....	23- 26		
		Bond for writ of error.	27- 29

*Case-made.*

Petition in error.....	30- 34	Plaintiff's petition and subsequent pleadings and rulings of the court thereon; the above being.....	35- 69
Plaintiff's second amended petition...	69- 76	Plaintiff's original petition and subsequent pleadings, not necessary to print on account of amended pleadings filed.	
Defendant's demurrer to second amended petition and ruling of the court thereon.	79- 82		

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Part to be printed.	Pages.	Part to be omitted.	Pages
Plaintiff's amendment to second amended petition .....	83- 84		
Defendant's answer...	85-106		
Motion of plaintiff to strike answer.....	107-108		
Demurrer to answer...	109-110		
Amended answer.....	115-118		
Motion to strike answer	119-121		
Supplemental motion to strike.....	122-123		
Order overruling motions .....	124-125		
Reply .....	126-128		
Demurrer to reply....	129-130		
Exceptions to depositions .....	131-137		
Proceedings upon trial	138-186		

Part to be printed.	Pages.	Part to be omitted.	Pages.
Exhibit B.....	187	Exhibit "A" introduced in evidence with dep- osition of Herbert F. Moore, the same be- ing a true and cor- rect copy of the ex- hibit attached to de- fendant's answer ap- pearing at pages 94 to 106 .....	106
Deposition of S. H. Smith .....	149-153		
Deposition of O. B. Graves .....	194-209		
Deposition of H. W. Ayles .....	189-192		
Evidence of C. E. Rob- inson .....	210-257		
Evidence of H. H. Smith .....	258-269		
Evidence of L. E. Du Bois .....	311-334		
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Evidence of J. E. Hult.	336-348		

Deposition of James P. Gilmore .....	274-294
Offer of Myers vs. St. Louis and San Fran- cisco R. Co.....	308-309
Deposition of W. R. Smith .....	296-306

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Part to be printed.	Pages.	Part to be omitted.	Pages.
Evidence of Edward A. Mosley, Secretary of Interstate Commerce Commission .....	455		
Objection to evidence..	349-350		
Instructions given to the jury by the court	458-464		
Instructions requested by defendant .....	467-465		
All the balance of the case made .....	476-505		
		All of the evidence of- fered in rebuttal....	351-450
		(The above evidence being decisions of va- rious State courts.)	

192 THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RY. CO. VS. C. E. ROBINSON.

Part to be printed.	Pages.	Part to be omitted.	Pages.
		Application for time to file briefs .....	506
Journal entry affirming case .....	529	Journal entry .....	507
		Opinion affirming case, the same heretofore shown in this record at pages 9-15 as Ex- hibit "B" to the peti- tion for writ of error	530-540
		Petition for rehearing the same being here- tofore shown in this record as Exhibit "A" to the petition for writ of error....	541-542
Journal entry denying petition for rehearing	543		
Certificate of Clerk to Transcript .....	....		

J. R. COTTINGHAM,  
S. T. BLEDSOE,  
GEO. M. GREEN,  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error.*

Service of the above is acknowledged to have been made on me,  
attorney of record for the defendant in error, this 3 day of April  
A. D. 1913.

H. H. SMITH,  
*Attorney for Defendant in Error.*

548 [Endorsed:] No. 964/23539. In the Supreme Court of  
the United States. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe  
Railway Company, Plaintiff in Error, vs. C. E. Robinson, Defend-  
ant in Error. Statement of errors and part of record to be printed.

549 [Endorsed:] File No. 23,539. Supreme Court U. S., Oc-  
tober Term, 1912. Term No. 964. The Atchison, Topeka  
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., Pl'tf in Error, vs. C. E. Robinson. Designation  
by plaintiff in error of parts of record to be printed, and proof of  
service of same. Filed April 14, 1913.

Endorsed on cover: File No. 23,539. Oklahoma Supreme Court.  
Term No. 450. The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Com-  
pany, plaintiff in error, vs. C. E. Robinson. Filed February 6th,  
1913. File No. 23,539.

NOV 27 1913

JAMES D. MAHER  
CLERK

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IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

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NUMBER 450.

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THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE  
RAILWAY COMPANY,

*Plaintiff in Error,*

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON,

*Defendant in Error.*

---

**BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF IN ERROR IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS WRIT OF ERROR OR AFFIRM.**

---

S. T. BLEDSOE,

J. R. COTTINGHAM,

GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error.*





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Counsel for plaintiff in error cannot accept the statement of facts contained in the motion to dismiss or affirm on behalf of defendant in error as correct. They deem it necessary to a proper presentation of the merits of the writ of error to make a brief and accurate statement of the points presented to this court for adjudication, in-

cluding a history of the controversy between the parties.

### **STATEMENT.**

The plaintiff in error sued out a writ of error to this court from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to review the judgment of that court affirming a judgment of the trial court awarding to plaintiff damages in the sum of \$1500.00, alleged to have been caused by injury to a certain horse in the transportation of such horse from Kansas City, Missouri, to Lawrence, Kansas, on the 16th day of September, 1907. The printed transcript does not include the entire record certified by the Supreme Court of the State, but includes such parts thereof as are necessary for a consideration of the issues presented to this Court for determination. Counsel for plaintiff in error designated, as required by the rules of this court, the parts of the record deemed by them relevant and material to the disposition of the issues involved herein, and served such designation upon counsel for defendant in error (Tr. 189-192). Service of this notice was accepted by counsel for defendant in error, and he evidently deemed the parts of the record designated by coun-

sel for plaintiff in error sufficient, as no counter notice to include additional matter was served as permitted by the rules of this court.

On the 29th day of June, 1908, defendant in error, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, filed his amended petition (Tr. 21-25), against the plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as defendant. In this petition he sought to recover damages in the sum of \$2000.00 for injuries alleged to have been suffered by a certain pacing mare named Nancy Alden, while being transported over the line of railroad of the defendant company from Kansas City, in the State of Missouri, to Lawrence, in the State of Kansas, the allegation in the petition being that "the damage resulted from rough handling in transit." (Tr. 21-25).

To this amended petition, after demurrer had been overruled, the defendant filed its answer, setting up among other things, a shipping contract limiting liability of the defendant for damages that might occur during the transportation of said animal (Tr. 28-41). Incidentally it was alleged in this case that this shipping contract was entered into in the State of Missouri, and the limitation of liability therein contained was valid under the laws of that State, and that the transportation was to

be concluded in Kansas, and the limitation of liability therein contained was valid under the laws of that State. It was specifically alleged (Tr. 31) that such contract was fairly entered into upon a valid consideration (Tr. 31). Subsequently, on the 19th day of April, 1909, the defendant filed its amended answer to said amended petition, (Tr. 44-45). In view of the statement of the issues as found in the motion to dismiss, said amended answer is here reproduced in full and is as follows:

“Comes now the defendant and by leave of court as had and obtained, files the following amendment to its answer, not waiving any matter pleaded in said answer, and filing the following amendment as supplemental thereto and as an amendment thereto.

“The defendant alleges and avers the fact to be that said shipment was from the State of Missouri into the State of Kansas, and was, therefore, an interstate shipment, and said shipment was made upon a tariff of rates which was duly filed and approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and which said tariff had been posted in this defendant's depots, both at Kansas City, Missouri, and at Lawrence, Kansas, and which was in full force and effect at the time said shipment moved; that said tariff was promulgated, filed and published in accordance with an Act of Congress, commonly known as the Interstate Commerce Act, which was approved June 29th, 1906; that by said tariff which was filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and posted as

provided by law, as above set out, and which was approved by the said Interstate Commerce Commission, and which was the legal tariff governing Interstate shipments of freight and live stock, it was provided as follows:

“ ‘(a) Rates named in section two apply on shipments of ordinary live stock, where contracts are executed by shippers on blanks furnished by these companies, and are based on the declared valuation by the shipper at time contract is signed, not to exceed the following:

“ ‘Each horse or pony (gelding, mare, stallion) mule or jack, \$100.00. Each ox, bull or steer, \$50.00. Each cow, \$30.00. Each calf, \$10.00. Each hog, \$10.00. Each sheep or goat, \$3.00.

“ ‘(b) Where the declared value exceeds the above an addition of twenty-five per cent will be added to the rate for each one hundred per cent or fractional part thereof of additional declared valuation per head. Animals exceeding in value \$800.00 per head will be taken only by special arrangement.

“ ‘(c) Table of rates named will be charged on shipments of live stock made with limitation of company's liability at common law, and under this statute shippers will have the choice of executing or accepting contracts for shipments of live stock with or without limitation of liability and rates accordingly.’

“ ‘That said shippers obtained the benefit of such reduced rate applicable to the value fixed in the written contract governing said shipment of horses; that said shipment set out in the petition was made in all respects under

the said tariff so filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the same is in all respects governed by the Act of Congress of the United States, above set out, commonly known as the Interstate Commerce Act, and that the rights and liabilities of the defendant to this action are determined and fixed by said Act of Congress, and in deciding the rights of the parties hereunder a consideration of said Act of Congress is necessary and that the rights and liabilities of the parties to this action cannot be fixed or determined except by a construction of said Act of Congress.

“That the liability of the defendant under this Bill of Lading and the construction of the said Act of Congress has never been clearly and unequivocally adjudicated and settled by the Supreme Court of the United States and that the construction of said statute in respect to the questions presented herein under said Bill of Lading are still unsettled by said Supreme Court.

“And defendant further alleges that there is a controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant and in this action, above set out, and that the decision of this case and of the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto, requires an adjudication as to the proper construction of said Act of Congress and a settlement of the controversy between the parties as to the meaning and effect thereof.

“Wherefore defendant prays judgment as in the answer, to which this is an amendment, prayed.”

The filing of this amended answer was a direct assertion that the shipment was controlled by and

the validity of the contract was to be determined under the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce and the amendments thereto. If anything in conflict with such contention is found in the previous answer it was abandoned by the filing of this amended answer. It is not believed, however, that anything in the original answer is in conflict with the amended answer. The execution of the limited liability contract relied upon by defendant, by the plaintiff Robinson, was admitted throughout the record. There is no denial of the fact that the shipment moved under the limited liability contract. There is no denial of the fact that the freight was paid on the basis of rates prescribed for limited liability contracts in accordance with the terms of the limited liability contract. The answer pleading the written contract was verified as required by the Oklahoma Statute. The reply was not verified, and under the statute a non-verified pleading does not operate to challenge the execution of a written instrument. The Interstate tariffs covering the shipment were duly certified and admitted in evidence (Tr. 156).

The contention of the defendant that the shipment was an interstate one, and the validity of the shipping contract to be determined by the Act to



Regulate Commerce and not by the laws of the State of Oklahoma or any other State, was covered by exceptions to the instructions given to the jury by the trial court (Tr. 151-160) and by instructions requested by counsel for defendant (Tr. 161-164), by the 15th and 16th paragraphs of the motion for new trial (Tr. 166), by the 16th and 17th assignments of error as found in the petition in error in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma (Tr. 19-20), by the petition for re-hearing filed in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma (Tr. 4-6), by the petition for writ of error to this court (Tr. 2-4), and by the assignments of error to the action of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma for review by this court (Tr. 13-15). Notwithstanding the statement contained in the motion to dismiss or affirm filed by the plaintiff in this court, it appears that the defendant presented its Federal question in its amended answer to the amended petition, that it urged the same on the trial of the cause in objection to the admission of evidence, by demurrer to the evidence, by motion to direct a verdict, by exceptions to instructions given, and by exceptions to the failure of the court to give requested instructions. Defendant therefore has at all times and at every stage of the case insisted that the validity of the shipping contract should be determined

under the Act to Regulate Commerce, and not otherwise. The allegation that the contract was valid under the laws of the State of Missouri, where the shipment originated, and under the laws of the State of Kansas, in no wise conflicts with the allegation that the validity of the contract should be determined under the Act to Regulate Commerce.

## REVIEW OF EVIDENCE.

### Applicable to Federal Question.

We will consider first, the facts; second, the law applicable thereto.

The plaintiff executed a limited liability shipping contract, in which it was agreed that the liability of the carrier should be limited to \$100.00 per head, in consideration of the application of a special published tariff rate, applicable to livestock moving under limited liability contracts. We quote from the title and caption of that contract as follows:

“Form 67-A. Regular.

Read this Contract carefully as numerous changes have been made.

*Live Stock Contract (Limited Liability).*

The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company.

Rules and Regulations for the Transportation of Live Stock.

NOTICE—This Railway has two rates on Live Stock.

The rate given under this contract is lower than the rate made by the Railway Company and connections for the transportation of Stock at carrier's risk, and without limitation of liability, and is based upon the conditions and agreements found in this contract and upon the valuation therein fixed. The shipper by

accepting this contract is deemed to accept the lower rate upon the terms and conditions specified as part of this contract." (Tr. p. 33.)

Paragraph 3 of this contract, so far as applicable to the issues here involved, is as follows:

"THIRD. The shipper hereby represents and agrees that his live stock does not exceed in value the prices below named, it being understood that the rate given is based upon such limit of valuation, which is the highest value accepted for the lower rate (animals of higher value being charged a higher rate); and in case of loss or damage from any cause for which the company may be liable, payment shall be made therefor only on the basis of the actual cash value at the time and place of shipment, but in no case to exceed the following, which is understood not to exceed the value as held by the shipper, to-wit:

For each horse or pony, gelding, mare or stallion, mule or jack, per head, \$100." (Tr. p. 35.)

With reference to the execution of this contract by Mr. Moore, who was both consignor and consignee therein, he testified as follows:

"Q. Can you state whose signature that is?

A. That is my signature made by Mr. Robinson.

Q. That is your signature, and Mr. Robinson was authorized by you to sign it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have this contract?

A. I presume Mr. Robinson had it." (Tr. p. 70.)

Also as follows:

“Q. You testified you always took a bill of lading when the horses were loaded?

A. We took a contract.

Q. Did you, or do you know the conditions of the contract?

To which the defendant objects as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, I presume he did know.

A. Certainly I know, I never read the damn thing, but I know what it means.” (Tr. p. 75.)

Also the following from the evidence of the plaintiff, Robinson:

“Q. At all of these places you say you did the shipping?

A. They were mostly shipped in Mr. Moore’s name.

Q. You did?

A. I helped.

Q. Moore was an ex-railroad employee?

A. Sir?

Q. Moore had worked for the railroad?

MR. SMITH: Objected to as improper cross-examination.

A. I don’t know whether he did or not.

Overruled.

Q. You were familiar with shipping race horses before you went to Kansas City?

A. Why, not very.

Q. You had been shipping all summer?

A. I had been riding with the horses all summer.

Q. Signing Mr. Moore’s name?

- A. No, that is the only time I signed Moore's name was in Kansas City." (Tr. pp. 106-107.)

Also the following from the evidence of plaintiff Robinson:

- "Q. I will ask you if you did not testify yesterday that you went down to the freight depot in Kansas City, and signed a contract for these horses, and signed Mr. Moore's name to the contract.
- A. You are getting way ahead of your story, I signed that before I loaded the horses at——
- Q. I say didn't you testify to that yesterday?
- A. That I signed Mr. Moore's name to that contract? Yes, sir." (Tr. p. 108.)

And further from the evidence of plaintiff Robinson, as follows:

- "Q. Now, when you went down to the station you say you signed Mr. Moore's name to the bill of lading?
- A. Yes, sir, I did.
- Q. You got your contract did you?
- A. I got my contract " " " (Tr. p. 112.)

And also as follows:

- "Q. I will ask you before the horses went out if you didn't go down to the depot, freight depot, and go to the proper office and sign up your contract to take your horses over to Lawrence?
- A. I went to the office and signed a contract about eight o'clock.

\* \* \* \* \*

Q. You did sign the name of Moore to the contract, did you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why did you sign that contract in the name of Moore?

A. Because Mr. Moore would be there I knew for sure when he got there he would have something to show he could get them off. And Mr. Moore told me I could sign them that way and when I went up to see when these horses were going out, and the agent told me the bill was ready to be signed, and I told him Mr. Moore was down in the car, and he said it would be all right for me to sign the name, and I signed the name."

(Tr. pp. 114-115.)

It also appears from the evidence of Moore, who was both consignor and consignee in the bill of lading that he and Robinson had been together from March, 1907, until September, 1907, traveling over the country attending fairs and participating in the racing with from four to five horses. (Tr. pp. 68 and 69.) The mare here involved, with certain others, was shipped from Kentucky in March, 1907, to Courtney, North Dakota, Robinson and Moore being together. They then shipped from Courtney to Carrington, N. Dakota; from there to New Rockford, N. Dakota; from there to Valley City, N. Dakota; from Valley City to Kensal; from

Kensal to Fessenden; from Fessenden to Harvey; from Harvey to Armour, apparently all in South Dakota; from Armour to Manhattan, Kansas; from Manhattan to Clay Center; from Clay Center to Topeka; from Topeka to Kansas City, and from Kansas City to Lawrence.

So far as disclosed by the record, he was accompanied at all times by Mr. Moore, a former railroad agent and tariff expert; by Mr. H. H. Smith, learned counsel for defendant in error in this case, and also witness for plaintiff on the trial of the cause. (Rec. pp. 121, 126, 127.)

Plaintiff Robinson at the time he signed Mr. Moore's name to the limited liability contract here involved had had at least six months' experience in the shipment of race horses; had the advice and assistance of an ex-railroad agent, undoubtedly familiar with tariffs and limited liability contracts. He had the assistance of counsel, learned in the law, familiar with race horses, with the Act to Regulate Commerce, and the forms of limited liability contracts, and the custom of railways in reference to their manner of execution.

The plaintiff testified (Tr. p. 107) that he signed a shipping contract covering almost every



movement of the race horses detailed in the evidence.

We doubt if the history of litigation will disclose any party to an action better equipped by experience and expert assistance and advisors to fully protect their interests than the plaintiff in this action as to the transaction involved.

1. We have, therefore, an admitted execution of a contract, limiting liability of the defendant to \$100.00.

2. We have a printed and published tariff prescribing a special rate where a limited liability contract is executed. This tariff further prescribes that where the value of the animal exceeds \$100.00 and is less than \$800.00, the freight shall be 25% additional.

3. We have a man executing this contract who is thoroughly conversant with such contracts and who has had a large experience in making live-stock shipments under limited liability contracts.

4. He executed the contract and received and retained duplicate copy thereof, and there is no evidence that there was any stress or rush or any reason why he did not read the same, if he did not.

5. The plaintiff was on the witness stand and testified that he executed the limited liability contract by signing Mr. Moore's name thereto, and that he was authorized to sign the same. He did not testify that he was not aware of the terms of the contract.

The entire conversation between the plaintiff and someone he supposes to be the agent of the railway company at Kansas City, Missouri, which is relied upon to constitute an oral contract, and which the trial court and the Supreme Court of the State, in effect, held could not be superseded by any written agreement, is as summarized in plaintiff's evidence as follows:

“Q. Just tell the conversation that occurred between you and the agent; what you said and what he said in reference to this shipment?

A. I went in there and asked him when the car should be spotted, and asked him when I should load the horses, and he told me the car would be spotted about six o'clock, or somewhere near that.

Q. Was there any further conversation?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was that?

A. I asked him what time the train got out, and he said it was due out at nine o'clock.

Q. Did he tell you what train it was?

A. He said it was the Red Ball Freight—no stops.

Q. Did you tell him anything about what you wanted to go to Lawrence for?

A. I did.

Q. Tell him what kind of horses you had?

MR. GREEN: Objected to as leading and suggestive.

THE COURT: It is suggestive.

Q. Just state what your conversation was?

A. I told him I had some race horses, and wanted to go through on a through freight, I wanted them to get through in good shape so they would be sound and would not be stove up. I wanted to win my race and I would like to go on a through freight and he told me this Red Ball went out at nine o'clock; we could go on that, and with that understanding I loaded the horses at six o'clock." (Tr. pp. 96, 97.)

The same transaction is described by Mr. H. H. Smith, counsel for defendant in error, in his evidence in the following language: (Tr. 122):

"Q. Now, did you have anything to do with shipping her out of Kansas City?

A. Nothing, only I called up the chief clerk from the Baltimore Hotel, and I went out with him to the track and Mr. Robinson called up. The time I did the talking was at the Baltimore Hotel.

Q. What was done after you had the conversation with the agent of the Santa Fe from the Elm Ridge track?

A. They were sent in to the freight depot of the Santa Fe in Kansas City.

Q. Did you go down to the depot?

A. I went down there about five o'clock, four

or five o'clock, something like that time in the afternoon.

Q. Well, did you have at that time any conversation with any of the agents or any of the employees of the Santa Fe?

A. Why, I talked with two or three of them just about getting out of there, and about the races I think I talked to somebody in where the clerks all were about the horses or something about shipping them.

Q. Well, what was that conversation?

A. I do not recollect any particular person, but I just inquired about the certainty of getting out on that train, and what kind of a train it was, and the time I talked to the clerk, I think it was upstairs, he said they would get out of there for sure about nine o'clock, and they would put them on the fast freight.

Q. Did he name the freight?

A. Yes, a freight called the Red Ball.

Q. Well, you saw the horses just prior to the time they were loaded on the car?

A. Yes, sir."

It will be observed that in one instance the plaintiff Robinson specifically swears (Tr. p. 108), "you are getting away ahead of your story, I signed that before I loaded the horses at —," but subsequently swore that it was after he loaded the horses.

The agent Dubois said that it was after the horses were loaded that the contract was signed, but this was clearly an assumption on his part

because he further stated he did not know when they were loaded, but we regard this as immaterial.

### ARGUMENT.

Before considering the law applicable to the particular controversy here involved, we desire to call the Court's attention to a certain opinion of the Supreme Court of the State rendered prior to that in the case at bar. The opinion to which we refer is by the Supreme Court of the State, while the opinion in this case is one rendered by the Commission of Appeals of the State of Oklahoma. The Supreme Court of the State had before it a question almost identical to the one involved in the case at bar, in *St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co. v. Ladd*, 33 Okla. 160, 124 Pac. 461. The language to which we desire to direct the court's attention is as follows:

"It is admitted that plaintiff signed the special contract, but he contends that he did so under such circumstances as not to charge him with knowledge of its contents, and that he did not have an opportunity to exercise the option of choosing the rate under which he desired to ship. It seems that the cattle were loaded just a few moments before the departure of the train on which they were to be transported; that, immediately after they were

loaded and before the shipper had time to get his bill of lading or sign his contract, the train crew commenced the necessary switching operations to transfer the loaded stock cars from the place they were loaded to their proper place in the train which was to carry them to their destination; that while this was going on the shipper went to the station agent, and signed the special contract referred to without reading it; that he made no inquiry whether or not the company had two rates, and the agent did not tell him that there were two rates, nor read the contract to him, nor call his particular attention to the conditions contained therein. It is also admitted that the cattle were on the road longer than the time usually necessary to transport them from Tuttle, Okla., to Kansas City, Mo., and that on their arrival at the market in Kansas City the cattle were considerably shrunken in flesh.

“The rule seems to be well settled that a shipper of live stock cannot, in the absence of fraud by the carrier, avoid limitations of the carrier’s liability contained in the bill of lading or shipping contract by showing that he executed the contract hurriedly, or without due care, or that he was ignorant of its contents, or failed to read the same. *Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Stone*, 112 Tenn. 348, 79 S. W. 1031, 105 Am. St. Rep. 955; *Hoffman v. Metropolitan Exp. Co.*, 111 App. Div. 407, 97 N. Y. Supp. 838; *Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Black*, 11 Ill. App. 465; *Stewart v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co.*, 21 Ind. App. 218, 52 N. E. 89; *Patterson v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co.*, 56 Mo. App. 657; *Mills v. Weir*, 82 App. Div. 396, 81 N. Y. Supp. 801; *Johnstone et al. v. Richmond, etc., R. Co.*, 39 S. C. 55, 17 S. E. 512. ‘As has been said by one court,’ says

Elliott in his work on Railroads (Vol. 4, Sec. 1502a), 'it would tend to disturb the force of all contracts if one in possession of ordinary capacity and intelligence were allowed to sign a contract and act under it in the enjoyment of all its advantages, and then to repudiate it upon the ground that its terms were not brought to his attention. In the absence of all fraud, misrepresentations, or mistakes, it must be presumed that he read the contract, and assented to its provisions.' In the case at bar it is apparent that it was the desire of the shipper that his cattle should be forwarded on the train they did go, and that the haste was necessary in order that his wishes in that respect could be carried out. There is no charge of fraud on the part of the railway company or its agents in the matter, and there seems to be an entire lack of any of the other ordinary grounds for relieving a competent party from the performance of conditions contained in a contract voluntarily signed by him. The evidence shows there were in fact two tariff rates on live stock, one of them, the higher rate, at the carrier's risk, the other, the lower rate, one of limited liability."

In the case at bar Commissioner Harrison says (Tr. 9): "The execution of the instrument in question here was not in issue." He undoubtedly thereby held that the execution of the limited liability contract was ~~immaterial~~ admitted.

There are some errors and one or two omissions in the opinion of the Commission of Appeals

of Oklahoma as it appears in the transcript in this cause. The following paragraph, to-wit:

“(3) The record in this case clearly shows negligence on the part of the railway company. Hence the remaining question is: Was the liability of the company limited to the value fixed in the written contract? A determination of this question depends upon whether the value was fixed by the shipper and whether such value was fairly agreed upon between the shipper and the agent of the carrier. The question may properly be determined without the necessity of construing the federal statute, known as the ‘Hepburn Act,’ ” (129 Pac. 23.)

was omitted either by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma or the printer in printing the record. The above paragraph, and that part of the opinion, which is as follows:

“As to whether the printed contract superseded all others, or whether the verbal agreement was merged in the printed contract, the evidence was conclusive that a definite and complete agreement in reference to the shipment was made over the phone by the shipper and the agent of the carrier without any mention or reference to the rate, the value of the stock, further than that it was racing stock, or to any limitation of liability or any mention of the fact that a written or printed contract would be required. The testimony offered by defendant substantiates this view and corroborates the testimony of plaintiff on those points. It also shows clearly that the stock was loaded, the car closed and tagged ‘Red



Ball,' the shipment fully delivered to the carrier and control of same completely surrendered by the shipper, and that after the car had been moved from the place of loading and started in transit, all pursuant to the verbal agreement, some two hours thereafter, the agent of the company presented to the shipper the printed contract, without calling his attention to its special provisions and without informing him that it contained provisions directly at variance with the terms of the verbal agreement, and without giving him an opportunity to examine its contents and exercise his right of choice.

"Under these circumstances, having made a definite and complete agreement as to the shipment, without mention of rate or limitation of liability, having surrendered certain of his rights, and certain rights having accrued to him under such agreement, it was reasonable for him to assume that the printed contract presented to him under such circumstances contained no provisions which would take away the rights already accrued." (Tr. 11.) (129 Pac. 23.)

show the basis upon which the trial court disposed of the issues. (In copying the above quotation we have conformed to the official publication thereof, and have eliminated the few typographical errors occurring in the transcript.)

It will be observed from these quotations that the Commission of Appeals of the State of Oklahoma made the validity of the written contract lim-

iting liability "depend upon whether the value was fixed by the shipper, and whether such value was fairly agreed upon by the shipper and agent of the carrier," and that the inquiry made by the shipper over the telephone as to when the animal would be moved from Kansas City to Lawrence, and the character of train in which it would move, constituted, without mention of rate terms or contract, or anything in relation thereto, a definite and complete agreement for the transportation of such animal. The court definitely held that such inquiry constituted a completed oral agreement, which the written contract, subsequently entered into, did not supersede. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record upon which a judicial conclusion could be fairly based, that the inquiry with reference to when the animal could be moved and the character of train upon which it would be moved constituted a contract of shipment. No sane man would insist that the railway company, by reason of the conversation had over the telephone could have established a liability against the plaintiff upon a contract of shipment, if the plaintiff had seen fit to decline to ship or to ship via some other line.

The limited liability contract to which the plaintiff signed the name of Robinson in two places

had printed on the face and at the top thereof, in plain type:

**“Read this Contract carefully as numerous changes have been made.**

**Live Stock Contract. (Limited Liability.)**

**The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company.**

**Rules and Regulations for the Transportation of Live Stock.**

**Notice: This railway has two rates on live stock.”**

followed by a statement of the two rates and explaining the basis of the limited liability contract. The plaintiff discussed with the agent the matter of signing this contract, and whether it would be acceptable for him to sign Moore's name thereto. There was no rush about the execution, there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that there was not ample time for an examination of the contract; nor to indicate that the plaintiff did not examine and understand the contract. The evidence conclusively shows that he was familiar with limited liability contracts and the terms thereof, and that he habitually shipped his horses under contracts of

this character. Nothing short of an absolute misconception of the legal rights of the parties under the act to regulate commerce and of the effect of the printed tariffs, could have led the court to arrive at the conclusion that this contract, based upon and made in accordance with the printed tariff, fairly executed, was not binding upon the parties thereto.

It is also manifest that the Commission of Appeals gave to this evidence the misconception and misapplication, and the effect of the evidence as to the oral conversations is clearly subject to review under the decision in *Mackey v. Dillon*, 4 How. 421, 447, wherein this court said:

“But when evidence is admitted as competent for this purpose, and it is sought to give it effect for other purposes which do involve questions giving this court jurisdiction, then the decisions of state courts on the effect of such evidence may be fully considered here, and their judgments reversed or affirmed, in a similar manner as if a like question had arisen in a supreme court of error of a state, when reversing the proceedings of inferior courts of original jurisdiction, and on this principle we are compelled to act in the present suit when dealing with the instruction given in behalf of the defendant.”

This language has been approved in many subsequent cases.

*Dower v. Richards*, 151 U. S. 658, 667.  
*Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Albers  
Comm. Co.*, 223 U. S. 573, 591, and  
cases there cited.

In other words, a proper and judicial consideration of the evidence in the record fails to disclose a scintilla of evidence in support of the findings of the Commission of Appeals of Oklahoma, in eliminating the Act to Regulate Commerce, and published tariffs and the effect of a contract, made pursuant thereto, and in execution of the provisions thereof.

That this case presents to this court for a review a well defined and vital federal question, it seems to us is conclusively established by the cases of:

*Mackey v. Dillon*, 4 How. 421-447.  
*Dower v. Richards*, 151 U. S. 658, 667.  
*Stanley v. Schwalby*, 162 U. S. 255, 274,  
77-79.  
*Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pitts-  
burg Railway Company*, 205 U. S. 1.  
*Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v.  
Albers Comm. Co.*, 223 U. S. 573-591.  
*Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Kirby*, 225 U.  
S. 155.  
*Adams Ex. Co. v. Croninger*, 226 U. S.  
491-9.

*Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Miller*, 226 U. S. 513.

*Chicago, St. Paul, Minnesota & Omaha R. Co. v. Latta*, 226 U. S. 519.

*Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Schuyler*, 227 U. S. 601, 611.

*Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl*, 227 U. S. 639.

*Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. Har-  
riman*, 227 U. S. 657.

*Louisiana R. R. Comm. v. Texas & Pa-  
cific R. Co.*, 229 U. S. 336.

*Wells Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus  
Co.*, 227 U. S. 469, 474, 475, 476.

*Can v. Texas & Pacific R. Co.*, 194 U. S.  
427.

**A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF  
THIS COURT ~~RELATIVE TO~~ LIMITED  
LIABILITY CONTRACTS SINCE THE  
ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE  
BECAME EFFECTIVE.**

We will not undertake to review the decisions of this court dealing with limited liability contracts prior to the effective date of the Act to Regulate Commerce. The decisions since that date appear to us to cover every phase of this controversy and to conclusively condemn the results accomplished by the decision of the Commission of Appeals of the State of Oklahoma.

The case of *Kansas City Southern Railway Company v. Albers Commission Co.*, 223 U. S. 575, involved the right of the Commission Company to recover from the Railway Company, as garnishee of Forrester Brothers, the difference between an eight cent contract rate and a published tariff rate of ten cents for a part of the time and fourteen cents for the remainder of the time. The ten cent and fourteen cent rates were "proportional" of a "through haul." In the trial of the cause it was contended by the plaintiff and found by the state court that such proportionable rate was unreason-

able and discriminatory and that the eight cent contract rate was valid. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the state, and it was here insisted that the matter was there disposed of upon a question of fact and no right to review by the Supreme Court of the United States existed.

This court used the following language in sustaining the right to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas:

“The second ground has more color, but is also untenable. While it is true that upon a writ of error to a state court we can not review its decision upon pure questions of facts, but only upon questions of law bearing upon the Federal right set up by the unsuccessful party, it equally is true that we may examine the entire record, including the evidence, if properly incorporated therein, to determine whether what purports to be a finding upon questions of facts is so involved with and dependent upon such questions of law as to be in substance and effect a decision of the latter. That this is so is amply shown by our prior rulings. Thus, in *Mackey v. Dillon*, 4 How. 421, 447, where the state courts had given to certain evidence an effect claimed to be unwarranted by an applicable law of Congress, it was held that their decision ‘on the effect of such evidence may be fully considered here.’ In *Dower v. Richards*, 151 U. S. 658, 667, where the question is, ‘of the competency and legal effect of the evidence as bearing upon a question of Federal law the decision may be reviewed by this court.’ In *Stanley v. Schwalby*, 162 U. S. 255, 274, 277-79,



which was an action of ejectment, the validity of an authority exercised under the United States was drawn in question and depended upon whether the United States had a good title to the land in controversy. That question turned upon whether the attorney for the United States, who had represented it in the acquisition of the land, knew at the time of a prior deed to one McMillan and the state court found that he had such knowledge. In this court it was insisted, on the one hand, that the finding was conclusive and, on the other, that the evidence was insufficient, as matter of law, to warrant the finding, and could be examined to determine whether this was so. In that connection this court, although recognizing the general rule that findings upon pure questions of facts are not open to review, said (p. 278): 'But so far as the judgment of the state court against the validity of an authority set up by the defendants under the United States necessarily involves the decision of a question of law, it must be reviewed by this court, whether that question depends upon the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, or upon the local law, upon principles of general jurisprudence.' And upon examining the evidence, this court held it to be 'wholly insufficient, in fact and in law, to support the conclusion that the attorney had any notice of the previous deed to McMillan,' and accordingly reversed the judgment of the state court. And in *Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburg Ry. Co.*, 205 U. S. 1, a case arising under the Federal Safety Appliance Law, wherein the state court found that the deceased contributed to his injury by his own negligence, thereby preventing a recovery, this court exercised the power to examine the evidence, notwithstanding a con-

tention that the finding was conclusive, and reversed the judgment upon the ground that it appeared that what had been found to be contributory negligence was at most an assumption of the risk, which was not a defense under the Federal statute. Perhaps, the most frequent exercise of this power occurs in cases arising under the clause of the Constitution forbidding a State to pass any law impairing the obligation of a contract, the existence of the contract in such cases being a mixed question of law and fact. *Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co.*, 115 U. S. 683, 697, a leading case upon the subject, contains this statement of the settled rule: 'Whether an alleged contract arises from state legislation, or by agreement, with the agents of a state, by its authority, or by stipulations between individuals exclusively, we are obliged, upon our own judgment and independently of the adjudication of the state court, to decide whether there exists a contract within the protection of the Constitution of the United States.' A like exercise of this power is shown in cases arising under the clause of the Constitution requiring full faith and credit to be given in each State to the judicial proceedings of every other State. *Huntington v. Attrill*, 146 U. S. 657, 684, was such a case. It was a suit in Maryland upon a judgment obtained in New York under a statute of the latter State imposing a liability for the debts of the corporation upon a director making a false certificate respecting its condition. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the judgment was for a strictly penal liability and therefore not within the protection of the full faith and credit clause. But when the case came here it was held that, 'if the state court declines to give full faith and credit to a judgment of another state, be-

cause of its opinion as to the nature of the cause of action on which the judgment was recovered, this court, in determining whether full faith and credit have been given to that judgment must decide for itself the nature of the original liability.' And upon reaching the conclusion that in that instance the original liability was not strictly penal this court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland.

"When due regard is had for the rule before indicated, and so often applied in other cases, it does not admit of doubt that in the present case we may examine the evidence, which has been properly incorporated in the records, to determine whether the general finding necessarily involved the decision of questions of law bearing upon the Federal right set up by the garnishee. And when this is done it is manifest, as is amply illustrated by the resume which we have given of the evidence and contentions of the parties, that the finding necessarily involved the decision of questions of the interpretation and application of the Interstate Commerce Act (24 Stat. 379 c. 104; 25 Stat. 855 c. 382) and also of other questions of law bearing upon the Federal right, such as the legal effect of evidence.

The case of *Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Kirby*, 225 U. S. 155, was a suit upon an oral contract for expedited shipment of certain livestock. There was no published tariff covering such shipment. This court held the contract illegal, discriminatory and void, and that it could not be the basis for a recovery

of damages for failure to complete the transportation in the time agreed upon.

The case of *Adams Express Co. v. Croninger*, 226 U. S. 491, was a suit to recover the value of a diamond ring delivered to the Express Company for transportation from Cincinnati, Ohio, to Augusta, Georgia. The case was disposed of upon the pleadings. The ring was alleged to be worth \$137.52 and the defendant pleaded that his charges were graduated according to value and that the lawful rate upon the package of the plaintiff from Cincinnati to Augusta was twenty-five cents if the value was \$50.00 or less, and was fifty-five cents if the value was \$125.00; that the plaintiff knew of said facts and if he did not declare the value that under the terms of the bill of lading of the company he could recover only a basis of \$50.00 valuation. The receipt issued by the Express Company showed no value, but contained a recital that in the absence of the declaration of a value exceeding \$50.00 the shipper agreed that the value was not more than \$50.00. A demurrer was sustained to the answer, judgment rendered for the plaintiff and this judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court of the state.

This court said:

“The answer relies upon the act of Congress of June 29, 1906, being an act to amend the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, as the only regulation applicable to an interstate shipment; and avers that the limitation of value declared in its bill of lading was valid and obligatory under that act. This defense was denied. This constitutes the Federal question and gives this court jurisdiction.” (226 U. S. 499.)

The case of *Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Company v. Miller*, 226 U. S. 513, was an action to recover the full value of a stallion shipped from a point in Iowa to a point in Nebraska under a valued livestock contract. The loss occurred in the State of Nebraska, through the negligence of the carrier, and the suit was in a court of that state. The plaintiff claimed that the stallion was in fact of the value of \$2,000 and that the limitation in the contract was void under the laws of both the state of Iowa and the state of Nebraska. This court, describing the contract involved in the *Miller* case, uses the following language (p. 517):

“The receipt or bill of lading placed a value upon the animal of two hundred dollars, and was signed by the shipper's agent. It recited that the schedules of rates and regulations filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission provide alternative rates of charges proportioned to the value of the stock delivered for transportation, as declared by the shipper, and that

the recovery of the shipper in case of loss or injury should not be in excess of the value thus agreed upon for the purpose of determining the rate."

From this description the contract must have been a duplicate of the one involved in the case at bar. The concluding paragraph of the opinion is as follows (p. 518):

"It follows that the Supreme Court of Nebraska erred in applying to the contract here involved the provisions of the Iowa statute, and of the constitution of the State of Nebraska, and in refusing to apply the exclusive regulation prescribed by Sec. 20 of the act of 1906, as that provision has been construed by this court in the Croninger case above referred to."

The case of *Chicago, St. Paul, Minnesota & Omaha R. Co. v. Latta*, 226 U. S. 519, was an action to recover the value of two horses lost in the course of interstate transportation. The plaintiff had executed a limited liability contract similar to the one here involved. The judgment of the Circuit Court and of the Circuit court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit was for the plaintiff, but reversed by this court.

The case of *Wells Fargo & Co. v. Neiman Marcus Co.*, 227 U. S. 469, was an action by a shipper against an express company to recover for the loss of a package of furs, of the alleged value of \$400,

shipped from New York to Dallas, Texas, and never delivered. The facts touching the delivery of this shipment to the express company and the circumstances surrounding the same as stated by this court are as follows (p. 473-4):

“The defendants in error were permitted to prove that the actual value of the furs was Four Hundred Dollars. That the consignors kept in their shipping office an express book containing blank express receipts. One of these was filled out in their office by their shipping clerk. When the wagon of the express company called at the office the agent signed the receipt, and the package was delivered to him by a boy assistant to the shipping clerk. No questions were asked as to the value and no value declared other than as shown in the receipt. It was also shown that the clerk, who wrapped and marked the package, did not know the value and had no actual knowledge of the graduated rates of the express company, and that he had had nothing to do with the selling or buying of the furs. One of the consignors, Abraham Jacobson, sold the furs personally and testified as to their value. He testified that he knew that if the value had been declared to be four hundred dollars, the express rate would have been higher, and that if no value was especially declared, they would be carried under the express rate applying to a package valued at not in excess of fifty dollars.”

The Court of Civil Appeals, of Texas, found it convenient to dispose of the issues upon a question

of fact in the following language (125 S. W. 615):

“The testimony raised the issue of fraud on the shipper’s part, but the law never presumes fraud, and under the evidence it is just as fair to presume that value was never thought of at the time, and that the shipper never intended to conceal value from the express company. The express company’s agent failed to perform a plain duty—that is, he failed to have the shipper declare the value—and failing in this duty we are of the opinion that the company is in no attitude to complain that the shipper did not state the value. In any event, it was a question for determination, and the trial court was justified under the evidence in finding against the express company. It can not require of a shipper the performance of a duty which was, at least its plain duty to perform and which it failed to perform. In failing to deliver the package which it agreed to transport and deliver, it breached its contract, and thereby became liable for the full value of the articles it failed to deliver.”

Answering this contention this court said:

“But the shipper in accepting the receipt reciting that the company ‘is not to be held liable beyond the sum of fifty dollars, at not exceeding which sum said property is hereby valued, unless a different value is hereinabove stated,’ did declare and represent that the value did not exceed that sum, and did obtain a rate which he is to be assumed to have known was based upon that as the actual value. There is no substantial distinction between a value stated upon inquiry, and one agreed upon or declared voluntarily. The rate of freight was based



upon the valuation thus fixed, and the liability should not exceed the amount so made, the rate basis."

Beyond question the decision of the Commission of Appeals of the State of Oklahoma is in direct conflict with the law as stated in the above quotation.

The case of *Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl*, 227 U. S. 639, was a suit to recover the value of a shipment of household goods from Lawton, Oklahoma, to Gentry, Arkansas. The consignor signed a release valuation of \$5.00 per hundred pounds. The evidence in the record by which the plaintiff, Carl, sought to avoid the effect of this contract is summarized by this court as follows (227 U. S. 643):

"The defendant in error testified, over objection, that though he could read and write and had signed the release set out above, and had received the bill of lading, he had neither read them nor asked any questions about them, and had not been given any information as to the contents of either document and had no knowledge of the existence of the two rates. He was also allowed to testify that if he had known of the difference between the two rates, and the effect of accepting the lower, he would have paid the higher rate. There was no evidence tending to show any misrepresentation made by the company, or any deceit, or fraud, or concealment, unless it be inferred from the fact that the company made no explanation of the rates

or the contents of either the bill of lading or the release. The shipper merely said that the bill of lading was handed to him with the release, which he was asked to sign. Exceptions were taken to the rulings upon evidence and to certain parts of the charge and for the refusal of the court to grant certain requests."

In disposing of the contention that under these circumstances the plaintiff was not bound by the valuation fixed in the shipping receipt, this court uses the following language (p. 652, 653):

"The valuation declared or agreed upon as evidenced by the contract of shipment upon which the published tariff rate is applied, must be conclusive in an action to recover for loss or damage a greater sum. In saying this, we lay on one side, as not here involved, every question which might arise when it is shown that the carrier intentionally connived with the shipper to give him an illegal rate, thereby causing a discrimination or preference forbidden by the positive terms of the act of Congress and made punishable as a crime. To permit such a declared valuation to be overthrown by evidence *aliunde* the contract, for the purpose of enabling the shipper to obtain a recovery in a suit for loss or damage in excess of the maximum valuation thus fixed, would both encourage and reward undervaluations and bring about preferences and discriminations forbidden by the law. Such a result would neither be just nor conducive to sound morals or wise policies. The valuation, the shipper declares, determines the legal rate where there are two rates based upon valuation. He must take notice of the rate applicable, and actual want of knowledge

is no excuse. The rate when made out and filed, is notice, and its effect is not lost, although it is not actually posted in the station. *Texas & Pacific Railway v. Mugg*, 202 U. S. 242; *Chicago & A. Railway v. Kirby*, 225 U. S. 155.

“It would open a wide door to fraud and destroy the uniform operation of the published tariff rate sheets. When there are two published rates, based upon difference in value, the legal rate automatically attaches itself to the declared or agreed value. Neither the intentional nor accidental misstatement of the applicable published rate will bind the carrier or shipper. The lawful rate is that which the carrier must exact and that which the shipper must pay. The shipper’s knowledge of the lawful rate is conclusively presumed, and the carrier may not be required to surrender the goods carried upon the payment of the rate paid, if that was less than the lawful rate, until the full legal rate has been paid. *Texas & Pacific Railway v. Mugg*, *supra*. Nor is the carrier liable for damages resulting from a mistake in quoting a rate less than the full published rate. *Illinois Central Railroad v. Henderson Elevator Company*, 226 U. S. 441. Nor can a carrier legally contract with a particular shipper for an unusual service unless he make and publish a rate for such service equally open to all. *Chicago & Alton Railway v. Kirby*, *supra*.

“That the valuation and the rate are dependent each upon the other is an administrative rule applied in reparation proceedings by the Interstate Commerce Commission. *Southern Oil Company v. Southern Railway Co.*, 19 I. C. C. Rep. 79; *Miller & Lux v. Southern Pacific Company*, 20 I. C. C. Rep. 129.”

As a result of the above conclusion this court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which had affirmed a judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff.

The case of *Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company v. Harriman*, *supra*, was an action in a Texas State court by a shipper of cattle under a limited live stock transportation contract from a point in Missouri to a point in Oklahoma to recover the value of cattle killed by negligent derailment occurring in Missouri. The shipment consisted of fifteen "show cattle" and the plaintiff recovered as their full value in the trial court, \$10,640.00. The judgment was affirmed by the court of last resort of the State of Texas.

With reference to the existence of a Federal question in the cause, this court said (227 U. S. 672):

"The liability sought to be enforced is the 'liability' of an interstate carrier for loss or damage under an interstate contract of shipment declared by the Carmack Amendment of the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906. The validity of any stipulation in such a contract which involves the construction of the statute and the validity of a limitation upon the liability thereby imposed is a Federal question to be determined under the general common law, and, as such, is withdrawn from the field of state law

or legislation. *Adams Express Co. v. Croninger*, 226 U. S. 491; *Michigan Central Railroad v. Freeland*, *ante*, p. 59."

The limitation of valuation expressed in the classification is not a mere incident to the matter of rate; it is, as is apparent from the above cases, an essential element in the determination of the rate, and the classification in the case at bar so states. The question of a maximum valuation in case of loss is essential to the advising of an alternative rate, because both the element of value and the element of damage in case of loss are properly used as determinative of the rate to be charged. The rate in the case at bar was fixed by classification, and the tariff by the movement of the horses, and the size of the car at \$17.60, based upon a released valuation of liability, limited to \$100.00 for each horse. The classification and tariff were required to be prepared and published by the Federal law. The elements going into the rate, and which may be logically annexed thereto, are, therefore, for determination by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

It is wholly immaterial whether the plaintiff herein actually knew the value, or whether he specifically agreed to it. The two rates and the release valuation under the lower rate is as much

a part of the published tariff as the minimum car load or as the measure of so many cents per one hundred pounds. As the court said in the Harri-man case, 227 U. S. 671:

“When the carrier graduates its rates by value and has filed its tariffs showing two rates applicable to a particular commodity or class of articles, based upon a difference in valuation, the shipper must take notice, for the valuation automatically determines which of the rates is the lawful rate.”

The opinion of the Commission of Appeals of the State of Oklahoma is based on the erroneous assumption that after the delivery to the carrier it is not competent for the carrier and consignor to agree upon a different rate than that of the unlimited common law liability for the shipment. That to permit the railway company to take the benefit of the limited liability contract after that time, would operate to deprive the shipper of some right he had acquired by delivery of the shipment to the carrier. This is a manifestly erroneous view of the law. Any time prior to the performance of the service by the carrier, the parties are at liberty to enter into a shipping contract in accordance with any one of the options contained in the printed tariff. This option was exercised when the railway company made out and presented to the plain-

tiff a limited liability contract, and when the plaintiff executed and accepted the same he must be taken to have contracted for an advantage not open to the courts to destroy.

This court has held in a number of cases that a shipper is charged with notice of the rate applicable, and that an actual want of knowledge is no excuse, and that the effect of such rate is not lost although not actually published in the station.

*Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Mugg*, 202 U. S. 242.

*Chicago & Alton v. Kirby*, 225 U. S. 155, 160.

*Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Carl*, 227 U. S. 639, 652.

Not only is this true, but it is clear from the facts, that the plaintiff was actually familiar with the different classes of live stock contracts and of the existence of different rates under the different contracts. Whether he knew of the actual particular rate under the limited liability contract in the case at bar is immaterial. The result of the opinion of the Commission of Appeals of the State of Oklahoma is a clear evasion of the requirements of the Act to Regulate Commerce. Under its decision no contract limiting liability would be valid under said act unless the valuation was actually agreed upon before loading for shipment.

The result of the action of the Commission of Appeals of Oklahoma is well described by this court (*Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl*, 227 U. S. 639, 652), as follows:

“It would open a wide door to fraud and destroy the uniform operation of the published tariff rate sheets. When there are two published rates based upon difference in value, the legal rate automatically attaches itself to the declared or agreed value.”


A motion to dismiss the appeal for want of Federal question in Case No. 451, October, 1913, term, entitled *The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, plaintiff in error, v. H. F. Moore, C. E. Robinson and S. H. Smith, defendants in error*, is presented concurrently with the presentation of the motion in this cause. The questions involved in the two cases are identical, and what is said in this case is fully applicable to the Moore case.

It is respectfully submitted that the motion to dismiss or affirm is without merit and should be denied.

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JAN 27 1914

JAMES D. MAHER  
CLERK

*In the*  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

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**NUMBER 450.**

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THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE  
RAILWAY COMPANY,

*Plaintiff in Error,*

vs.

C. E. ROBINSON,

*Defendant in Error.*

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**BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.**

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*In the*  
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THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE  
RAILWAY COMPANY,

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vs.

C. E. ROBINSON,

*Defendant in Error.*

---

**STATEMENT OF CASE.**

C. E. Robinson, defendant in error, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, instituted suit in the District Court of Lincoln County, Oklahoma, to recover damages alleged to have resulted from the transportation by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, hereinafter referred to as defendant, to a certain mare, "Nancy Alden," from Kansas City, Missouri, to Lawrence, Kansas, on the 16th day of September, 1907.

The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of \$1500.00, which

judgment was, on appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, affirmed.

A petition for re-hearing was filed in the Supreme Court of the State, overruled, and a writ of error obtained to this Court to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.

The printed transcript does not include the entire record, certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State, but only such parts thereof as are necessary for a consideration of the issues presented to this Court for disposition, the record having been prepared and printed pursuant to Paragraph 9, of Rule 10, of this Court.

On the 29th day of June, 1908, plaintiff filed his amended petition (Tr. 21-25) against the defendant, seeking to recover damages in the sum of \$2,000.00 for injuries alleged to have been suffered by a certain pacing mare, named Nancy Alden, while being transported over the line of railroad of the defendant from Kansas City, in the State of Missouri, to Lawrence, in the State of Kansas. The allegations in the petition being that the damage resulted from "rough handling in transit."

To this amended petition, after demurrer had been overruled, the defendant filed its answer,

setting up among other things, a shipping contract limiting the liability of the defendant for damages that might occur during the transportation of said animal (Tr. 28-41). Incidentally it was alleged that this shipping contract was entered into in the State of Missouri, and the limitation of liability therein contained was valid under the laws of that State, and that the transportation was to be concluded in Kansas, and the limitation of liability therein contained was valid under the laws of that State. It was specifically alleged (Tr. 31) that such contract was fairly entered into upon a valid consideration (Tr. 31). Subsequently, on the 19th day of April, 1909, the defendant filed its amended answer to said amended petition, (Tr. 44-45). In view of the statement of the issues as found in the motion to dismiss, said amended answer is here reproduced in full and is as follows:

“The defendant alleges and avers the fact to be that said shipment was from the State of Missouri into the State of Kansas, and was, therefore, an interstate shipment, and said shipment was made upon a tariff of rates which was duly filed and approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and which said tariff had been posted in this defendant's depots, both at Kansas City, Missouri, and at Lawrence, Kansas, and which was in full force and effect at the time said shipment moved; that said tariff was promulgated, filed and published in accordance with an Act of Con-



gress, commonly known as the Interstate Commerce Act, which was approved June 29th, 1906; that by said tariff which was filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and posted as provided by law, as above set out, and which was approved by the said Interstate Commerce Commission, and which was the legal tariff governing interstate shipments of freight and live stock, it was provided as follows:

“(a) Rates named in section two apply on shipments of ordinary live stock, where contracts are executed by shippers on blanks furnished by these companies, and are based on the declared valuation by the shipper at time contract is signed, not to exceed the following:

“Each horse or pony (gelding, mare, stallion), mule or jack, \$100.00. Each ox, bull, or steer, \$50.00. Each cow \$30.00. Each calf, \$10.00. Each hog, \$10.00. Each sheep or goat, \$3.00.

“(b) Where the declared value exceeds the above an addition of twenty-five per cent will be added to the rate for each one hundred per cent or fractional part thereof of additional declared valuation per head. Animals exceeding in value \$800.00 per head will be taken only by special arrangement.

“(c) Table of rates named will be charged on shipments of live stock made with limitation of company's liability at common law, and under this statute shippers will have the choice of executing or accepting contracts for shipments of live stock with or without limitation of liability and rates accordingly.’

“That said shippers obtained the benefit of such reduced rate applicable to the value fixed in the written contract governing said shipment of horses; that said shipment set out

in the petition was made in all respects under the said tariff so filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the same is in all respects governed by the Act of Congress of the United States, above set out, commonly known as the Interstate Commerce Act, and that the rights and liabilities of defendant to this action are determined and fixed by said Act of Congress, and in deciding the rights of the parties hereunder a consideration of the rights and liabilities of the parties to this action cannot be fixed or determined except by a construction of said Act of Congress.

“That the liability of the defendant under this Bill of Lading and the construction of the said Act of Congress has never been clearly and unequivocally adjudicated and settled by the Supreme Court of the United States and that the construction of said statute in respect to the questions presented herein under said Bill of Lading are still unsettled by said Supreme Court.

“And defendant further alleges that there is a controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant and in this action, above set out, and that the decision of this case and of the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto, requires an adjudication as to the proper construction of said Act of Congress and a settlement of the controversy between the parties as to the meaning and effect thereof.

“Wherefore defendant prays judgment as in the answer, to which this is an amendment, prayed.”

The filing of this amended answer was a direct assertion that the shipment was controlled by and the validity of the contract was to be determined

under the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce and the amendments thereto. If anything in conflict with such contention is found in the previous answer it was abandoned by the filing of this amended answer. It is not believed, however, that anything in the original answer is in conflict with the amended answer. The execution of the limited liability contract relied upon by defendant, by the plaintiff Robinson, was admitted throughout the record. There is no denial of the fact that the shipment moved under the limited liability contract. There is no denial of the fact that the freight was paid on the basis of the rates prescribed for limited liability contracts, and in accordance with the terms of the limited liability contract. The answer pleading the written contract was verified as required by the Oklahoma statute. The reply was not verified, and under the statute a non-verified pleading does not operate to challenge the execution of a written instrument. The interstate tariffs covering the shipment were duly certified and admitted in evidence. (Tr. 156.)

The contention of the defendant that the shipment was an interstate one, and the validity of the shipping contract to be determined by the Act to Regulate Commerce and not by the laws of

the State of Oklahoma or any other State, was covered by exceptions to the instructions given to the jury by the trial court (Tr. 157-160), by instructions requested by counsel for defendant (Tr. 161-164), by the 15th and 16th paragraphs of the motion for new trial (Tr. 166), by the 16th and 17th assignments of error as found in the petition in error in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma (Tr. 19-20), by the petition for rehearing filed in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma (Tr. 4-6), by the petition for writ of error to this court (Tr. 2-4), and by the assignments of error to the action of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma for review by this court (Tr. 13-15).

### **ABSTRACT AND REVIEW OF EVIDENCE.**

We will consider first, the facts; second, the law applicable thereto.

The plaintiff executed a limited liability shipping contract, in which it was agreed that the liability of the carrier should be limited to \$100.00 per head in consideration of the application of a special published tariff rate, applicable to livestock moving under limited liability contracts. We quote from the title and caption of that contract as follows:

“Form 67-A. Regular.

Read this Contract carefully as numerous changes have been made.

## LIVESTOCK CONTRACT (LIMITED LIABILITY.)

The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company.

Rules and Regulations for the Transportation of Live Stock.

Notice—This Railway has two rates on Live Stock.

The rate given under this contract is lower than the rate made by the Railway Company and connections for the transportation of Stock at carrier's risk, and without limitation of liability, and is based upon the conditions and agreements found in this contract and upon the valuation therein fixed. The shipper by accepting this contract is deemed to accept the lower rate upon the terms and conditions specified as part of this contract." (Tr. p. 33.)

Paragraph 3 of this contract, so far as applicable to the issue here involved, is as follows:

"Third. The shipper hereby represents and agrees that his live stock does not exceed in value the prices below named, it being understood that the rate given is based upon such limit of valuation, which is the highest value accepted for the lower rate (animals of higher value being charged a higher rate); and in case of loss or damage from any cause for which the company may be liable, payment shall be made therefor only on the basis of the actual cash value at the time and place of shipment, but in no case to exceed the following, which is understood not to exceed the value as held by the shipper, to wit:

"For each horse or pony, gelding, mare or

stallion, mule or jack, per head, \$100.' ” (Tr. 35.)

With reference to the execution of this contract Mr. Moore, who was both consignor and consignee therein, testified as follows:

“Q. Can you state whose signature that is?

A. That is my signature made by Mr. Robinson.

Q. That is your signature, and Mr. Robinson was authorized by you to sign it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have this contract?

A. I presume Mr. Robinson had it.’ (Tr. 70.)

Q. You testified you always took a bill of lading when the horses were loaded?

A. We took a contract.

Q. Did you, or do you know the conditions of the contract?

To which the defendant objects as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, I presume he did know.

A. Certainly, I know; I never read the damn thing, but I know what it means.” (Tr. 75.)

Also the following from the evidence of the plaintiff, Robinson:

“Q. At all of these places you say you did the shipping?

A. They were mostly shipped in Mr. Moore’s name.

Q. You did?

A. I helped.

Q. Moore was an ex-railroad employee?

A. Sir?

Q. Moore had worked for the railroad?

MR. SMITH: Objected to as improper cross-examination.

A. I don't know whether he did or not.  
Overruled

Q. You were familiar with shipping race horses before you went to Kansas City?

A. Why, not very.

Q. You had been shipping all summer?

A. I had been riding with the horses all summer.

Q. Signing Mr. Moore's name?

A. No, that is the only time I signed Moore's name was in Kansas City. (Tr. 106-107.)

Q. I will ask you if you did not testify yesterday that you went down to the freight depot in Kansas City, and signed a contract for these horses, and signed Mr. Moore's name to the contract.

A. You are getting away ahead of your story; I signed that before I loaded the horses at—

Q. I say, didn't you testify to that yesterday?

A. That I signed Mr. Moore's name to that contract? Yes, sir. (Tr. 108.)

Q. Now, when you went down to the station you say you signed Mr. Moore's name to the bill of lading?

A. Yes, sir; I did.

Q. You got your contract, did you?

A. I got my contract \* \* \* (Tr. 112.)

Q. I will ask you before the horses went out if you didn't go down to the depot, freight depot, and go to the proper office and

sign up your contract to take your horses over to Lawrence?

A. I went to the office and signed a contract about eight o'clock.

Q. You did sign the name of Moore to the contract, did you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why did you sign that contract in the name of Moore?

A. Because Mr. Moore would be there, I knew for sure when he got there he would have something to show he could get them off. And Mr. Moore told me I could sign them that way, and when I went up to see when these horses were going out, and the agent told me the bill was ready to be signed, and I told him Mr. Moore was down in the car, and he said it would be all right for me to sign the name, and I signed the name." (Tr. 114-115.)

It also appears from the evidence of Moore, who was both consignor and consignee in the bill of lading, that he and Robinson had been together from March, 1907, until September, 1907, traveling over the country attending fairs and participating in the racing with from four to five horses. (Tr. 68-69.) The mare here involved, with certain others, was shipped from Kentucky in March, 1907, to Courtney, North Dakota, Robinson and Moore being together. They then shipped from Courtney to Carrington, N. Dakota; from there to New Rockford, N. Dakota; from there to Valley City, N. Dakota; from Valley City to



Kensal; from Kensal to Fessenden; from Fessenden to Harvey; from Harvey to Armour, apparently all in South Dakota; from Armour to Manhattan, Kansas; from Manhattan to Clay Center; from Clay Center to Topeka; from Topeka to Kansas City, and from Kansas City to Lawrence.

So far as disclosed by the record, plaintiff was accompanied at all times by Mr. Moore, a former railroad agent and tariff expert; by Mr. H. H. Smith, learned counsel for defendant in error in this case, and also witness for plaintiff on the trial of the cause. (Tr. 121, 126, 127.)

Plaintiff Robinson, at the time he signed Mr. Moore's name to the limited liability contract here involved, had had at least six months' experience in the shipping of race horses; had the advice and assistance of an ex-railroad agent, undoubtedly familiar with tariffs and limited liability contracts. He had the assistance of counsel, learned in the law, familiar with race horses, with the Act to Regulate Commerce and the forms of limited liability contracts, and the custom of railways in reference to their manner of execution.

The plaintiff testified (Tr. 107) that he signed a shipping contract covering almost every

movement of the race horses detailed in the evidence.

The entire conversation between the plaintiff and some one he supposes to be the agent of the railway company at Kansas City, Missouri, which is relied upon to constitute an oral contract, and which the trial court and the Supreme Court of the State, in effect, held could not be superseded by any written agreement, is as summarized in plaintiff's evidence as follows:

“Q. Just tell the conversation that occurred between you and the agent; what you said and what he said in reference to this shipment?

A. I went in there and asked him when the car should be spotted, and asked him when I should load the horses, and he told me the car would be spotted about six o'clock, or somewhere near that.

Q. Was there any further conversation?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was that?

A. I asked him what time the train got out, and he said it was due out at nine o'clock.

Q. Did he tell you what train it was?

A. He said it was the Red Ball Freight—no stops.

Q. Did you tell him anything about what you wanted to go to Lawrence for?

A. I did.

Q. Tell him what kind of horses you had?

MR. GREEN: Objected to as leading and suggestive.

THE COURT: It is suggestive.

Q. Just state what your conversation was?

A. I told him I had some race horses, and wanted to go through on a through freight, I wanted them to get through in good shape so they would be sound and would not be stove up. I wanted to win my race and I would like to go on a through freight, and he told me this Red Ball went out at nine o'clock; we could go on that, and with that understanding I loaded the horses at six o'clock." (Tr. 96, 97.)

The same transaction is described by Mr. H. H. Smith, counsel for defendant in error, in his evidence in the following language (Tr. 122):

"Q. Now, did you have anything to do with shipping her out of Kansas City?

A. Nothing, only I called up the chief clerk from the Baltimore Hotel, and I went out with him to the track and Mr. Robinson called up. The time I did the talking was at the Baltimore Hotel.

Q. What was done after you had the conversation with the agent of the Santa Fe from the Elm Ridge track?

A. They were sent in to the freight depot of the Santa Fe in Kansas City.

Q. Did you go down to the depot?

A. I went down there about five o'clock, four or five o'clock, something like that time in the afternoon.

Q. Well, did you have at that time any conversation with any of the agents or any of the employees of the Santa Fe?

A. Why, I talked with two or three of them just about getting out of there, and about the races; I think I talked to somebody in where the clerks all were about the horses or something about shipping them.

Q. Well, what was that conversation?

A. I do not recollect any particular person, but I just inquired about the certainty of getting out on that train, and what kind of a train it was, and the time I talked to the clerk, I think it was upstairs, he said they would get out of there for sure about nine o'clock, and they would put them on the fast freight.

Q. Did he name the freight?

A. Yes, a freight called the Red Ball.

Q. Well, you saw the horses just prior to the time they were loaded on the car?

A. Yes, sir."

It will be observed that in one instance the plaintiff, Robinson, specifically swears (Tr. 108), "you are getting away ahead of your story, I signed that before I loaded the horses at—," but subsequently swore that it was after he loaded the horses.

The agent Dubois said that it was after the horses were loaded that the contract was signed, but this was clearly an assumption on his part because he further stated he did not know when they were loaded. However, we regard this as immaterial.

The witness Dubois testified for the defendant (Tr. 130), and fully explained the application of the classification and rate, and the provisions of the tariff applicable to the shipment were read

into the record, as follows: "One hundred and fifty per cent. (150 per cent) of the rates named herein will be charged on shipments of live stock made without limitation of the company's liability at common law, and under this status shippers will have the choice of exercising and accepting contracts for shipments of live stock with or without limitation of liability, and rates accordingly" (Tr. 136).

This provision is found on page 34 of the tariff, the printed record refers to page 84. This is a typographical error and should be page 34.

We doubt if the history of litigation will disclose a party better equipped by experience and expert assistants to fully protect his interests than the plaintiff as to the transaction herein involved.

To summarize:

**First.**

We have the admitted execution of a contract by the plaintiff limiting the liability of the defendant to \$100, fairly and freely executed.

**Second.**

We have a printed and published tariff prescribing a special rate where a limited liability contract is executed.

**Third.**

We have a plaintiff executing the contract who was thoroughly conversant with such contracts and who had had a large experience making live stock shipments under limited liability contracts.

**Fourth.**

The plaintiff received, at the time he executed said contract, a duplicate thereof in writing, and there is no evidence that there was any stress, or rush, or any reason why he did not read the same, if in any event he did not; nor is there a scintilla of evidence that he did not understand the contract he executed.

**Fifth.**

Plaintiff testified that he executed the limited liability contract by signing Mr. Moore's name thereto, and that he was authorized to sign the same. He did not testify or even suggest that he was not aware, to the fullest extent, of the terms of the contract he signed.

**Sixth.**

We have the admission of the execution of the written contract pursuant to the printed and published tariffs, and there is not a scintilla of evi-

dence that the plaintiff was misled, or misunderstood, or misapprehended the language or meaning of the contract, or that there was any fraud perpetrated upon him or any wrong done him in any particular in the execution of the contract.

**Extracts from the act to regulate commerce, approved February 4th, 1887, as amended by the act of June 29th, 1906. (Chap. 3591, 34 Stat. 584) pertinent to issues involved:**

Section 2 reads:

“That if any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act, shall, directly or indirectly, by any special rate, rebate, drawback, or other device, charge, demand, collect or receive from any person or persons a greater or less compensation for any service rendered, or to be rendered, in the transportation of passengers or property, subject to the provisions of this Act, than it charges, demands, collects, or receives from any other person or persons for doing for him or them a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, such common carrier shall be deemed guilty of unjust discrimination, which is hereby prohibited and declared to be unlawful.”

Section 3 in part provides:

“That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality,

or any particular description of traic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."

Section 6 in part provides:

"That every common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act shall file with the Commission created by this Act and print and keep open to public inspection schedules showing all the rates, fares and charges for transportation between different points on its own route and between points on its own route and points on the route of any other carrier by railroad, by pipe line, or by water when a through route and joint rate have been established. If no joint rate over the through route has been established, the several carriers in such through route shall file, print, and keep open to public inspection, as aforesaid, the separately established rates, fares and charges applied to the through transportation. The schedules printed as aforesaid by any such common carrier shall plainly state the places between which property and passengers will be carried, and shall contain the classification of freight in force, and shall also state separately all terminal charges, storage charges, icing charges, and all other charges which the Commission may require, all privileges or facilities granted or allowed and any rules or regulations which in any wise change, affect, or determine any part or the aggregate of such aforesaid rates, fares, and charges, or the value of the service rendered to the passenger, shipper, or consignee. Such schedules shall be plainly printed in large type, and



copies for the use of the public shall be kept posted in two public and conspicuous places in every depot, station, or office of such carrier where passengers or freight, respectively, are received for transportation, in such form that they shall be accessible to the public and can be conveniently inspected. The provisions of this section shall apply to all traffic, transportation, and facilities defined in this Act.

"No carrier, unless otherwise provided by this Act, shall engage or participate in the transportation of passengers or property, as defined in this Act, unless the rates, fares, and charges upon which the same are transported by said carrier have been filed and published in accordance with the provisions of this Act; nor shall any carrier charge or demand or collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for such transportation of passengers or property, or for any service in connection therewith between the points named in such tariffs than the rates, fares and charges which are specified in the tariff filed and in effect at the time; nor shall any carrier refund or remit in any manner or by any device any portion of the rates, fares, and charges so specified, nor extend to any shipper or person any privileges or facilities in the transportation of passengers, or property, except such as are specified in such tariff."

Section 10 in part provides:

"Any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act, or, whenever such common carrier is a corporation, any officer or agent thereof, or any person acting for or employed by such corporation, who, by means of false billing, false classification, false weighing, or

false report of weight, or by any other device or means, shall knowingly and willfully assist, or shall willingly suffer or permit, any person or persons to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates then established and in force on the line of transportation of such common carrier, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall upon conviction thereof in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction within the district in which such offense was committed, be subject to a fine of not exceeding five thousand dollars, or imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court, for each offense.

Any person and any officer or agent of any corporation or company who shall deliver property for transportation to any common carrier, subject to the provisions of this Act, or for whom as consignor or consignee any such carrier shall transport property, who shall knowingly and willfully, by false billing, false classification, false weighing, false representation of the contents of the package or false report of weight, or by any other device or means, whether with or without the consent or connivance of the carrier, its agent or agents, obtain transportation for such property at less than the regular rates then established and in force on the line of transportation, shall be deemed guilty of fraud, which is hereby declared to be a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction thereof in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction within the district in which such offense was committed, be subject for each offense to a fine of not exceeding five thousand dollars or imprisonment in the

penitentiary for a term of not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court." Section 20 in part provides:

"That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another State shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed: Provided, that nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law.

"That the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company issuing such receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover from the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company on whose line the loss, damage, or injury shall have been sustained the amount of such loss, damage, or injury as it may be required to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any receipt, judgment or transcript thereof."

#### **Extracts from the Elkins Act.**

Section one of the Act of February 19, 1903, c. 708, 32 Stat. 847, entitled, "An Act to further regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States," commonly known as the Elkins Act,

as amended by section two of the Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 587, provides that:

“The willful failure upon the part of any carrier subject to said acts to file and publish the tariffs or rates and charges as required by said acts, or strictly to observe such tariffs until changed according to law, shall be a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, etc., \* \* \* and it shall be unlawful for any person, persons, or corporation to offer, grant, or give, or to solicit, accept or receive any rebate, concession, or discrimination in respect to the transportation of any property in interstate or foreign commerce by any common carrier subject to said act to regulate commerce, and the acts amendatory thereof whereby any such property shall by any device whatever be transported at a less rate than that named in the tariff published and filed by such carrier, as is required by said act to regulate commerce and the acts amendatory thereof or whereby any other advantage is given or discrimination is practiced. Every person or corporation, whether carrier or shipper, who shall, knowingly, offer, grant, or give, or solicit, accept, or receive any such rebates, concession, or discrimination shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction, etc. \* \* \*

“\* \* \* Whenever any carrier files with the Interstate Commerce Commission or publishes a particular rate under the provisions of the act to regulate commerce or acts amendatory thereof or participates in any rates so filed or published, that rate as against such carrier, its officers or agents, in any prosecution begun under this act shall be conclusively deemed to be the legal rate, and any de-

parture from such rate, or any offer to depart therefrom, shall be deemed to be an offense under this section of this act."

### **ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.**

(Tr. 13, 14, 15.)

#### **First.**

That the Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in affirming the judgment of the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

#### **Second.**

That the Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in not reversing said judgment of the District Court of Lincoln County, State of Oklahoma.

#### **Third.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the contract set forth in the petition and amendment thereto of the defendant in error, plaintiff below, was a valid contract.

#### **Fourth.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in refusing to hold said contract void as being a contract in violation of the Act of Congress of February 4th, 1887, and the amendments thereto, commonly called the Interstate Commerce Act or the Act to Regulate Commerce.

#### **Fifth.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in affirming said judgment enforcing a contract

which was void as being in contravention of and a violation of the Act of Congress of February 4th, 1887, and the amendments thereto, entitled an Act of Congress of February 4th, 1887, approved February 4th, 1887, and in effect April 5th, 1887 (24 Stat. at Large 379), as amended by an Act approved March 2nd, 1889 (25 Stat. at Large 885), and by an Act approved February 10th, 1891 (26 Stat. at Large 743), and by an Act approved February 8th, 1895 (28 Stat. at Large 643), and by an Act approved June 29th, 1906 (34 Stat. at Large 584), known as the Interstate Commerce Act or an Act to Regulate Commerce.

#### **Sixth.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in its failure to consider the federal question presented in said cause and in concluding that said Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma could legally dispose of the issue in said cause without passing upon and deciding as to whether or not said alleged contract of shipment was in violation of the Act to Regulate Commerce, and such action was a denial to the plaintiff in error of a right, title, privilege and immunity specially set up and claimed under such clause and section of the said Interstate Commerce Act to the great damage of the plaintiff in error.

#### **Seventh.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the alleged contract was not invalid and that it was, if made, in violation of the Act of Congress and amendments and particularly in violation of Sections 2, 3, 6, and 10 of said Act of Congress as amended June 29th, 1906.

**Eighth.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in refusing to hold that said contract was invalid as being in violation of said Act and sections thereof.

**Ninth.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in refusing to hold that said contract was discriminatory and unlawful under said Act and sections thereof.

**Tenth.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the defendant in error was not bound by the terms and provisions of the tariffs and classifications on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission and with its agent at Kansas City, Missouri, the point of origin of said shipment.

**Eleventh.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the plaintiff in error had a right under the evidence in the case to agree to carry the horses in said shipment upon its Red Ball freight train.

**Twelfth.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the alleged agreement to carry the horses upon the Red Ball freight train, a particular train, was not an agreement to perform a special service not provided for by the published tariff and classification.

**Thirteenth.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the contract of shipment was the oral negotiations had over the telephone with the shipper and some one representing himself to be the agent of the railway company, which said contract was in direct violation of and not one provided for by the tariffs and classifications which were on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission and with petitioner's agent at point of origin, and in holding that said verbal negotiations were the contract of shipment, and were not superseded by the written contract of shipment entered into by the parties subsequent to said alleged oral contract.

**Fourteenth.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the defendant in error was not presumed to have knowledge of the provisions of said Act and sections thereof, and the provisions of the tariffs and classifications on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission and with the agent at Kansas City, Missouri, the point of origin of said shipment.

**Fifteenth.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in holding that the defendant in error was not presumed to know that he contracted for a lower rate than that to which he was lawfully entitled and that he contracted for special privilege in shipment by designated train to which he was not lawfully entitled, and for which the plaintiff in error and defendant in error could not contract without violating said Acts of Congress and sections thereof.



**Sixteenth.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in its construction and application of the law with reference to said Act and sections thereof as hitherto declared and announced by the Supreme Court of the United States.

**Seventeenth.**

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma erred in that the judgment aforesaid given was given for said defendant in error and against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, whereas, by the law of the land, the said judgment ought to have been given for the said The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company.

## ARGUMENT.

It is unnecessary to consider the assignments of error in detail. They challenge the correctness of the conclusions of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma in denying to the defendant the benefit of a limited liability contract, the execution of which is admitted by the plaintiff. They also challenge the correctness of the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma in holding that an interpretation of the Act to Regulate Commerce is not necessarily involved in determining the validity of the limited liability shipping contract involved in this proceeding. The last mentioned conclusion of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is based upon an assumption that has no foundation in fact and has not a scintilla of evidence in the record for its support.

On the afternoon of the 16th day of September, 1907, the plaintiff inquired by telephone of the agent of the defendant, at Kansas City, Missouri, as to when and by what character of train he could have certain race horses transported from Kansas City, Missouri, to Lawrence, Kansas. He was advised if his horses were ready for loading by six o'clock p. m. they could be transported on what was known as the "Red Ball" freight, leaving Kansas City about nine o'clock p. m. Subse-

quently the horses were loaded and the plaintiff appeared at the office of the defendant and executed a limited liability contract, by signing the name of a Mr. Moore thereto.

The railroad company had two rates on livestock in force, one carrier's risk, and the other limited liability. Under the printed and published tariff, by the execution of a limited liability contract a reduction of substantially 33 1/3% was obtained in the transportation rate. The limited liability contract executed by the plaintiff and the rate paid were both pursuant to and in accordance with the published tariff of the defendant, of the terms of which the plaintiff was and is charged with knowledge.

*Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Mugg*, 202 U. S. 242.

*Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Kirby*, 225 U. S. 155, 160.

*Kansas City So. R. Co. v. Carl*, 227 U. S. 639, 652.

*C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Miller*, 226 U. S. 513.

*C. St. P. Minn. & Omaha R. Co. v. Latta*, 226 U. S. 519.

*Wells Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co.*, 227 U. S. 469.

*M., K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman*, 227 U. S. 657.

The contract was executed by the plaintiff deliberately and without anything to prevent his

giving the same the fullest consideration. He received and kept a duplicate and at no time denied that he was familiar with the provisions of such contract. The animals moved under this limited liability contract and the freight was paid thereunder. Notwithstanding this fact the Commission of Appeals for Oklahoma held, and this holding was adopted by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, when it adopted the opinion as a whole, that the inquiry over the telephone as to when the animals could be moved, and the character of train they could be moved in, constituted a completed contract which was not superseded by the deliberate execution by the plaintiff of the limited liability contract, under which the animals moved, and of the payment of the freight on the basis of such limited liability contract.

The Supreme Court proper of the State of Oklahoma has uniformly held the execution of a limited liability contract under circumstances similar to those here involved, to be valid and binding upon the party, whether he inquired about, read or understood the contract or not, saying that "a shipper of live stock can not, in the absence of fraud by the carrier, avoid limitations of the carrier's liability contained in the bill of lading or the shipping contract by showing that he executed

the contract hurriedly or without due care or that he was ignorant of its contents or failed to read the same." *St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ladd*, 33 Okla. 160, 124 Pac. 461. The decision in the case at bar, therefore, is not only a departure from all recognized principles, but is an absolute departure from the well established and uniform rule heretofore applied in every instance by the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma. No case could probably be found where the shipper of livestock prior to the execution of a limited liability contract did not inquire what time and on what train his shipment would move. No sane man would insist that the railroad company, by reason of the conversation had over the telephone or at the station, for that matter, could have established a liability against the plaintiff upon a contract of shipment if the plaintiff had declined to ship or had shipped via some other line.

If it should be held that the evidence of the conversations had between the plaintiff and the agent above referred to were admissible for any purpose, to give to such evidence the effect given by the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma was to so misapply the same in its effect upon the rights of the defendant under the Act to Regu-

late Commerce as to constitute a Federal question reviewable by this court.

*Mackey v. Dillon*, 4 How. 421, 447.

*Dower v. Richards*, 151 U. S. 658, 667.

*K. C. So. R. Co. v. Allen Comm. Co.*, 223 U. S. 573, 591.

*Stanley v. Schwalby*, 162 U. S. 255, 274, 77-79.

Nothing short of an absolute misconception of the legal rights of the parties under the Act to Regulate Commerce and of the effect of the printed tariffs and a limited liability contract executed pursuant thereto, could have led the court to the conclusion that this contract based upon and made in accordance with such tariff, and fairly and freely executed, was not binding upon the parties thereto.

This court very appropriately said in the case of *M. K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman*, 227 U. S. 657, 672:

“The liability sought to be enforced is the ‘liability’ of an interstate carrier for loss or damage under an interstate contract or shipment declared by the Carmack Amendment of the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906. The validity of any stipulation in such a contract which involves the construction of the statute, and the validity of a limitation upon the liability thereby imposed is a Federal question to be determined under the general common law, and, as such, is withdrawn from the field of state law or legislation.”

This declaration by this court undoubtedly

would have the same force in its application to judicial legislation that it would have to that of the ordinary kind.

**Review of opinions of this court involving validity  
of limitation of liability provisions in inter-  
state shipping contracts.**

This court has recently, in a series of cases discussed, adjudged, and it seems to us finally determined, the questions involved in the case at bar.

We desire to refer briefly to the facts involved and the opinion of the court in each of these cases.

The case of *Adams Express Co. v. Croninger*, 226 U. S. 491, was a suit to recover the value of a diamond ring delivered to the express company for transportation from Cincinnati, Ohio, to Augusta, Georgia. The case was disposed of on the pleadings. The ring was alleged to be worth \$137.52, and the defendant pleaded that its charges were graduated according to value and that the lawful rate upon the package from Cincinnati, Ohio, to Augusta, Georgia, was 25c if the value was \$50.00 or less, and was 55c if the value was \$125.00. Suit was brought for the full value. The receipt or bill of lading contained no state-

ment of value, but a stipulation in the following words:

“In consideration of the rate charged for carrying said property, which is regulated by the value thereof and is based upon a valuation of not exceeding fifty dollars unless a greater value is declared, the shipper agrees that the value of said property is not more than fifty dollars, unless a greater value is stated herein, and that the company shall not be liable in any event for more than the value so stated, nor for more than fifty dollars if no value is stated herein.”

The express company in its answer pleaded the shipping receipt containing the above recital, and further pleaded that the plaintiff knew the facts recited in said receipt and that if he did not declare the value he could recover only on the basis of the \$50.00 valuation. A demurrer was sustained to the answer, judgment rendered for the plaintiff, which judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. This Court reversed that judgment, holding the recital contained in the receipt a binding contract under the Act to Regulate Commerce. This court, speaking through Mr. Justice Lurton, said:

“The answer relies upon the act of Congress of June 29, 1906, being an act to amend the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, as the only regulation applicable to an interstate shipment; and avers that the limitation of



value, declared in its bill of lading, was valid and obligatory under that act. This defense was denied. This constitutes the Federal question and gives this court jurisdiction. \* \* \*

“That no inquiry was made as to the actual value is not vital to the fairness of the agreement in this case. The receipt which was accepted showed that the charge made was based upon a valuation of fifty dollars unless a greater value should be stated therein. The knowledge of the shipper that the rate was based upon the value is to be presumed from the terms of the bill of lading and of the published schedules filed with the Commission. That presumption is strengthened by the fact that across the top of this bill of lading there was this statement in bold type, ‘This Company’s charge is based upon the value of the property, which must be declared by the shipper.’

“That a common carrier cannot exempt himself from liability for his own negligence or that of his servants is elementary. *York Mfg. Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad*, 3 Wall. 107; *Railroad Company v. Lockwood*, 17 Wall. 357; *Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Company*, 93 U. S. 174; *Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad*, 112 U. S. 331, 338. The rule of the common law did not limit his liability to loss and damage due to his own negligence, or that of his servants. That rule went beyond this and he was liable for any loss or damage which resulted from human agency, or any cause not the act of God or the public enemy. But the rigor of this liability might be modified through any fair, reasonable and just agreement with the shipper which did not include exemption against the negligence of the carrier or his servants. The inherent right to receive a com-

pensation commensurate with the risk involved the right to protect himself from fraud and imposition by reasonable rules and regulations, and the right to agree upon a rate proportionate to the value of the property transported.

“It has therefore become an established rule of the common law as declared by this court in many cases that such a carrier may by a fair, open, just and reasonable agreement limit the amount recoverable by a shipper in case of loss or damage to an agreed value made for the purpose of obtaining the lower of two or more rates of charges proportioned to the amount of the risk. *York Mfg. Co. v. Railroad*, 3 Wall. 107; *Railroad v. Lockwood*, 17 Wall. 357; *Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad*, cited above; *Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & W. Trans. Co.*, 117 U. S. 312, 322; *Steam. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co.*, 129 U. S. 397, 442; *New York L. E. & W. Ry. Co. v. Estill*, 147 U. S. 591, 619; *Primrose v. W. U. Tel. Co.*, 154 U. S. 1, 15; *Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Solan*, 169 U. S. 133, 135; *Calderon v. Atlas Steamship Company*, 170 U. S. 272, 278; *Pennsylvania Railroad v. Hughes*, 191 U. S. 477, 485.

“That such a carrier might fix his charges somewhat in proportion to the value of the property is quite as reasonable and just as a rate measured by the character of the shipment. The principle is that the charge should bear some reasonable relation to the responsibility and that the care to be exercised shall be in some degree measured by the bulk, weight, character and value of the property carried.

“Neither is it conformable to plain principles of justice that a shipper may understate the value of his property for the purpose of re-

ducing the rate, and then recover a larger value in case of loss. Nor does a limitation based upon an agreed value for the purpose of adjusting the rate conflict with any sound principle of public policy." (p. 508, 509, 510.)

What is above said is applicable to every phase of the controversy here.

The case of *Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. Miller*, 226 U. S. 513, was an action to recover the full value of a stallion shipped from a station in Iowa to a station in Nebraska under a limited liability livestock contract. The loss occurred in the State of Nebraska through the negligence of the carrier, and the suit was in a court of that state. The plaintiff claimed that the stallion was in fact of the value of \$2,000 and that the limitation in the contract was void under the laws of both the State of Iowa and the State of Nebraska. This court, describing the contract involved in the Miller case, uses the following language (p. 517):

"The receipt or bill of lading placed a value upon the animal of two hundred dollars, and was signed by the shipper's agent. It recited that the schedules of rates and regulations filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission provide alternative rates of charges proportioned to the value of the stock delivered for transportation, as declared by the shipper, and that the recovery of the shipper in case of loss or injury should not be in excess of the

value thus agreed upon for the purpose of determining the rate."

From this description the contract must have been a duplicate of the one involved in the case at bar. The concluding paragraph of the opinion is as follows:

"It follows that the Supreme Court of Nebraska erred in applying to the contract here involved the provisions of the Iowa statute, and of the constitution of the State of Nebraska, and in refusing to apply the exclusive regulation prescribed by Sec. 20 of the act of 1906, as that provision has been construed by this court in the Croninger case above referred to."

This court thereupon reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, and remanded the cause to be proceeded with in accordance with its opinion.

The case of *Chicago, St. Paul, Minnesota & Omaha R. Co. v. Latta*, 226 U. S. 519, was an action to recover the value of two horses lost in the course of interstate transportation. The plaintiff had executed a limited liability contract similar to the one here involved. The judgment of the Circuit Court and of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit was for the plaintiff, but reversed by this court.

The case of *Wells Fargo & Co. v. Neiman*

*Marcus Co.*, 227 U. S. 469, was an action by a shipper against an express company to recover for the loss of a package of furs of the alleged value of \$400, shipped from New York to Dallas, Texas, and never delivered. The facts touching the delivery of this shipment to the express company and the circumstances surrounding the same as stated by this court are as follows:

“The defendants in error were permitted to prove that the actual value of the furs was Four Hundred Dollars. That the consignors kept in their shipping office an express book containing blank express receipts. One of these was filled out in their office by their shipping clerk. When the wagon of the express company called at the office the agent signed the receipt, and the package was delivered to him by a boy assistant to the shipping clerk. No questions were asked as to the value and no value declared other than as shown in the receipt. It was also shown that the clerk, who wrapped and marked the package did not know the value and had no actual knowledge of the graduated rates of the express company, and that he had had nothing to do with the selling or buying of the furs. One of the consignors, Abraham Jacobson, sold the furs personally and testified as to their value. He testified that he knew if the value had been declared to be four hundred dollars, the express rate would have been higher, and that if no value was especially declared, they would be carried under the express rate applying to a package valued at not in excess of fifty dollars.”

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas found

it convenient to dispose of the issues upon a supposed question of fact in the following language (125 S. W. 615):

“The testimony raised the issue of fraud on the shipper’s part, but the law never presumes fraud, and under the evidence it is just as fair to presume that value was never thought of at the time, and that the shipper never intended to conceal value from the express company. The express company’s agent failed to perform a plain duty—that is, he failed to have the shipper declare the value—and failing in this duty we are of the opinion that the company is in no attitude to complain that the shipper did not state the value. In any event, it was a question for determination, and the trial court was justified under the evidence in finding against the express company. It can not require of a shipper the performance of a duty which was, at least, its plain duty to perform and which it failed to perform. In failing to deliver the package which it agreed to transport and deliver, it breached its contract, and thereby became liable for the full value of the articles it failed to deliver.”

Answering this contention this court said:

“But the shipper in accepting the receipt reciting that the company ‘is not to be held liable beyond the sum of fifty dollars, at not exceeding which sum said property is hereby valued, unless a different value is hereinabove stated,’ did declare and represent that the value did not exceed that sum, and did obtain a rate which he is to be assumed to have known was based upon that as the actual value. There is no substantial distinction between a value stated upon inquiry, and one agreed

upon or declared voluntarily. The rate of freight was based upon the valuation thus fixed, and the liability should not exceed the amount so made, the rate basis."

Beyond question the decision of the Commission of Appeals of the State of Oklahoma is in direct conflict with the law as stated in the above quotation.

The case of *Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl*, 227 U. S. 639, was a suit to recover the value of a shipment of household goods from Lawton, Oklahoma, to Gentry, Arkansas. The consignor signed a release valuation of \$5.00 per hundred pounds. The evidence in the record by which the plaintiff, Carl, sought to avoid the effect of this contract is summarized by this court as follows (227 U. S. 643):

"The defendant in error testified, over objection, that though he could read and write and had signed the release set out above, and had received the bill of lading, he had neither read them nor asked any questions about them, and had not been given any information as to the contents of either document and had no knowledge of the existence of the two rates. He was also allowed to testify that if he had known of the difference between the two rates, and the effect of accepting the lower, he would have paid the higher rate. There was no evidence tending to show any misrepresentation made by the company, or any deceit, or fraud, or concealment, unless

it be inferred from the fact that the company made no explanation of the rates or the contents of either the bill of lading or the release. The shipper merely said that the bill of lading was handed to him with the release, which he was asked to sign. Exceptions were taken to the rulings upon evidence and to certain parts of the charge and for the refusal of the court to grant certain requests."

In disposing of the contention that under these circumstances the plaintiff was not bound by the valuation fixed in the shipping receipt, this court uses the following language (p. 652, 653):

"The valuation declared or agreed upon as evidenced by the contract of shipment upon which the published tariff rate is applied, must be conclusive in an action to recover for loss or damage a greater sum. In saying this, we lay on one side, as not here involved, every question which might arise when it is shown that the carrier intentionally connived with the shipper to give him an illegal rate, thereby causing a discrimination or preference forbidden by the positive terms of the act of Congress and made punishable as a crime. To permit such a declared valuation to be overthrown by evidence *aliunde* the contract, for the purpose of enabling the shipper to obtain a recovery in a suit for loss or damage in excess of the maximum valuation thus fixed, would both encourage and reward undervaluations and bring about preferences and discriminations forbidden by the law. Such a result would neither be just nor conducive to sound morals or wise policies. The valuation, the shipper declares, determines the legal rate where there are two rates based upon valua-



tion. He must take notice of the rate applicable, and actual want of knowledge is no excuse. The rate when made out and filed, is notice, and its effect is not lost, although it is not actually posted in the station. *Texas & Pacific Railway v. Mugg*, 202 U. S. 242; *Chicago & A. Railway v. Kirby*, 225 U. S. 155.

“It would open a wide door to fraud and destroy the uniform operation of the published tariff rate sheets. When there are two published rates, based upon difference in value, the legal rate automatically attaches itself to the declared or agreed value. Neither the intentional nor accidental misstatement of the applicable published rate will bind the carrier or shipper. The lawful rate is that which the carrier must exact; and that which the shipper must pay. The shipper's knowledge of the lawful rate is conclusively presumed, and the carrier may not be required to surrender the goods carried upon the payment of the rate paid, if that was less than the lawful rate, until the full legal rate has been paid. *Texas & Pacific Railway v. Mugg*, *supra*. Nor is the carrier liable for damages resulting from a mistake in quoting a rate less than the full published rate. *Illinois Central Railroad v. Henderson Elevator Company*, 226 U. S. 441. Nor can a carrier legally contract with a particular shipper for an unusual service unless he make and publish a rate for such service equally open to all. *Chicago & Alton Railway Co. v. Kirby*, *supra*.

“That the valuation and the rate are dependent each upon the other is an administrative rule applied in reparation proceedings by the Interstate Commerce Commission. *Southern Oil Company v. Southern Railway Co.*, 19

I. C. C. Rep. 79; *Miller & Lux v. Southern Pacific Company*, 20 I. C. C. Rep. 129.”

As a result of the above conclusion this court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which had affirmed a judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff.

The case of *Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company v. Harriman*, 227 U. S. 357, was an action in a Texas Court by a shipper of cattle under a limited liability livestock transportation contract, similar to the one here involved, from a station in Missouri to a station in Oklahoma, to recover the value of cattle killed by negligent derailment, occurring in Missouri. The shipment consisted of a number of show cattle, and the plaintiff recovered as their full value in the trial court \$10,640.00. The judgment was affirmed by the court of last resort of the State of Texas. The contract limited the liability of the railway company to \$30.00 for each horse, stallion or bull, and \$20.00 for each cow. This court held that under the contract, the shipper had the choice of two rates, and that (p. 670, 671):

“It is not unreasonable for the purpose of graduating freight according to value to divide the particular subject of transportation into two classes, those above and those below a fixed maximum amount. No other method is

practicable, and this is a method administratively approved by the Commerce Commission.

“That the value of the cattle shipped under this valuation did greatly exceed the valuation therein represented, may be true. It only serves to show that the shipper obtained a lower rate than he was lawfully entitled to have by a misrepresentation. It is neither just nor equitable that he shall benefit by the lower rate, and then recover for a value which he said did not exist, in order to obtain that rate. Having obtained a rate based upon the declared value he is concluded, and there is no room for parol evidence to show otherwise.”

The last paragraph has special application to the facts disclosed in the case at bar.

The limitation of valuation expressed in the classification is not a mere incident to the matter of rate; it is, as is apparent from the above cases, an essential element in the determination of the rate, and the classification in the case at bar so states. The question of a maximum valuation in case of loss is essential to the advising of an alternative rate, because both the element of value and the element of damage in case of loss are properly used as determinative of the rate to be charged. The rate for the movement of the horses, in the size car used, was fixed by the classification and tariff at \$17.60, based upon a released valuation of liability, limited to \$100 for each horse.

The classification and tariff were required to be prepared and published by the Federal law. The elements going into the rate, and which may be logically annexed thereto, are, therefore, for determination by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

It is wholly immaterial whether the plaintiff herein actually knew the value, or whether he specifically agreed to it, but the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held to the contrary. The two rates and the release valuation under the lower rate is as much a part of the published tariff as the minimum carload or as the measure of so many cents per one hundred pounds. As the court said in the *Harriman* case, 227 U. S. 671:

“When the carrier graduates its rates by value and has filed its tariffs showing two rates applicable to a particular commodity or class of articles, based upon a difference in valuation, the shipper must take notice, for the valuation automatically determines which of the rates is the lawful rate.”

The opinion of the Commission of Appeals of the State of Oklahoma is based on the erroneous assumption that after the delivery to the carrier it is not competent for the carrier and consignor to agree upon a different rate than that of the unlimited common law liability for the shipment. That to permit the railway company to take the

benefit of the limited liability contract after that time, would operate to deprive the shipper of some right he had acquired by delivery of the shipment to the carrier. This is a manifestly erroneous view of the law. Any time prior to the performance of the service by the carrier, the parties are at liberty to enter into a shipping contract in accordance with any one of the options contained in the printed tariff. This option was exercised when the railway company made out and presented to the plaintiff a limited liability contract, and when the plaintiff executed and accepted the same the defendant must be taken to have contracted for an advantage not open to the courts to destroy.

This court has held in a number of cases that a shipper is charged with notice of the rate applicable, and that an actual want of knowledge is no excuse, and that the effect of such rate is not lost although not actually published in the station.

*Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Mugg*, 202 U. S. 242.

*Chicago & Alton v. Kirby*, 225 U. S. 155, 160.

*Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Carl*, 227 U. S. 639, 652.

Not only is this true, but it is clear from the facts, that the plaintiff was actually familiar with

the different classes of livestock contracts and of the existence of different rates under the different contracts. Whether he knew of the actual particular rate under the limited liability contract in the case at bar is immaterial. The result of the opinion of the Commission of Appeals of the State of Oklahoma is a clear evasion of the requirements of the Act to Regulate Commerce. Under its decision no contract limiting liability would be valid under said act unless the valuation was actually agreed upon before loading for shipment.

The result of the action of the Commission of Appeals of Oklahoma is well described by this court (*Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl*, 227 U. S. 639, 652), as follows:

“It would open a wide door to fraud and destroy the uniform operation of the published tariff rate sheets. When there are two published rates based upon difference in value, the legal rate automatically attaches itself to the declared or agreed value.”

#### **ERROR IN INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY COURT.**

The seventh instruction given by the trial court (Tr. 159), was in effect a direction to the jury to find for the plaintiff and to find against the defendant upon its contention as to limitation of liability under the shipping contract. The court told the jury that if they found that the repre-

sentation of value was not made by the plaintiff or his agents, but was arbitrarily inserted by the defendant or its agent "or printed in the said contract when Moore's name was signed to it, you are instructed that plaintiff is not bound by the limitation of \$100.00, and you will find the actual damage which plaintiff has incurred by reason of the injuries to said mare, if any, not exceeding the sum of \$1,875.00."

In as much as it is admitted that the contract was a printed one and that the values appeared therein, in print, the legal effect of this instruction was to find against the defendant upon its contention as to limitation of liability. In other words the court did not submit the question to the jury, but instructed the jury to find against the defendant. The statement of law found in the seventh instruction given by the court is as a whole a gross misstatement of the rule applicable. There is not a single paragraph of this statement that correctly applies the rule for determining the validity of limitation of liability in the shipping contract. The instruction evidence a want of appreciation of the fundamental principles controlling such liability. Notwithstanding a serious challenge of the correctness of the action of the trial court in giving this instruction the Supreme

Court of the state affirmed the judgment. The opinion of the Supreme Court of the State upon this question is found in the third paragraph of the opinion which was omitted from the transcript, and is as follows:

“(3) The record in this case clearly shows negligence on the part of the railway company. Hence the remaining question is: Was the liability of the company limited to the value fixed in the written contract? A determination of this question depends upon whether the value was fixed by the shipper and whether such value was fairly agreed upon between the shipper and the agent of the carrier. The question may properly be determined without the necessity of construing the federal statute, known as the ‘Hepburn Act.’ ” (129 Pac. 23.)

It is therefore manifest that the Supreme Court of the State adopted an interpretation of the Act to Regulate Commerce in its application to interstate shipping contracts wholly at variance with the interpretation given by this court in the case above reviewed.

In conclusion we submit that there is not in the record a scintilla of evidence to impeach, suspend or avoid the written shipping contract or bill of lading under which the livestock involved in this proceeding moved. Such written contract was freely and fairly executed, and under the de-



eisions of this court is conclusive upon the parties. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, and of the trial court be each reversed, and that the cause be remanded to be disposed of in accordance with the law as heretofore declared by this court.

S. T. BLEDSON,  
J. R. COTTINGHAM,  
GEO. M. GREEN,

*Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error.*

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No. 450.

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**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE  
UNITED STATES**

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**THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE  
RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error,**

**VS.**

**C. E. ROBINSON, Defendant in Error.**

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
**BRIEF OF DEFENDANT IN ERROR.**

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**H. H. SMITH,  
Attorney for Defendant in Error.**

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**Shawnee Printing Company, 231 N. Bell St., Shawnee, Okla.**



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**BRIEF AND STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN  
ERROR.**

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**STATEMENT.**

This action is to recover on an oral agreement to ship the mare in controversy from Kansas City, Missouri, to Lawrence, Kansas, on the 17th day of September, 1907.

The following facts may be agreed as settled in this case:

That the petition alleges (record page 20) that an oral agreement was made to ship said horses. That

the said mare in controversy was injured on account of the negligent and careless handling of said mare. That the said mare was delivered to the plaintiff in error about 4 o'clock, of the 17th of September, 1907. That there was no agreement as to the rate of freight; that no rate of freight is specified in the alleged written contract; that the rate of freight was unknown to the shippers. That the original agreement was begun by conversation of H. H. Smith, over phone with the Chief Clerk of the Santa Fe Office at Kansas City, Missouri, (R. 125) concluded by conversation with Robinson at track, and in any event at the yards at the time the horses were loaded.

See also Moore's testimony, page 64, R.

Q. Did you have a contract?

A. I did not, but presume Mr. Robinson had one.

Q. What time of the day did you load the horses?

A. We loaded them about 6 o'clock, or half past on September 16th, 1907.

Q. You say you did not secure a bill of lading or shipping contract for these horses?

A. I did not.

Page 65 R.

Q. I ask you to examine the paper I here-with hand you, which is marked by the stenographer Exhibit "A" and state whether you have seen it before?

A. I have never seen it before that I can remember of.

Q. What time of the day did you move from the Darick track to Argentine?

A. About 10 o'clock, or maybe a little before.

Q. These horses were placed in the car about 6 o'clock at Kansas City?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you have the horses at the freight office when you made arrangements to ship to Lawrence?

A. No sir, we made arrangements for the car before we brought the horses down.

Q. Did you or did Mr. Robinson, talk with more than one party at the depot at Kansas City, when you arranged for the shipping of the horses at Kansas City?

A. I do not know.

Q. You were with him all the time were you?

A. Most of the time, but I was in the car part of the time while he was up there.

Q. You knew that this shipment moved on a reduced rate of freight did you not?

A. I can't say that I did, because I didn't.

Q. Did you tell the Clerk or Agent, that you wanted the reduced rate of freight?

A. No sir.

Q. What, if anything did you say about the freight?

A. I didn't say anything that I remember.

Q. Did the Agent say anything about the freight?

A. No sir, not that I remember.

Q. Did he say anything to Mr. Robinson?

A. No sir.

Q. Did Mr. Robinson say anything to him about the freight rate?

A. No sir, not that I remember.

Q. You can read, and had the opportunity to read this contract?

A. I can read, but never had the opportunity to read this contract.

(Then the live-stock contract is attached, and shows that the valuation clause to be signed by the shipper, and set out as a declared valuation agreement, was never signed by Moore; the main body of the

same, only being signed, as appears at page 145, original record.

"I or we, hereby declare the valuation of livestock covered by the within contract, does not exceed for each mare \$———, and the reduced rates as given, are based upon such valuation.

-----  
Shipper."

At page 99 R., Robinson testifies:

"I ordered a car about noon, over the telephone. Me and Mr. Smith together went to the telephone and ordered a car from the Santa Fe road. They told us to load the horses about four \* \* \* \* it was about six before the car was ready for us to load. We loaded the horses at six o'clock.

Q. Who was this you were talking to?

A. The Agent at Kansas City.

Q. In what place?

A. In the freight depot.

Q. The Agent of the freight depot, of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe, were you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now just state what was your conversation with him?

A. I told him I had race horses, and wanted to get off on a fast freight that didn't make any stops so we wouldn't be jerked around and would be in good condition, and they told us there was a red ball freight going at 9 o'clock, and they would put us on that, and we loaded with that understanding.

Q. Where did you have this conversation with the Agent?

A. In the office. In one of their offices, there is a good many offices there; the office where they write out the bills, make up the bills and contracts.

Q. Just state what the conversation was?

A. I told him we had race horses, and wanted to get to Lawrence in good shape, and wanted to go on a through freight, and he told us about the red ball freight, and told us he would put us on that freight, never said anything about any other kind of a freight.

Q. What did you say about going to Lawrence?

A. I told him we had a race there and wanted to go on a good freight, so they would be in good shape, and didn't want them knocked around.

Q. What time did you load the horses?

A. We had them loaded at 6 o'clock.

"I spoke to the switchman, and he said he did not know there were any horses in the box cars."

"I asked the Cashier at Lawrence what the freight was. He said he didn't know what the freight was, that the Conductor that went through the night before on the red ball that was supposed to carry us, took the bill on through with him, and he would have to wait until the Conductor came back before he could get the bill, and send me what the freight was. He said if we would pay him \$20.00, if there was any difference he would collect it the next day.

At page 122 R.

Q. When was it you had the conversation with the Agent in his office?

A. Well I had two or three conversations with him, one when I first got down there with the horses.

Q. What time was that?

A. About Two. And I had one about Three, and I was in the office there several times along all the afternoon.

Q. When did you make your arrangements about shipping—getting your contract?

A. Why that was after we had loaded the horses, I would judge about 8 o'clock.

Q. Now then all of these conversations took place there in the same office building, or the same room, were they?

A. Well I was talking to the Chief Clerk upstairs.

Q. You talked with the Chief Clerk upstairs?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Was that the same Clerk that signed this contract with you?



A. Oh no this was the Chief Clerk, its was a different department altogether.

Q. Is he the same man as the Agent?

A. No.

Q. What did you talk to him about?

A. I went up to talk with him about ordering the car, and about when it would be spotted and about one thing and another.

Q. Do you know whether he was the Agent of the Company or not?

A. He said he was.

Q. Did you have any conversation with the Chief Clerk at the time you signed the contract?

A. No sir.

At Lawrence, Kansas, page 115 R.

Q. Did you sign any freight receipt?

A. No sir, I never signed any receipts there myself at all.

Q. And didn't get any?

A. No I didn't.

Q. Do you know just how much the freight charges were on this shipment?

A. Yes sir.

Q. How much?

A. \$20.00 besides the \$2.60 they collected afterwards.

Q. Do you know who paid the \$2.60?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Who?

A. Mr. H. H. Smith.

At page 117 R. on cross examination, Mr. Robinson again testifies that he had the several conversations with the Agent, and no contract and no rate of freight was agreed upon, and none requested.

Q. Did he say anything about giving you a reduced rate or, about valueing the mare at \$100.00?

A. He said nothing about a reduced rate, or about the value of the mare.

Q. Did you ask him anything about giving you a reduced rate?

A. I never asked him for any reduced rate.

Q. Did the billing clerk or the Agent, or the Chief Clerk, or any of the parties you talked with about this shipment, see these horses at any time prior to the loading of them?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Who was it?

A. There was a man on the platform who had charge of loading freight.

Q. Did he see them?

A. He saw the horses—saw us load them.

Q. Did you tell the Agent they were race horses?

A. Yes sir.

Q. What was it?

A. I told him what kind of horses they were—told him they were race horses, that I was going to the races with them, I wanted to get there in time and in good shape, wanted to go on a good train, a fast train that made no stops, and made arrangements for them to go on the through freight called the red ball.

Q. You didn't make any inquiry did you?

A. About what?

Q. Any rates?

A. I never ask them what the rates were, I was going to ask at the other end, we always paid at the other end.

Q. You didn't ask him anything about shipment, did you?

A. No sir, I didn't ask him for any reduced rate.

Q. You can read?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Had an opportunity to read this contract?

A. Not before it was signed, no.

Why?

A. Because the billing clerk in putting it out for me to sign, holds it down there, there is four or five places to sign, and he takes the bill in his fingers, and says "sign here" and turns it over and says "sign here," and I knew I had to sign a bill in order to get the horses shipped.

Q. It didn't make any difference to you what you signed?

A. Yes, it did make a difference to me what I signed.

Q. Did you ask him to let you read it?

A. No sir I didn't.

At page 125 R. he testifies to the agreement, and conversations had with reference to the shipment.

Smith testifies that his recollection was that he paid \$20.00, and then \$2.60, freight.

It runs in my mind it was twenty, but it could have been possible I gave him a twenty dollar bill and he gave me back some change, but I think it was \$20.00. Part of the sum was collected at the time, and the balance of it was collected at he track.

Du Bois, the Agent, of the plaintiff in error, testifies:

Q. Did you tell him about a reduced rate before you took the contract? Did he say anything to you about wanting a reduced rate?

A. No sir.

Q. No conversation whatever was there about a reduced rate, Mr. Du Bois?

A. No sir.

Q. What did he say when he said he wanted to ship those horses?

A. Well, I cannot state the conversation word for word, he probably came and asked for a contract.

Q. Did you have any conversation prior to the signing of the contract?

A. No sir.

Q. When did he sign this contract?

A. Why, I think it was about 8 o'clock in the evening.

Q. Two hours after you went on duty?

A. Yes sir.

Q. You go on at six?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Horses had already been loaded then, had they?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did they tell you what kind of a freight they wanted to ship on, what kind of a train they wanted to ship these horses on?

A. No sir.

Q. You say Mr. Robinson and Mr. Moore, never said anything to you about going out on this train?

A. No sir.

Q. Did you say anything to them about going out on this train?

A. No sir.

Q. How does the Conductor get the billing?

A. From the yards at Argentine.

Q. How do you get the billing there?

A. By messenger boys.

Q. You say Mr. More and Mr. Robinson got the billing about 8 o'clock?

A. About 8 o'clock.

Q. Horses were then already loaded?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Had he made any arrangements with you to ship those horses before that time?

A. No sir.

Q. You don't know of any solicitation on their part for a reduced rate?

A. No sir.

Q. Do you know of anybody that had a conversation with Mr. Robinson or Mr. Moore, prior to the loading of these horses?

A. No sir.

At page 157 R. Agent J. E. Hult testifies:

Q. You required always didn't you on the Santa Fe at the time you were employed, when a shipper made those shipments, before he could make the shipment, that he must sign one of those contracts of affreightment?

A. You mean we wouldn't accept a shipment without executing a live-stock contract?

Q. Yes sir?

A. No sir, we would not do that.

Q. The shipper would be compelled to sign one before he got his shipment?

A. Before we accepted the shipment.

Now it will be apparent from this testimony, that the horses were loaded and shipped and all arrangements made, and the matter concluded before any alleged contract was submitted. The horses had moved to the Darick track, with Moore in charge. Robinson remained to go to Lawrence in another way, and when he found the horses had not gone, he proceeded with them. This contract was put up to him after the horses were moved. He had no opportunity to read it. It had in fact no reference to the shipment, so far as the original agreement and understanding was concerned. Neither the agent nor the Chief Clerk denied the testimony of either Robinson, Moore or Smith, that final arrangements were made by phone and in person, and the horses moved out on that agreement. If the contract had been presented to either Mr. Smith, or Moore, while there, in good faith, it probably would not have been signed, when its contents were read, as Mr. Smith, owned two of these horses that were shipped. There is no testimony in this record that the rate of freight was \$17.60, except a receipt prepared after the Railway Company knew that the horses were injured in the yards, before they arrived at Lawrence. The freight receipt was a device to make out their case, and the testimony goes to show that the local rate of freight was paid, \$22.50. The Agent at Kansas City, and the Chief Clerk who com-

pleted the agreement, before Du Bois came into service, or on duty, neither of them deny the oral agreement. Du Bois testifies that no arrangements were made with him about shipping horses, and no conversation occurred about shipping them. The Jury had a right to conclude that the purported written contract, from all of its appearances, was not properly signed, and was not a bona fide agreement, and was not within the contemplation of the parties, and the rate of freight collected, was not the rate of freight agreed on, if any at all, was agreed on, as consideration for limited liability.

It must be assumed therefore that the parties to the agreement understood that the horses were race horses, and that they would pay the regular rate of freight. This clearly appears from the evidence, and the second thought of the company, when they knew these valuable horses were injured, was to prepare a freight rate that would fit the alleged contract exacted of Robinson. The plaintiff in error must first show that the shipment was not as per individual horse, but by the car and under the released rate. This was not shown to the satisfaction of the jury. At least it was a controverted question.

The position of the plaintiff in error has constantly shifted in this case. The plaintiff in error contended that the oral agreement was a special agreement, and prohibited by the Hepburn Act under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of *Chicago & Alton Ry. Co. v. Kirby*, 225 U. S. 155. It could not sustain this position in the

Supreme Court, for the reason that there was no evidence to support the contention, that the horses were to be delivered at a special time, and for a special consideration. Its contention is stated, in its brief for a re-hearing as follows:

"This action was brought by the defendant in error in assumpsit against the Railway Company, not upon the common law obligation of the Railway Company to carry within a reasonable time without negligent delay, but upon the red ball freight, and deliver them at Lawrence, Kansas, in time for the races. Is this contract valid, or is it a method of dealing which brings about the forbidden result which was intended by the Interstate Commerce Act? Assuming that there was at Kansas City at the time of the shipment in question, a competitor, etc., \* \* \* \* the competitor sues the railway company upon the written contract. The defendant in error sues upon what has been termed the special contract. The competitor recovers \$100.00 a head for his horses, and the defendant in error recovers \$1500.00, a head for his horses. The rate of freight charged and collected in both cases, was the same. Which contract is valid, the special contract, open to the public in general, with his competitor. The contract for special delivery upon which alone this suit was brought, is an unlawful discrimination, and therefore void. The contract set out in the petition being for a special service, not noted in, but, on the contrary, prohibited by the published tariffs, even if made, was void as being in violation of the section of the Interstate Commerce Act, prohibiting discrimination, and no recovery could be had thereon. The petition of the defendant in error leaves no uncertainty that it was upon a special agreement for special service. Here in this case the attempt is made to recover upon a special contract, that is unauthorized by the tariffs, which is discriminatory in its character, and in the teeth of the prohibitions of the Act of Congress.

See Supreme Court of the United States, in *Chicago & Alton v. Kirby*, 225 U. S. 155.

"The precise question was before the Supreme Court of the United States in the Kirby case; which was an action for the delay and damage to a shipment of horses."

It thus appears that the plaintiff in error for the first time has now abandoned the position that this was a special oral agreement, seeking here to set up that there was no special or oral agreement. It could not support its position in respect, to special contract, because the evidence was controverted, as to the amount of freight paid. There is not a word of testimony in the record that the special service of being placed on the red ball freight was demanded, or that the horses were to be placed on any special train or delivered at any special time, but a mere offer was made to give such service by the plaintiff in error; and therefore we have merely the breach of the oral agreement, and the plaintiff in error, if it did not collect the amount of freight which it was entitled to collect, when it collected \$22.60 instead of \$17.60, its released rate, is remitted to the Court to collect the additional freight that it was entitled to collect under the Hepburn Act, which according to counsel's brief would be 33 1-3 per cent, or \$26.40. Can plaintiff in error present for the first time a new theory to this Court?



## THE ISSUE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA.

The issue then in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, recognized by the plaintiff in error, was that the shipment moved on an oral agreement, but that this agreement being in reference to an interstate shipment constituted a special agreement, requiring that the horses be delivered within a particular time, and on a special train. It failed to sustain this theory, and the Court accepted the only plausible theory, that is, that the shipment moved upon an oral agreement, which constituted a breach of the Railway Company's obligation to carry safely, and within a reasonable time. The horses were not weighed which, according to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri, is conclusive that the alleged written contract was not in good faith.

See; *Leas v. Quincy Ry. Co.*, 136 S. W. 963;  
*Burns v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co.*, 132 S. W. 1;  
*Grant v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co.*, 132 S. W. 311.

We are aware that this Court has decided several times that the signing of the contract was conclusive on the shipper as to the terms contained, but in each of these decisions the Court clearly says that if any deceit or fraud, of whatever kind and nature, is practiced on the shipper, that these facts of fraud or deceit may be shown in the case, and the Jury are the rightful judges of the probative value of the same; and the contract in that class of cases would not be binding. Now we have here presented, the fact that

the shipment had moved; that Moore had never been asked to sign a contract, and that after the shipment had been moved, a new man comes on duty and informs Robinson that it is not necessary for Moore to sign the contract but that he (Robinson) may sign it, and Robinson believing that he is signing a mere passport, signs said contract in one part of the same, **but does not sign the valuation clause**, and this is evidence that the purported contract was not treated as a contract at all; and it was shown by the evidence that the men paid their fare, and this is a fact contrary to the contention of the plaintiff in error, which, if the shipment was made under the tariff rate now contended for, one man would have been passed free, in charge of the horses. The evidence further shows that the horses were shipped at the local rate, and that the freight was to be paid at whatever that rate was, for that class of horses, and that \$22.60, was required of the shippers, and paid, while a receipt is put in evidence, issued at and made out at destination, which only shows \$17.60, the rate contended for. The Jury had a right to believe that this \$17.60, was inserted in this receipt to be used for the purposes of this suit, in case there was any controversy by litigation. These are facts and circumstances which went to the Jury, on whether or not the shipment moved by oral agreement, or by a written contract. Plaintiff in error for the first time seriously contends that the shipment moved otherwise than by oral agreement. H. H. Smith, who was interested in the shipment, having two horses himself in the shipment, first made

the arrangements for the shipment, and the Company was informed that two of these horses, in all probability belonged to him; had seen these horses loaded and the shipment depart from the point of loading to the Darick track, a number of miles from the place of loading, to be distributed to the Argentine yards, on the Kansas side. Smith had left the point of shipment for some time when the alleged contract was put out to Robinson. There is no evidence that Robinson had any actual authority, and there is no evidence that Moore was ever asked to sign a contract himself. It is true Robinson testifies that he had authority in a general way to sign Moore's name, but there is no evidence in this case that Moore authorized Robinson to sign this contract, or knew anything about it. As matter of fact three of these horses belonged to H. H. and S. H. Smith, the former an attorney of experience, and the latter an attorney for the Interstate Commerce Commission. It is very clear that H. H. Smith who was present was advising the shipment on the oral agreement, and for the short distance, expected to pay the rate of freight for horses of that class. The contract put in evidence itself, shows that the Agent or the Clerk at said point had no authority to bind the Company on a valuation exceeding \$800.00; then, if the agreement was bona fide, how would he have proceeded under that written contract to bind the shippers, without authority. Every person conversed with at the point of shipment, who had and who assumed to have authority, knew these were valuable race horses, and under the Hart case,

the Company would be guilty of collusion, if its position is correct, knowing the value of the horses, to have permitted a shipment under the purported released liability.

**THE FACTS FOUND BY THE SUPREME COURT  
OF OKLAHOMA, ARE CONCLUSIVE ON THIS  
COURT.**

The Supreme Court found that the shipment moved on an oral agreement, and that no contract was executed until after the shipment had moved; and that this contract was procured by deceit and fraud and were not shipped on a fast freight but left at Argentine. The Jury and the trial court and the Supreme Court found that the rate of freight paid, was in excess of the rate claimed under a released liability contract. Therefore there was no consideration for any such contract, even though it was bona fide and in good faith. An oral contract is just as binding as a written contract, and is not in contravention of the Hepburn Act, or the Carmack amendment, so that the only question presented in this case is as determined by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, whether the real shipment that the minds of the parties met on was according to the terms of the oral agreement, or according to the terms of the written agreement. It appears clear from the evidence in this case that the understanding was that the shipment was to be by the oral agreement and the horses were to move on fast freight, and, that the parties were ready and willing to pay the rate of freight necessary for this class of stock.

It appears that \$5.00 more than the rate named in the contract, procured from Robinson by deceit, was collected. This amount was collected also without any reference to any contract or any rates specified in the contract. The plaintiff in error is then remitted to an action to collect whatever the residue is, if any. The plaintiff in error contends in its brief that the rate at \$17.60, would be 33 1-3 per cent less than the regular rate. If this is true then, the plaintiff in error should have collected \$26.40, instead of \$22.60. Could it be contended that S. H. Smith, the owner of one of the horses in question, should be bound by an agreement procured after all arrangements were made and contract completed for the shipment of one of these horses? Could H. H. Smith be bound by an unauthorized contract executed by a person unauthorized after the shipment had moved, and as testified by J. E. Hult, the shipment would not move unless one was executed at some time before the horses reached their destination or until the shipment was completed?

This Court has heretofore determined that the Supreme Court of the United States will not inquire into the facts, but depend upon the findings of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Hilton v. Dickman, 10 U. S. 165;  
United States v. Burchard, 125 U. S. 178.  
Carter v. ----- Ocean Ins. Co., 554

Rule 6 of this Court 2.

Where the jurisdiction of this Court is doubtful, a writ of error will not be awarded.

N. Y. & N. E. Ry. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 555;  
So. Ry. Co. v. Carson, 194 U. S. 136.

The Interstate Commerce Act does not contemplate either a written or an oral contract, and neither has been legislated about by Congress, and until Congress exercises authority over these contracts, they will be regulated by the law of the place where they are made. An oral contract is valid in Missouri, in reference to an interstate shipment, so long as its terms do not contravene the provisions of the Act.

Railroad Company v. Abilene Cotton Co., 204 U. S. 426;

Merchants Cotton Press Co. v. Insurance Co., 151 U. S. 368.

The Supreme Court of the United States will not take jurisdiction of a case decided on a theory not necessary to determine a federal question.

Case Mfg. Co. v. Soxman, 138 U. S. 431.

If the defendant in error and the parties shipping with him, could not make a valid oral agreement and rely upon it, shipping out on a fast freight, having the rate of freight collected at the point of destination, as the record shows it was collected here, then such contract must be considered invalid. If this fact was submitted to the Jury and found to be the contract, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma found it to be the contract before this Court can take jurisdiction, it must determine that there are no facts in the record to support such a finding. Otherwise this Court would have no jurisdiction.

Atlantic Coast Line Co. v. Riverside Mill Co., 40 S. P. A.

Hammond v. Whittredge, 204 U. S. 547.

"As to when the question may be raised, see Forbes v. Virginia State Council, 216 U. S. 399.

Where the disposition of a Federal question was not necessary to the determination of the cause and the judgment is based on a distinct ground or grounds broad enough to sustain it, over which this court has no jurisdiction, the writ of error cannot be maintained."

Rogers v. Jones, 214 U. S. 204.

See also; *Leathe v. Thomas*, 207 U. S. 93;

*California Powder Works v. Davis*, 151 U. S. 393;

*Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Shannon*, 223 U. S. 468.

Questions of fact found by State courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court of the United States.

*King v. West Virginia*, 216 U. S. 100;

*Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas*, 212 U. S. 97;

*Chrisman v. Miller*, 197 U. S. 319.

The cases cited by counsel for plaintiff in error, are not applicable, because, in all of the cases cited, the question presented was that the shipment moved upon the written contract, but there was ~~no~~ bona fide valuation.

In this case it has been determined by the findings of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma that the shipment moved on the oral agreement, and that a greater rate of freight was collected than that required under the purported contract, and the horses not shipped in a reasonable time but negligently injured.

We quote from the opinion of the Court:

"Now in the case at bar, up to and including a complete consignment and surrender of control of stock by the shipper, the starting of the shipment in transit and the assumption of liability for negligence by the carrier, every move made, every step taken towards the shipment, was under and pursuant to a parole contract. Under these circumstances the shipper had the right to assume that his stock would not be grossly misused, and

to act on the faith thus inspired, and rely on the rights thereby accrued to him, and the carrier will not be permitted to take away those rights and relieve itself of the liability thus incurred, without having given him a fair opportunity to assent thereto. The record discloses that such opportunity was not given. Therefore the verbal contract must control. There being no agreement in the verbal contract as to the extent of limitation of liability, the carrier is held to its common law liability for its negligence."

The Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed this holding in the case of the Railway Co. v. Kirby, 226 U. S. 155, wherein it is said:

"The implied agreement of the common carrier is to carry safely, and deliver at destination within a reasonable time. It is otherwise when the action is for a breach of a contract to carry within a particular time, etc."

The submission as a question of fact as to whether the shipment moved by oral contract, or the written contract was a question of practice in this jurisdiction, and is not reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States.

"Matters of practice in inferior courts do not constitute subjects upon which error can be assigned in the appellate courts."

Parsons v. Bedford, 7 Law Ed. 732;

Earnshaw v. United States, 146 U. S. 60.

As to whether there was any evidence, and as to whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, is a matter for the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to determine, and not the Supreme Court of the United States.



The Francis Wright, 105 U. S. 381.

And this is so when the facts are submitted to a Referee or a State court.

Boggs v. Mining Co., 18 Law Ed. 245.

The trial Court submitted to the Jury, the question whether or not, at the time the oral agreement was made, if they believed, that Robinson represented the value of said mare to the Agent of the plaintiff in error and said Agent relied on said representation of value so made, and granted by reason thereof to the plaintiffs, a rate less than the regular rate for this class of shipments, that it would be the duty of the Jury to limit the findings on damages to the sum of \$100.00 as contended for in the answer of the plaintiff in error.

The statement of the plaintiff in error that this was equivalent to directing a verdict, is not true, because if the Jury believed that such representations were made, then Robinson would be bound, provided he secured a reduced rate. If he did not secure a reduced rate, and paid \$22.60, as the evidence shows, then he would not be bound by such a limitation, if any in fact, was had in the contract on which the shipment was made. They had the right to determine on what contract the shipment was made. They had the right to determine that the oral agreement was not merged into the purported written agreement.

Mr. Du Bois testified, he being the Agent of the plaintiff in error:

Q. No conversation whatever was there about a reduced rate, Mr. Du Bois?

A. No sir.

If the case was decided upon some ground where it was not necessary to bring the Federal statute into controversy, then no Federal question is presented, and the Supreme Court of the United States, has no jurisdiction.

See; *Lawler v. Walker*, 14 Howard, 149; 14 Law Ed. 364, and cases there cited.

Also, it is not sufficient that the Supreme Court can say that it ought to have decided some Federal question, or that it might have decided one.

See, *The Victory*, 18 Law. Ed. 848.

It must appear that the State Court could not have reached its judgment without expressly deciding the Federal matter.

*Bachtel v. Wilson*, 204 U. S. 36.

If the Statute is only collaterly involved, the Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction.

*Candee v. York*, 168 U. S. 642;

*Williams v. Oliver*, 13 Law. Ed. 921.

If the case is disposed of upon non-federal grounds, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction.

*Harrison v. Morton*, 171 U. S. 38;

*Klinger v. Missouri*, 20 Law. Ed. 635;

*Chicago Railway Co. v. Illinois*, 50 Law. Ed. 596.

All of the cases cited by the plaintiff in error were presented to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, and the questions involved were thoroughly discussed on the application of the plaintiff in error for a rehearing. The *Croninger* case and the *Kirby* case, were especially relied upon in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, but the Court held that there was no evidence to

sustain the contention that the oral agreement was a special contract, as contended by the plaintiff in error. That the Croninger case had no application because that was a case where the contract was not drawn in question, and it was conceded that the contract pleaded was made, but was not fairly entered into, there being no agreed valuation; that the question presented here was whether or not from the facts the shipment moved upon the oral agreement and the stock had departed according to its terms. If so, then there was no limitation of liability. In clear support of this contention, it was shown that \$22.60, was collected, and the fare of the men were paid.

When the plaintiff in error failed to ship the horses on a through freight and converted them into its own yards, there to be grossly injured, and took 18 hours, after loading, to deliver them 50 miles, can this Court say that the oral agreement was breached, but the breach is healed because of the attempted substitution of a contract by a Clerk, who came on duty after the shipment had left and after the contract had ben completed, and put on this young man a purported contract when he refused to sign the valuation clause in it.

We respectfully submit to the Court that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is correct, and that it must be affirmed, and the writ denied, with 10 per cent damages for delay.

Respectfully Submitted,

H. H. SMITH,

Attorney for Defendant in Error.

11  
Justice Supreme Court, U. S.  
FILED.

AUG 12 1913

JAMES H. MCKENNEY,

CLERK.

IN THE  
SUPREME COURT  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES

The Atchison, Topeka and  
Santa Fe Railway Com-  
pany,

*Plaintiff in Error.*

vs.

C. E. Robinson,

*Defendant in Error.*

No. **450.**

H. H. SMITH,  
*Attorney for Defendant in Error.*



IN THE  
SUPREME COURT  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES

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The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Com- pany,	}	No. ....
<i>Plaintiff in Error.</i>		
vs.		
C. E. Robinson,	}	
<i>Defendant in Error.</i>		

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**MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM.**

**At October, 1913, Term.**

Comes now the defendant in error by his counsel appearing in that behalf, and moves the Court to dismiss the writ of error herein, for the reason that there can now be no actual controversy involving the real and substantial rights between the parties to the record, because this Court has

passed on all material questions raised therein, and determined them adversely to the contention of the plaintiff in error; and further, for the reason that by virtue of the determination of this Court, said writ of error is without merit; and further, for the reason that by virtue of the determination of this court, this said writ of error and proceedings thereunder remain only for the purpose of delay.

And the said defendant in error in support of said motion, alleges and says, that the defendant in error brought said action originally on the carrier's breach of its obligation to carry within a reasonable time, and exercise reasonable care in the handling of said shipment, and the oral understanding therein entered into at said time in the City of Kansas City, was found by the jury to be the real contract between the parties to the shipment, the plaintiff in error and the defendant in error herein; and that said oral agreement was one not merged into, any legal and binding written agreement; and that by the terms of said oral understanding, no limitation was expressed on the liability of the value of the mare shipped, and no rate of freight was agreed upon, and none paid at

said time, but that at the destination of the shipment, without any express rate of freight being agreed upon, except the rate which applied to race horses of value, which rate was collected by the plaintiff in error, of the defendant in error; and if, according to the determination of said jury, and the finding of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, the said rate so collected, was not the rate in existence that governed said shipment, then the said plaintiff in error is remitted to a collection of the difference between said rate so collected, and the said rate governing said shipment, and the said defendant in error has not objected or refused to pay said rate, and on the contrary, stands ready and willing so to do; and further, that the plaintiff in error has never demanded or brought any action to recover said sum due on said shipment, if any there is.

That the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, found and adjudged that the issue presented under the pleadings to the jury in the trial of said cause, was, that said shipment moved on said oral understanding, and no other contract valid or binding on the defendant in error was made; and further, the said Supreme Court of the State of



Oklahoma, found and adjudged that the plaintiff in error by its answer pleaded, that the contract was made in the State of Missouri, and was governed by Missouri law, which issue was joined by the defendant in error, and the said issue so joined was supported by proof of the plaintiff in error and defendant in error, and submitted to the jury. That the submission of this issue was purely a question of practice, and may not be interfered with by this Court. That the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the judgment of the trial court upon the issue so presented by the plaintiff in error and joined by the defendant in error, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court entered thereon, so that no federal question was presented in the determination of the merits of this case, either in the trial court, or in the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, but that the same was decided exclusive of any federal question, and upon an issue presented by the plaintiff in error itself, making it unnecessary to construe the "Hepburn Act." This being so, this Court is without jurisdiction to enter of record and determine any question involved in this cause, except as to the jurisdiction of this Court, and

upon the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, on the facts, that no federal question was involved, this Court is bound, and cannot examine the record as to the facts, but will be guided by the finding and judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma; and the defendant in error by counsel aforesaid, also moves the Court to affirm the said judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, from which Court said writ of error was certified, because, although the record in said cause may show that this Court has jurisdiction in the premises, yet, it is manifest by the decisions and determinations of this Court, now clearly governing this case, and the question on which the jurisdiction of this Court depends, is now so frivolous as not to need further argument or authority, or abstract of the record, and that this case is now pending in this Court for delay only. That the defendant in error have judgment for costs and 10 per cent damage for hinderance and delay.

H. H. SMITH,  
*Attorney for Defendant in Error.*

Messrs. Cottingham & Bledsoe,  
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,  
Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error:

Please take notice that on the.....day of  
October, 1913, or as soon thereafter as counsel can  
be heard, a motion of which the foregoing is a  
copy, will be submitted to the Supreme Court of  
the United States, for the decision of the Court  
thereon, on the grounds set out in said motion.

Annexed hereto is a copy of the brief or argu-  
ment in support of said motion.

.....  
Attorney for C. E. Robinson, de-  
fendant in error in the trial court  
and for the purpose of this  
motion.

Service of the foregoing motion to dismiss or  
affirm, and the annexed brief or argument, ac-  
knowledgeed this the.....day of July, 1913.

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
Counsel for the Atchison, Topeka  
& Santa Fe Railway Company,  
Plaintiff in Error.

The Atchison, Topeka and  
Santa Fe Railway Com-  
pany,

*Plaintiff in Error.*

vs.

C. E. Robinson,

*Defendant in Error.*

**BRIEF OF DEFENDANT IN ERROR ON MOTION  
TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM.**

This case is now before this Court on a motion by the defendant in error to dismiss or affirm. From the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, error was certified to this Court. The error assigned is a pretended construction of a federal statute, namely: "Hepburn Act."

### **STATEMENT OF THE CASE.**

This action was begun in the District Court of Lincoln County, Oklahoma, on the 29th day of July, 1908, by C. E. Robinson to recover of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, damages for injury to the racing mare, Nancy Alden, from Kansas City, Missouri, to Lawrence, Kansas, in 1908; trial by jury was held April 20th, 1911, and verdict for plaintiff returned in the sum of Fifteen Hundred (\$1500.00) Dollars. Motion for new trial overruled; error certified by Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in 1912.

### **ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR.**

THE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR ARE BROADLY, THAT THE SHIPMENT MOVED UNDER THE HEPBURN ACT, BEING INTER-STATE COMMERCE TRAFFIC, AND THAT THE COMMERCE ACT DID NOT RECOGNIZE VERBAL CONTRACTS. That a valid contract of shipment was signed by C. E. Robinson for H. F. Moore which granted to him a reduced rate as consideration for a limitation of liability, which limitation of valuation was to the sum of One Hundred Dollars, in case of damage to the mare, no rate of freight being expressed in the contract. That the trial court erred in admitting testimony of the actual value of the mare.

## **THE PLEADINGS.**

The defendant in error filed petition relying on the oral understanding between the parties hereto, and for breach of the common law obligation to CARRY SAFELY and WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME. Plaintiff in error filed demurrer, which was overruled, and then it filed answer setting up that the contract entered into was a Missouri contract, and was controlled by Missouri law.

Thereafter defendant in error filed motion to strike which was overruled, then plaintiff in error filed an amendment to original answer setting up that the interstate act controlled the shipment, still contending for the defense of a Missouri contract controlled by Missouri law, and a contract of shipment controlled by the commerce act. The court overruled motion to strike, and defendant in error filed reply. Plaintiff in error relied on the original answer to which defendant in error joined issue, and, on the trial of said action, both introduced evidence and depositions on the law of Missouri, according to the original answer, and



plaintiff in error also introduced evidence as to the interstate commerce rate, to which defendant in error objected, principally on the ground that the issue presented did not make it necessary or competent to prove said rate, it not being pleaded or shown that the shipment was a carload shipment. The trial court submitted the issue thus raised to the jury, that the jury might determine as matter of fact whether the shipment moved under the written contract pleaded in plaintiff in error's answer, or whether the same moved under oral understanding, set out in defendant in error's petition, and the issues were so made. The question of fraud or arbitrary exaction being set up against the written contract pleaded, which contained limitation clause. The trial court submitted the issue of its execution to the jury and the bona fideness of the transaction—the jury found against the written contract, and returned a verdict for the actual damage to the mare and in favor of the oral agreement. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, for its determination, and the finding of every issue made in the trial court was affirmed as to the facts and law.

The following objection, page 228 case made

of defendant in error to plaintiff in error's evidence, state the ground of fraud:

**Findings on the Pleadings by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.**

"Numerous errors are assigned by appellant, but all are disposed of under the two general propositions, viz:

First: Whether the railway company was entitled to judgment on the pleadings, having set up a written contract, the execution of which was not denied under oath; second: Were the provisions in the written contract valid and were they binding on the shipper?

As to the first proposition, the plaintiff did not RELY ON A WRITTEN CONTRACT of any character, nor did he sue for violation of the terms of a written contract, but alleged the shipment to have been made under a definite VERBAL CONTRACT IN WHICH NO REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THE FREIGHT RATE OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES, and sought recovery on the grounds of the gross negligence of the company in the manner of handling the shipment. This presented the material issues to be tried, a determination of which in favor of plaintiff would entitle him to recover and which were joined by defendant in its general denial of the allega-

tions in the petition. The plaintiff therefore was entitled to have these issues tried and determined, and in the trial of same was entitled to all the competent, material evidence at his command in support of his view of such issues. Therefore, the setting up of a written contract by defendant did not preclude the plaintiff from his right to have such issues determined, nor entitle defendant to judgment on the pleadings, notwithstanding plaintiff had failed to deny the execution of the contract under oath. If plaintiff had stated a cause of action, which in our opinion was done, he had a right to have same determined upon the theory he had chosen—upon the grounds of his own choice. And, not relying on a written contract, not suing on a written contract, but claiming the shipment to have been made under a verbal agreement, and relying for recovery on the carrier's common-law liability for negligence, he should not be required to abandon his chosen grounds and to try his case upon a different theory by the setting up of a written contract, unless such contract constituted a *prima facie* defense to his action. Whether it did or not depended upon the question that it was the only contract, which question was one of fact, and

was completely answered by a determination of the issues tendered in the petition, that the shipment was made under a verbal contract." Hence, the decisive issues tendered by both the petition and the written contract being disposed of by a determination of the issues presented by the petition, it is immaterial whether the execution of the written contract be denied under oath or not, or whether or not plaintiff's reply was verified. It was held by this court in *Flesher v. Callahan*, 32 Okl. 283, 122 Pac. 489, that section 5648, Comp. Laws 1909, "providing that allegations of the execution of written instruments and indorsements thereon shall be taken as true unless the denial thereof be verified by affidavit, requires the verification of the denial of the execution only." The execution of the instrument in question here was not in issue. Therefore it was not error to overrule defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings."

Extract from opinion of said Court, 129 Pac. 22, verified by original opinion.

*Findings of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 129 Pac. 23, verified by original opinion, as to the facts tendered in issue in the trial court.*

“The record in this case clearly shows negligence on the part of the railway company. Hence the remaining question is: Was the liability of the company limited to the value fixed in the written contract? *A determination of this question depends upon whether the value was fixed by the shipper and whether such value was fairly agreed upon between the shipper and the agent of the carrier.* This question may properly be determined without the necessity of construing the federal statute, known as the “Hepburn Act.”

The question here is not a question of law as to whether the carrier had authority to limit its common-law liability to a value fixed by the shipper and fairly agreed upon between the shipper and carrier, but is a question of fact whether such value was fixed by the shipper and whether it was fairly agreed upon between the parties. If, as a matter of fact, such value was not fixed by the shipper and was not fairly agreed upon by the parties, but was arbitrarily printed in the contract by the carrier without the knowledge or even the implied assent of the shipper, then the carrier's liability is not limited to such value and there is no necessity for a construction of the federal act.

Therefore the issue, being one of fact, was properly determinable by the jury, from the evidence, and we think the verdict was fairly and reasonably supported by the testimony submitted. But it is contended by the company that the court erred in admitting testimony which tended to vary the terms of the written contract. If there had been no other issue to be tried, except the validity of the written contract, the contention might be well taken. But there were other issues independent of the written contract, and decisive of plaintiff's right of recovery, on which plaintiff relied and had a right to have determined and a right to introduce any testimony relevant, competent, and material to a determination of such issues, and was offered for such purpose, it was not error to admit same although it may have had the consequent effect of varying the terms of the written contract; for, as stated in the discussion of the first proposition, plaintiff had tendered the issue, "that the shipment was made under a verbal agreement and that the company was guilty of gross negligence" and relied on these grounds for recovery. THE DEFENDANT BY GENERAL DENIAL, JOINED THESE ISSUES, thereby giving plain-

tiff the right to have them determined, although the conclusion may have followed, as a logical sequence, that the terms of the written contract were not fairly entered into. C. R. I. & P Ry Co., v. mission of evidence.

As to whether the printed contract superseded all others, or whether the verbal agreement was merged in the printed contract, THE EVIDENCE WAS CONCLUSIVE THAT A DEFINITE AND COMPLETE AGREEMENT IN REFERENCE TO THE SHIPMENT WAS MADE OVER THE PHONE by the shipper AND THE AGENT OF THE CARRIER WITHOUT ANY MENTION OR REFERENCE TO THE RATE, THE VALUE OF THE STOCK, FURTHER THAN THAT IT WAS RACING STOCK, OR TO ANY LIMITATION OF LIABILITY OR ANY MENTION OF THE FACT THAT A WRITTEN OR PRINTED CONTRACT WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE TESTIMONY OFFERED BY DEFENDANT SUBSTANTIATES THIS VIEW AND CORROBORATES THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF ON THOSE POINTS. It also shows clearly that the stock was loaded, the car closed and tagged, "Red Ball" THE SHIPMENT fully delivered TO

THE CARRIER AND CONTROL OF SAME COMPLETELY SURRENDERED BY THE SHIPPER, AND THAT AFTER THE CAR HAD BEEN MOVED FROM THE PLACE OF LOADING AND STARTED IN TRANSIT ALL PURSUANT TO THE VERBAL AGREEMENT. SOME TWO HOURS THEREAFTER, THE AGENT OF THE COMPANY PRESENTED TO THE SHIPPER THE PRINTED CONTRACT, WITHOUT CALLING HIS ATTENTION TO ITS SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND WITHOUT INFORMING HIM THAT IT CONTAINED provisions directly at variance with the terms of THE VERBAL AGREEMENT, and without giving him an opportunity to examine its contents and exercise his right of choice.

Under these circumstances, having made a definite and complete agreement as to the shipment, without mention of rate or limitation of liability, having surrendered certain of his rights, and certain rights having accrued to him under such agreement, it was reasonable for him to assume that the printed contract presented to him under such circumstances contained no provisions which would take away the rights already accrued. A.



T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Dill, 48 Kan. 210, 29 Pac. 148; K. P. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 17 Kan. 251; Railway Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 267, 21 L. Ed. 627; Hart v. Railroad Co., 112 U. S. 331, 5 Sup. Ct. 151, 28 L. Ed. 717; Bostwick v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. 45 N. Y. 712; Swift v. Pacific Mail & Steamship Co. 106 N. Y. 206, 12 N. E. 583; M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Withers, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 506, 40 S. W. 1073; S. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gorman, 79 Kan. 643, 100 Pac. 647, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 637; Louisville, etc. Ry. Co. v. Crayeroft, 12 Ind. App. 203, 39 N. E. 523; Gulf Ry. Co. v. Wood (Tex. Civ. App.) 30 S. W. 715; Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Meyer, 78 Ala. 597; Strohn v. Detroit etc. Ry. Co., 21 Wis. 544, 94 Am. Dec. 564."

"Now in the case at bar, up to and including a complete consignment and surrender of control of stock by the shipper, the starting of the shipment in transit and the assumption of liability for negligence by the carrier every move made, every step taken toward the shipment, was under and pursuant to a parol contract. Under these circumstances the shipper had the right to assume that his stock would not be grossly misused and to act on the faith thus inspired, and rely on the rights

thereby accrued to him, and the carrier will not be permitted to take away those rights and relieve itself of the liability thus incurred, without having given him a fair opportunity to assent thereto.

The record discloses that such opportunity was not given. Therefore the verbal contract must control. There being no agreement in the verbal contract as to the extent of limitations of liability, the carrier is held to its common-law liability for negligence. There is no controversy as to the value of the animal, the extent of the injuries, nor the damage thereby sustained. The allegation of negligence being fairly sustained by the evidence, we see no reason why the verdict should be set aside.

The judgment is therefore affirmed."

## **ARGUMENT.**

Little need be said.

A motion to dismiss or affirm under the circumstances herein is proper and should be granted. The shipment having moved on the parol agreement which was lawfully entered into, and no rate of freight being agreed on, and no limitation being agreed to—the rate of freight which said shipment moved on may be presumed to be the regular rate on that character of shipment. This being determined as a question of fact, the Supreme Court of the United States will not inquire into the same, but the findings of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, became a question of law to this Court, and are not re-viewable.

Hilton v. Dickman, 10 U. S. 165.

United States v. Burchard, 125 U. S. 178.

Carter v. ——— Ocean Ins. Co. 554.  
Rule 6 of this Court 2.

Where the jurisdiction of this Court is doubtful, a motion to dismiss or affirm, is proper.

N. Y. & N. E. Ry. Co. v. Bristol, 151,  
U. S. 555.

So. Ry. Co. v. Carson, 194 U. S. 136.

If the issues were made and trial had, without involving federal question, the Supreme Court of the United States will sustain motion to dismiss—the construction of state law by state court being conclusive and binding on this Court. The parol contract to charge the rate posted, required by the Commerce act, or the regular rate, as must be assumed from the findings on the evidence held to be legal and proper by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, is not in conflict with the Federal act. Robinson did not contract for an advantageous rate, and it was the railroad company's business to collect the regular rate—this Court clearly distinguished this case in *Railway Co. v. Kirby*, 226 U. S.

“The implied agreement of a common carrier is to carry safely and deliver at destination within a reasonable time. It is otherwise when the action is for a breach of a contract to carry within a particular time, etc.”

It will thus be seen that this is not a special contract for a particular train, or in a particular

train, and the action was for a breach of the carrier's obligation to carry safely and in a reasonable time, or "upon the liability of the carrier otherwise" than on a special agreement. The Railway Company may collect the difference between the rate collected, and the one required under the interstate act—that act does not contemplate any kind of contract, only a particular class of rates.

Railroad Company v. Abilene Cotton Co. 204 U. S. 426.

Merchants Cotton Press Co. v. Insurance Co. 151 U. S. 368.

The whole action was purely on "the carrier's liability for negligence in not promptly shipping and delivering."

The motion to dismiss or affirm must be sustained for want of jurisdiction in this Court, of any federal question necessary in the determination of the issues in the case.

The Supreme Court of the United States will not take jurisdiction of a case decided on a theory not necessary to determine a federal question.

Case Mfg. Co. v. Soxman, 138 U. S. 431.

### **Final Judgments of Highest Court.**

“Whenever the highest court of a State, by any form of decision, affirms or denies the validity of any judgment of an inferior court over which it by law can exercise appellate authority, the jurisdiction of this court to review such decision, if it involve a Federal question, will upon a proper proceeding attach.”

Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U. S. 248.

### **Federal Questions.**

“The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked where the defendant claimed rights under a Federal statute, and that statute was referred to in and was an element of the decision of the State court.”

Atlantic Coast Line Co. v. Riverside Mill Co. 40 S. P. A.

Hammond v. Whittredge, 204 U. S. 547.

“As to when the question may be raised, see Forbes v. Virginia State Council, 216 U. S. 399. Where the disposition of a Federal question was not necessary to the determination of the cause and the judgment is based on a distinct ground or grounds broad enough to sustain it, over which this court has no jurisdiction, the writ of error cannot be maintained.”

Rogers v. Jones, 214 U. S. 204. See also Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U. S. 93; California Powder Works v. Davis, 151 U. S. 393; Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Shannon, 223 U. S. 468.

### Questions of Fact.

“On a writ of error the Supreme Court does not deal with the facts. *King v. West Virginia*, 216 U. S. 100. But that court, ‘accepts the findings of the court of the State upon matters of fact as conclusive,’ and reviews only questions of Federal law within the jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court.”

*Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas*, 212 U. S. 97; *Chrisman v. Miller*, 197 U. S. 319.

The submission to the jury by the trial court, the issue, of the contract, whether it was a verbal or written contract, was a matter wholly within the discretion of the Court, and merely because the issue was pleaded and presented, that the shipment was an interstate shipment, did not make it necessary for the Court to decide any Federal question. The discretion of the Court was not abused. Decisions of the Court below cannot be examined in this court, except in cases of gross abuse. Generally, where the action of the inferior court is discretionary its decision is final.

The submission of the trial court of the contract to the jury, was a matter of practice in this jurisdiction, and is not reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States.

See: *Earnshaw v. United States*, 146 U. S. 60.

31 L. Ed. 87; *Parsons v. Bedford*, 3 Peters, 433, 7 L. Ed. 732.

The general rule is well settled that amendments are discretionary with the court below, and therefore the allowance or refusal of pleadings or amendments to pleadings by the trial court, is not reviewable in the Supreme Court. MATTERS OF PRACTICE IN INFERIOR COURTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE SUBJECTS UPON WHICH ERROR CAN BE ASSIGNED IN THE APPELLATE COURTS.

*Parsons v. Bedford, supra.*

This court cannot review the evidence in any case. That is a matter for the trial court, so that the Supreme Court of the United States could have no jurisdiction when the issues presented were entirely for the trial court; and it has been decided where there was any evidence upon which such findings could be made, or whether there was any evidence, that is a matter for the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

*Case Mfg. Co. v. Soxman*, 138 U. S. 431; *the Francis Wright*, 105 U. S. 381.



This conclusiveness of the facts found, extend to the findings by state courts to whom they have been submitted by waiving a jury, or by trial by jury, or to a referee, where they are so held by state courts under state laws.

Boggs v. Mining Co., 3 Wall. 304; 18 L. Ed. 245.

Under the act of Congress of March 3, 1865, authorizing the trial of facts by the Circuit Courts, and enacting that the findings of the court upon them shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury, the Supreme Court sitting as a Court of Error cannot pass, as it does, in equity appeals, upon the weight or sufficiency of evidence. This court has often held that for all the purposes of their review, the facts as found and stated by the Court below, are conclusive.

It will be seen by the court that there is no issue presented here for the decision of this court. The theory of the plaintiff in error was, that the trial court should have sustained the written contract as a matter of law. It is manifest that inasmuch as a question of arbitrary exaction or fraud was raised in the pleadings, and the question of fact was presented thereon which contract

governed the shipment, the court manifestly had the right to submit to the jury the question, whether or not the written contract was obtained by duress or fraud, or whether the shipment moved by verbal contract. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma sustained the finding of the jury, and trial court. The trial court presented to the jury in Instruction No. 1, the verbal contract. Page 415 case-made.

“The plaintiff in this action contends that the defendant undertook to transport the mare Nancy Alden, to the City of Lawrence, from the City of Kansas City, in a reasonable time, and that she was being transported on the part of the plaintiff for racing her there in races.”

In Instruction No. 2, page 416 case-made, the plaintiff in error's contract was submitted to the jury, in which the Court said, that if defendant in error, C. E. Robinson, signed the name of one H. F. Moore, to a contract, in which contract plaintiff agreed, that in consideration of a limitation of the value of said mare, in case of injury, to a sum not exceeding \$100.00, that he was granted a reduced rate, etc., he was bound by such limitation.

In Instruction No. 7, case-made 417, the Court

presents the issue relative to the plaintiffs in error's contention in the following instruction:

"As to the contract pleaded by the defendant in its answer, alleged by it to have been executed by the plaintiff in this case, I instruct you as follows: That if you believe from the evidence that at the time of the shipment of the mare, the contract of shipment was entered into between the plaintiff, Robinson, either by him or any one for him and he, Robinson, represented to the defendant or its agents at Kansas City, that the value of said mare did not exceed one hundred dollars, and that the defendant through its agents at Kansas City, relied on said representation of value so made, and granted by reason thereof to the plaintiffs, a rate less than the regular rate for this class of shipments, on said mare, and was misled by said misrepresentations of plaintiff as to the value of said mare, in fixing said rate, and was induced to fix a lower rate than the regular rate, if you find there was a lower rate fixed on said mare than the regular rate, then you are instructed that if you find the defendant guilty of negligence, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the mare's injuries, you are limited in your findings to the sum of one hundred dollars.

But if you find that representations of value of said mare were not made by the plaintiff or his agents, but that the same was arbitrarily inserted by defendant, or its agents at Kansas City, or printed in said contract when Moore's name was signed to it,

you are instructed that plaintiff is not bound by the limitation of one hundred dollars, and you will find the actual damage which plaintiff has incurred by reason of the injuries to said mare, if any, not exceeding the sum of \$1875.00."

Defendant excepts to the giving of the above instruction.

It becomes clear then that the plaintiff in error has not been deprived of his rights, nor has it presented in the entire case, a Federal question, for the court had the right to present to the jury the issue of the pleadings, viz: whether the shipment moved on the verbal contract pleaded by defendant in error, or the written contract pleaded in the answer. The mere fact that the Railway Company did not collect the rate of fare which it is entitled to collect, has nothing whatever to do with the determination of the issues in this case. The court did not pass upon, and it did not hold that the terms and conditions of said tariff so filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, were not binding upon the defendant in error. The contention of the plaintiff in error is that the court refused to instruct the jury, that the written contract was binding as a matter of law, and

merged the oral agreement, which, under the issues presented, the court could not do. The merging of the contract argued and presented by plaintiff in error as controlled by and under Oklahoma law where this cause was tried then they are bound by the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The allegation of the amended petition of the defendant in error sets up the fact: "that said conversation and agreement was MADE OR said agreement and conversation, said clerk directed this plaintiff, C. E. Robinson, to load said horse between the hours of four o'clock and six o'clock, at the platform of their yards at the receiving freight office in said city, county and state. \* \* \* \* \* But the defendant failed to convey said mare according to said agreement, promise and conversation."

At the time the mare was shipped, when this oral agreement was made, the defendant in error alleges: "and the said defendant, its agents and servants, were informed by this plaintiff that the said mare, Nancy Alden, was a race mare, and she was being shipped there for the said purpose." So that the verbal contract which was found by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, to have been

properly pleaded and sustained by evidence, is the only contract with reference to this shipment, that may be considered by this court at this time. This contract was permissible under the laws of Missouri. The defendant denied this verbal contract by general denial, and pleaded that a written contract was entered into in its answer at page 46, case-made, and it alleged that said contract was the only contract entered into and executed by said parties; thus, it made the issue, whether or not it was the only contract.

At page 54, casemade, the plaintiff in error tenders the issue that said contract was executed in the State of Missouri; that said contract is a Missouri contract, and continues to allege that said contract was valid and legal under the laws of Missouri. It also sets up the laws of Kansas, as controlling said contract in part, owing to the contract being partially performed in that state.

At page 76, case-made, it filed its amended answer, wherein it alleged that the shipment was an interstate shipment; that the same was controlled by the Interstate Commerce Act, and that the rates specified and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission controlled this shipment.

It also alleged there is a controversy between the plaintiff and defendant, and that to determine said controversy, required an adjudication of the act of Congress known as the "Hepburn Act."

Manifestly, if this contract was not the contract entered into between the parties as matter of fact, there is no conflict here between the parties to this action that involve either a construction of, or conflict with the "Hepburn Act." That act does not prohibit a verbal agreement at the regular rate.

The testimony of the witnesses agree, and the court finds that an oral agreement was made, and on this question the evidence is not only conclusive, but conclusive on this court by the finding of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Admitting that this was an interstate shipment, and certain rates are fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the question of fraud whatever its form in connection with said contract, is still a question of fact, on which the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma is final, and if said written contract was fraudulently procured or arbitrarily exacted, and without contain-

ing the terms of the verbal agreement, and was not the real agreement on which the shipment moved, then, the Railway Company is remitted to a suit to recover the difference between the rate collected, and the Interstate Commerce rate.

Although the evidence is not for this court here, we suggest; at page 145, case-made, Robinson testifies as follows:

"Q. You may tell the jury whether you ordered the car yourself for this shipment?

A. I phoned from the Elmridge race track at noon for a car.

Q. You know who you talked to? A. I called for the agent. I don't know who answered, he said he was the agent.

Q. What did you say to him? A. I told him I had a bunch of race horses, I wanted to ship to Lawrence, Kansas, in time to race them, and wanted them in good shape. He told me he could get them out at nine o'clock that night, and have the horses loaded at four o'clock.

Q. What did you do then, what did you do after that. A. We took the horses down and put them in Hunter's Transfer Barn at noon.

Q. What time did you load them? A. At six o'clock."

Following this conversation, is related a con-



versation at the yards in reference to the time the freight train left Kansas City and a repetition of the conversation had over the phone, that the horses were race horses; that defendant in error was anxious to get them there in time for the races; not a word about the rate of freight, or a written contract.

Robinson also testifies at page 180, case-made, when he got to Lawrence, Kansas, the point of destination, he sought the agent, and had a conversation with him.

“Q. What conversation—just give the conversation you and the agent had? A. I asked the agent what the freight was, and he told me to talk to the cashier.

Q. Well, did you talk to him? A. I talked to the cashier, and asked him what the freight was, and he said he didn't know. He said the conductor that went through the night before on the red ball freight—I said that the cashier told me the conductor that went through the night before took the bill through with him, and he had no bill and did not know what the freight was, and did not know what to charge us until that conductor came back and give him the bill. He told us he would collect twenty dollars and if there was any more he would collect that afterwards.”

Now there is no clear evidence in the record as to the amount that was collected, unless it may be said that a preponderance of the testimony shows that the rate, \$17.50 was collected, but this sum was never brought to Robinson's or Moore's attention until after the plaintiff in error knew that the horses were injured.

Mr. DuBois, the agent of the plaintiff in error, testifies at page 271, in reference to the way-bill. At page 280, case-made.

Q. Do you recollect what kind of a looking man signed it?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did he say anything to you about wanting a reduced rate?

A. No, sir.

Q. No conversation whatever was there about a reduced rate, Mr. DuBois?

A. No, sir.

Q. What did he say when he said he wanted to ship those horses, just state the conversation?

(Answer stricken)

Q. Did you have any conversation with him prior to the signing of the contract?

A. No, sir.

Q. When did he sign this contract?

A. Why, I think it was about eight o'clock in the evening.

Q. Two hours after you went on duty?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You go on at six o'clock.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The horses had already been loaded, had they?

A. Yes, sir.

It will be remembered that Robinson testifies that the horses were loaded at six o'clock, and had already started on their journey. This contract was signed at eight o'clock, and it must be agreed that this is a fact upon a reading of the record. Then he is asked if any arrangement had been made with him to ship those horses, at page 284.

Q. Horses were then already loaded?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Had he made arrangements with you to ship those horses before that time?

A. No, sir.

In reference to the contract which the Railroad Company put up on Robinson, or attempted to be substituted for the original agreement, he testifies as follows. Case-made page 281.

Q. I will ask you to state what rate is specified in the contract that was signed there at that time by Mr. Moore?


A. There is no rate specified in the contract.

It will therefore appear from the evidence, although this court will not consider the evidence in this case, that no rate of freight was ever brought to the attention of these parties, either by the purported contract which this Agent, DuBois, attempts to substitute for the verbal agreement, or in the verbal agreement.

It may be assumed therefore that the defendant in error agreed and expected to pay the regular rate for horses of that character. On this evidence alone quoted, the Court may find that the judgment is sustained by evidence. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, find on these facts that the shipment moved by verbal agreement; that this agreement was complete, final and effectual. Hence we say, there was no occasion for either the trial court, or the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, to decide any Federal question. This being so, this Court has no jurisdiction, and the motion to dismiss must be sustained.

H. H. SMITH,

*Attorney for Defendant in Error.*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. W. Keller", is written over the typed name and title.